¹ Cf. Livy (Pol) xlii, 47, 4–9; Diod. xxx, 7, 1.

² Polyb. xxxvi, 9, 7: νῦν δὲ προοίμιον μὲν ἐκτεθεῖσθαι τῆς ἰδίας προαιρέσεως τὰ κατἀ Περσέα, βαστάσαντας ἐκ ρἱӡῶν τὴν Μακεδόνων βασιλείαν, τετελειωκέναι δὲ κατὰ τὸ παρὸν διὰ τῆς περὶ Καρχηδονίων διαλήψεως.

³ Livy (ann.) xlii, 27, 5: ‘Cn. Sicinius praetor ut exercitum paratum ad traiciendum haberet, C. Popilio consuli ex auctoritate senatus C. Licinius praetor scribit, ut et legionem secundam … et «ex» sociis Latini nominis quattuor milia peditum. ducentos equites idibus Februariis Brundisi adesse iuberet.’

⁴ Kahrstedt, , Klio xi, 1911, 428Google Scholar; Sanctis, De, Storia dei Romani iv, 1, 398Google Scholar.

⁵ Kritische Untersuchungen 246. According to his scheme, the Polybian section ends at the close of § 5, and 18, 6–28, 13, is annalistic.

⁶ I omit all consideration of such annalistic passages as 19,6 and 22, 5–7, where entirely contradictory accounts of Sicinius's movements are given.

⁷ O.c. 249. Nissen makes the preceding annalistic section end at 36, 8—consulibus. One may neglect Soltau's attribution of all ch. 36 to Polybius (Livius' Geschichtswerk 45).

⁸ Polyb. xxvii, 2, 12: οὗτοι μὲν ταῦτα διαπράξαντες ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησι κατὰ χειμῶνα…. ἀπέπλεον εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην.

⁹ Livy (Pol.) xlii, 44, 8: ‘Marcius et Atilius … principio hiemis Romam redierunt.’

¹⁰ See De Sanctis, o.c. iv, 1, 398, who thinks that the crossing of Sicinius and Marcius will have been ‘a un dipresso contemporaneo’.

¹¹ Kahrstedt, , Klio xi, 1911, 415–430Google Scholar, ‘Zum Ausbruch des 3ten mak. Krieges.’ This essay is ignored by De Sanctis and omitted from the bibliography to Benecke's chapter on Perseus in CAH viii (1930), 758–9Google Scholar. Kahrstedt's findings are accepted by Münzer, P-W, s.v. ‘Cn. Sicinius (8)’, 2197–8, and rejected by implication by Geyer, P-W, s.v. ‘Perseus’, 1011. All reference to Sicinius and his force is omitted in Pais-Bayet, , Histoire Romaine (Paris, 1926)Google Scholar. Owing to war conditions I have been unable to consult P. Heiland's Jena dissertation (1913): Untersuchungen zur Gesch. des Königs Perseus von Makedonien (179–68).

¹² Livy (Pol.) xlii, 38, 8 f.

¹³ Ibid. 38, 1–7.

¹⁴ Ibid. 43, 3.

¹⁵ Ibid. 47, 2.

¹⁶ Ibid. 40, 1: the difference in tense is perhaps significant; the garrisoning of the cities had not yet taken place.

¹⁷ Livy (Pol.) xlii, 37, 1.

¹⁸ Geyer, P-W, s.v. ‘Perseus’, 1011.

¹⁹ Livy (Pol.) xlii, 37, 5.

²⁰ Livy, xlii, 36, 9.

²¹ On the divisions inside the Greek cities at this time, and the importance to Perseus of the pro-Macedonian parties see Niese, Gesch. d. griech. u. mak. Staaten iii, 102 f.

²² Cf. the Roman reply (Livy (Pol.) xlii, 37, 6): ‘cui rescribi non placuit, nuntio ipsius, qui litteras attulerat, dici praesidii causa ipsarum urbium Romanos facere.’

²³ Livy (Pol.) xlii, 37, 3.

²⁴ Rev. Ét. anc. xxv, 1923, 354Google Scholar; BCH lvi, 1932, 533 f.Google Scholar

²⁵ E.g. Livy (Pol.) xxxii, 4, 7; xxxiii, 41, 9; xxxvi, 45, 8. Similarly, in Livy (Pol.) xxxii, 32, 1, ‘hiems iam eo tempore erat’ refers to October; cf. Walbank, Philip V of Macedon 320, n. 4.

²⁶ Cf. Livy (Pol.) xxxi, 47, 1: ‘Iam autumnale equinoctium instabat : … itaque ante hiemales motus evadere inde (sc. from the Euboean channel) cupientes Piraeum …repetunt’; De Sanctis, o.c. iv, 1, 389; Holleaux, , BCH lvi, 1932, 533Google Scholar f.

²⁷ Cf. Kahrstedt, o.c. 424 : ‘Ante hiemem war Marcius abgereist (Sept./Oktob., das ist nach polybianischer Rechnung schon κατὰ χειμῶνα) die Konferenz mit Perseus mag um den 1. November herum erfolgt sein, damals gab es noch kein Korps des Sicinius.’ It is, I think, clear that Kahrstedt has not appreciated the full implications of ante hiemem in this passage: hence even he puts Marcius's embassy rather too late.

²⁸ See above, p. 82, nn. 5–7. Kahrstedt, o.c. 416, suggests that having already taken his account of Sicinius's movements from an annalist, Livy was obliged to ignore Polybius's record of the same events, when he mentioned them in their proper chronological place.

²⁹ This possibility is recognised by De Sanctis, o.c. iv. 1, 398: ‘Il paucis post diebus dunque di 37, 1 0 è una forma di transizione cronologica introdotta autosche-diasticamente ed erroneamente da Livio per collegare due racconti di provenienza diversa i cui rapporti cronologici in realtà Livio non si è studiato di chiarire; ovvero.…’ It cannot, in any case, as De Sanctis clearly shows, refer to the hearing of Perseus's legati at Rome, described in the early part of ch. 36 from annalistic sources.

³⁰ On the embassy of 200 see Walbank, o.c. 128–135; 313–17; on that of 192, ibid. 194 f. In addition to the latter commission, Cato was sent in the autumn of 192 to Athens, Patrae, Aegium, and Corinth (Plut., Cat. mai. 12, 4–5). In both years the legati were in Greece for some months before any troops crossed the straits.

³¹ Cf. Kahrstedt, o.c. 428; De Sanctis, o.c. iv, 1, 398.

³² The position in 200 was a little different. Then the main Roman force crossed over in September, owing to the delay the Senate had experienced in getting the war-vote through the Centuries.

³³ Cf. Kahrstedt, o.c. 416.

³⁴ See preceding section.

³⁵ Frank, T., Class. Phil, v, 1910, 358–361CrossRefGoogle Scholar, ‘The diplomacy of Q. Marcius in 169 B.C.,’ rejects the whole story of this truce’ (followed in this by Scullard, History of the Roman World 753–146, 292). He argues that a ‘truce’ six months before hostilities break out has no meaning. However, what Marcius did secure was a postponement of hostilities; and this Polybius terms ανοχαί and Livy indutiae (Polyb. xxvii, 5, 8; Livy (Pol.) xlii, 43, 4). It is difficult to see what other words they could have used. Frank's arguments are rejected by Münzer, P-W, s.v. ‘Marcius Philippus (79)’, 1577 and by Otto, , Abh. Bay. Akad. N.F. xi, 1934Google Scholar, ‘Zur Geschichte der Zeit des 6. Ptolemäers,’. 64, n. 1.

³⁶ Livy (Pol.) xlii, 47, 10 : ‘A. quoque Atilium miserunt ad occupandam Larisam in Thessalia timentes ne, si indutiarum dies exisset, «Perseus» praesidio eo misso caput Thessaliae in potestate haberet.’ This takes place after the approval of Marcius's proceedings, but just before the hearing of the Macedonian envoys (ch. 48 (Pol.)): hence it follows that the truce was near its expiry when this interview took place, T. Frank, o.c. 359, has no grounds for describing the indutiae as ‘a month's truce’: its length is in fact unknown.

³⁷ Livy (Pol.) xlii, 47, 9.

³⁸ De Sanctis, o.c. iv, 1, 275.

³⁹ Nissen, o.c. 254.

⁴⁰ Apparently this is also the view of Benecke, CAH viii, 261, who, after describing Marcius's return to Rome and, by implication, the dismissal of Perseus's envoys, begins a new paragraph with the words, ‘Rome had at last decided to declare war’: the actual war-motion is unfortunately not mentioned, nor is it clear where or when Benecke imagines the rerum repetitio or indictio belli to have been presented.

⁴¹ For this τόποσ see the examples quoted by Gelzer, , Hermes lxviii, 1933, 139Google Scholar, n. 2.

⁴² Cf. McDonald, and Walbank, , JRS xxvii, 1937, 192Google Scholar ff.

⁴³ On this see McDonald and Walbank, ibid. 192–3, and Heuss, , Die völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen der römischen Aussenpolitik in republikanischer Zeit (Klio, Beiheft xxxi, 1933) 22Google Scholar, who, however, has no grounds for assuming that sacral law forbade the fetiales to leave Italian soil; Livy (ann.) xxx, 43, 9, which he quotes in evidence, states in fact the contrary: ‘fetiales cum in Africam ad foedus feriundum ire iuberentur….’

⁴⁴ Cf. Livy i, 32, 5; vii, 6, 7; 32, I; x, 45, 7: Dionys., Ant. Rom. ii, 72, 6: Lange, Röm. Altertümer i³, 322 f.

⁴⁵ This appears clearly in the preliminaries to the Syrian War, Livy (ann.) xxxvi, I, 5: ‘si ea rogatio perlata esset, tum si ita videretur consulibus, rem integram ad senatum referrent.’ Any subsequent rerum repetitio would thus be a matter falling wholly within the Senate's competence.

⁴⁶ Livy (ann.) xxi, 17, 4: ‘latum inde ad populum, vellent iuberent populo Carthaginiensi bellum indici.’ Livy (ann.) xxxi, 6, 1: ‘(P. Sulpicius)…rogationem promulgavit, vellent iuberent Philippo regi Macedonibusque qui sub regno eius essent ob iniurias armaque illata sociis populi Romani bellum indici; cf. 8, 1: ‘bellum iusserant.’

⁴⁷ If, as seems probable, the reply to Perseus's envoys at Rome (Livy (ann.) xlii, 36, 1 f.; (Pol.) xlii, 48, 1 f.) was the rerum, repetitio and indictio belli before the Third Macedonian War (see infra, p. 89, n. 56), it is very doubtful if it conforms to the usual procedure.

⁴⁸ E.g. Livy (ann.) xxxi, 3, 4–6; 7, 2–15; 42, 1–10; and the war-motion quoted in n. 46 above (Second Macedonian War); xlii, 25, 1 f. (war with Perseus). The loose claim in the last-mentioned passage that a rerum repetitio was delivered to Perseus before the resolution of the Senate and the vote of the Centuries is paralleled by the similar reference (Livy (ann.) xxxvi, 3, 10) to the reply of the fetiales to the question whether war should be declared on the Aetolians separately: ‘amicitiam renuntiatam videri, cum legatis totiens repetentibus res nee reddi nee satisfieri aequum censuissent.’

⁴⁹ Cf. Livy (ann.) xxxi, 7, 2–15, giving the speech of C. Sulpicius: the stress on the threat of an invasion was clearly a propaganda move.

⁵⁰ Cf. Sallust, Cat. 29, 3 : ‘aliter (i.e. without the SCU) sine populi iussu nullius earum rerum consuli ius est.’ For the second century this point is well illustrated by the outcry raised by the political enemies of Cn. Manlius Vulso in 187, to prevent his being given a triumph over the Galatians (Livy (ann.) xxxviii, 44, 9 f.). Manlius had carried out this campaign without authorisation from Rome and is therefore accused of pursuing a ‘privatum latrocinium’ (45, 7), a war ‘nullo gentium iure’ (45, 11), of wanting ‘tolli fetialia iura’ and reducing the fetiales to a cypher (46, 12). His enemies ask: ‘num senatum quoque de bello consuli non placet? non ad populum ferri, velint iubeantne cum Gallis bellum geri?’ And in a passage which is discussed below (p. 91, n. 61) they contrast the proper procedure and stigmatise Manlius's conduct as ‘iactura religionis’ and ‘deorum oblivio’ (46, 12). Allowing for the acrimony of political controversy, the discussion makes it quite clear that Manlius's conduct was unprecedented. Not so, however, the situation in which he had taken this step. In fact Flamininus had faced a similar dilemma in winter 196, when he was within an ace of waging on his own initiative what, according to Livy, he termed a just and pious war against the Boeotians (Livy (Pol.) xxxiii, 29, 1 f.). Sooner or later it was inevitable that a situation would arise requiring decisive action on the part of a consul or proconsul without reference to the distant Senate and people; and eventually the Senate had to acquiesce, contenting itself with characterising as bellum iniustum such action as it could not subsequently approve (e.g. Livy (ann.) xliii, 4, 13: compensation of the Abderites in 170 for their ill-treatment at the hands of Hostilius). In 81 Sulla tried to revert to the old position by making it treasonable for a provincial governor to leave his province, march his army beyond its frontiers or start a war on his own initiative, without the authorisation of Senate and People (Cic. in Piso. 21, 50); his failure is apparent from the career of Caesar. On this question see further Heuss, o.c. 22 f., who, however, in consequence of his legalistic approach, does not trace the historical situation in which the problem arose, the Senate's attitude of drift towards it, and the important distinction between a major war undertaken ab initio, and minor operations carried out by a general already operating on a distant front, which might by a stretch of procedure be regarded as a tail-piece to a war already declared. I have dwelt on this point, as it affords another example of the decay of the rigid ius fetiale in second-century conditions—this time to the advantage of the individual commander rather than that of the Senate as a whole.

⁵¹ Supra, p. 82, n. 4.

⁵² Livy (ann.) xlii, 30, 10–11.

⁵³ Though not specifically mentioned, the passing of the war-motion follows logically from the narrative, and is never in question (cf. Kahrstedt, o.c. 421, n. 1).

⁵⁴ Livy (ann.) xlii, 31, 1.

⁵⁵ E.g. the war-motion against Philip in 201/0 (Livy (ann.) xxxi, 6, 3) or that against Carthage in 218 (Livy (ann.) xxi, 17, 1–4).

⁵⁶ Supra, p. 88, n. 47. The interview with Perseus's legati is described twice in Livy, once in 36, 1 f., after an annalist (cf. Nissen, o.c. 249; against Soltau, o.c. 45, who makes it Polybian, see Kahrstedt, o.c. 422), and again after Polybius (48, 1 f.; see Nissen, o.c. 252). The first version is subsequent to the holding of the Latin Games ‘Kalendis Iuniis, quo maturius in provincias magistratus proficiscerentur’ (35, 3), a date which is to be equated with March 171, and there is no reason to question this order of events. It may be observed that this doublet is rejected by Geyer, P-W, s.v. ‘Perseus’, 1007, who treats 36, 1 and 48, I as referring to quite separate embassies, and apparently by Benecke, CAH viii, 260, though his account is far from clear (Marcius ‘advised the king to send a further embassy to Rome (i.e. at the Peneus interview), though his last envoys had received no answer’). The issue is slightly complicated by the fact that there is some evidence for an embassy sent by Perseus to Rome between that of Harpalus (Livy (Pol.) xlii, 14, 2; App. Maced. II, 3; Diod. xix, 34) and the one to which the ultimatum was presented; thus Appian, Maced. II, 3, records: ὁ δ' αὗθισ ἔπεμπεν ἑτἑρουσ, and Livy (Pol.) xlii, 40, g, giving Marcius's speech in Thessaly, has a reference to this embassy in his words: ‘certum habeo et scripta tibi omnia ab Roma esse et legatos renuntiasse tuos,’ which refer to events subsequent to the departure from Rome of Harpalus (cf. Nissen, o.c. 250, who is preferable on this point to Kahrstedt, o.c. 430). But this does not involve the identification of this embassy with that in Livy (ann.) xlii, 36.

⁵⁷ As Nissen implies; see above, p. 87, nn. 39 and 40. Cf. also De Sanctis, o.c. iv, 1, 280, n. 116: ‘Qui sembra che vada inserito Liv. xlii, 30, 10.’ There is in fact a slight inconsistency in De Sanctis on this point, since elsewhere he appears to regard the meeting between Perseus and Marcius on the Peneus as the real ultimatum; see above, p. 86, n. 38, and Cf. Encic. Ital. xxvi, 1935 s.v. ‘Perseo’, 803: ‘L'ultimatum romano fu presentato al re da Marcio Filippo che, tuttavia, non essendo ancora votata la guerra dai comizî nè iniziati i preparativi militari, concesse a P. una tregua per trattative ulteriori e così gli legò le mani nel momenta in cui un'ardita offensiva in Grecia poteva essere promettente di successo.’ On this subject no help is to be expected from Polybius, who was not awake to the significance of the fetial procedure (Cf. Gelzer, , Hermes lxviii, 1933, 165Google Scholar). He records (xxvii, 6, 3) how the Senate dismissed Perseus's envoys προδιειληϕότεσ ὑπἐρ τοῦ πολεμεῖν. But from Polybius's use of προδιαμβάνω (e.g. v, 29, 4; ix, 31, 2; xi, 1, 3) it is clear that it means nothing more than ‘come to a previous decision’ and has no technical relevance to the procedure of the warmotion. Appian, Maced. II, 5, writes: οἱ δὲ (sc. the Senate) οὐδἐν αὐτοῖσ ἀποκρινάμενοι, τὸμ πόλεμον ἐσ τὸ ϕανερὸν ἐκύρουν This last phrase (which Schweighaeuser translates ‘sed protinus bellum publice decretum’) should mean ‘the Senate openly ratified the war’; and it is noteworthy that in Polybius (e.g. i, 11, 3; 17, 1) κυρόω is usually used of the δῆμοσ and seems to be the equivalent of iubeo. But at this period the only way in which the Senate could ratify a war was by giving effect by means of the indictio belli to the People's conditional declaration of war. Hence, if Appian is to be pressed, what he means is ‘the Senate openly proclaimed that they were at war (i.e. to the envoys and the world at large)’. Thus, in so far as fetial procedure was being observed, this passage confirms the view that this interview with Perseus's envoys was regarded in the subsequent tradition as the combined rerum repetitio and indictio belli.

⁵⁸ O.c. 425.

⁵⁹ So too, apparently, De Sanctis: supra, n. 57.

⁶⁰ I ignore in this connection the account of Livy (ann.) xlii, 25, 1 ff., which describes an embassy sent to Perseus early in 172 ‘ad res repetendas … renuntiandamque amicitiam’, since it is generally recognised to be a part of the Roman propaganda of justification, and a thoroughly unreliable record; cf. Nissen, o.c. 246–7; Heuss, o.c. 50–1. (Pais-Bayet, o.c. i, 556, however, still accepts its authenticity.) On the peculiar case of the ultimatum delivered to Nicanor in 200 (which had at any rate the sanction of a senatus consultum) and the difficulties felt later on in connection with it, see McDonald, and Walbank, , JRS xxvii, 1937, 194–5Google Scholar Walbank, o.c. 131.

⁶¹ It is unfortunate that in Livy (ann.) xxxviii, 45, 4–5, a passage contrasting the correct procedure adopted in the preliminaries to the wars with Antiochus, Philip and Hannibal with the lack of all formalities in Manlius's attack on the Galatians (supra p. 88, n. 50), the reading is uncertain. The MS has: ‘de omnibus his consultum senatum populum fuisse saepe legatos ante res repetitas postremo qui bellum indicerent missos’; and if the usual emendation (‘…populum iussisse, saepe legatos ante missos, res …’) be accepted, this gives the four constituents of a correct war-declaration in the order proper to this period, viz. senatus consultum, populi iussum, rerum repetitio, indictio belli. Madvig, followed by Weissenborn-Müller (Teubner, ed. 1900) reads : ‘…iussisse, per legatos ante res repetitas, postremo …,’ thus referring the rerum repetitio to an earlier period; and though the third edition of Weissenborn-Müller's commentary (1909) reverts to the earlier reading, it refers the ante to both legatos … missos and res repetitas. This reading is preferable to Madvig's; but Weissenborn-Müller's interpretation of it ought not to be right: ante should refer only to the sending of legali (a common theme among annalistic exaggerations: supra, p, 88, n. 48), and not to the rerum repetitio as well. Unfortunately it cannot be considered certain that Livy necessarily recorded the correct historical situation (for his frequent references to rerum repetitiones preceding senatorial and popular decisions prove that he was not personally clear on the exact fetial position during the second century); and moreover the fifth item (‘saepe legatos ante missos’) comes in awkwardly. It is not impossible that the original source of this passage had the four constituents in their correct order, but that some intermediate annalist or even Livy himself sought to ‘rectify’ and improve the account with references to legati ante missi. There is in fact no reason why the four stages of the war-declaration should not have been mentioned in their due chronological order; and I am personally inclined to go behind the present doubtful reading to the order which Livy gives, and to treat that as evidence.

⁶² On the close connection between the change in the year and the war-declaration see Kahrstedt, Die Annalistik von Livius, B. xxxi–xlv, 21, n. 1. The relation of the consular year to the campaign is brought out clearly by the events of 153, when, in order that the consul Q. Fulvius Nobilior might proceed without delay to Spain, the day of entry into office was brought forward to 1st January; cf. Münzer, P-W, s.v. ‘Fulvius (95)’, 268.

⁶³ For a full treatment of the problems of this embassy see Walbank, o.c. 313–17.

⁶⁴ Ibid. 198 f. Baebius made no move during the winter, but was able to come to an important agreement with Philip, and open the campaign in 191 some time before the consular army crossed over from Italy.

⁶⁵ Cf. Livy (Pol.) xlii, 15, 1–2: ‘nondum quidem parantis bellum … Romanos, sed itainfestos, utfacile appareret non dilaturos’; 18, 2 (probably annalistic; see above, p. 85, n. 28): ‘belli administratio ad novos consules reiecta est.’

⁶⁶ Supra, pp. 84 f.

⁶⁷ On the significance of the choice of these states, all previous possessions or close allies of Macedon, with the exception of Aetolia, which had moved towards her after the Syrian War (cf. Walbank, o.c. 219–220), see Theiler, , Die politische Lage in den beiden makedonischen Kriegen (Diss. Halle, 1914), 67Google Scholar. It should, however, be noted that the Lentuli visited the Peloponnese, though Livy does not give the details of their mission.

⁶⁸ This was mainly due to the fact that the Roman decision was prompted by two external considerations, Eumenes's visit and allegations, and the convenient isolation of Perseus (cf. De Sanctis, o.c. iv, 1, 273). In addition there was the slight disadvantage that the years 173–0 were marked by quite acute factional struggles inside the ruling oligarchy, which had resulted in the election of a series of plebeians to the consulship; cf. Livy (ann.) xlii, 10, 11 ff.: ‘patres… utrique pariter consuli infensi’; 18, 2 (quoted above n. 65); see on these struggles Münzer, Römische Adelsparteien und Adelssee familien 219 f.

⁶⁹ Sicinius had 5,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, and of these 2,000 were employed garrisoning the forts of Dassaretia and Illyria in the districts marching with Macedon (Livy (ann.) xlii, 36, 8–9). As these fortresses were occupied peacefully, the problem of a winter campaign in these difficult districts, such as had confronted L. Apustius in 200 (Livy (Pol.) xxxi, 27, 1–8) did not arise. On the wide support for Perseus in Greece at this time, there is the evidence of Cato (Aul. Gell., Noct. Att. vi, 3, 16). See also supra, p. 84, n. 21.

⁷⁰ Supra, p. 82, n. 1. But the majority supported Marcius: ‘vicit tamen ea pars senatus, cui potior utilis quam honesti cura intererat.’

⁷¹ Supra, p. 89, n 56.

⁷² Livy (ann.) xlii, 36, 1 f.; the Polybian account (Livy xlii, 48, 1 f.) is subsequent to the return of Marcius to Rome, his despatch to Greece once more, and various provisions for the affairs of Thessaly, etc.: it is followed immediately by the preparations of the commanders for 171 to leave the city.

⁷³ Klio xi, 1911, 430.

⁷⁴ Supra, p. 86, n. 36.

⁷⁵ An interesting parallel is provided by the interview given to the Aetolians in 191 (Livy (Pol.) xxxvi, 35, 5–6). In this case too the envoys came under a truce, and it was also in the interest of Rome to immobilise the enemy for as long as possible: consequently the envoys do not appear to have been granted a hearing until after the expiry of the truce (cf. Walbank, o.c. 212, n. 6). They were then given a sharp intererat.” view and told to leave Italy within fifteen days. The difference lies in the fact that the Aetolians were already at war with Rome.

⁷⁶ Livy (Pol.) xlii, 49, 10.