I argue here that economic activity fell considerably in the first three decades of Paraguay's early national period, below levels it had attained in the late colonial period and would attain again only after the mid-nineteenth century. I attribute this economic depression primarily to regional political fragmentation and the institutional regression it triggered. In the 1810s, the United Provinces of the River Plate sought to keep the former Viceroyalty of the River Plate under a single federal government, but failed to prevent Paraguay's early secession. Their subsequent trade blockades and military threats had profound economic and political effects on Paraguay: revenues from foreign trade taxation fell, scale economies in defence and justice provision vanished, a standing army emerged, government budget deficits worsened, mercantilist regulations heightened, the fiscal burden increased, and transactions costs generally rose. Proponents of federation, more representative governments, and freer trade progressively declined, while supporters of secession, political absolutism, and government regulation became ever more prominent. In the 1820s, blockade relaxations exacerbated economic intervention by the state, which substantially redistributed property rights in land towards itself. In the 1830s, renewed blockading had more than proportional negative effects on economic activity, which remained below late colonial levels at least until international waterways became freely navigable shortly after mid-century. Colonial absolutism and mercantilism may be said to have been restored with a vengeance. Long-run economic performance worsened.

In 1859 the district attorney of Montes Claros, in a long dispatch to the provincial chief of police, enumerating the many evils prevailing in his jurisdiction, included ‘craven traffickers who abduct little free children of colour whom they trick and seduce with fruits and presents, to sell as if they were slaves, trading them for livestock or mere trinkets’. This complaint was not an isolated incident; it reflected a larger trade in free people of colour which took place in the sertão of northern Minas Gerais after the closing of the transatlantic slave trade in 1851 and before the passage of the law of the free womb in 1871. The internal trade in free persons ceased in the early 1870s, when mandatory slave matriculation made illicit transactions more detectable.

On 1 February 1875, a hopeful President Santiago Pérez took pride in informing Congress of the peace and prosperity brought about by a decade or so of Radical rule in Colombia. His optimism was soon disappointed. A week later, he quelled a mutiny only by replacing both his Minister of War and the Army Commander-in-Chief. At the end of the month, the State of Magdalena was showing serious signs of political turmoil, while the recently sacked Minister of War, General Ramón Santodomingo Vila, was in the port of Barranquilla plotting against the government of the Union. By August, the States of Bolívar and Panamá had both officially declared war against Pérez's administration; rumours reached Bogotá which accused ‘Santo Domingo Vila of conspiracy to be President of the Republic of Costa Firme’. Customs-houses in the Caribbean ports were held by rebel forces for almost four months, and rebel steamers on the Magdalena river blocked the country's main artery of trade. Bloody confrontations completed the picture of another civil war, leaving behind an indefinite number of casualties and a Treasury in disarray. When President Pérez again faced Congress to give his annual message in 1876, he had to acknowledge his previous misjudgement.

No topic encapsulates better the fundamental contradiction in capitalist development in Porfirian Mexico than the turbulent history of the copper industry. Within the space of a few years, the industry simultaneously experienced rapid growth, labour conflict and political controversy with international implications. This historical dynamic was unleashed, in part, by the Mexican government's policy of attracting overseas investors to Mexico through generous concessions and tax breaks that facilitated foreign control over key industries. The privileged position that public policy afforded foreign companies resulted in a nationalist backlash and exacerbated tension between native labour and foreign capital. The famous strike at Cananea, Sonora, in 1906 brought to national attention the grievances of Mexican workers over wage scales that favoured foreign workers over natives, falling real wages, and the power and arrogance of United States companies in Mexico. The strike became a scandal when armed North Americans from nearby Arizona crossed the border and assisted local authorities in crushing Mexican workers. This violation of Mexican sovereignty caused a storm of protest from both liberals and conservatives and unsettled the Díaz regime on the eve of the Mexican Revolution.

This article is a study of the emergence of a populist leader. By combining an analysis of the social creation of the populist leader José María Velasco Ibarra in ‘La Revolución Gloriosa’ (or the May Revolution), with a study of his discourse, this paper explains why Velasco Ibarra became the central political figure in Ecuador in the mid-1940s.

For a long period, the consensus in development studies argued that the unemployed in urban areas were not part of the poverty problem. It was argued in the 1970s that open unemployment in developing countries was not, in general, a serious social problem. This was not because rates of open unemployment were low in urban areas – Turnham cited open unemployment rates in urban areas of over ten per cent for countries as diverse as Ghana, Guyana, Panama, Puerto Rico, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Korea and the Philippines. Rather, it was argued that the unemployed were not poor. They were predominantly the relatively well-educated young, who were waiting to find good jobs, or migrants ‘queuing’ for work in the formal sector, or people temporarily out of work as they moved from one job to another. The urban informal sector or agriculture would provide jobs for those really needing work. Therefore, the ‘needy’ would not remain in open unemployment for long. Long periods of open unemployment would be luxury, available only to the better-off.

When Patricio Aylwin accepted the Chilean presidential sash in March 1990 an era in Latin American politics dominated by authoritarian regimes came to an end. Virtually every country in the region now had to grapple with the complicated task of consolidating fragile democratic regimes. Surprisingly, given what may be the emergence of a new democratic era, one is hardpressed even to begin answering an obvious question: How will years of non-democratic rule affect future efforts to establish democratic political processes in their wake? Despite recent attention to the ways in which different types of transition process affect the prospects for democracy, the impact of authoritarian rule on subsequent political processes remains largely unstudied.