¹ For example, Collier and Sater start their influential History of Chile by affirming that this Southern Cone country was characterised by a ‘track record of political stability, institutional continuity notably greater than that of the majority of Iberoamerican Republics and even, it should be added, European countries such as, for example, France’: Collier, Simon and Sater, William E., Historia de Chile, 1808–1994 (Madrid: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 10Google Scholar; and A History of Chile, 1808–2002 (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)Google Scholar.

² For the purposes of this study I take the definition of the policy-making process given by Stein and colleagues, under which it ‘can be understood as a succession of bargains among political actors, interacting in formal and informal arenas’ and as encompassing ‘the process by which policies are discussed, approved and implemented’ through ‘negotiations’ and ‘transactions’: Stein, Ernesto et al., La política de las políticas públicas: progreso económico y social en América Latina (Washington, DC: BID, David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies and Editorial Planeta, 2006), pp. 11, 18Google Scholar.

³ Williamson, John, ‘Democracy and the “Washington Consensus”’, World Development, 21: 8 (1993), pp. 1329–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ‘In Search of a Manual for Technopols’, in Williamson (ed.), The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994), pp. 11–28; and ‘From Reform Agenda to Damaged Brand Name’, Finance and Development, 40: 3 (Sep. 2003), pp. 10–13Google Scholar.

⁴ Williamson, ‘From Reform Agenda’.

⁵ To the point of concealing the indissociably normative and ideological aspects that underpin this ‘consensus’: see Rodrik, Dani, ‘Goodbye Washington Consensus. Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank's “Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform”’, Journal of Economic Literature, 44: 4 (2006), pp. 973–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a sophisticated analysis of the type of cosmopolitan and transnational elite that emerged behind this consensus, see Dezalay, Yves, ‘Les courtiers de l'international: héritiers cosmopolites, mercenaires de l'impérialisme et missionnaires de l'universel’, Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales, 151–2 (2004), pp. 5–35Google Scholar.

⁶ This is a definition of technocracy that is congruent with that provided by Centeno, although he does not refer explicitly to economists: ‘the administrative and political domination of a society by a state elite and allied institutions that seek to impose a single, exclusive policy paradigm based on the application of instrumentally rational techniques’, reflecting an ‘ideology of method’. Angel Centeno, Miguel, ‘The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy’, Theory and Society, 22 (1993), pp. 314, 312Google Scholar.

⁷ Williamson, ‘In Search of a Manual for Technopols’, p. 12.

⁸ Domínguez, Jorge I. (ed.), Technopols: Freeing Politics and Markets in Latin America in the 1990s (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1997), p. 7Google Scholar.

⁹ Ibid., p. 29.

¹⁰ It is not a coincidence that the cast of technopols studied by the team led by Domínguez comprises principally Latin American economists who served as finance minister in their respective countries (Pedro Aspe in Mexico, Domingo Cavallo in Argentina, Alejandro Foxley in Chile). The noteworthy exception is Fernando Henrique Cardoso who, as well as being a sociologist and finance minister, was also president of Brazil. For an analysis of the complexities related to the notion of ‘political competence’ in sociology and political science, see Joignant, Alfredo, ‘Pour une sociologie cognitive de la compétence politique’, Politix: Revue des Sciences Sociales du Politique, 65 (2004), pp. 149–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and ‘Compétence politique et bricolage: les formes profanes du rapport au politique’, Revue Française de Science Politique, 57: 6 (2007), pp. 799–817CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ Williamson, ‘In Search of a Manual for Technopols’, p. 12.

¹² Panizza, Francisco, ‘Beyond “Delegative Democracy”: “Old Politicians” and “New Economics” in Latin America’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 32: 3 (2000), pp. 737–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Teichman, Judith, ‘Merging the Modern and the Traditional: Market Reform in Chile and Argentina’, Comparative Politics, 37: 1 (2004), pp. 23–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹³ Treisman, Daniel, ‘Cardoso, Menem, and Machiavelli: Political Tactics and Privatisation in Latin America’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 38: 3 (2003), p. 94CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ Wallis, Joe, ‘Understanding the Role of Leadership in Economic Policy Reform’, World Development, 27: 1 (1999), pp. 39–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ Wallis, ‘Understanding the Role of Leadership’, p. 47. Santiso and Whitehead understand ‘cognitive institutions’ as a set of state and non-state agencies that ‘collect, process, analyze and deliver the kind of information about a society that is necessary to monitor and interpret the impact of policy measures and to adjust or reformulate them when they prove ineffective or counterproductive’: Javier Santiso and Laurence Whitehead, ‘Ulysses, the Sirens and the Art of Navigation: Political and Technical Rationality in Latin America’, OECD Working Paper no. 256 (Paris: OECD, 2006), p. 8.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 39.

¹⁷ Marier, Patrik, ‘Empowering Epistemic Communities: Specialised Politicians, Policy Experts and Policy Reform’, West European Politics, 31: 3 (2008), pp. 513–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸ Haas, Peter M., ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’, International Organisation, 46: 1 (1992), pp. 1–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹ Bourdieu, Pierre, La distinction: critique sociale du jugement (Paris: Minuit, 1979)Google Scholar; and Le sens pratique (Paris: Minuit, 1980)Google Scholar.

²⁰ Joignant, Alfredo, ‘Agent, structure et cognition: questions de recherche à partir de la sociologie de Pierre Bourdieu et Anthony Giddens’, Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, 108 (2000), pp. 187–96Google Scholar.

²¹ Dezalay, Yves and Garth, Bryant G., The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists, and the Contest to Transform Latin American States (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In this sense it is possible to relate the study of technopols with the research agenda of ‘government sciences’, which studies ‘ideas in action or, in other words, in practical applications and concrete uses’: Olivier Ihl, Martine Kaluszynski and Gilles Pollet, ‘Pour une sociohistoire des sciences du gouvernement’, in Ihl, Kaluszynski and Pollet (eds.), Les sciences du gouvernement (Paris: Economica, 2003), p. 12.

²² Markoff, John and Montecinos, Verónica, ‘The Ubiquitous Rise of Economists’, Journal of Public Policy, 13: 1 (1993), p. 58CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²³ Verónica Montecinos and John Markoff, ‘From the Power of Economic Ideas to the Power of Economists’, in Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando Lópes-Alves (eds.), The Other Mirror: Grand Theory Through the Lens of Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

²⁴ Valdés, Juan Gabriel, Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School of Economics in Chile (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)Google Scholar; Huneeus, Carlos, ‘Technocrats and Politicians in an Authoritarian Regime: The “ODEPLAN Boys” and the “Gremialists” in Pinochet's Chile’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 32: 2 (2000), pp. 461–501CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Huneeus, Carlos, El régimen de Pinochet (Santiago: Editorial Sudamericana, 2000)Google Scholar. On the way in which neoliberal ideas were transmitted, see Denord, François, ‘Le prophète, le pèlerin et le missionnaire: la circulation internationale du néo-libéralisme et ses acteurs’, Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales, 5 (2002), pp. 9–20Google Scholar.

²⁵ Despite his interest in the subject, this sometimes appears to be the case in the work of Silva: Silva, Patricio, ‘Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monks’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 23: 2 (1991), pp. 385–410CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ‘Los tecnócratas y la política en Chile: pasado y presente’, Revista de Ciencia Política, 26: 2 (2006), pp. 175–90Google Scholar.

²⁶ For two interesting interpretations of the Chilean model under the Concertación governments, one of which is written by a technopol, see Martner, Gonzalo, Remodelar el modelo: reflexiones para el Bicentenario (Santiago: Lom, 2007)Google Scholar; and Muñoz, Oscar, El modelo económico de la Concertación, 1990–2005: ¿Reformas o cambio? (Santiago: Catalonia–FLACSO, 2007)Google Scholar.

²⁷ The literature on these two issues most widely read not only by Chilean professional sociologists, political scientists and economists but also by some political actors was Foxley, Alejandro, Experimentos neoliberales en América Latina (Santiago: CIEPLAN, 1982)Google Scholar, in economics; and O'Donnell, Guillermo et al. (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986)Google Scholar, in political science. Along with many other references to studies that formed part of the mainstream of sociology, political science and economics, these issues are clearly reflected in the hundreds of working papers published by technopols avant la lettre in different Chilean research centres during the 1980s which circulated among intellectuals and political leaders opposed to Pinochet. It is in these texts that the navigation charts (see below) and the goals of the first Concertación government (1990–4) would have their origin.

²⁸ Joignant, Alfredo, ‘La politique des “transitologues”: luttes politiques, enjeux théoriques et disputes intellectuelles au cours de la transition chilienne à la démocratie’, Politique et Sociétés, 2: 3 (2005), pp. 33–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁹ Puryear, Jeffrey, Thinking Politics: Intellectuals and Democracy in Chile, 1973–1988 (Baltimore, MD, and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994)Google Scholar.

³⁰ Two other people should be added: Eugenio Tironi and Mario Marcel, the former with a PhD in sociology from the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris and a member of the Party for Democracy, and the latter with a PhD in economics from Cambridge University and a member of the Socialist Party. Both were extremely influential in their respective parties and the Concertación as a whole between 1990 and 2010. Although neither served as minister or undersecretary, Tironi established his position as a technopol as director of the Secretariat for Communications and Culture (1990–4) and subsequently as a strategist for the Concertación's presidential campaigns and a key figure in the preparation of its government programmes. Similarly, Marcel served as director of the Budget Office (2000–6) and participated actively in drawing up a number of the coalition's economic programmes. Finally, both played a leading role in determining the positions adopted by their respective parties. However, since neither served as minister or undersecretary (the two government positions used here to identify technopols) they are not included in the analysis below.

³¹ Silva captures this function of translating ‘the points of agreement and disagreement’ very well, but restricts it to ‘technical language’ in circumstances in which this role also targeted politicians whose competence only allowed them to accept political arguments expressed in political language: Silva, Patricio, In the Name of Reason: Technocrats and Politics in Chile (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2008), p. 21Google Scholar. According to Axelrod, the study of cognitive maps helps to reveal the systems of belief of political leaders and policy-makers: Axelrod, Robert, Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976)Google Scholar.

³² Stein et al., La política de las políticas públicas, p. 6.

³³ Hira, Anil, ‘Should Economists Rule the World? Trends and Implications of Leadership Patterns in the Developing World, 1960–2005’, International Political Science Review, 28: 3 (2007), p. 326CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁴ Until 1973, most undergraduates studied at either the University of Chile or the Catholic University, generally at their campuses in Santiago.

³⁵ However, one of them, Alejandro Foxley, took his undergraduate degree at the Catholic University of Valparaíso rather than Santiago.

³⁶ Dezalay and Garth, The Internationalisation of Palace Wars.

³⁷ This information and that used below was gathered through a survey of the 20 technopols (to which nine replied) and completed using secondary biographic information contained in media files and public archives.

³⁸ I am very grateful to Alejandro Foxley for the information he provided me with privately.

³⁹ Camp, Roderic Ai, Political Recruitment across Two Centuries: Mexico, 1884–1991 (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1995), pp. 149, 243Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ To the extent that Foxley is explicitly characterised as a technopol in Domínguez, Technopols.

⁴¹ Four of the nine technopols who answered the survey indicated that, as well as having benefited from sponsorship by their party, they also received ‘the support of an important leader’ for the post of minister or undersecretary.

⁴² With some minor modifications, this characterisation of the Chilean ministries is consistent with the approach adopted by David Altman in ‘Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Chile, 1990–2006: The Executive Branch’, in Peter M. Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern (eds.), Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2008), pp. 264–5.

⁴³ These reports are held in the archive of Justicia y Democracia, the foundation created by former president Patricio Aylwin.

⁴⁴ This transactional way of governing was known as the ‘democracy of agreements’ and was often justified using Lijphart's work on consociational democracy – see Lijphart, Arend, Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1968)Google Scholar; and Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977)Google Scholar – while the ‘navigation charts’ set out goals that were feasible under a realistic assessment of the correlation of forces involved. The content of these true road maps began to appear in 1991, in ‘Informe de Análisis’, report of the President's Office, no. 002543 (24 May 1991), which set out their ‘keystones’ and the concept of ‘successive waves of reforms’, while the term ‘navigation charts’ appeared six months later in ‘Informe de Análisis’, report of the President's Office, no. 002567 (9 Nov. 1991). For an ex-post rationalisation of the democracy of agreements and navigation charts, see Boeninger, Edgardo, Democracia en Chile: lecciones para la gobernabilidad (Santiago: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1997)Google Scholar. For a general reflection on the cognitive maps by two technopols, see Flisfisch, Angel, Ricardo Solari and Andrés Villar, Desarrollo y evolución de la Concertación: liderazgos y sistemas decisionales. Las vidas de la Concertación (Santiago: FLACSO, 2008)Google Scholar. For an approximation of government use of scientific knowledge based on a systematic study of these reports, see Alfredo Joignant, ‘La raison d'Etat: usages politiques du savoir et gouvernement “scientifique” des technopols au Chili (1990–4)’, manuscript.

⁴⁵ In this sense, ‘transversal party’ is the political neologism that serves to refer to the community of technopols under the Aylwin government who were characterised by unswerving loyalty to the president, over and above the different political parties to which they belonged. Camou is one of the few authors to use this local term to emphasise the technopols’ role as ‘catalysts of consensus’: Camou, Antonio, ‘Los consejeros del príncipe: saber técnico y política en los procesos de reforma económica en América Latina’, Nueva Sociedad, 152 (1997), p. 66Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ In this area, the reserved reports prepared by the President's Office provide valuable information about the appropriation of the economic model by the Concertación through gradual and cumulative reform. Indeed, it is no coincidence that practically all the reports conclude with an economic chapter.

⁴⁷ This was reflected in the different reports issued by the President's Office in systematic efforts to abort different types of social conflict, ranging from strikes in the public sector to radicalisation of the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (Workers’ United Centre, CUT), the main umbrella trade union organisation. These are what Posner refers to as the ‘demobilisation policies’ implemented during Concertación governments: Posner, Paul W., ‘Popular Representation and Political Dissatisfaction in Chile's New Democracy’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 41: 1 (1999), pp. 59–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and ‘Local Democracy and the Transformation of Popular Participation in Chile’, Latin American Politics & Society, 46: 3 (2004), pp. 55–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On this topic, see Alfredo Joignant, ‘Political Parties in Chile: Stable Coalitions, Inert Democracy’, in Kay Lawson and Jorge Lanzaro (eds.), Political Parties and Democracy, vol. 1: The Americas (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), pp. 141–7. It is important to note, however, that this political approach had the backing of the Concertación parties and a high level of union discipline, and was not merely the result of a cynical strategy on the part of the technopols. In any case, this strategy of contention took account of the difficulties experienced in transitions in Spain, Poland and other Latin American countries during the 1980s, as demonstrated by the numerous studies prepared by Chilean technopols before taking up government posts: Angel Flisfisch, ‘Reflexiones en torno a la proposición: la libertad económica es condición necesaria de la libertad política’, Material de Discusión FLACSO, no. 27 (1982) (on Poland); ‘Algunas hipótesis sobre la relación entre intelectuales y partidos políticos en Chile’, Documento de Trabajo FLACSO, no. 234 (1985) (on Uruguay); ‘Hacia un realismo político distinto’, Documento de Trabajo FLACSO, no. 219 (1984); and ‘Consenso democrático en el Chile autoritario’, Documento de Trabajo FLACSO, no. 330 (1987) (on Spain, Argentina and Bolivia).

⁴⁸ Tiberghien, Yves, Entrepreneurial States: Reforming Corporate Governance in France, Japan and Korea (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 2007)Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ This method of identifying the inner circle takes its inspiration from the strategy of Kadushin, which consisted of a battery of questions for identifying France's small financial elite that was the focus of recognition and admiration among its peers: Kadushin, Charles, ‘Friendship Among the French Financial Elite’, American Sociological Review, 60: 2 (1995), pp. 202–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁰ In the case of Enrique Correa (PS), a technopol who served as a minister only between 1990 and 1994 and never as a member of Congress or party leader, this shows that his influence was maintained from other spheres (that of consultant and informal adviser to the country's presidents). This suggests that the technopols’ influence can be perpetuated over time from spheres that are not always reflected in the occupation of formal positions of political power.

⁵¹ However, this indicator needs to be qualified since this rate of approval does not take account of the technopols’ power to abort executive initiatives when these lacked sufficient support among the Concertación parties as well as the opposition.

⁵² Dobry, Michel, Sociologie des crises politiques: la dynamique des mobilisations multisectorielles (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1986), pp. 79–95Google Scholar.

⁵³ Patricio Silva, In the Name of Reason.

⁵⁴ Boeninger, Edgardo, Chile rumbo al futuro: propuestas para reflexionar (Santiago: Uqbar, 2009), p. 25Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ For more on strategic elites, see Keller, Suzanne, Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1963)Google Scholar.

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