Separated by many thousands of miles and very different cultural heritages, Argentina and Canada might not seem to have much in common. But during the period between 1870 and 1930, there were many striking similarities between the economic development of these two countries at opposite ends of the New World (Blain, 1972). Indeed, by the late 1920s, Alejandro E. Bunge, the distinguished head of the economics faculty at the University of Buenos Aires, was pointing to the “Argentine- Canadian economic parallel” in his publications (Bunge, 1929). Bunge had perceived that Argentina and Canada were two of a small group of historically favored new countries that shared what Canadian economist Melville Watkins (1963: 149) has called, “an enormous advantage over the typical underdeveloped country,” because they did not “start their development with population pressing against scarce resources.”

Almost all literature on immigration in the context of assimilation addresses itself either directly or indirectly to values. While material is more often available for examining assimilation's external manifestations, such as frequency of intermarriage with the native population, degree of participation in the institutions of the host country, and willingness to adopt its language, these manifestations inevitably turn around the more amorphous question of native and immigrant values. More fundamental than social patterns, values determine whether an immigrant will learn the new language or will intermarry with the long-term residents of the host country.

On March 20, 1980, a small group of would-be Cuban exiles attempted to force a bus through the gates of the Peruvian embassy in Havana. In the process, they killed one Cuban military guard on duty and apparently touched off a chain of events that resulted in the “Freedom Flotilla“—the dramatic emigration of 125,266 Cubans (Bowen, 1980:9). This exodus, one of the most controversial episodes in recent U.S.-Cuban relations, also sparked a national and international ideological debate over its significance. Central to the ideological struggle and the theme of this article are the legitimacy problems facing the Cuban state.

Colombia provides a particularly instructive case of auto industry development. An intermediate-level country in terms of market size and stage of industrialization, its potential for dealing or bargaining effectively with transnational automobile firms is considerably less than that of Brazil, Mexico, or Argentina, but far more comparable to that of most Third World countries. It would be wrong, however, to lump all intermediate countries together. They vary enormously in terms of the size of their carbuying publics, their economic and natural resources, and their commitments to and progress toward industrial development. Moreover, these factors themselves are conditioned by past and present policy decisions and are subject to the politico-economic priorities and strategies of individual governments.