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Congressional capacity and the abolition of legislative service organizations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 November 2018

Andrew J. Clarke
Andrew J. Clarke*
Affiliation:
Government & Law, Lafayette College, Kirby Hall of Civil Rights, USA
*
*Corresponding author. Email: clarkeaj@lafayette.edu
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Abstract

I analyse the relative influence of lawmakers before and after a watershed moment in the development of faction institutions: the abolition of legislative service organizations. Blocs of lawmakers in the House of Representatives were afforded official resources to advance their policy agendas between 1979 and 1995. In the wake of the “Republican Revolution,” however, these groups were categorically dismantled. Using a difference-in-difference design, I estimate the individual-level effect of losing congressional resources on relative legislative effectiveness. The results inform our understanding of faction power, legislative bargaining and evolving congressional institutions.

Keywords

American party factionslegislative politicsU.S. Congress
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Public Policy , Volume 40 , Issue 2 , June 2020 , pp. 214 - 235
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2018

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Supplementary material: Link

Clarke Dataset

Dataset

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/G3BKWG
Link
Supplementary material: PDF

Clarke supplementary material

Online Appendix

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