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The Japanese Period in Indochina and the Coup of 9 March 1945

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 April 2011

Ralph B. Smith
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For the greater part of the period from 1940 to 1945, French Indochina occupied a peculiar place in the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Great East Asia. Following the capitulation of France before the German army in June 1940, the northern part of Indochina became the first area in Southeast Asia to admit Japanese troops — at that stage, as an extension of the Japanese campaign in southern China. In July 1941 the Japanese advance into southern Indochina marked the first step towards a full-scale attack on European and American possessions in the whole region, which materialized in December 1941. But this military advance into Indochina, precisely because it took place before the general assault on Southeast Asia and the Pacific, had to be achieved by means of agreements and treaties with an established government. These were possible only because the French in Indochina decided to recognize the pro-German government at Vichy, so that the Japanese were able to apply diplomatic pressure both in France and at Hanoi. Once the agreements had been made, the Japanese saw no need to change the basis of their occupation of Indochina even after December 1941; they were by then preoccupied with establishing their presence in other areas. Consequently they continued to recognize the French administration in Indochina and to maintain diplomatic relations with it, so long as diplomatic pressure was sufficient to ensure that Japanese military needs were fully met.

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Articles
Information
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , Volume 9 , Special Issue 2: Japan and the Western Powers in Southeast Asia , September 1978 , pp. 268 - 301
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1978

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References

In writing this article, I am greatly indebted to Mr. M. Shiraishi and to Mrs. M. Nakahara for their assistance during a visit to Tokyo in November/December 1975; and to Mr. M. Shiraishi and to Miss M. Takemoto, for translation and interpretation of Japanese source materials.

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3 Ibid., pp. 443–44.

4 Opinion-Impartial (Saigon), 25 Nov. 1944, 14 May 1945; for biographical details, see Japan Biographical Encyclopedia (Tokyo, 1958)Google Scholar.

5 For a list of this material, which was taken to Washington in 1945 and later microfilmed by the Library of Congress, but which has now been partly restored to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, see Library of Congress, Checklist of Archives in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Washington, 1954). There is some confusion regarding the numbers in this list and those used at the Foreign Ministry Archives; where documents have been consulted in Tokyo, in what follows, the numbers given are those used in Tokyo.

6 For these aspects of Decoux's policy, see Decoux, op. cit., pp. 431ff.

7 Ibid., pp. 401 ff, etc.

8 On these aspects of Decoux's policy, one must consult his critics; e.g. Pedrazzini, J., La France en Indochine (Paris, 1972), pp. 111 ffGoogle Scholar.

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19 Ibid., pp. 137–38; Devillers, op. cit., p. 93.

20 Information from Col. Hayashi Hidezumi, Dec. 1975. See n. 28 below.

21 He was still alive in Saigon in the 1960s and his biography appears in Who's Who in Vietnam, 1967 (Saigon, 1967)Google Scholar.

22 Devillers, op. cit., pp. 89, 92. For the background to the Caodaists in the 1930s, see Smith, R.B., “An Introduction to Caodaism”, Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies (London), XXXIII (1970)Google Scholar.

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24 Devillers, op. cit., pp. 89–91.

25 Dao, Hoang Van, Viet-Nam Quoc-Dan Dang: Lich-su dau-tranh can-dai (Saigon, 1965), pp. 189–90Google Scholar. Two of these parties were proscribed by the Viet-Minh Provisional Government in early September 1945; Viet-Nam Dan-Quoc Cong-Bao (Hanoi), 29 Sept. 1945, p. 6.

26 Toyofumi, Tominaga, in Yu, Ikeda (ed.), Daitoa Senshi [History of the Great East Asia War], vol. II (Tokyo, 1968)Google Scholar. He refers to Col. Hayashi Hidezumi, who was responsible for looking after Diem in Saigon and who would appear to be the original source of the information. See n. 28 below.

27 This is apparent from the information given in Benda, H.J., The Crescent and the Rising Sun (The Hague, 1958)Google Scholar.

28 Col. Hayashi kindly permitted an interview with the author in Dec. 1975; I am greatly indebted to him both for specific factual information and for the insight he gave into the situation in Saigon during 1944–45.

29 South China Morning Post, 10 Nov. 1945.

30 Devillers, op. cit., pp. 89–91.

31 Who's Who in Japan, 1937 gives details of his diplomatic career to that date; see also Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, E.4.0.0.-13 (=S.5..4.0.0.2), for his role in charge of the Enquiry into Natural Resources, Sept. 1941; Opinion-Impartial, 21 Oct. 1944, for his position at the Japanese Cultural Institute; and Opinion-Impartial, 22 May 1945 for his role after 9 Mar. 1945.

32 Lan, Phuong, Nha Cach-Mang Ta Thu Thau, 1906–1945 (Saigon, 1974), p. 272Google Scholar. For his meeting with Ho Chi Minh (Nguyen Ai Quoc), see Lacouture, J., Ho Chi Mirth (Paris, 1967), p. 19Google Scholar. Until his death, Komatsu was Professor of French at Tokyo University.

33 Decoux, op. cit., pp. 300–301. Text also in Legrand, J., L'Indochine a l'Heure Japonaise Cannes, 1963), pp. 224–25Google Scholar.

34 Devillers, op. cit., p. 118.

35 G. Sabattier, Le Destin de l'Indochine: Souvenirs et Documents, 1941–1951 (Paris, 1952), pp. 387–90. Sabattier was placed in charge of the Resistance troops in northern Indochina. On Blaizot's position, see n. 36 below.

36 The dispute on this issue, and the question of Blaizot's position, is covered in some detail in the British archives, although the full story of relations with the U.S. at this point has yet to be revealed. See FO 371/46304, P.R.O., London.

37 Decoux, op. cit., pp. 319–20; Legrand, op. cit., p. 233. Langlade transmitted to Decoux the instructions of the new Minister of Colonies in Paris, for which see Sabattier, op. cit., pp. 99–100.

38 Kirbyef, S.W. et al. , The War against Japan, vol. III (London, 1961)Google Scholar.

39 Romanus, C.F. and Sunderland, R., Stillwell's Command Problems (“U.S. Army in World War II” Series, Washington, 1956), pp 316 ffGoogle Scholar. On the bombing of Indochina before Jan. 1945, see Chennault, C., The Way of a Fighter (New York, 1949), pp. 248–50, etcGoogle Scholar.

40 Ehrman, J.P.W., Grand Strategy, August 1943-September 1944 (“History of the Second World War” Series, London, 1956)Google Scholar.

41 Butow, R.J.C., Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford, 1954), pp. 42–43Google Scholar.

42 Kirby, op. cit., (London 1965), IV, 85–86.

43 W.O. 203/5608, P.R.O., London.

44 Legrand, op. cit., pp. 229–33; Boisanger's note on the conversation is dated 20 Nov. 1944. Boisanger was in charge of diplomatic affairs under Decoux.

45 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey: Fifth Air Force, in the War against Japan (Washington, 1947), p. 21Google Scholar. For Japanese reaction, see the various telegrams between Indochina and Tokyo cited below.

46 The making of the plan is reported in a telegram from Matsumoto to Shigemitsu, 25 Feb. 1945, following an investigation of the situation in Indochina by a Foreign Ministry official named Ishizawa. A. 7.0.0.9 – 54 (=S.0.0.54), pp. 191–93, Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, Tokyo. The identity of the officer is not given, but it appears to have been Col. Hayashi Hidezumi; see n. 65 below.

47 He had previously been in Timor. He took over command in Indochina on 14 Dec. 1944. Sittan Meigo Sakusen [The Sittang and Mei-go Operations], (Tokyo, 1969), pp. 594–95Google Scholar.

48 Matsumoto to Shigemitsu, 25 Jan. 1945. A.7.0.0.9–54, pp. 26–27, in Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, Tokyo.

49 Sabattier, op. cit.ch. 5–6.

50 IMT Document no. 501 (=IPS no. 2664), from the Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives.

51 See below for more details of this debate, and references.

52 Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, A.7.0.0.9–54, pp. 50ff.

53 British archives, FO 371/46305/F1563, P.R.O., London: secret correspondence between the French and British governments on 12 Mar. 1945.

54 Domei broadcast, in English for Europe, 10 Mar. 1945, as monitored by the B.B.C.; copies of monitored reports are to be found in the P.R.O. files: FO 371/46305/F1569.

55 Sabattier, op. cit., pp. 118–23.

56 Ibid., pp. 115–18.

57 Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, A.7.0.0.9.-54, pp. 194–96.

58 Ibid., p. 280.

59 Defence Agency, Office of War History: Sittan Mei-go Sakusen and Tominaga Toyofumi, “The Coup d'Etat in Hue” in Ikeda Yu (ed.), Daitoa Senshi, vol. II. I am grateful to Miss Takemoto for a translation of the latter.

60 For text, see Decoux, op. cit., 330.

61 Tominaga, as above, gives a fairly detailed account of this from the Japanese side.

62 See the Situation Reports of 10–29 Mar. 1945, forwarded to the Foreign Office by the War Office, in FO 371/46305/F1642 etc., P.R.O. London.

63 Note the telegram from Churchill to Roosevelt, 17 Mar. 1945, on this question: FO 371/46305/F1714, P.R.O., London.

64 Domei in English, 13 Mar. 1945, as monitored by the B.B.C.; copy in FO 371/46305/F1569, P.R.O., London.

65 See n. 46 above.

66 Matsumoto to Shigemitsu, 25 Feb. 45, Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, A.7.0.0.9. 54, pp. 191–93.

67 Tsukamoto to Shigemitsu, 16 Jan. 1945, Ibid., pp. 9–14.

68 Tsukamoto to Shigemitsu, 11 Feb. 1945, Ibid., pp. 102–3.

69 The reports are contained in telegrams from Matsumoto to Shigemitsu, 22–23 Feb. 1945, Ibid., pp. 168–71, 173–75.

70 Shigemitsu to Matsumoto, 24 Feb. 1945, Ibid., pp. 181–85. For a discussion of the Japanese conception of “independence within the New Order of East Asia”, as opposed to ‘independence based on the idea of liberalism and self-determination’, see Elsbree, W.H., Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, 1940–1945 (Harvard, 1953), pp. 25 ffGoogle Scholar. The phrases quoted are from Exhibit 1336 of the International Military Tribunal of the Far East, i.e., the Total War Research Institute's “Draft basic plan for the establishment of the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere”, 27 Jan. 1942.

71 Matsumoto to Shigemitsu, 26 Feb. 1945, ibid., pp. 194–96.

72 Shigemitsu to Matsumoto, 26 Feb. 1945, Ibid., pp. 197–98.

73 Matsumoto to Shigemitsu, 28 Feb. 1945, Ibid., pp. 220.

74 This point is referred to in a memorandum by Ogijima, chief of the second political section of the Foreign Ministry, 30 Jan. 1945 (Ibid., pp. 44–49); and in several telegrams, e.g., Shigemitsu to Matsumoto, 7 Feb. 1945 (Ibid., pp. 70–80); Matsumoto to Shigemitsu, 26 Feb. 1945 (ibid, pp. 194–96).

75 Domei news agency reports, 14 Mar. 1945, based on proclamation of Tsuchihashi in Saigon the previous day, as monitored by the B.B.C. Copy in British archives, FO 371/46305/F.1569. Nisjiimura is not mentioned there, but see also Opinion-Impartial (Saigon), 23 Mar. 1945.

76 Opinion-Impartial, 10, 11, 30 Apr. 1945.

77 Opinion-Impartial, 21, 22 Mar. 1945.

78 Devillers, op. cit., p. 125, reproduces the French version of the text. See also Ngay Nay (Hanoi), 5 May 1945; and the account by Tominaga.

79 Ngay Nay, 5 May 1945.

80 Proclamation of Japanese authorities, 15 Mar. 1945, as reported by Domei news agency; see FO 371/46305/F1569, and also Opinion-Impartial, 19 Mar. 1945.

81 Mus (1947?), Lecon 3, pp.2–3.

82 Saintany, J., Histoire d'une Paix Manquee, Indochine, 1945–1947 (Paris, 1967), p. 54Google Scholar.

83 La Tribune Indochinoise (Saigon), 15 Apr. 1942, 20 May 1942.

84 Cited in Khanh, Huynh Kim, “The Vietnamese August Revolution Reinterpreted”, Journal of Asian Studies, XXX, no. 4 (1971), 766Google Scholar.

85 Dieu, Pham Van, Viet-Nam Van-hoc Giang-binh (Saigon, 1961), pp. 477–80Google Scholar.

86 Opinion-Impartial, 20 Apr. 1945, based on Domei report of previous day. A full list of ministers is given. See Devillers, op. cit., p. 127.

87 See Who's Who in the Republic of South Vietnam (Giai-Phong Editions, South Vietnam, 1969), p. 42Google Scholar.

88 Biographies of the following ministers will be found in Souverains et Nota bilites de l'Indochine (Hanoi, 1943): Hoang Xuan han, Nguyen Huu Thi, Tran Van Chuong, Vu Ngoc Anh. For the death of Vu Ngoc Anh on 23 July 1945, see Opinion-Impartial, 26 July 1945.

89 Opinion-Impartial, 9 May 1945.

90 Ibid., 16 July 1945; See Devillers, op. cit., 127.

91 Opinion-Impartial, 25 May 1945

92 Ibid., various issues during July/August; figures based on numbers given at different dates during period.

93 Long, Ngo Vinh, Before the Revolution: The Vietnamese Peasants under the French (Cambridge, Mass., 1973)Google Scholar.

94 Opinion-Impartial, 12 June 1945.

95 Ngay-Nay, 23 June 1945.

96 Devillers, op. cit., p. 127.

97 Opinion-Impartial, 28 June 1945.

98 Ngo Vinh Long, pp. 122ff; he translates sections of an eyewitness acount of the famine by Tran Van Mai, p p. 221ff.

99 Opinion-Impartial, 12 June 1945;Ngay-Nay, 23 June 1945.

100 Thanh-Nghi, 12 May 1945.

101 Opinion-Impartial, 23 May 1945.

102 Ibid., 8 June 1945.

103 Series of Thanh-Nghi and Ngay-Nay for 1945 were consulted by the author at the then “National Library” in Saigon, 1972.

104 Thanh-Nghi, 5 May 1945.

105 Ngay-Nay, 23 June 1945.

106 Communique of 12 July, reporting decrees dated 29 June 1945; Opinion-Impartial, 16 July 1945.

107 Opinion-Impartial, 18 July, 1 Aug. 1945.

108 Ibid., 26 July 1945.

109 Opinion-Impartial, 4 Apr. 1945.

110 Ibid., 10, 12 Apr. 1945.

111 Ibid., 15 Apr. 1945.

112 Nam, Nguyen Ky, Hoi-Ky 1925–1964: II. 1945–54 (Saigon, 1964), pp. 151–63Google Scholar. Devillers merely says that permission for such a demonstration on the 16th was refused by the Japanese (p. 125); but it is clear that it did take place on the 18th. For Duong Ba Trac, see Tran Van Giap, Luoc-Truyen cac Tac-Gia Viet-Nam (Hanoi, 1972), II, 112–13.

113 Devillers, op. cit, p. 125–26.

114 Opinion-Impartial, 25, 27 May 1945.

115 Probably written by a British political officer named Meiklereid who arrived in Saigon about that time: FO 371/46309/F9525, P.R.O., London.

116 Opinion-Impartial, 2 July 1945.

117 Ibid., same issue.

118 Ibid., 9, 23 July 1945.

119 Ibid., 2 Aug. 1945.

120 Ibid., 18 Aug. 1945.

121 Ibid., 20 Aug. 1945.

122 Although there is no formal account of his movements during these years, it is evident from the published Vietnamese accounts by such people as Nguyen Luong Bang and Hoang Quoc Viet. For his journey to Kwangsi and back in 1941, see the account in Viet, Hoang Quoc, A Heroic People (Hanoi, 1965), pp. 195–213Google Scholar.

123 For a relatively detailed account of this base area, see Giap's, Vo Nguyen contributions to A Heroic People (Hanoi 1965), pp. 91–149Google Scholar; and to Days with Ho Chi Minh (Hanoi). See also Chen, K.C., Vietnam and China, 1938–1954 (Princeton, 1969)Google Scholar, ch. for the movements of Ho Chi Minh throughout this period.

124 Some information about the development of this base area can be gleaned from the essay by Hoang Quoc Viet in A Heroic People, cited in n. 123, and also from Thirty Years of Struggle of the Party (Hanoi, 1960), IX, 72 ffGoogle Scholar.

125 Thirty Years of Struggle of the Party, pp. 84–86. See also the essay by Nguyen Luong Bang in A Heroic People, p. 62.

126 For an English translation of the text, see Breaking Our Chains: Documents on the Vietnamese Revolution of August 1945 (Hanoi, 1960), pp. 7–17Google Scholar.

127 Histoire de la Revolution d'Aout (Hanoi, 1972), pp. 85ffGoogle Scholar.

128 Ibid., 83–84.

129 Ibid., 88–89.

130 Breaking Our Chains, pp. 22–42; Histoire de la Revolution d'Aout, pp. 99–100.

131 Breaking Our Chains, pp. 52–57.

132 Histoire de la Revolution d'Aout, pp. 104–5; Thirty Years of Struggle of the Party, p. 88.

133 Fenn, C., Ho Chi Minh (London, 1973), pp. 75–82Google Scholar. Fenn was working for OSS and AGAS in Kunming in the first half of 1945, and was responsible for Ho's success in securing cooperation with AGAS; they first met, in Kunming, on 17 Mar. 1945.

134 The date of Ho's move to Tan-Trao is not firmly established, but this appears the most likely date; see Vo Nguyen Giap's contribution to Days with Ho Chi Minh.

135 The only information concerning this mission so far published is in Smith, R. Harris, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley, 1972), pp. 331–34Google Scholar.

136 For more detail on this period, see Devillers, op. cit., pp. 136 ff and Histoire de la Revolution d'Aout, pp. 127ff.

137 Ibid., pp. 138–39. The failure to seize the bank was remarked upon critically by Truong Chinh in his assessment of the August Revolution, written in Sept. 1946; see Chinh, Truong, Primer for Revolt (New York, 1963), p. 42Google Scholar.

138 Devillers, op. cit., pp.

139 Even as early as 4 Sept. 1945, Tran Van Giau, the communist leader in Saigon, was having great difficulty in securing a policy of conciliation towards the British forces, in view of the more belligerent attitude of the non-communist groups. Devillers, op. cit., 155–56.

140 Included in Report to Foreign Office, P.R.O., London, FO 371/46308/F7054.

141 South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 8 Oct. 1945; See also report of 28 Sept. 1945. A week later, Terauchi is quoted as admitting that some deserters were helping the “nationalists”, but this “did not reflect the true Japanese attitude”; he claimed that senior officers were all cooperative with the British, but he had had to reprove some junior officers. Ibid., 17 Oct. 1945.

142 Ibid., 16 Oct. 1945.

143 Ibid., 17 Oct. 1945.

144 Mus, op. cit., pp. 9–11.