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Marshall Aid as a Catalyst in the Decolonization of Indonesia, 1947–49

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 August 2009

Pierre Van Der Eng
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Extract

The United States did not give Marshall aid to Western Europe for purely humanitarian reasons. Aid was also, perhaps even mainly, provided to serve the economic and political purposes of the United States. In studies dealing with the Marshall aid programme, the suspension of aid to the Dutch colony of Indonesia, and the seeming threat to halt the stream of dollars to the Netherlands, has been used as an example to prove that the programme was an American instrument of political power. In studies dealing with the decolonization of Indonesia, it is also alleged that the menace of adjournment of Marshall aid forced the Dutch to retreat from their colony in December 1949. However, primary sources show that neither the offer of Marshall aid in June 1947, nor the seeming threat to halt aid to the Netherlands in December 1948, prevented the Dutch government from pursuing its own way in the process leading to the independence of Indonesia. The Dutch cabinet was not sufficiently impressed by both the offer and the threat to keep it from engaging in military “police actions” in July 1947 and December 1948 against the nationalist Republic of Indonesia.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , Volume 19 , Issue 2 , September 1988 , pp. 335 - 352
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1988

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References

I thank Prof. Dr. Angus Maddison and Dr. Yong Mun Cheong for their comments on drafts of this article.

1 On the intentions of the Marshall aid programme see: Arkes, H., Bureaucracy, the Marshall Plan and the National Interest (Princeton, 1972), p. 4Google Scholar; van der Beugel, E.H., From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership: European Integration as a Concern of American Foreign Policy (Amsterdam, 1966), pp. 238–39Google Scholar; Gimbell, J., The Origins of the Marshallplan (Stanford, 1976), pp. 270–73Google Scholar. On the practice and impact of the programme see also: Kolko, J. and Kolko, G., Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954 (New York, 1972)Google Scholar; Milward, A.S., The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–1951 (London, 1984)Google Scholar; Price, H.B., The Marshallplan and Its Meaning (New York, 1955)Google Scholar; Wexler, I., The Marshall Plan Revisited: The European Recovery Program in Economic Perspective (Westport/London, 1983)Google Scholar.

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17 This paragraph draws on: Colbert, E., “The Road Not Taken: Decolonization and Independence in Indonesia and Indochina”, Foreign Affairs, LI (1973): 624Google Scholar; and Drooglever, “United States and the Dutch Applecart”, pp. 36–37.

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31 Mr. D.U. Stikker (1897–1979) studied law. He was director of Heineken breweries in the pre-war years. In 1945 he entered into politics as chairman of the Employers Association and the Liberal Party. He was Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1948–52, and later Dutch ambassador in London, ambassador with NATO and OEEC and Secretary General of NATO.

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Later this motion was sharpened, due to the American military commitment in the Korean war, by the statement that the United States could interrupt aid to countries which did not support resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations.

55 Minutes of Cabinet (31 October 1949) RvM, box 393.

56 “Notities Betreffende de Politieke Situatie in Indonesië bij de Aanvang van 1956” (p. 18), J.E. van Hoogstraten to the Stichting Vertegenwoordiging in Indonesië van de Nederlandse Industrie (16 01 1956) ORNI, box 171Google Scholar.

57 New York Times (2 January 1953).

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Until 1949 Indonesia had received loans from the United States ($100 million for the purchase of army surplus goods, of which $62.6 million realized), Canada (Can$15.5 million), IMF (£5 million), Australia (A£8.5 million) and ECA ($15 million), which added up to about $145.4 million, see: Smit, C., De Indonesische Quaestie, De Wordingsgeschiedenis der Souvereiniteitsoverdracht (Leiden, 1952), pp. 280–82Google Scholar.

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