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Bureaucrats and the Senegalese Political Process

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Extract

While independence in West Africa focused academic attention on political parties, the proliferation of military régimes in the late 1960s– by 1970, seven West African countries had experienced military rule — brought two other institutions into prominence: the military and civil bureaucracies. This article seeks to throw some light on the place of the civil bureaucracy in Senegal through a study of the role of bureaucrats in the country's political process.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1971

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References

Page 543 note 1 The loi-cadre was an enabling law by virtue of which the Fourth Republic French Government modified the administrative structure established in French West Africa after World War II. Its provisions have been summed up as ‘measures of administrative decentralisation and deconcentration’. The Government Council it established in each territory was a local executive, responsible for the management of the ‘deconcentrated’ and ‘decentralised’ administrative services. For the text of the loi-cadre, see Journal officiel tie l'Afrique occidentale française (Dakar), I 307 1956.Google Scholar

Page 543 note 2 Until this date, ‘real political life’ focused on Paris, where almost all African politicians of any substance served either as deputies or as senators. A few of them were made ministers, sometimes with cabinet rank.

Page 544 note 1 Both Senegal and Soudan preserved their individuality within the Community throughout the life of the Mali Federation.

Page 544 note 2 Loi constilutionnelle 70–15 of 26 02 1970,Google Scholar in Journal officiel de la République du Sénégal (Rufisque), 28 02 1970.Google Scholar

Page 544 note 3 After taking over full powers after the abortive coup d'état of December 1962, Senghor was elected executive President in December 1963. His mandate, which ended in 1967, was extended to 1968, when he was re-elected for a new term of five years. This means he can remain in power until early 5973. It may also be added that under the constitution he can seek another term of five years after that date.

Page 544 note 4 As used here, ‘government’ refers to what is commonly called the cabinet in English. We have avoided the latter term because it can be confused with the private secretariat of the Minister, called the cabinet ministériel. Between 1957 and 1962 the head of the government was the Prime Minister. Under the presidential régime introduced in 1963, the President became the head of government. The constitutional reform of February 1970 reintroduced the post of a Prime Minister who became the head of government; however, unlike the two previous arrangements, the government he heads only executes the policies determined by the President of the Republic: see Loi constitutionnelle 70–55 of 26 February 1970, loc. cit.

Page 545 note 1 This freedom is, however, limited in France by unwritten rules of discretion. Needless to say, it has not been easy to interpret what discretion really means; but, thanks to the French Conseil d‘e’tai, some rough idea exists.

Page 545 note 2 The Senegalese parliament is a single-chamber assembly. It was called the territorial assembly between 1957 and 1959 and had 60 members. In 1959 it became known as the national assembly (the word ‘national’ was substituted for ‘territorial’ to take account of the progress made towards independence) and the size was increased to 80. While the title of national assembly has since remained unchanged, the size rose to 82 in 1963 but was reduced again to 80 in 1968.

Page 545 note 3 The general statute of the civil service in Senegal allows an offical to be ‘detached’ from the service either in order ‘to exercise an elective public office’ or to take up an administrative post outside the service, usually in public enterprises, mixed-economy enterprises, or international organisations (the private sector is excluded). The provision for détachement in the Senegalese statute, as in that of France, is very generous. A long period of détachement covers five years, and this can be renewed ‘indefinitely’ for five years at a time. See Statut général de la fonction publique (Rufisque, n.d.), Article 67, p. 20.Google Scholar The Government has recently discovered that the generous provision for detachement is leading to a ‘flight of qualified cadres’ to international organisations, to which Senegalese civil servants are attracted for financial reasons; see circular no. 2681PM/SGG/ADJ of 5 August 1970. The Government intended to introduce legislation sometime in 1971 to limit the periods of détachements: interview, Prime Minister's Office, November 1970.

Page 545 note 4 The practice of inviting bureaucrats to serve in governments was largely inspired by a similar practice reintroduced in France by de Gaulle's Fifth Republic. For a discussion of the practice there, see Cheverny, J., ‘Le Mode autoritaire de l'anarchie’, in Esprit (Paris), 01 1970, pp. 5668.Google Scholar A further proof of Gaullist influence was the adoption by Senegal, from 1963 to 1967, of the rule of incompatibility between the functions of a deputy and of a member of the government.

Page 546 note 1 Pépy, D., ‘Les Etats africains et leurs problémes’; unpublished cours at the Institut d'études politiques de Paris, 1964/1965, p. 351.Google Scholar

Page 546 note 2 Most of the training was done in France, notably at the Institut des hautes études d'outre-mer, Paris.

Page 546 note 3 All senior members of ministerial cabinets – directeur de cabinet, chef de cabinet and conseiller technique – are, by the nature of their functions, regarded as bureaucrats in this study.

Page 547 note 1 Dakar-matin, the single daily newspaper published in Dakar during the period, printed only pro-government views, and the opposition circulated political tracts.

Page 547 note 2 Interviews, October 1970. A resolution to the effect was passed at the ruling party's Congress in 1960.

Page 547 note 3 Senghor, L. S., New Year Message, Dakar-matin, I 01 1963.Google Scholar There is probably some exaggeration in this assessment, but it does confirm the point made here.

Page 548 note 1 For a different view, see Zolberg, A., according to whom only ‘routine-oriented’ Africans remained in the civil service, while the ‘innovative’ ones opted for a political career; Creating Political Order: the party-states of West Africa (Chicago, 1966), p. 121.Google Scholar

Page 548 note 2 Although electoral experience in the four Senegalese communes of Gorée, Rufisque, Saint-Louis, and Dakar dates back to the nineteenth century, the whole territory started participating in elections in 1946. Constituency-based elections were discontinued after 1959.

Page 548 note 3 A rebel member of one of the major parties involved in the 1957 elections won his seat against all opposition because of his large electoral ‘clan’.

Page 548 note 4 The majority of these technical administrators were elected in the constituency where they worked, even if they had been born in a different area.

Page 548 note 5 According to the provisions of the loi-cadre, the members of the Government Council in each territory were to be elected by a majority vote of the territorial assembly. The majority party in each assembly was free to elect any number of outsiders; all the territories took advantage of this opportunity and two outsiders were elected in Senegal– about the overall average number.

Page 549 note 1 Guillemin, P., ‘La Structure des premiers gouvernements locaux en Afrique noire,’ in Revue française des sciences politiques (Paris), IX, 3 09 1959, pp. 667–85.Google Scholar

Page 549 note 2 The local holders of financial power were also French. However, this strategy of racial solidarity was not peculiar to Senegal. Only a few territories – for example, Guinea – did not appoint Frenchmen to their finance ministries.

Page 550 note 1 One of the accusations levied against Dia during the November/December 1962 crisis within the ruling party was that he had ‘packed’ the latest government reshuffle.

Page 550 note 2 ‘Although the revised Constitution of February 1970 did not introduce a dyarchy (it is officially called a ‘deconcentrated’ presidential system) the Prime Minister, who is head of government, has enough powers to make it inappropriate to refer to the post-1970 period as exclusively senghorien.

Page 550 note 3 Discours à l'Assemblée nationale (Rufisque), 19 04 1963.Google Scholar

Page 551 note 1 This was true in varying degrees of Nkrumah's Ghana and Modibo Keita's Mali. Guinea has gone furthest with this doctrine; see ‘Ladipo Adamolekun, ‘Politics and Administration in West Africa: the Guinean model’, in Journal of Administration Overseas (London), VIII, 4, 10 1969, pp. 235–42.Google Scholar

Page 551 note 2 This resolution followed after an appeal for voluntary subscriptions had interested only 28 out of 279 bureaucrats of central ministerial departments and 59 out of 162 holding political administrative posts in regional and local administration. See , M., ‘L'Union progressiste sénégalaise’, in Traore, B. et al. , Forces potitiques en Afrique noire (Paris, 1966), p. 138.Google Scholar

Page 552 note 1 The turning-point was the 7th U.P.S. Congress, held in Dakar from 27 to 30 December 1969. It was baptised the Congrés de la participation responsable, and the responsible participants were almost all bureaucrats!

Page 552 note 2 This term, already used by some students of Senghor, formally entered the Senegalese political vocabulary during 1970 and its chief exponent today is the leader of the C.E.R.E.S., who is the Directeur de cabinet of the President. He is also an executive member of Club nation et développement. For the inaugural conference on senghorinne, see Le Soleil (Dakar), 14 09 1970.Google Scholar

Page 553 note 1 See Senghor, L. S., Rapport de politique générale: politique, nation et développement moderne, VIe congrés de l'U.P.S.,5, 6, et 7 janvier 1968 (Rufisque, 1968), p. 156.Google Scholar

Page 553 note 2 We shall use this term in preference to the more trendy terms, ‘technocrat’ or ‘technical’ minister (ministre technique). All the ministers with whom we shall be concerned are ‘bureaucrats’, in the sense used in this article, but only a few of them are ‘technocrats’ both in the strict sense of the term and with regard to the relevance of their technical qualifications to their ministerial posts. For example, while a medical doctor and a veterinary doctor are ‘technocrats’, neither, in our opinion, can be called a ‘technocrat-minister’ in the Ministries of External Affairs, Armed Forces, or Education. On the other hand, a medical doctor will be a ‘technocrat-minister’ in the Ministry of Health. However, mini.stre technique is also used in France to refer to a bureaucrat appointed as head of a ministry, which the Government intends to insulate from controversy; in such a case, what matters is the political independence of the bureaucrat rather than his technical competence in the affairs of the ministry concerned. This notion of appointing politically independent bureaucrats to ministerial posts is unknown in Senegal. The writer is grateful to M Jean Fourré of the French Conseil d'état for information on the uses of the term mirnstre technique in France.

Page 555 note 1 Ajoulat, L., ‘Réflexions sur la fonction publique africaine’, in Le Mois en Afrique (Dakar), 02 1966, p. 45.Google Scholar

Page 555 note 2 Although the post of secretary general is considered equivalent to a secretary of state, it is not included in our figures because only a bureaucrat can be nominated to it. Similarly, commissioners are sometimes considered equivalent to secretaries of state, but we exclude them from our figures for the same reason.

Page 555 note 3 A recurring theme in Senghor's speeches and writing since 1963 was his condemnation of la politique politicienne, meaning a kind of politics whose objective is ‘the conquest of power through intrigues and underground manoeuvres’. He contrasted this with his own idea (ideal?) of politics, which was exclusively concerned with promoting national development. See Senghor, L. S., Rapport de politique générale, pp. 925.Google Scholar

Page 556 note 1 L'Unité africaine (Dakar), 14 03 1968.Google Scholar

Page 556 note 2 Senghor has consistently repeated his desire to prepare for the succession: ‘when I feel that Senegal is engaged in the right way, freed from its infantile diseases, I shall retire. And, before my retirement, I shall campaign for my successor’ [my italics]. Milcent, E., Au Carrefour des options africaines: le Sénégal (Paris, 1965), p. 150.Google Scholar

Page 556 note 3 Interviews, October 1970. There were, of course, a few exceptions.

Page 558 note 1 It is interesting to note that the punishment for opposition or indifference on the part of bureaucrats towards the political leadership has never been severe. For example, among pro-Dia bureaucrats, a few left the country under Senghor to become international civil servants while the rest were banished into insignificant posts. A few years later, some of them were reinstated in important positions. However, at the lower levels of administration, civil servants who have openly manifested their opposition to the ruling régime have been more severely dealt with. The communiqués concerning U.P.S. reconciliation agreements with two opposition parties, in 1963 and 1966, reveal the extent of such punishment. For the former, see Lô, op. cit. p. 535; and for the latter, see Unite africaine, 15 September 1966.

Page 558 note 2 A military officer was also serving as ambassador in an important capital. In January 1975 a lieutenant-colonel was appointed governor of the Casamance region.

Page 558 note 3 Interviews, March and April 1971. The threat of the military to professional politicians is obvious; and the posts of prefect and governor are normally reserved for civil bureaucrats.