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Currents in Contemporary Ethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Sharona Hoffman  and
Andrew P. Morriss
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Extract

Contemporary developments in reproductive technology hold great promise for those who have difficulty conceiving naturally. However, they have generated extensive debate among lawyers, ethicists, legislators, the media, and the public. Concern has intensified recently in light of claimed attempts to clone human beings. One implication of the new reproductive technologies upon which few commentators have focused is their effect on inheritance rights and on the notorious Rule Against Perpetuities. For example, what impact should the possible existence of frozen sperm or frozen embryos have upon the execution of wills and implementation of the Rule? If one leaves property to one’s children but has frozen sperm or embryos that might produce children the Rule? If one leaves property to one’s children but has frozen sperm or embryos that might produce children decades after one’s death, what should be done about the distribution of the estate? These difficult questions can no longer be ignored.

Type
Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 31 , Issue 4 , Winter 2003 , pp. 721 - 724
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2003

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References

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