What should the strategic relationship between the United States and Latin America be in the next 10 years? This paper will try to provide an agenda for answering this question by trying to clarify some of the issues involved. It seeks to promote responsible dialogue on regional security matters based on realistic assessment of the national interests involved and the impact they have on one another.

United States defense relations with Latin America over the last 40 years have revolved around two strategy frameworks: one East- West and the other North-South. During this time the United States has attempted to integrate Latin America into its East-West global strategy, subordinating Latin American interests to the overall requirement of containing Soviet power.

During 1981 and early 1982 - the first year and a half of Reagan's first term in office - Colombia, under the leadership of Liberal President Julio César Turbay Ayala (1978-82), surfaced as one of the staunchest U.S. allies in the turbulent Caribbean Basin. That Colombia would endorse the broad outlines of Reagan's policies came as no surprise to anyone, for the country had pursued a consistently pro-North American foreign policy throughout the post-World War II period. What did surprise many observers was the extent to which President Turbay abandoned his country's traditional low-profile approach to Caribbean and hemispheric affairs and replaced it with an activist foreign policy closely identified with the Reagan Administration.

Colombia is structurally dependent upon the United States in economic, technological and military terms. While the country's industrial capacity has grown substantially in recent decades, the economy still relies heavily on agro-exports-, coffee alone accounts for two-fifths of the country's foreign exchange earnings.

May 10, 1981, not only ushered in a political surprise for France, as well as for its European and American allies, but sent positive shockwaves throughout that part of the Caribbean which is still French. On that date François Mitterrand came to power in the Metropole of France at the same time that the Départements d'Outre-Mer (DOM or overseas departments) of Martinique, Guadeloupe and Guiana rejected his candidacy with a unanimity as stunning as it is rare in West Indian politics. Ever since the DOM have been coping with Socialism in France, decentralization in the Caribbean, and an unprecedented antilleanization of local culture, institutions, and politics. The result has been a paradox of heightened social liberalism combined with intensified political violence; but paradox has always been at the heart of the French Antilles.

At the Vatican, on 2 May 1985, representatives of Chile and Argentina signed a treaty to end the Beagle Channel dispute, the last major territorial conflict between the two nations. The treaty was a tribute to the professionalism of the negotiators of both countries as well as of the Vatican mediators, and it represented a major foreign policy triumph for President Raúl Alfonsín, head of Argentina's democratically-elected civilian government. Alfonsin's position on key issues, such as sovereignty over the islands within the channel, contrasted sharply with those of his military predecessors. According to Vatican officials, it was Alfonsin's flexibility that laid the groundwork for resolution of the issue (New York Times, 1984a). Chilean willingness to accede to fundamental Argentine demands was also crucial to resolution.

Since the Late 1960s, due to détente and rising nationalism in Latin America, the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries have succeeded in expanding diplomatic relations with most countries in the Western Hemisphere (Blasier, 1984; Fichet, 1981). For an increasing number of Third World nations, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries of Eastern Europe have become a source of trade, credits, technical assistance and political support. Hence, many Third World countries view CMEA agreements as a means of strengthening their negotiating position vis-á-vis the United States and other developed countries. In turn, the CMEA countries have stepped up their commercial activity irrespective of the nature of the governments of the recipient countries. In the case of Latin America, CMEA ability to provide such funding is restrained by their own economic limitations, by geographical distance and by the shortage of foreign exchange. These factors discourage risky commitments in a region that is peripheral to essential security concerns of the CMEA countries.

Pronouncements by the Reagan Administration not withstanding, the oft repeated accusation that Nicaragua is but a Soviet or Cuban pawn does not appear consistent with a closer examination of the facts (see NACLA, 1985). Beginning with the original 1969 FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional) Program, the Sandinista leadership which now rules Nicaragua has steadfastly maintained its nonaligned orientation. In fact, since coming to power, the Sandinistas have not only become active members of the Nonaligned Movement, but have also used their ties with the Nonaligned to explain their policies and to garner much needed international support for their actions. In the process, they appear to have taken full advantage of policy options created by the development of the Nonaligned Movement and only recently available to Latin American nations.

It is now six years since the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) toppled the regime of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Even today, the nature of the FSLN - its road to power, its political complexion and orientation, and its objectives - remains the subject of heated debate. Some still argue that the Sandinista regime is a nationalistic, non-aligned, although radical, Third World government. Others emphasize the Marxist-Leninist overtones characterizing its seizure and consolidation of power, its foreign relations, and its efforts to introduce socialist transformation to Nicaraguan society.

Basically, there are two exaggerated views of Nicaraguan foreign policy: one depicts Nicaragua as a communist pawn of Moscow and Havana; the other views Nicaragua as a classical non-aligned Third World nation. Neither school of thought reflects the complex reality of Nicaraguan politics and foreign policy.