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The Politics of Sentencing Reform in Brazil: Autonomous Bureaucrats, Constrained Politicians and Gradual Policy Change

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 July 2014

RODRIGO M. NUNES
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Abstract

Popular attitudes towards crime in Latin America induce local legislators to support harsh sentencing frameworks. What, therefore, explains the adoption of non-prison sentences across the region? Using Brazil as a case study, this article claims that sentencing reform is a consequence of the growing autonomy of bureaucrats who manage the criminal justice system. Insulated from patronage networks and granted broad mandates to pursue solutions to pressing penal crises, these policy elites use their position in the state to develop new rules and facilitate their approval despite popular opposition to measures that limit the state's punitive capacity. The findings point to the importance of bureaucratic autonomy for the enactment of policies that can benefit the underprivileged but do not enjoy widespread support from voters.

Spanish abstract

Las actitudes populares alrededor del crimen en Latinoamérica induce a legisladores locales a apoyar esquemas de sentencias duras. ¿Qué, entonces, explica la adopción de penas sin cárcel a lo largo de la región? Utilizando a Brasil como un caso de estudio, este artículo señala que las reformas son consecuencia de la creciente autonomía de los burócratas que manejan el sistema de justicia penal. Aislados de redes clientelares y con mandatos amplios para encontrar soluciones a crisis penales, sus políticas logran cristalizar gracias a que utilizan su posición en el estado para desarrollar nuevas reglas y facilitar su aprobación pese a la oposición popular a medidas como limitar la capacidad punitiva del estado. Los hallazgos señalan la importancia de la autonomía burocrática para la promulgación de políticas que pueden beneficiar a grupos no privilegiados pero que no cuentan con apoyo generalizado entre los votantes.

Portuguese abstract

Atitudes populares com relação à criminalidade na América Latina induzem legisladores locais a apoiarem um regime de sentenças severas. O que então explica a adoção na região de sentenças não privativas de liberdade? Usando o Brasil como um estudo de caso, este artigo sustenta que a reforma sentencial é uma consequência da autonomia crescente de burocratas que gerenciam o sistema judicial. Longe de redes de patrocínio e com concessão de amplos mandatos para buscar soluções para urgentes crises penais, estas elites burocráticas usam suas posições no estado para criar novas regras e facilitar suas aprovações, a despeito da oposição popular às medidas que limitam a capacidade punitiva do estado. As descobertas apontam para a importância da autonomia burocrática para o estabelecimento de políticas que podem beneficiar os menos privilegiados, mas que não gozam de apoio geral do eleitorado.

Keywords

Brazilsentencing reformbureaucracydrug policyprison overcrowdingBrasilreforma penalburocraciapolítica hacia las drogascárceles saturadasBrasilreforma sentencialburocraciapolíticas de drogassuperlotação carcerária
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 47 , Issue 1 , February 2015 , pp. 121 - 148
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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