1. L. No. 1587, adopted by the TGNA on 5 May 1972; published in the Official Gazette on May 16, 1972 (No. 14189) [hereinafter Law of 1972].

2. Id. at art. 43 & art. 46.

3. Id. at art. 58.

4. L. No. 5490, adopted by the TGNA on Apr. 25, 2006; published in the Official Gazette on Apr. 29, 2006 (No. 26153).

5. This issue has surfaced repeatedly in the European Union (EU) monitoring reports. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), for example, prepared three reports about Turkey in 1999, 2000 and 2004. The Commission noted in the first of these that obliging people to designate their religion or faith in their family register and on their identity cards would, in certain circumstances, invite intolerance and discrimination. European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, ECRI's Country-by-Country Approach: Report on Turkey, 12 (Feb. 5, 1999) (available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/ecrt/5-archives/1-ecri%27s_work/1-country_by_country/CBC1-Turkey.pdf) (accessed Nov. 12, 2006). The Commission repeated this opinion in the second report and recommended that Turkish authorities should abolish the religious information requirement. European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, Second Report on Turkey, 7 (Dec. 15, 2000) (available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/ecri/5-archives/1-ecri%27s_work/5-cbc_second_reports/Turkey_CBC2_en.pdf) (accessed Nov., 12, 2006). The latest report also touched on this issue, with the Commission opining that the elimination of the religious record from identity documents would improve the freedom of religion in Turkey. European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Third Report on Turkey 12 (June 25, 2004) (available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/humanrights/ecri/1-ecri/2-country-by-country_approach/turkey/Turkey%20third%20report%20-%20cri05-5.pdf) (accessed Nov. 12, 2006). This was, in fact, one of the debated issues within the framework of the EU harmonization process, which has been gaining momentum after the approval of Turkey's candidate status in the Helsinki Summit of 1999. For the political aspects of reform process, see Levent Gonenc, Dynamics of Political Reform in Turkey, Europa-Kolleg Discussion Paper (2006) (available at www.europa-kolleg-hamburg.de/deutsch/diskussion/pdf/Paper2006.pdf) (accessed Nov. 12, 2006). For legal aspects of the reform process, see Ozbudun, Ergun & Yazici, Serap, Democratization Reforms in Turkey (1993–2004) (TESEV 2004)Google Scholar.

6. 8 Saban 1298 (July 5, 1881), Irade, Suray-i Devlet 3148.

7. Karpat, Kemal H., Ottoman Population Records and the Census of 1881/82-1893, 9 Intl. J. Middle E. Stud. 237, 252 (1978)Google Scholar.

8. Shaw, Stanford J., The Ottoman Census System and Population, 9 Int. J. Middle E. Stud. 325, 331 (1978)Google Scholar.

9. Id., at 331.

10. Id. at 335.

11. Nufus ve Vatandas Isleri Mudurlugu (Directorate of Population & Citizenship Affairs), Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye Tezkiresinden Nufus Ctizdanlarina (From Ottoman Population Certificates to Republican Identity Booklets) 8, 12-13, http://www.nvi.gov.tr/Attacbed/NVI/cuzdanJdtap.pdf (accessed Nov. 12, 2006) (showing samples of Ottoman-Turkish identity cards) (Turkish).

12. Sicilli Nüfus Kanunu, Ağustos (Aug.) 14, 1330 (1914), 5 Şevval 1332.

13. See Law of 1972, supra n. 1.

14. See supra n. 11, at 66 (Turkish).

15. Decisions of the Constitutional Court: E. 1979/9, K.1979/44, Nov. 27, 1979, http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/eskisite/KARARLAR/IPTALITIRAZ/K1979/K1979-44.htm (accessed Nov. 12, 2006); E.1995/17, K. 1995/16, June 21, 1995, http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/eskisite/KARARLAR/IPTALITIRAZ/K1995/K1995-16.htm (accessed Nov. 12, 2006) (Turkish).

16. Although the heading of the section on ID documents was changed from Millet (Nation) to Din (Religion), the type of information inscribed in this section remained the same.

17. Stanford Shaw defined the concept as follows:

[T]he division of society into communities along religious lines formed the millet (nation) system, with each individual or group belonging to one millet or another according to religious affiliation. Subjects had status and position in society only through membership in such millets …. Each millet established and maintained its own institutions to care for the functions not carried out by the Ruling Class and state, such as education, religion, justice, and social security.

Shaw, Stanford J., History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey vol. 1, 151 (Cambridge U. Press 1976)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18. The nineteenth-century legal reforms triggered the abolition of the “Millet System.” These reforms started with the “Royal Edict of 1839” (Tanzimat Fermani), which officially recognized for the first time the equality of all Ottoman subjects before the law regardless of their religion. This principle was confirmed by the “Edict of 1856” (Islahat Fermanı) in a more extensive way. That edict promised to treat all subjects equally in terms of appointments to government posts, administration of justice, taxation and military services. The Constitution of 1876 also guaranteed the principle of equality before law and recognized Ottoman citizenship for all subjects. See generally Davison, Roderic H., Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century, 59 Am. Hist. Rev. 844 (1954)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19. The Lausanne Treaty was signed between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on July 24, 1923. The Lausanne Treaty repealed the Peace Treaty of Sevres of 1920, which had been concluded between the Ottomon Empire and the Allies of World War I, except Russia and the United States. The Sèvres Treaty, abolishing the Ottoman Empire, was not recognized by the government led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. For the contents of the both treaties, see The World War I Document Archive, http://wwi.iib.byu.edu/index.php/Post-1918_Documents (last modified Jan. 30, 2008).

20. See Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Lausanne, art. 37-45, July 24, 1923, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne (accessed Sept. 6, 2007). See particularly art. 40:

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein.

Id.

21. See Baskin Oran, Türkiye'de Azınlılar: Kavramlar, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama {Minorities in Turkey: Conceptions, Lausanne, Domestic Regulations, Jurisprudence, Applications) 36-41 (TESEV 2004) (Turkish). This policy can also be detected in some statutes today, such as “Law on Private Educational Institutions” (Özel Öǧgretim Kurumları Kanunu) adopted recently by the TGNA. Law No. 5580, adopted by the TGNA on Feb. 8, 2007; published in the Official Gazette on Feb. 14, 2007 (No. 26434). Art. 2 of the Law explicitly describes minority schools as private kindergartens, primary schools and secondary schools (including high schools) founded by the Greek, Armenian and Jewish communities, whose rights are protected by the Lausanne Treaty.

22. See Kushner, David, Self-Perception and Identity in Contemporary Turkey, 32 J. Cont. Hist. 219 (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23. Icduygu, Ahmet, Colak, Yilmaz & Soyarik, Nalan, What is the Matter with Citizenship? A Turkish Debate, 35 Middle East. Stud. 187, 195 (10 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24. Undoubtedly, after the foundation of the Republic, language was also a vital component for the creation of new Turkish citizenry. However, religion trumped language in certain cases. The case of Karaman Turks may illustrate this point. After the Greco-Turkish war, two governments signed a protocol in Lausanne in 1923 for the compulsory exchange of populations. Within the framework of his Agreement, the exchange was not based on language, but on religion. Muslims in Greece, except those who were living in Thrace, were to be sent to Turkey. Orthodox Christians in Turkey, on the other hand, except those who were living in Istanbul and in two islands across Canakkale, were to be sent to Greece. Karaman Turks, who were Orthodox Christians, identified themselves as “Turk,” spoke Turkish as their mother tongue, even worshiped in Turkish. However, their Turkish identification was not sufficient to exempt them from deportation; they were sent to Greece, even though they did not want to leave Turkey. See Lewis, Bernard, Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror 18–19 (Modern Lib. 2003)Google Scholar; Lewis, Bernard, The Return of Islam, Commentary 39, 43 (01 1976)Google Scholar.

25. Ahmet Yildiz, Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene, Türk Ulusal Kimliǧinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları (1919-1938) (How Happy Those Who Would Say “I am Turk,” The Ethno-Secular Limits of Turkish National Identity (1919-1938), at 137 (Iletisim 2004) (Turkish).

26. One may note the similarities between the Turkish and Greek cases in this respect. The religion column on identity cards was compulsory until May 2000 in Greece. Because the overwhelming majority of the population, almost 98%, is Orthodox-Christian, religion appears to be an indispensable element of the Greek nation. In this sense, Orthodoxy is tantamount to Hellenism, the distinctiveness of the Greek nationality, and historical and cultural identity. See Molokotos-Liederman, Lina, Identity Crisis: Greece, Orthodoxy, and the European Union, 18 J. Contemporary Religion 291, 299 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Vassiliki Karageorgiou, The EU's Impact on the Orthodox Church of Greece, Paper prepared for the 2d LSE Ph.D. Symposium on Modern Greece: Current Social Science Research on Greece, June 10, 2005, (available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/helIenicobservatory/pdf/2nd_Symposium/Vassiliki_Karageorgiou_paper.pdf) (accessed Mar. 7, 2008). So, the strong ties between the Orthodox Church and the State are mainly the cause and effect of the framing of the Greek identity.

27. Köker, Levent, National Identity and State Legitimacy: Contradictions of Turkey's Democratic Experience, in Civil Society Democracy and the Muslim World: Papers Read at a Conference held at the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul Oct. 28-30, 1996, vol. 7 (Ozdalga, Elisabeth & Person, Sune eds., Swedish Research Inst. 1997)Google Scholar (a collection of the papers can be obtained at http://www.srii.org/ta7.htm) (accessed Mar. 7, 2008).

28. During the Republican era, although ruling elites expressed their commitments to the principle of secularism, they—including the military rulers of the transitory periods after military interventions—did not hesitate to use religion as a unifying framework. See Subasi, Necdet, Ara Dönem Din Politikalari (The Religious Policies of Military Regimes), 93 Toplum ve Bilim 284 (2002)Google Scholar.

29. This proposal was explicitly articulated by the Government after its meeting on Aug. 3, 2000. Cumhuriyet (Istanbul) (Aug. 4, 2000) http://arama.yore.com.tr:8081/cgibin/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/cumhuriyet/0008/04/t/c0506.html (accessed Mar. 18, 2008).

30. For further information on MERNIS, see Central Population Management System, http://www.nvi.gov.tr/11,Ana_Sayfa_Mernis_Ingilizce.html (accessed Nov. 12, 2006).

31. Radikal (Istanbul) (Aug. 4, 2000) http://www.radikal.com.tr/2000/08/04/politika/01din.shtml (accessed Mar. 18, 2008).

32. Zaman (Istanbul) (Apr. 18, 2001) http://www.zaraan.com.tr/arsiv.do (accessed Nov. 12, 2006).

33. Zaman (Istanbul) (Jun. 26, 2004) http://www.zaman.com.tr/arsiv.do (accessed Nov. 12, 2006).

34. The New Anatolian (Istanbul) (Mar. 1, 2006) http://www.thenewanatolian.com (accessed Nov. 12, 2006).

35. Zaman (Istanbul) (Mar. 22, 2006) http://www.zaman.com.tr/arsiv.do (accessed Nov. 12, 2006).

36. See for an interview with Ismail Nacar (researcher on the history of Islam), Vatan (Istanbul) (May 8, 2006) http://wwwl0.gazetevatan.com/root.vatan?exec=yazardetay&sid=&Newsid=77454&Categoryid=4&wid=2 (accessed Mar. 18, 2006).

37. Vatan (Istanbul) (May 8, 2006) http://www2.vatanim.com.tr/root.vatan?exec=yazardetay&sid=&Newsid=77405&Categoryid=7&wid=0 (accessed Mar. 18, 2008). Here, we may point to the similarities between Turkish and Indonesian situations. Interestingly enough, the reasons, provided by the Indonesian Minister of Religion, Maftuh Basyuni, for preserving religious designations on identity cards was similar with those put forward by the opponents of the new Law in Turkey. According to the Minister: “It's very important to maintain it. Identity has to be as complete as possible. Also to maintain harmony.” He also added that “if someone died, and nothing was known about him, people would not know how to bury him if his religion were not clearly stated on his ID.” Indonesia Matters, KPT Religion, http://www.indonesiamatters.com/834/ktp-religion (posted May 8, 2006).

38. Alevi, which is generally considered under the Shi'a branch, is a sect of Islam. Those Alevis living in Anatolia have developed their own life-style. Although no official statistics are available about the number of Alevis in Turkey, it is unofficially estimated that 15 to 25% of Turkey's population is Alevi. See Vorhoff, Karin, Let's Reclaim Our History and Culture: Imagining Alevi Community in Contemporary Turkey, 38 Die Welt des Islams 220, 228 (1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Erman, Tahire & Göker, Emrah, Alevi Politics in Contemporary Turkey, 36 Middle E. Stud. 99, 99 (10 2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The majority of Alevis are ethnically and linguistically Turkish, descended mainly from central and eastern Anatolia, though some 20% are Kurdish. David Zeidan, The Alevi of Anatolia, http://www.alevi.dk/ENGELSK/THE_ALEVI_OF_ANATOLIA.pdf. (Dec. 1995). Alevis constitute the country's second largest religious community after the Sunnis. Their religious practices differ from those of Sunni Muslims. For instance, they do not worship in mosques; they meet in their own prayer halls; men, women and children participate together at funeral services. Most notably, they use Turkish rather than Arabic in their religious ceremonies and literature.

39. Evrensel (Istanbul) (July 4, 2006) http://www.evrensel.net/arsiv.php (accessed Nov. 12, 2006).

40. Erman, Tahire & Erdemir, Aykan, Aleviler ve Topluma Eklemlenme Sorunsali (Alevis and the Problem of Social Integration) in Turkiye'de Çogunluk ve Azinlik Politikalari, AB Sürecinde Yurttaslik Tartismalari (Majority and Minority Policies in Turkey, Debates on Citizenship in the EU Process) 180 (Kaya, Ayhan & Tarhanli, Turgut eds., TESEV 2005)Google Scholar.

41. See the joint press statements of the ABF & ECAA, Oct. 10, 2004 & Mar. 18, 2006, http://www.psakd.org/abf.html (accessed Nov. 22, 2006) (Turkish).

42. See L. No. 5490, supra n. 4.

43. Law of 1972, supra n. 1, at art. 11.

44. Sabah (Istanbul) (Sept. 30, 2004) http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/09/30/siy106.html (accessed Mar. 18,2008).

45. Radikal (Istanbul) (Oct. 21, 2005) http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=167621&tarih=21/10/2005 (accessed Mar. 18, 2008).

46. One may observe the reluctance of administrative authorities particularly in the high school teacher's case. After the final judgment, the National Education Directorate punished the high school teacher by cutting 1/8 of his salary claiming that he had made a statement to the press about the court decision without getting the permission of his superiors. According to the administrative authority, a civil servant could not make a statement to the press about his legal rights as well as his public duties and responsibilities. Ostensibly, this punishment was not due to the high school teacher's religious preferences, but again, doubts were expressed about the real reason of the National Education Directorate's act.

47. Ahdar, Rex & Leigh, Ian, Is Establishment Consistent with Religious Freedom?, 49 McGill L.J. 650 (2004)Google Scholar. Several terms, such as internal and external aspects of religious liberty and inner and outer religious freedoms, have been used to explain these dimensions of religious liberty in different contexts. The conceptual pair of “forum internum-forum externum” is also used in the European context. See Tahzib-Lie, Bahia, The European Definition of Freedom of Religion or Belief, 9 Helsinki Monitor 17 (No. 3 1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

48. Ahdar, Rex & Leigh, Ian, Is Establishment Consistent with Religious Freedom?, 49 McGill L.J. 650 (2004)Google Scholar.

49. Id. at 650.

50. See Decision of the Constitutional Court E. 1979/9, supra n. 15 (Turkish).

51. Id.

52. Id.

53. It is interesting to note that plaintiffs requested to change the information in their religion boxes to “Armenian” instead of “Christian.” We may construe this as a remnant of the Millet System.

54. Id.

55. Id.

56. Constitution of the Turkish Republic (1961), § 2, pt IV, art. 19, ¶ 3, http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1961constitution-text.pdf (accessed Oct. 29, 2007). The same regulation is included in Art. 24, Para. 3 of the Turkish Constitution with a slight difference: “No one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in religious ceremonies and rites, to reveal religious beliefs and convictions, or be blamed or accused because of his religious beliefs and convictions.” Const. Republic of Turkey, pt. II, ch. 2, art. 24, ¶ 3, http:www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/loaded/pdf_dosyalari/THE_CONSTITUTION_OFTHE_REPUBLIC_OF_TURKEY.pdf (accessed Oct. 29, 2007). Both Art. 19, Para. 3 of the 1961 Constitution and Art. 24, Para. 3 of the 1982 Constitution can be seen as an application of the general principle enshrined in Art. 18, Para. 2 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, http://www.ohchr.org/English/law/ccpr.htm#art18 (accessed Oct. 29, 2007). More correctly, these constitutional provisions flesh out the concept of coercion in the Turkish context.

57. The Court repeated the same reasoning in the case of 1995, which we shall discuss in detail below.

58. Tanor, Bülent, Türkiye'de Demokratikleşme Perspektifleri (Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey) 107 (TUSIAD 1997)Google Scholar; Bulent Tanor & Necmi Yuzbasioglu, 1982 Anayasasma Göre Türk Anayasa Hukuku (Turkish Constitutional Law According to the Constitution of 1982) 167 (Yapi Kredi 2001) (Turkish); Kaboglu, Ibrahim O., Özgurlükler Hukuku (Law of Freedoms) 365–368 (6th ed., Imge Kitabevi 2002) (Turkish)Google Scholar; Sabuncu, Yavuz, Anayasaya Giris (Introduction To The Constitution) 137 (Imaj Yayinevi 2005) (Turkish)Google Scholar.

59. Gozler, Kemal, Türk Anayasa Hukuku (Turkish Constitutional Law) 125 (Ekin Kitabevi 2000)Google Scholar.

60. This regulation was added to the Population Register Law of 1972 in 1984 by the L. No. 3080, adopted by TGNA on Nov. 15, 1984; published in Official Gazette on Nov. 21, 1984 (No. 18582).

61. Gozler, supra n. 59, at 125.

62. Art. 22 of the Population Register Law of 1972.

63. This principle forbids the state from wielding its power to impose on individuals, certain behavior which the individuals would otherwise not prefer. Freedom from coercion, in this sense, creates a protected domain for individuals against state interference. Accordingly, if a state decision or a state policy leads to the coercion of people on religious grounds, then it violates the freedom from coercion, which would be unacceptable in a secular-liberal regime. Art. 18, Para. 2 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights formulated this principle in the following manner: “No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.” United Nations Covenant, supra n. 56 (all provisions of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights entered into force on Mar. 23, 1976, except Art. 41 which came into effect on Mar. 28, 1979. Turkey signed the convention on Aug. 15, 2000 and ratified on Sept. 23, 2003).

64. Ahdar & Leigh, supra n. 48, at 667.

65. See Turkish Const. 1961, supra n. 56.

66. Art. 24 of the 1982 Constitution, currently in force, guarantees freedom of religion and conscience and consists of five paragraphs:

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction.

(2) Acts of worship, religious services, and ceremonies shall be conducted freely, provided that they do not violate the provisions of Article 14.

(3) No one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in religious ceremonies and rites, to reveal religious beliefs and convictions, or be blamed or accused because of his religious beliefs and convictions.

(4) Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shall be subject to the individual's own desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives.

(5) No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the state on religious tenets.

Turkish Const. 1982, supra n. 56.

67. Dec. Const. Ct. E. 1995/17, supra n. 15. According to the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions, the Constitutional Court examines laws, decrees having the force of law, and the standing orders of the Parliament. See 1982 Const., supra n. 56, at Art. 148. According to the Constitution in force, access to the Constitutional Court may be sought in two ways. One of them is focused on making abstract legal norms consistent and uniform. Allegations about unconstitutionality of a norm may be brought to the Constitutional Court only within a limited time after the publication of that norm in the Official Gazette by a restricted number of persons and groups, such as the president of the Republic, parliamentary groups of the ruling party, the main opposition party, and the minimum one-fifth of the total number of parliamentarians. Another way to appeal to the Constitutional Court to invalidate a norm because of its unconstitutionality is concrete norm control. If a court that is trying a case finds that the norm to be applied is unconstitutional, or if it is convinced of the seriousness of a claim of unconstitutionality submitted by one of the parties, it must postpone the consideration of the case until the Constitutional Court decides on the issue. If the Constitutional Court decides that the norm is unconstitutional, the norm will cease to have effect from the date of publication of the Constitutional Court's decision in the Official Gazette. For details see Ozbudun, Ergun, Constitutional Law, in Introduction to Turkish Law 19 (Ansay, Tugrul & Wallace, Don Jr. eds., 5th ed., Kluwer L. Intl. 2005)Google Scholar.

68. See Dec. Constitutional Ct. E. 1995/17, supra n. 15.

69. Id.

70. Id.

71. Art. 2 states:

The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble.

72. See Turkish Const. 1982, supra n. 66.

73. See Dec. Constitutional Ct. E. 1995/17, supra n. 15.

74. Id. Note that in another case, the Constitutional Court unanimously decided that Article 61 of the Law on Criminal Trial Procedure, which obliges courts to ask witnesses their religion with their name, appellation, age, occupation, and domicile was unconstitutional. The Court pointed out in this case that obliging a witness to disclose his or her religion would allow the possibility of the influence of religion in public affairs. Religion should be kept an internal matter in a secular state in order to eliminate all kinds of influence and possible intervention into religion. Also, the questioned provision would require a person to reveal his or her belief without his or her will. This legal obligation is unavoidable for anyone because obeying law is a requisite of the rule of law. This is why the Court came to the conclusion that the questioned provision is contrary to Art. 2 and 24 of the Constitution. Dec. Constitutional Ct. E. 1995/25, K. 1996/5, Feb. 2, 1996 (Turkish) http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/eskisite/KARARLARy/PTALITIRAZ/K1996/K1996-26.htm (accessed Mar. 18, 2006).

75. Kurland, Philip B., Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1961–1962)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

76. Gedicks, Frederick Mark, Religious Exemptions, Formal Neutrality and Laicite, 13 Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. 473, 485 (2006)Google Scholar.

77. Id. at 486.

78. Id. at 485-486.

79. See supra n. 71.

80. See Dec. Constitutional Ct. E. 1995/17, supra n. 15.

81. Douglas Laycock defined the concept of substantive neutrality as follows: “[T]he religion clauses require government to minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance.” Laycock, Douglas, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DePaul L. Rev. 993, 1001 (1989–1990)Google Scholar.

82. Monsma, Stephen V., Substantive Neutrality as a Basis for Free Exercise-No Establishment Common Ground, 42 J. Church & St. 13, 27 (2000) (emphasis in original)Google Scholar.

83. Id. at 29.

84. Indeed, religious intolerance may make ID cards with religious information literally dangerous. For example, religious information was included in Lebanese identity documents until the issuance of new cards on Mar. 17, 1997. During the civil war, many people were killed because of their religious affiliation, which was revealed on IDs. In compliance with the Taif Accord, the religious lines were removed from identity documents. According to a news article:

The plight of foreign hostages in Lebanon is continually in the news, but generally less known is the fact that many Lebanese themselves are seized as hostages. Since the civil war began in 1975, no one knows how many of this country's citizens have been abducted and killed, by one side or the other, depending on their religion. This has come to be known as the “battle of the IDs,” because religion is spelled out on Lebanese identity cards, and much of this activity takes place at the so-called Green Line that divides Beirut into predominantly Christian and Muslim sectors.

Raschka, Marilyn, The Forgotten Hostages: Lebanese Kidnappings: An Unknown Number Have Been Abducted, Usually Because of Their Religion, LA Times 6 (04 2, 1990)Google Scholar. We may also mention the Indonesian case. The Indonesian Parliament adopted a law on Dec. 8, 2006, requiring the inclusion of religious information on ID cards. Indonesian House Passes Controversial Bill into Law, People's Daily Online (Dec. 9, 2006) http://english.people.com.cn/200612/09/eng20061209_330484.html (accessed Jan. 12, 2007). This regulation was widely criticized on the grounds that it would assist in fostering religious discrimination. An activist, Maya Safira Muchtar from the National Integration Movement said, people have been killed in sectarian conflicts because religion is mentioned on the cards. Indonesia Matters, KPT Religion, http://www.indonesiamatters.com/834/ktp-religion (accessed Jan. 12, 2007). The National Integration Movement called the Government to review the Law by pointing out that the law would threaten national unity and could incite more sectarian conflicts in the country. Sijabat, Ridwan Max, Call to Take Religion from ID Cards, Jakarta Post (03 2, 2007)Google Scholar (available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/Archives/ArchivesDet2.asp?FileID=20070302. H05#). Turkey has not experienced such religious conflict in the republican era, but a recent public opinion survey alerts us that the increasing level of religious intolerance should be taken seriously. See Ali Carkoglu & Binnaz Toprak, Deǧişen Türkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset (Religion, Society and Politics in Changing Turkey) (TESEV 2006).

85. See e.g. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 9, http://www.hri.Org/docs/ECHR50.html#C.Art9 (accessed Nov. 1, 2007).

86. Sofianopoulos, Spaïdiotis, Metallinos and Kontogiannis v. Greece, Information Note No. 48 on the Case-Law of the ECHR (Dec. 12, 2002), http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/InformationNotes/INFONOTENo48.htm (accessed Nov. 18, 2006).

87. Here, it should be noted that the line between legal and political theory blurs when it comes to the question of neutrality. Moreover, some of the authors (e.g., Ronald Dworkin) whom we shall be consulting in this section, can be considered neither purely political, nor purely legal theorists. Nevertheless, one may still detect a distinct approach with its own terminology in each of the respective fields. We believe that this “not-so-visible” demarcation between legal and political studies allows us to study the relevant theories separately.

88. Dworkin, Ronald, Liberalism, in A Matter of Principle 191 (Harv. U. Press 1985)Google Scholar.

89. Rawls, John, The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 251, 262 (1988)Google Scholar.

90. Dimock, Susan, Liberal Neutrality, 34 J. Value Inquiry 189, 190 (2000)Google Scholar.

91. Id. at 191.

92. Wall, Steven, Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint 8 (Cambridge U. Press 1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

93. See e.g. Chen, Selina, Liberal Justification: A Typology, 18 Politics 189 (1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (reviewing the relationship between neutrality and perfectionism).

94. Generally, a two-fold typology of neutrality is accepted by political theorists; “neutrality in the consequences of government policy” and “neutrality in the justification of government policy.” See e.g. Kymlicka, Will, Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality, 99 Ethics 883 (1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

95. Beckman, Ludvig, The Liberal State & the Politics of Virtue 115–133 (Transaction Publishers 2001)Google Scholar.

96. See Laycock, supra n. 81.

97. It has been argued that consequential neutrality is unattainable for several reasons. First, it is impossible to conceive a policy that would satisfy all citizens. In other words, it is inevitable that state action will have a variable impact on particular conceptions of the good. Second, it would hardly be possible to equalize the effects of a state's actions on individuals, for the level of satisfaction of individuals by the state's action cannot be practically measured. Third, the state will have to interfere with individuals' lives and the market to achieve outcome neutrality, which is incompatible with the basic premises of liberalism. See Daskalovski, Zhidas, Neutrality, Liberal Nation Building and Minority Cultural Rights, 5 Critical Rev. Intl. Soc. & Political Phil. 27, 28–31 (2002)Google Scholar.

98. Dimock, supra n. 90, at 192.

99. Caney, Simon, Consequentialist Defences of Liberal Neutrality, 41 Phil. Q. 457, 458 (1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

100. Within this context, we may also discuss the practice of asking for religious affiliations on the census. The goal of census in a liberal neutral state should be to get information about population, economic and social characteristics of inhabitants, etc. with the aim of giving better service to its citizens. Religious belief should not hold a place on a census questionnaire because the state is not able to better fulfill its functions with the knowledge of this information. See Good, Dorothy, Questions on Religion in the United States Census, 25 Population Index 3 (1959) (discussing this problem in America)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

101. Indeed, the use of religious information on ID cards in certain historical situations reminds us that such practices would go along with non-liberal states. Religious information on identity cards, for example, was used for identifying the Jews in Nazi Germany. The notorious “J-stamp” on ID cards was a ticket to discrimination for the Jewish community at the time. See Krop, J.F., The Jews under the Nazi Regime, 245 Annals Am. Acad. Political & Soc. Sci. 28 (1946)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sobel, Richard, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National Identification Systems, 15 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 319, 344–346 (2002)Google Scholar; Sobel, Richard, The Degradation of Political Identity under a National Identification System, 8 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 37 (2002)Google Scholar.

102. The ECHR has supremacy over laws in accordance with Article 90 of the Constitution of 1982. Accordingly, related provisions of the ECHR and their interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights are binding for Turkey. See Gonenc, Levent & Esen, Selin, The Problem of the Application of Less Protective International Agreements in Domestic Legal Systems: Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution, 8 European J. L. Reform, 485 (2006)Google Scholar.

103. Greece was the only EU country continuing the practice of holding religious information on identity cards. The EU, however, never approved this policy of the Greek Government. This issue appeared for the first time in Greece in the 1980s. The compulsory religious belief slot on IDs was first introduced by the German occupiers during World War II in order to identify the Jews. See Stamoulas, Aristotelis, Cultural Democracies And Human Rights: Conditions For Religious Freedom in Modern Greece, 3 J. Hum. Rights 477 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Later, in 1986, the Socialist Government made the revelation of religious affiliation on ID cards voluntary. However, it became compulsory again in 1991, through legislation prepared by the center-right government. The following year, the European Parliament issued a strong recommendation to alter the Greek legislation due to the religious minority problems, such as those experienced by the Jehovah's Witnesses, so the center-right government attempted to reinstate the regulation, which was in effect between 1986-91. Surprisingly, this time, even the Socialists did not vote in favor of the amendment, for it was perceived by the majority of the deputies as giving in to blackmail by the European Union regarding the Macedonian issue. Anastassiadis, Anastassios, Religion and Politics in Greece: The Greek Church's ‘Conservative Modernization’ in the 1990's 6 (Ctr. Intl. Stud. & Research, Research Paper 2004, http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org/publica/qdr.htmGoogle Scholar (accessed Nov. 12, 2006). The issue did not come up until 2000. Finally, despite the opposition of the conservative groups, the Greek Government deleted religious faith information as well as other personal data (e.g., citizenship, spouse's name, profession and fingerprints) from identity documents in 2000 to harmonize its domestic legislation with the European standards. By doing so, the Greek authorities also hoped to undo the ongoing conflict between its domestic legislation and the ECHR decisions. See Molokotos-Liederman, supra n. 26, at 303. It is interesting to note that, unlike Turkey, the new legislation in Greece faced quite intense opposition, spearheaded by the Orthodox Church. Evidently, the special link between the Orthodox Church and the State and society explains this phenomenon. The Orthodox Church has always considered itself the protector of not only faith and morality, but also of Greek national identity. Moreover, it has always had close relations with the State. As a result, the Church, receiving considerable support from the State, obtained a privileged position vis-a-vis other beliefs in the country. For instance, it received generous public subsidies in the form of clergy payments and tax exemptions, and the Church has the right to influence national education and cultural orientation in schools. Stamoulas, supra at 485. Thus, the Orthodox Church viewed the new law as a first step in the gradual erosion of its institutional monopoly and considered it an attack against Greek identity. The Clergy provoked the opposition forces against the new legislation by using the argument that “Orthodoxy is inseparable from the Greek identity.” The religious authorities, organizing mass rallies in big cities for fifteen months, collected more than three million signatures to put this issue in a referendum, which would result in the optional inclusion of religious information on ID cards. Mavrogordatos, George, Orthodoxy and Nationalism in the Greek Case, 26 W. European Politics 117, 122–123 (01 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Prodromou, Elizabeth, Negotiating Pluralism and Specifying Modernity in Greece: Reading Church-State Relations in the Christodoulos Period, 51 Soc. Compass 471, 474 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. As a matter of fact, the hard work of the Orthodox Church yielded no results.

104. See Merkel, Wolfgang, Embedded and Defective Democracies, 11 Democratization 33 (12 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.