2. Senator Reed Smoot (R-Utah) chaired the Senate Finance Committee, responsible for tax and trade legislation. Smoot, born in January 1862, was first elected to the Senate in 1902. He served five six-year terms, until his defeat in the 1932 general election. Joining the Finance Committee in 1909, when Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island served as chairman, Smoot became chairman in 1923.

Congressman Willis Hawley (R-Ore.), chaired the Ways and Means Committee. Born in May 1864, Hawley won election to the House of Representatives in 1906. He became a Ways and Means Committee member in 1917 and committee chairman in 1929.

3. As a preliminary matter some may ask: Is the 1930 tariff act properly called Smoot-Hawley or Hawley-Smoot? Convention dictates that, since all revenue legislation must originate in the House of Representatives, the popular name of a tariff act begins with the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee-in this case Willis Hawley, an Oregon Republican. Even so, many Americans have long preferred the appellation Smoot-Hawley. Major newspapers and wire services used different variations in 1930 stories. The Associated Press and the New York Times exhibited a preference for Hawley-Smoot, while the United Press and the Washington Post frequently used Smoot-Hawley. A third wire service, the International News Service, frequently used Smoot-Hawley-Grundy, a formulation that included Senator Joseph Grundy (R-Pa.), long a textile lobbyist. The Wall Street Journal preferred Hawley-Smoot but also used the Smoot-Hawley form in wire stories. Over time, most Americans seem to have adopted the Smoot-Hawley form, perhaps because it seemed more felicitous. Senator Reed Smoot, the Finance Committee chairman, was a superior legislator—a work horse, not a show horse—and perhaps merits that special recognition. Chairman Hawley apparently did not leave any office files; thus historians have more difficulty evaluating his performance.

4. Emphasis added. Cooper, Richard N., “Trade Policy as Foreign Policy,” in Stern, Robert M., ed., U.S. Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), 291–92Google Scholar.

5. Quotes from DiBacco, Thomas V., Mason, Lorna C., Appy, Christian G., History of the United States (Boston, 1991), 540Google Scholar; and O'Connor, John R., Schwartz, Sidney, Wheeler, Leslie A., Exploring United States History (New York, 1984), 579Google Scholar.

6. Brinkley, Alan, Current, Richard N., Freidel, Frank, and Williams, T. Harry, American History, 8th ed. (New York, 1991), 740Google Scholar; Salvatore, Dominick, 4th ed., International Economics (New York, 1993), 270.Google Scholar

Similar comments appear in the following high-school history texts: Graff, Henry F., America: The Glorious Republic (Boston, 1985), 634Google Scholar; Green, Robert P. Jr., Becker, Laura L., and Coviello, Robert E., The American Tradition: A History of the United States (Columbus, 1984), 510Google Scholar; O'Connor, John R., Schwartz, Sidney, and Wheeler, Leslie A., Exploring United States History (New York, 1984), 579Google Scholar; Davidson, James West and Lytle, Mark H., The United States: A History of the Republic (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1981), 595Google Scholar; Sobel, Robert, LaRaus, Roger, De Leon, Linda Ann, and Morris, Harry P., The Challenge of Freedom (River Forest, III, 1981), 516, 541Google Scholar.

Among the college-level history books critical of the 1930 tariff are these: Bailey, Thomas A., American Pageant 5th ed. (Lexington, Mass., 1985), 850–51Google Scholar; Bailyn, Bernard, Dallek, Robert, Davis, David Brion, Donald, David Herbert, Thomas, John L., and Wood, Gordon S., The Great Republic: A History of the American People, 3d ed. (Lexington, Mass, 1985), 730, 31, 56Google Scholar; Blum, John M., Schlesinger, Arthur Jr., et al. , The National Experience, 6th ed. (New York, 1985), 658Google Scholar; Nash, Gary B., Jeffrey, Julie Roy, and others, The American People (New York, 1986), 2:780Google Scholar. Many other textbooks in economics, diplomatic history, political science, and international law offer comparable, critical interpretations.

My sampling of economics texts includes: Samuelson, Paul A. and Nordhaus, William D., Economics, 14th ed. (New York, 1992), 688Google Scholar; Miller, Roger LeRoy, Economics Today, 7th ed. (New York, 1991), 872Google Scholar; Ekelund, Robert B. Jr. and Tollison, Robert D., Economics (Boston, 1986), 784Google Scholar; Campbell R. McConnell, Economics, 5th ed. 1972), 741. Also Kindleberger, Charles P., The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1973), 194, 294Google Scholar.

For political science and law writings, several representative items are listed: Destler, I. M., American Trade Politics (Washington, D.C., 1986), 4Google Scholar; Oye, Kenneth, Economic Discrimination and Political Exchange (Princeton, 1992), 79, 214Google Scholar; Winham, Gilbert R., International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation (Princeton, 1986), 36–37Google Scholar; and Jackson, John H. and Davey, William J., Legal Problems of International Economic Relations (St. Paul, Minn., 1986), 144Google Scholar. Some political scientists specializing in international political economy have begun to reevaluate Smoot-Hawley. See, for example, Lake, David A., Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887–1939 (Ithaca, 1988), 191–209Google Scholar.

7. One measure is the merchandise trade balance. From 1893 to 1971 the U.S. enjoyed a persistent trade surplus. Since 1971 the U.S. has experienced a persistent merchandise trade deficit. About 1970 the average duty on dutiable imports dropped below 10 percent, a level believed to have some commercial significance depending on conditions in particular product markets.

8. Obviously not all writers emphasize each of the above points.

9. It is arguable that the average ad valorem equivalent may not capture the full protective effect. If higher duties effectively barred imports, the average ad valorem equivalent could prove an unreliable measure.

10. Statistics from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States (Bicentennial Edition), 2:888.

11. The economists Marc Hayford and Carl A. Pasurka Jr. have also noted that deflation has an upward bias on items carrying specific rates of duty. See Hayford and Pasurka, “Effective Rates of Protection and the Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley Tariff Acts,” Applied Economics 23 (1991): 1389.

12. U.S. Tariff Commission, Relation of Duties to Value of Imports (Washington, D.C., 1932), 2, 16.

13. The Revenue Act of 1932 increased the ad valorem equivalent on coal from 12 percent in 1931 to 29.4 percent in 1932. Petroleum products, previously on the free list, received a 33 percent equivalent duty. The 4-cent-per-pound tax on copper amounted to a 65 percent ad valorem rate in 1932. A $3 duty per thousand board feet of lumber translated to about a 24 percent ad valorem equivalent in 1932. See U.S. Tariff Commission, Economic Analysis of Foreign Trade of the United States in Relation to the Tariff (Washington, D.C., 1933).

14. Ibid.; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract, 1993 (Washington, D.C., 1993), 818.

15. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States (Bicentennial Edition), 2:888; U.S. Tariff Commission, Computed Duties and Equivalent Ad Valorem Rates on Imports into the United States from Principal Countries 1929 and 1931. (Washington, D.C., 1933). About 80 percent of imports from neighboring Canada and Mexico entered duty-free under Smoot-Hawley, up for both countries over tariff treatment under Fordney-McCumber. For many Asian and Latin American countries, except Argentina and Cuba, a substantial percentage of exports to the U.S. entered duty-free or at low rates. In 1931, 96 percent of Brazil's exports entered free, and so did 84 percent of Japan's exports.

In light of the criticisms of Smoot-Hawley protectionism, it is especially ironic to note that the trade data show a decline in the average ad valorem equivalent on all U.S. imports after passage of the act. One should not exaggerate this conclusion. In 1930, some importers may have rushed shipments to avoid higher duties, while others delayed shipments, anticipating that some dutiable merchandise might enter on the free list.

16. Wanniski, Jude, The Way the World Works (New York, 1978), 125, 141Google Scholar.

17. Fred Kent, a New York banker, and Roger Babson, a financial commentator, blamed the Democratic insurgent coalition for creating uncertainty. See New York Times, 12, 13, 21, 23 November, 1929.

Several economic historians also reject the Wanniski thesis. Harold Bierman concludes that the theory lacks credible evidence, in his Great Myths of 1929 and the Lessons to Be Learned (New York, 1991), 120Google Scholar. Barry Eichengreen says that “neither theory nor evidence supports Wanniski's thesis.” See Eichengreen, , “Did International Economic Forces Cause the Great Depression?” Contemporary Policy Issues 6 (April 1988): 94CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Kindleberger, Charles agrees in his A Financial History of Western Europe (London, 1984), 366.Google Scholar

18. See also Fremling, Gertrud M., “Did the United States Transmit the Great Depression to the Rest of the World?” American Economic Review 75 (December 1985): 1181–85Google Scholar.

19. U.S. Tariff Commission, Economic Analysis of Foreign Trade of the United States in Relation to the Tariff (Washington, D.C., 1933), 413–59.

20. Temin, Peter, Lessons from the Great Depression (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), 46Google Scholar; Barry Forces Cause the Great Depression,” 112; and “The Political Economy of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff,” in Ransom, Roger L., ed., Research in Economic History (Greenwich, Conn., 1989), 12:25–29Google Scholar.

21. Hull, Cordell, Memoirs (New York, 1948), 1:355Google Scholar. Feis to Joseph B. Wood, 26 May 1932, 611.003/2592, RG 59, NA.

22. Sir E. Howard to R. L. Craigie, Foreign Office, 26 July 1929, FO 371/13537, British Public Records Office. The British Board of Trade took the view that tariff-rate adjustments had relatively little impact on trade flows. See Sir L. Fountain comment, 10 August 1929, in FO 371/13537.

23. Howard to Foreign Office, 8 August 1929, FO371/13537, and R. Lindsay to Foreign Office, 25 July 1930, FO 371/14280. For Ambassador Lindsay's assessment of the representation issue, see R. Lindsay to Foreign Office, 25 July 1930, FO 371/14280, all BPRO.

24. Emphasis added. “Study on Discrimination Against American Commerce,” 15 November 1931, 611.OO31/377–1/2, Record Group 59, National Archives.

From 1929 to 1931, U.S. exports lost market share in major import markets. Published Department of Commerce data involving 108 countries show that the value of imports from the U.S. declined as a share of total imports in most major markets from 1929 to 1931.

These are estimates. Such data need to be used cautiously because of the many currency conversions required and the different data-collection methods employed in foreign countries. Such price data do not distinguish between dutiable and duty-free imports, essential if one is to analyze the consequences of tariffs during a period of generally declining world trade.

25. Leacy, F. H., ed., Historical Statistics of Canada (Ottawa, 1983), G389–95Google Scholar. The same conclusion applies to the three-year period 1929 to 1932. Data on export product trends from U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce Yearbook [1932–33].

Many European countries bought fewer automobiles in the early 1930s as they sought to build up domestic industries. However, they did not bar all U.S. products. Hollywood and prune growers sharply boosted exports to European markets. Between 1929 and 1931, for example, prune exports to Italy quadrupled.

26. Drummond, Ian M. and Hillmer, Norman, Negotiating Free Trade (Waterloo, Ontario, 1989), 16Google Scholar.

27. Eichengreen, “The Political Economy of Smoot-Hawley,” in Roger L. Ransom, ed., Research in Economic History, 12:34. In his careful study of Britain's turn to protectionism, Tim Rooth gives almost no attention to Smoot-Hawley. Rooth, , British Protection and the International Economy: Overseas Commercial Policy in the 1930s (Cambridge, 1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28. U.S. Tariff Commission, Computed Duties; U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce Yearbook, 1932. The U.S. Tariff Commission reported to Congress on the problem in Depreciated Exchange (Washington, D.C., 1932).

29. Copy in papers of Senator George Norris, Library of Congress.

30. Ronald Reagan, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1987, 2:1348; 1988, 1:61, 238, 395.

31. Portland Oregonian, 22–24 May 1932; Salem Oregon Statesman, 23 May 1932.

32. New York Times, 24 May and 20 November 1932. Salt lake City Tribune, 10 and 13 November 1932. Merrill, Milton R., Reed Smoot: Apostle in Politics (Logan, Utah, 1990), 232Google Scholar.

33. Temin, Lessons from the Great Depression; Eichengreen, “International Economic Forces”; Kindleberger, Financial History, 367–69. Schuker, Stephen A., American “Reparations” to Germany, 1919–33: Implications for the Third-World Debt Crisis (Princeton, July 1988), 100–101Google Scholar.

34. Strange, Susan, “Protectionism and World Politics,” international Organization 39 (Spring 1985): 239–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

35. Ambassador R. Lindsay to Foreign Office, 30 October 1930, FO 371/14280, British Public Records Office. See also Michelson, Charles, The Ghost Talks (New York, 1944), 23–24Google Scholar.

36. Susan Strange has suggested that American corporations perpetrated the myth because they regarded British and European colonies as “obstructing their conquest of the world market” after World War II. Strange, “Protectionism and World Politics,” 240.