Most studies of policy formulation focus on the nature and kind of advice provided to decision-makers and think of this as originating from a system of interacting elements: a “policy advisory system”. Policy influence in such models has historically been viewed as based on considerations of the proximate location of policy advisors vis à vis the government, linked to related factors such as the extent to which governments are able to control sources of advice. While not explicitly stated, this approach typically presents the content of policy advice as either partisan “political” or administratively “technical” in nature. This article assesses the merits of these locational models against evidence of shifts in governance arrangements that have blurred both the inside vs outside and technical vs political dimensions of policy formulation environments. It argues that the growing plurality of advisory sources and the polycentrism associated with these governance shifts challenge the utility of both the implied content and locational dimensions of traditional models of policy advice systems. A revised approach is advanced that sees influence more as a product of content than location. The article concludes by raising several hypotheses for future research linking advisory system behaviour to governance arrangements.

What is the impact of Greece's fiscal meltdown on the effectiveness of Europe's response? Using Perrow's normal accidents theory, I argue that efforts to reduce the likelihood of a Greek default activated conflicting centripetal and centrifugal modes of governance. Greater centralisation in decision-making at the European Union level improves policy effectiveness because it addresses problems of contagion but it simultaneously raises the risk of overall failure by increasing diagnosis, coordination and compliance costs. Three episodes are explored: the first bailout in May 2010, the mid-term fiscal strategy in June–July 2011 and the second bailout in February 2012. Implications are drawn for theories of delegation, intergovernmentalism and the future of EU crisis management.

This article focuses on one type of institutional change: conversion. One innovative approach to institutional change, the “political-coalitional approach”, acknowledges that: institutions can have unintended effects, which may privilege certain groups over others; institutions are often created and sustained through compromise with external actors; and institutions’ external context can vary significantly over time, as different coalitions’ power waxes and wanes. This approach helps explain the conversion of one institution drawn from the UK National Health Service, the National Reporting and Learning System. However, the shift of this system from producing formative information to facilitate learning to promote safer care, towards producing summative information to support resource allocation decisions, cannot be explained merely by examining the actions of external power coalitions. An internal focus, which considers factors that are normally viewed as “organisational” (such as leadership and internal stability), is also required.

New Zealand moved further in neo-liberal tax reform than most other advanced economies over the last three decades. The article investigates this extreme case to address the question of what explains major neo-liberal economic reform. Comparing tax policy-making in two periods, the 1980s and 2008–10, we argue that neo-liberal tax reform in New Zealand is best understood as the product of “autonomous bureaucratic action”. That is, bureaucratic organisations within the state independently formulated the goals and ideas for reform, took an activist role in policy-making and strongly influenced the policy preferences of ministers. Moreover, responding to a criticism often raised against state-centred theories, we offer an explicit explanation of bureaucratic preferences. We argue that bureaucratic goals and ideas were a product of how particular structural features of the bureaucracy – organisation and training – made ministries more or less receptive to new ideas within the economics discipline.