Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-s2hrs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-12T11:22:20.510Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Ostroms and the contestable nature of goods: beyond taxonomies and toward institutional polycentricity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 August 2020

Veeshan Rayamajhee Open the ORCID record for Veeshan Rayamajhee [Opens in a new window]  and
Pablo Paniagua
Veeshan Rayamajhee*
Affiliation:
Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics (DAAE), North Dakota State University, Fargo, North Dakota, USA
Pablo Paniagua*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Economy (DPE), King's College London, and Senior Researcher at Fundación para el Progreso, Santiago, Chile
*
*Corresponding author. Email: veeshan.rayamajhee@gmail.com and pablo.paniagua_prieto@kcl.ac.uk
*Corresponding author. Email: veeshan.rayamajhee@gmail.com and pablo.paniagua_prieto@kcl.ac.uk
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper builds on the Ostroms' oeuvre to suggest that the binary Samuelsonian taxonomy of goods – or the ‘sterile dichotomy’, as Elinor Ostrom calls it – cannot serve as a reliable guide for public policy. Using the Ostroms' insights on co-production, institutional matching, and polycentricity, we argue that the ‘inherent’ nature of goods and their specific taxonomy are not static and definitive concepts but are instead contestable and dynamic features that are institutionally contingent. We explore four crucial mechanisms and/or contexts, not altogether unrelated, whereby the nature of goods becomes contestable and malleable: namely, (1) technological and geographical factors, (2) coproduction and entrepreneurial ingenuity, (3) bundling and unbundling of services, and (4) ideologies and regime shifts. This exercise has twofold purposes. First, we generalize the notion that there is nothing ‘inherent’ in the nature of goods and services and that they are fluid, heterogeneous, and malleable concepts. Second, we contribute to the debate on the provision of public goods and the role of civil society by highlighting the need for institutional malleability and diversity adaptive to changing technology, contexts, and institutional conditions.

Keywords

ContestabilityOstromspolycentricitypublic goodstypology of goods
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 17 , Issue 1 , February 2021 , pp. 71 - 89
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2020

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Acheson, J. M. (1975), ‘The Lobster Fiefs: Economic and Ecological Effects of Territoriality in the Maine Lobster Industry’, Human Ecology, 3(3): 183–207.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aligica, P. D. (2014), Institutional Diversity and Political Economy: The Ostroms and Beyond, New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Aligica, P. D. and Boettke, P. J. (2009), Challenging Institutional Analysis and Development: The Bloomington School, London and New York: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aligica, P. D. and Tarko, V. (2013), ‘Co-production, Polycentricity, and Value Heterogeneity: The Ostroms’ Public Choice Institutionalism Revisited’, American Political Science Review, 107(4): 726–741.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bator, F. M. (1958), ‘The Anatomy of Market Failure’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 72(3): 351–379.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boettke, P. J., Coyne, C. J. and Leeson, P. T. (2011), ‘Quasimarket Failure’, Public Choice, 149(1–2): 209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchanan, J. M. (1965), ‘An Economic Theory of Clubs’, Economica, 32(125): 1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Candela, R. A. and Geloso, V. J. (2018a), ‘Market Theory and the Lighthouse System’, Available at SSRN 3219907.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Candela, R. A. and Geloso, V. J. (2018b), ‘The Lightship in Economics’, Public Choice, 176(3–4): 479–506.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Candela, R. A. and Geloso, V. J. (2018c), ‘The Lighthouse Debate and the Dynamics of Interventionism’, The Review of Austrian Economics: 1–26.Google Scholar
Candela, R. A. and Geloso, V. J. (2019a), ‘Coase and Transaction Costs Reconsidered: The Case of the English Lighthouse System’, European Journal of Law and Economics, 48(3): 331–349.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Candela, R. A. and Geloso, V. J. (2019b), ‘Why Consider the Lighthouse A Public Good?’, International Review of Law and Economics, 60: 105852.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carnis, L. (2013), ‘The Provision of Lighthouses Services: A Political Economy Perspective’, Public Choice, 157(1–2): 51–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chamlee-Wright, E. and Storr, V. H. (2009), ‘Club Goods and Post-Disaster Community Return’, Rationality and Society, 21(4): 429–458.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clark, C. W. (1980), ‘Restricted Access to Common-Property Fishery Resources: A Game-Theoretic analysis’, in Dynamic Optimization and Mathematical Economics, Boston, MA: Springer, pp. 117–132.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clark, J. R. and Powell, B. (2019), ‘The ‘Minimal’ State Reconsidered: Governance on the Margin’, The Review of Austrian Economics, 32(2): 119–130.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coase, R. H. (1974), ‘The Lighthouse in Economics’, The Journal of Law and Economics, 17(2): 357–376.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cornes, R. and Sandler, T. (1996), The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cowen, T. (1985), ‘Public Goods Definitions and Their Institutional Context: A Critique of Public Goods Theory’, Review of Social Economy, 43(1): 53–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
CRAS (1874), ‘Report of the Chicago Relief and Aid Society of Disbursement of Contributions for the Sufferers of the Chicago Fire’, Chicago, Chicago Relief Aid Society.Google Scholar
Demsetz, H. (1970), ‘The Private Production of Public Goods’, The Journal of Law and Economics, 13(2): 293–306.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Demsetz, H. (1973), ‘Joint Supply and Price Discrimination’, The Journal of Law and Economics, 16(2): 389–405.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fritz, R. (2020), ‘Social Services as Impure Public Goods: Ostromian Lessons for their Provision in Contemporary Welfare States’, in Boettke, P. J., Herzberg, B. and Kogelmann, B. (eds), Exploring the Political Economy and Social Philosophy of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, London: Rowman & Littlefield International, pp. 51–78.Google Scholar
Furton, G. and Martin, A. (2019), ‘Beyond Market Failure and Government Failure’, Public Choice, 178(1–2): 197–216.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hammond, J. D. (2015), ‘Paul Samuelson on Public Goods: The Road to Nihilism’, History of Political Economy, 47(suppl_1): 147–173.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harris, C. (2018), ‘Institutional Solutions to Free-Riding in Peer-to-Peer Networks: A Case Study of Online Pirate Communities’, Journal of Institutional Economics, 14(5): 901–924.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leeson, P. T. and Sobel, R. S. (2008), ‘Costly Price Discrimination’, Economics Letters, 99(1): 206–208.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Medema, S. G. (2009), The Hesitant Hand: Taming Self-Interest in the History of Economic Ideas, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Musgrave, R. A. (1959), The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy, New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
Ostrom, E. (1972), ‘Metropolitan Reform: Propositions Derived From Two Traditions’, Social Science Quarterly, 53(3): 474–493.Google Scholar
Ostrom, E. (1990), Governing the Commons, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ostrom, E. (2000), ‘The Danger of Self-Evident Truths’, PS: Political Science & Politics, 33(1): 33–46.Google Scholar
Ostrom, E. (2003), ‘How Types of Goods and Property Rights Jointly Affect Collective Action’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 15(3): 239–270.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ostrom, E. (2005), Understanding Institutional Diversity, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Ostrom, E. (2010), ‘Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems’, American Economic Review, 100(3): 641–672.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ostrom, E. (2011), ‘Background on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework’, Policy Studies Journal, 39(1): 7–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ostrom, V. (2008), The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration, Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Alabama Press.Google Scholar
Ostrom, V. and Ostrom, E. (2002), ‘Public Goods and Public Choices’, in Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings From the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Michigan-Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, pp. 75–103.Google Scholar
Ostrom, E. and Ostrom, V. (2004), ‘The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice’, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 63(1): 105–147.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ostrom, E., Gardner, R. and Walker, J. (1994), Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ostrom, V., Tiebout, C. M. and Warren, R. (1961), ‘The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry’, American Political Science Review, 55(4): 831–842.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parks, R. B., Baker, P. C., Kiser, L., Oakerson, R., Ostrom, E., Ostrom, V., Percy, S. L., Vandivort, M. B., Whitaker, G. P. and Wilson, R. (1981), ‘Consumers as Coproducers of Public Services: Some Economic and Institutional Considerations’, Policy Studies Journal, 9(7): 1001–1011.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pickhardt, M. (2006), ‘Fifty Years After Samuelson's ‘The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure’: What are we Left With?’, Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 28(4): 439–460.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Polanyi, M. (1951), The Logic Of Liberty, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Rajan, R. (2019), The Third Pillar: How Markets and the State Leave the Community Behind, New York: Penguin Press.Google Scholar
Rayamajhee, V. (2020), ‘On the Dynamic Nature of Goods: Applications in Post-Disaster Contexts’, in P. J. Boettke, B. Herzberg and B. Kogelmann (eds.), Exploring The Political Economy and Social Philosophy of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, London: Rowmand & Littlefield International, pp. 3–30.Google Scholar
Rayamajhee, V. and Bohara, A. K. (2019a), ‘Natural Disaster Damages and Their Link to Coping Strategy Choices: Field Survey Findings From Post-Earthquake Nepal’, Journal of International Development, 31(4): 336–343.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rayamajhee, V. and Bohara, A. K. (2019b), ‘Do Voluntary Associations Reduce Hunger? An Empirical Exploration of the Social Capital-Food Security Nexus among Food Impoverished Households in Western Nepal’, Food Security, 11(2): 405–415.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rayamajhee, V. and Bohara, A. K. (2019c), ‘Social Capital, Trust, and Collective Action in Post-earthquake Nepal’, Working Paper.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rayamajhee, V. and Joshi, A. (2018), ‘Economic Trade-Offs Between Hydroelectricity Production and Environmental Externalities: A Case for Local Externality Mitigation Fund’, Renewable Energy, 129: 237–244.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rayamajhee, V., Storr, V. H. and Bohara, A. K. (2020), ‘Social Entrepreneurship, Co-production, and Post-disaster Recovery’, Disasters.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Samuelson, P. A. (1954), ‘The Pure Theory of Public expenditure’, The review of Economics and Statistics, 36(4): 387–389.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Samuelson, P. A. (1955), Economics: An Introductory Analysis, 3rd edition, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.Google Scholar
Schlager, E. and Ostrom, E. (1992), ‘Property-rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis’, Land Economics, 68(3): 249–262.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schlager, E., Blomquist, W. and Tang, S. Y. (1994), ‘Mobile Flows, Storage, and Self-Organized Institutions for Governing Common-Pool Resources’, Land Economics, 70(3): 294–317.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shrestha, A. (2019), ‘Everything you need to know about the Guthi Bill,’ The Kathmandu Post.Google Scholar
Skarbek, E. C. (2014), ‘The Chicago Fire of 1871: A Bottom-up Approach to Disaster Relief’, Public Choice, 160(1–2): 155–180.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stern, L. M. (1979), ‘Politics Without Consensus: Center-Province Relations and Politician Communication in China, January 1976–January 1977’, Asian Survey, 19(3): 260–280.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sunuwar, D. K. (2019), ‘Indigenous Peoples Force the Withdrawal of Guthi Bill in Nepal’, https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/indigenous-peoples-force-withdrawal-guthi-bill-nepal (accessed 22 February 2020).Google Scholar
Tabarrok, A. (1998), ‘The Private Provision of Public Goods via Dominant Assurance Contracts’, Public Choice, 96(3–4): 345–362.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tarko, V. (2017), Elinor Ostrom: An Intellectual Biography, London: Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd.Google Scholar
Tullock, G. (1965), The Politics of Bureaucracy, Washington: Public Affairs Pr.Google Scholar
Williams, A. A. (1996), ‘Pumps as Turbines for Low Cost Micro Hydro Power’, Renewable Energy, 9(1–4): 1227–1234.CrossRefGoogle Scholar