^1. In his comparative study of the depression, Gourevitch, Peter observes that in all industrialized nations the crisis “greatly extended state activism in the economy … in 'corporatist directions.' ” Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, 1986), 231.Google Scholar

^2. Scholars attempting to place America's response to the depression in comparative perspective have focused on the emergence of Keynesian measures of demand management and relief measures for the unemployed while generally ignoring the NRA. See Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times; Weir, Margaret and Skocpol, Theda, “State Structures and the Possibilities for 'Keynesian' Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Evans, Peter B., Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, and Skocpol, Theda (New York, 1985)Google Scholar; Skocpol, Theda and Ikenberry, John, “The Political Formation of the American Welfare State in Historical and Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Social Research 6 (1983): 87–148Google Scholar; Patterson, James J., “Comparative Welfare History: Britain and the United States, 1930–1945,” in The Roosevelt New Deal: A Program Assessment Fifty Years After, ed. Cohen, Wilbur J. (Austin, 1986)Google Scholar; Levine, Daniel, Property and Society: The Growth of the American Welfare State in International Comparison (New Brunswick, 1988)Google Scholar; Hill, Kim Quaile, Democracies in Crisis: Public Policy Responses to the Great Depression (Boulder, 1988)Google Scholar; Garraty, John A., “The New Deal, National Socialism, and the Great Depression,” American Historical Review 78 (1973): 907CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Unemployment in History: Economic Thought and Public Policy (New York, 1978)Google Scholar; and The Great Depression (New York, 1987).Google Scholar

Works concentrating on the NRA include: Brand, Donald R., Corporatism and the Rule of Law: A Study of the National Recovery Administration (Ithaca, 1988)Google Scholar; Hawley, Ellis W., The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in Economic Ambivalence (Princeton, 1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Himmelberg, Robert F., The Origins of the National Recovery Administration: Business, Government and the Trade Association Issue, 1921–1933 (New York, 1974)Google Scholar; Bellush, Bernard, The Failure of the NRA (New York, 1975)Google Scholar; Fine, Sidney, The Automobile Under the Blue Eagle: Labor, Management, and the Automobile Manufacturing Code (Ann Arbor, 1963)Google Scholar; Kennedy, JohnOhl, Hugh S. Johnson and the New Deal (DeKalb, 1985)Google Scholar; Skocpol, Theda and Finegold, Kenneth, “State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal,” Political Science Quarterly 97 (Summer 1982): 255–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^3. Establishing a national incomes policy through negotiations between state officials and peak associations representing all workers' and employers' organizations is the most frequently cited example of corporatism. Alan Cawson, though, argues that even if corporatism at the level of the nation-state, “macro-corporatism,” is “arguably the most important variety of corporatism,” the concept is also applicable at less inclusive levels of economic and political organization. Cawson uses the term “meso-corporatism” to describe corporatist practices involving individual firms. Corporatism and Political Theory (Oxford, 1986), 68–82.Google Scholar

^4. Students of corporatism do not agree on a single definition, but Philippe Schmitter's conception of “social corporatism,” in which the state recognizes a limited number of functionally organized voluntary associations as the exclusive representatives of the interests of capital and labor in deliberations concerning economic policy in return for those associations exercising a controlling or moderating influence on their members' behavior, has been especially influential. Schmitter, Philippe C., “Still the Century of Corporatism,” in Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation, ed. Schmitter, Philippe C. and Lehmbruch, Gerhard (Beverly Hills, 1979), 13.Google Scholar

Andrew Shonfield made early, though not very systematic reference, to “corporatism” in Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (1965; reprint, New York, 1969)Google Scholar. Recent works on corporatism include: Berger, Suzanne, ed., Organising Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics (New York, 1981)Google Scholar; Cawson, Corporatism and Political Theory; Cawson, , “Pluralism, Corporatism and the Role of the State,” Government and Opposition 13 (1978): 178–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cox, Andrew and O'Sullivan, Noel, eds., The Corporate State: Corporatism and the State Tradition in Western Europe (Aldershott, England, 1988)Google Scholar; Crouch, Colin, Class Conflict and the Industrial Relations Crisis: Compromise and Corporatism in the Policies of the British State (London, 1977)Google Scholar; Crouch, , “Pluralism and the New Corporatism: A Rejoinder,” Political Studies 31 (1983): 452–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Crouch, , ed., State and Economy in Contemporary Capitalism (New York, 1979)Google Scholar; Grant, Wyn, ed., The Political Economy of Corporatism (New York, 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Harrison, Reginald, Pluralism and Corporatism: The Political Evolution of Modem Democracies (London, 1980)Google Scholar; Jordan, A. Grant, “Iron Triangles, Wooly Corporatism, and Elastic Nets: Images of the Policy Process,” Journal of Public Policy, 1 (1981): 96–123CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lehmbruch, Gerhard and Schmitter, Philippe C., eds., Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making (Beverly Hills, 1982)Google Scholar; Martin, Ross M., “Pluralism and the New Corporatism,” Political Studies 31 (1983): 86–102CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nedelman, Birgitta and Meier, Kurt G., “Theories of Contemporary Corporatism: Static or Dynamic?” Comparative Political Studies 10 (1977): 39–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pahl, R. E. and Winkler, J. T., “The Coming Corporatism,” Challenge 18 (March–April 1975), 28–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Panitch, Leo, “Recent Theorizations of Corporatism: Reflections of a Growth Industry,” British Journal of Sociology 31 (June 1980): 159–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pike, Frederick B. and Stritch, Thomas, eds., The New Corporatism: Social-Political Structures in the Iberian World (Notre Dame, 1974)Google Scholar; Williamson, Peter J., Varieties of Corporatism: A Conceptual Discussion (Cambridge, 1985)Google Scholar; Wilson, Frank L., “Interest Groups and Politics in Western Europe: The Neo-Corporatist Approach,” Comparative Politics 16 (October 1983): 105–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Winkler, J. T., “Corporatism,” Archives Europeenes de Sodologie 18 (1976): 100–136CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Winkler, , “The Coming Corporatism,” in The End of the Keynesian Era, ed. Skidelsky, R. (New York, 1977)Google Scholar; Zeigler, Harmon, Pluralism, Corporatism, and Confucianism: Political Association and Conflict Resolution in the United States, Europe, and Taiwan (Philadelphia, 1988)Google Scholar. For an excellent comparative study of interwar European corporatism, see Maier, Charles S., Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade After World War I (1975; reprint, Princeton, 1988).Google Scholar

Students of comparative policy history agree that the strength of a society's labor movement has been a critical factor in the creation of state welfare programs, but not enough attention has been paid to the way in which organized labor's weakness in the United States may have influenced policy innovation in other areas. Shalev, Michael, “The Social Democratic Model and Beyond: Two Generations of Comparative Research on the Welfare State,” Comparative Social Research 6 (1983): 87–148.Google Scholar

^5. Many historians have commented on the role of antistatism in American political culture. Recent examples include: Keller, Morton, Regulating a New Economy: Public Policy and Economic Change in America, 1900–1933 (Cambridge, 1990)Google Scholar; Hawley, Ellis W., “The New Deal and the Anti-Bureaucratic Tradition,” in The New Deal and its Legacy: Critique and Reappraisal, ed. Eden, Robert (New York, 1989)Google Scholar; and Brinkley, Alan, “The New Deal and the Idea of the State,” in The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–1980, ed. Fraser, Steve and Gerstle, Gary (Princeton, 1989)Google Scholar. For works that emphasize the significance of antistatism in Britain, see Freyer, Tony, Regulating Big Business: Antitrust in Great Britain and America, 1880–1990 (New York, 1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dyson, Kenneth H. F., The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of an Idea and Institution (New York, 1980)Google Scholar; and Fox, Alan, History and Heritage: The Social Origins of the British Industrial Relations System (London, 1985).Google Scholar

^6. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D.C., 1960), 73Google Scholar; Hill, Democracies in Crisis, 41.

^7. Mitchell, B. R., European Historical Statistics, 1750–1970 (New York, 1978), 66–67Google Scholar; Hill, Democracies in Crisis, 41.

^8. Galambos, Louis, Competition and Cooperation: The Emergence of a National Trade Association (Baltimore, 1966)Google Scholar; Himmelberg, Origins of NRA.

^9. For Baruch's proposal for the establishment of a “supreme court of business,” see New York Times, 2 May 1930; the Harriman plan, “Planning Proposals of the Committee on Continuity of Business and Employment of the United States Chamber of Commerce,” appears in America Faces the Future, ed. Beard, Charles A. (Boston, 1932), 196–264Google Scholar. At its annual meeting in 1931, the United States Chamber of Commerce adopted a resolution favoring legislation to empower the Federal Trade Commission “to receive, approve, and enforce under judicial review, agreements on the part of business men seeking to eliminate wasteful practices and trade abuses in the course of their competitive relations, provided such agreements do not tend unreasonably to restrain trade or to create monopoly.” Nation's Business 19 (June 1931): 30Google Scholar. See also Harriman's, testimony in Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Manufactures,Establishment of National Economic Council, 71st Cong., 1st sess., 188(26 October 1931).Google Scholar The text of Swope's plan is reprinted in Beard, America Faces the Future, 160–73. See also Frederick, J. George, ed., The Swope Plan: Details, Criticisms, Analysis (New York, 1931)Google Scholar; and Swope's testimony in Senate Hearings, Economic Council, 300–317 (28 October 1931).

^10. Thomas C. Chadbourne, quoted in Frederick, Swope Plan, 74.

^11. In 1931 unions enrolled less than one out often potential members. George Sayers Bain and Price, Robert, Profiles of Unions Growth: A Comparative Statistical Portrait of Eight Countries (Oxford, 1980), 88.Google Scholar

^12. Beard, America Faces the Future, 165–67. See also Radosh, Ronald, “The Development of the Corporate Ideology of American Labor Leaders” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1967), 275.Google Scholar

^13. Himmelberg, Origins of NRA, 124–62. In Wisconsin, Governor Phillip LaFollette offered a plan to guarantee adequate representation of nonbusiness interests in a statesanctioned scheme of industrial self-government. He proposed state legislation to authorize groups of employers in the same industry “to associate themselves with a board of trade for the purpose of stabilizing employment,” if every such organization established “a public policy committee” consisting of representatives of consumer and employee interests. This public policy committee, as well as the governor and each house of the state legislature, would retain a veto power over the operations of an industry's system of self-government. Message to Wisconsin legislature, 24 November 1931, in Beard, America Faces the Future, 366–69. LaFollette's proposal failed to win legislative approval before he was defeated for reelection in 1932. Miller, John E., Governor Philip F. LaFollette, the Wisconsin Progressives, and the New Deal (Columbia, 1982), 21.Google Scholar

^14. American Federationist 38 (October 1931): 1182–83.Google Scholar

^15. Donald Richberg, Memo for D. B. Robertson (1931?), Donald Richberg Papers, Chicago Historical Society. Norman Thomas expressed similar concerns about the Swope Plan, as did M. H. Hedges, research director of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. Frederick, Swope Plan, 94–95; Radosh, “Corporate Ideology,” 258–60.

^16. Bernstein, Irving, The Lean Years: A History of the American Worker (1960; reprint, Baltimore, 1966), 195–215.Google Scholar

^17. Johnson, James P., The Politics of Soft Coal: The Bituminous Industry from World War I Through the New Deal (Urbana, 1979), 123–33Google Scholar; New York Times, 12 February 1933. The operators' views are expressed in a Coal Age editorial cited by Johnson. W. Jett Lauck, former secretary to the National War Labor Board and later a close adviser to John L. Lewis, urged Lewis to support not only an industry-specific plan for reorganizing the coal industry, but also a more comprehensive proposal to establish tripartite boards composed of employer, labor, and public representatives for all industries. Lewis rejected Lauck's advice, arguing that “it is debatable that I could undertake, with propriety, to act as a spokesman for industries other than coal.” Dubofsky, Melvyn and Van Tyne, Warren, John L. Lewis: A Biography (New York, 1977), 175–77Google Scholar. See also Brody, David, “Labour Relations in American Coal Mining: An Industry Perspective,” in Workers, Owners, and Politics in Coal Mining: An International Comparison of Industrial Relations, ed. Feldman, Gerald D. and Tenfelde, Klaus (New York, 1990), 94–99.Google Scholar

^18. Johnson, Politics of Soft Coal; Brody, “Labour Relations in American Coal Mining.” Sidney Hillman's Amalgated Clothing Workers Union played an analogous role in the garment industry, but on a regional, rather than nationwide, basis. Fraser, Steve, “Dress Rehearsal for the New Deal: Shop-Floor Insurgents, Political Elites, and Industrial Democracy in the Amalgamated Clothing Workers,” in Working-Class America: Essays on Labor, Community, and American Society, ed. Frisch, Michael H. and Walkowitz, Daniel J. (Urbana, 1983)Google Scholar. Gary Marks argues that the strength of industrial unions within a nation's labor movement determines whether a labor party is likely to become well established. Unions in Politics: Britain, Germany, and the United States in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries (Princeton, 1989).Google Scholar

^19. Himmelberg, Origins of NRA; Wilson, Joan Hoff, Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive (Boston, 1975)Google Scholar; Hawley, Great War and the Search for a Modern Order; Rosen, Elliot A., Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Brains Trust: From Depression to New Deal (New York, 1977).Google Scholar

^20. Seymour, John Barton, The Whitley Councils Scheme (London, 1932)Google Scholar. For the small number of industries in which neither workers nor employers were well organized and in which “sweating” was a problem, the Trade Boards Act of 1909 (introduced in Parliament by Winston Churchill) allowed the government to establish trade boards having the power to fix legal minimum-wage rates. Allen, V. L., Trade Unions and the Government (London, 1960), 59–60.Google Scholar

^21. 240 H.C. Deb., col. 973–74 (24 June 1930).

^22. Macmillan, Harold, Winds of Change, 1914–1939 (New York, 1966), 327–28Google Scholar. See also Conservative Eustace Percy's proposal for industrial self-government, Democracy on Trial: A Preface to Industrial Policy (London, 1931).Google Scholar

^23. Mosley, Oswald, A National Policy: An Account of the Emergency Program Advanced by Sir Oswald Mosley M. P. (London, 1931), 20–23.Google Scholar

^24. Nicholson, Max, “The Proposal for a National Plan,” originally published in Week' End Review (February 1931)Google Scholar, reprinted in Fifty Years of Political and Economic Planning: Looking Forward, 1931–1981, ed. John Pinder (London, 1931), 7. For general overviews, see Carpenter, “Corporatism in Great Britain”; and Booth, Alan and Pack, Melvyn, Employment, Capital, and Economic Policy: Great Britain, 1918–1939 (Oxford, 1985).Google Scholar

^25. 232 H.C. Deb., col. 666 (21 November 1929).

^26. 240 H.C. Deb., col. 545–47 (18 June 1930). As of 1930 approximately one and a quarter million workers were covered by the system. Allen, Trade Unions and the Government, 59–60; Seymour, Whitley Councils, 40.

^27. Minister of Labour Margaret Bondfield contended that it was “in the interests of all concerned in industry that matters affecting conditions of work should be the subject of … voluntary arrangement” between representative organizations of employers and employed. 232 H.C. Deb., col. 1595 (28 November 1929).

^28. For background, see Arnot, R. Page, The Miners: Years of Struggle, vol. 2 of a history of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain (London, 1953)Google Scholar; Kirby, M. W., The British Coalmining Industry, 1870–1946 (Hamden, 1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Roy Church, “Employers, Trade Unions, and the State, 1889–1987: The Origins and Decline of Tripartism in the British Coal Industry,” in Workers, Owners, and Politics in Coal Mining; and Supple, Barry, “The Political Economy of Demoralization: The State and the Coalmining Industry in America and Britain Between the Wars,” Economic History Review, 2d series, 41 (1988): 566–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^29. Gospel, Howard F., Markets, Firms, and the Management of Labour in Modern Britain (New York, 1992), 79–101CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Tolliday, Steven and Zeitlin, Jonathan, “National Models and International Variations in Labour Management and Employer Organization,” in The Power to Manage? Employers and Industrial Relations in Comparative-Historical Perspective, ed. Tolliday, Steven and Zeitlin, Jonathon (London, 1991).Google Scholar

^30. Beveridge, W. H., Letter to the Editor, The Times, 21 October 1929Google Scholar; “The Coal Mines Bill,” The Economist, 14 December 1929.

^31. Kirby, British Coalmining, 124–37; Skidelsky, Rober, Politicians and the Slump: The Labour Government of 1929–1931 (London, 1967), 111–13Google Scholar, 131–34.

^32. Lucas, Arthur Fletcher, Industrial Reconstruction and the Control of Competition: The British Experiments (London, 1937), 74Google Scholar. Winston Churchill attacked the Labour government's proposal as “a most repulsive specimen of Syndicalism whereby the Government, under duress, joins forces with a powerful capitalist interest, and with a still more powerful vote interest, in the hope of fortifying their own political strength and with the callous ntention of pillaging the wealth of the nation.” 233 H.C. Deb., col. 1763 (19 December 1929). Ironically, the small minority of Liberals was the most insistent on a more direct role for the state in rationalizing production.

^33. Supple, “Political Economy of Demoralization,” 579.

^34. Kirby, British Coalmining, 124.

^35. Supple, “Political Economy of Demoralization,” 584.

^36. According to Dubofsky and Van Tine: “By 1932 most bituminous operators desired some sort of federal legislation to liberate coal from the antitrust laws and to sanction pricefixing and joint marketing arrangements,” but they opposed the Davis-Kelley bill because it recognized collective bargaining rights. John L. Lewis, 177. Brody, “Labour Relations in American Coal Mining,” 100–105; Johnson, Politics of Soft Coal, 135–36, 217–20.

^37. In Britain's coal industry, though union density fell subsequently after reaching a peak of 77 percent in 1921, union membership at no time during the depression went below 50 percent. Union density in the American mining, quarrying, and oil industries, which stood at 36 percent in 1920, fell to 23 percent in 1930. Bain and Price, Profiles in Union Growth, 45, 95.

^38. Reagan, Patrick D., “Creating the Organizational Nexus for New Deal Planning,” in Voluntarism, Planning, and the State, ed. Brown, Jerold E. and Reagan, Patrick D. (Westport, 1988)Google Scholar; Kidd, Stuart, “Collectivist Intellectuals and the Ideal of National Economic Planning, 1929–33,” in Nothing Else to Fear: New Perspectives on America in the Thirties, ed. Baskerville, Stephen W. and Willett, Ralph (Manchester, England, 1985)Google Scholar; and Booth and Pack, Employment, Capital, and Economic Policy, 55–75, 148–64.

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^40. The distinction between representative and technocratic conceptions of a national economic council is useful, but each of these categories can be further differentiated into statist and nonstatist varieties. Representative coucils could exist either outside or within the the structure of government, though nonstatist versions of this scheme were most common. Since a representative congress would retain an organizational base of support outside of the state, it could be as much a reflection of the state's dependence on organizations in the private sector as a vehicle for the state to co-opt private associations for its own purposes. Most proposals for a technocratic economic council had a clearly statist dimension in that they addressed the problem of limited state capacities for economic planning not by devolving state power onto existing private sector organizations, but rather by enhancing the state's own independent expertise. An alternative nonstatist technocratic model was also possible, so long as the body of experts assembled under private auspices and remained outside the government. In both countries, business supporters of either form of macro-level planning body tended to favor reliance on nonstatist approaches; support for either representative or technocratic mechanisms with a statist dimension was more likely to come from intellectuals, labor leaders, or government officials.

^41. Industrial Conference, Report of Provisional Joint Committee Presented to Meeting of Industrial Conference (London, 1920)Google Scholar; Lowe, Rodney, “The Failure of Consensus in Britain: The National Industrial Conference, 1919–1921,” Historical Journal 21 (1978): 649–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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^44. 2330 H.C. Deb., col. 420–21 (17 July 1929). Minister of Labour Margaret Bondfield offered a similar response when Mander again raised the issue the following May. 238 H.C. Deb., col. 2026 (15 May 1930). Ultimately the NCEO proved unwilling to follow through on the idea.

^45. Bullock, Alan, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, vol. 1: Trade Union Leader, 1881– 1940 (London, 1960)Google Scholar; Citrine, Walter McLennan, Men and Work: An Autobiography (1964; reprint, Westport, 1976).Google Scholar

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^47. Howson and Winch, EAC, 20–23.

^48. All told, seven industrialists, two trade union officials, two scientists, three economists, and one historian were named to the EAC, including Ernest Bevin, G. D. H. Cole, John Maynard Keynes, R. H. Tawney, and Sir Arthur Balfour. In spite of Hobson's and Layton's support for a representative council, most economists were more sympathetic to a technocratically conceived body. Keynes was a particularly influential spokesperson for an economic general staff, but even G. D. H. Cole, who back in 1919 had originally been a strong advocate of a representative council, had come to support a technocratic perspective. Howson and Winch, EAC, 20–30; Marquand, David, Ramsay MacDonald (London, 1977), 523–25.Google Scholar

^49. Churchill, Winston L. Spencer, Parliamentary Government arui the Economic Problem (Oxford, 1930)Google Scholar; Howson and Winch, EAC, 155. Oswald Mosley soon called for a National Planning Council far more powerful than either the EAC or Churchill's Economic Parliament. Mosley, National Policy, 17–18, 33.

^50. Percy, Democracy on Trial, 60.

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^56. Matthew Woll to James Girard (chair of NCF's Commission on Industrial Inquiry),3 June 1931, reprinted in Beard, America Faces the Future, 34–37. The NCF dated back to the turn of the century and brought together conservative unionists from the AFL with some of the nation's more enlightened business leaders. Green, Marguerite, The National Civic Federation and the American Labor Movement, 1900–1925 (Washington, D.C., 1956)Google Scholar; and Weinstein, James, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900–1918 (Boston, 1969).Google Scholar

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^61. Kendall was president of the Taylor Society. Lewis Lorwin of the Brookings Institution and Mary Van Kleeck of the Sage Foundation subsequently supported the same concept. Hearings, Senate, Economic Council, 414–415 (2 November 1931)Google Scholar; 213 (26 October 1931); 334–37 (29 October 1931), n.p. (1 December 1931); 314 (28 October 1931).

^62. Thomas Ferguson argues that after the initial stage of the New Deal, in which the interests of protectionist labor-intensive industries often dominated, more “progressive” capital-intensive industries and internationalist banking concerns came to the fore to create the foundation for the post-1935 New Deal. Ferguson contends that capitalintensive industries could better afford liberal labor policies, since wage costs were proportionally less important for them than for older labor-intensive industries. “From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression,” International Organization 38 (Winter 1984): 41–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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^64. Macmillan, Harold, Reconstruction: A Plea for a National Policy (London, 1933), 9–10Google Scholar, 32, 39, 53, 73, 113–14; Macmillan, Winds of Change, 266–67, 326–40. See also Booth and Pack, Employment, Capital, and Economic Policy, 57–62; Newton, Scott and Porter, Dilwyn, Modernisation Frustrated: The Politics of Industrial Decline in Britain Since 2900 (Oxford, 1985), 80Google Scholar; and Middlemas, Keith, Politics in Industrial Society (London, 1979), 325Google Scholar. Conservative Arthur Salter also called in 1933 for the establishment of a new “selfgoverning and self-regulating economic structure, based upon specialised institutions and group organisations” that reflected a similarly corporatist outlook, even though it was less ambitious in scope and made no explicit provision for the participation of organized labor. SirSalter, Arthur, The Framework of an Ordered Society (New York, 1933), 41.Google Scholar

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^67. Liberal M.P. Geoffrey Mander offered the amendments. See 261 H.C. Deb., col. 2041–64 (19 February 1932).

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^74. Howson and Winch, EAC, 107.

^75. Bernstein, Lean Years, 397–415. The Norris-La Guardia Act entailed an endorsement of the idea that organization by workers was a necessary complement to the growth of large-scale industry, but its primary purpose was to limit, not extend, the role of government in industrial relations. Ernst, Daniel, “The Yellow-Dog Contract and Liberal Reform, 1917–1932,” Labor History 30 (Spring 1989): 251–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Horowitz, Ruth L., Political Ideologies of Organized Labor: The New Deal Era (New Brunswick, 1978), 77–80.Google Scholar

^76. The NIRA was an omnibus piece of legislation that gained widespread support from various groups because it combined several different and even conflicting ideas of how the state might bring an end to the depression. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly; Himmelberg, Origins of NRA.

^77. Bernstein, New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy, 34.

^78. Skocpol and Finegold, “State Capacity and Economic Intervention.” Skocpol and Finegold contrast the NRA's failure with the relative success of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, which, they argue, was able to institutionalize state intervention in agriculture by building on the organizational base that had developed since the Agriculture Department's creation in 1889.

^79. See, for example, Crouch, Class Conflict and the Industrial Relations Crisis; and Williamson, Varieties of Corporatism.

^80. Skidelsky, Politicians and the Slump, 390.

^81. Baldwin observed that he “dreaded Roosevelt's experiments” and thought they would quickly produce “an appalling mess up in America.” Adusting to Democracy, 26. See also Skidelsky, Politicians and the Slump; and Middlemas, Keith and Barnes, John, Baldwin: A Biography (London, 1969).Google Scholar

^82. Brand, Corporatism and the Rule of Law, 94–95.

^83. Bernstein, Lean Years, 481–83.

^84. Himmelberg, Origins of NRA; Galambos, Competition and Cooperation.

^85. For a comparative analysis, see Tony Freyer, Regulating Big Business.

^86. Willoughby, Raymond, “The Trade Associations Are Ready,” Nation's Business 21 (July 1933): 35.Google Scholar

^87. Editorial on NIRA, Nation's Business 21 (June 1933): 29.Google Scholar

^88. Hearings of Senate Committee on Finance,National Industrial Recovery, 73d Cong., 1st sess., 221(22 May 1933).Google Scholar The one senator who explicitly raised the prospect of amending the NIRA to guarantee labor representation was Robert LaFollette, Hearings, Senate, National Industrial Recovery, 26–27 (22 May 1933)Google Scholar. FDR's speech is reprinted in American Federationist 40 (July 1933): 683. Rexford Tugwell, who was more suspicious of business than FDR, also said little about the role organized labor might play in the NIRAlike proposal for a “national plan” he put forward in The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts (New York, 1933).Google Scholar

^89. Felix Frankfurter suggested that Richberg join the group responsible for drafting the NIRA so that someone with close contacts with organized labor would be involved. Bernstein, Irving, A History of the American Worker, 1933–1941: Turbulent Years (Boston, 1970), 28–29Google Scholar. W. Jett Lauck, a close associate of John L. Lewis, also played an important role in pressing for Section 7a's inclusion in the NIRA. Dubofksy and Van Tine, John L. Lewis, 182–83.

^90. Hearings, Senate, National Industrial Recovery, 26–27 (22 May 1933)Google Scholar. Frankfurter expressed concern to Robert Wagner, the chief legislative sponsor of the NIRA, about the possible lack of protection for labor interests in the proposed law. However, instead of arguing that the bill be amended to require direct representation of organized labor, Frankfurter suggested to Wagner an amendment providing that the Secretary of Labor be assured “real authority in the initiation and conduct of negotiations on all proposals affecting labor in the development of industrial codes.” Felix Frankfurter to Robert Wagner, 30 May 1933, Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress.

^91. Editorial, American Federationist 40 (July 1933): 679.

^92. Lyon, Leverett S. et al. , The National Recovery Administration: An Analysis and Appraisal (Washington, D.C., 1935), 459Google Scholar. Labor was represented in the coal and clothing industries, but not in such mass-production industries as autos, steel, rubber, or electrical manufacturing.

^93. See, for example, the testimony of James Emery, head of the National Association of Manufacturers, and E. L. Michael, fomer business representative on the National War Labor Board, in Senate Hearings, National Industrial Recovery, 288–89; 379–81 (29 May 1933; 31 May 1933). Shortly after the NIRA went into effect, Nation's Business observed: “The apprehension that the Act would be a vehicle for unionization of industry through the power of Government seems to have been largely unfounded.” “Industry Tries the New Deal,” 21 (August 1933): 59. Levine, Rhonda F., Class Struggle and the New Deal: Industrial Labor, Industrial Capital, and the State (Lawrence, Kan., 1988)Google Scholar; and Vittoz, Stanley, New Deal Labor Policy and the American Industrial Economy (Chapel Hill, 1987)Google Scholar, both discuss the internal divisions in the business community concerning the NIRA.

The AFL successfully lobbied Congress to modify Richberg's original version of Section 7a by adding wording taken from the Norris-La Guardia Act banning “interference, restraint, or coercion” by employers in their workers' designation of collective bargaining agents, and by changing wording that initially prohibited employers from requiring workers to join “any organization” as a condition of employment to a ban applying only to compulsory membership in a “company union.” Bernstein, New Deal Collective Bargaining, 33–37; William Green's testimony before Hearings of the House Committee on Ways and Means,National Industrial Recovery, 73d Cong., 1st sess., 117–18(19 May 1933).Google Scholar

^94. “‘;The New Deal’ in Industry,” Coal Age 38 (June 1933): 173.

^95. Vittoz, Neu Deal Labor Policy, 93.

^96. “The ‘New Deal’ in Industry,” 174; Johnson, Politics of Soft Coal, 150–64.

^97. Bernstein, New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy.

^98. Gospel, Markets, Firms and the Management of Labour.

^99. Colin Crouch, “The State, Capital, and Liberal Democracy,” in State and Economy in Contemporary Capitalism, 27.

^100. Throughout the early 1930s the American Federationist consistently proclaimed an underconsumptionist interpretaion of the nation's economic woes as a means of justifying the need for increased unionization. Robert Wagner also cited the contribution higher wages resulting from unionization would make to economic stability. Huthmacher, J. Joseph, Senator Robert F. Wagner and the Rise of Urban Liberalism ([1968] New York, 1971).Google Scholar

^101. In addition to Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society, see Beer, British Politics in the Collectivist Age; and Taylor, Robert, “The Trade Union 'Problem' Since 1960,” in Trade Unions in British Politics, ed. Pimlott, Ben and Cook, Chris (London, 1982).Google Scholar