An individual-concept, hereinafter “individuation”, is a function from possible worlds to individuals. Constant individuations I will call “subsistents” (the notion will presently be generalized). A “substance”, after Thomason [35], is a subsistent whose value exists for the world at hand. In the systems of quantified modal logic developed over the past twenty years, the tendency has been to restrict the range of quantifiers to substances (often represented technically by the simple individuals that would be the values of the constant individuations), while allowing constant terms (particularly descriptions) to express arbitrary individuations. One result is to invalidate unrestricted universal instantiation (and existential generalization), rather as in free logic. Such systems approximate some features of ordinary usage rather nicely, e.g. the behavior of quantifiers and definite descriptions in tensed discourse. Stalnaker and Thomason's Q3r [34], based on the latter's Q3 [35], [36], is exemplary of this approach.

The suggestion has repeatedly been considered to quantify over individuations in general (Kanger [14], Kaplan [17], Hughes and Cresswell [12, p. 196], Thomason [35, p. 136], Pollock [30]).

Where a is a Turing degree and ξ is an ordinal < (ℵ1)L1, the result of performing ξ jumps on a, a(ξ), is defined set-theoretically, using Jensen's fine-structure results. This operation appears to be the natural extension through (ℵ1)L1 of the ordinary jump operations. We describe this operation in more degree-theoretic terms, examine how much of it could be defined in degree-theoretic terms and compare it to the single jump operation.

Modal logics are studied in their algebraic disguise of varieties of so-called modal algebras. This enables us to apply strong results of a universal algebraic nature, notably those obtained by B. Jónsson. It is shown that the degree of incompleteness with respect to Kripke semantics of any modal logic containing the axiom □p→P or containing an axiom of the form □mp↔□m+1p for some natural number m is . Furthermore, we show that there exists an immediate predecessor of classical logic (axiomatized by p↔□p) which is not characterized by any finite algebra. The existence of modal logics having immediate predecessors is established. In contrast with these results we prove that the lattice of extensions of S4 behaves much better: a logic extending S4 is characterized by a finite algebra iff it has finitely many extensions and any such logic has only finitely many immediate predecessors, all of which are characterized by a finite algebra.

One of the main results of Gödel [4] and [5] is that, if M is a transitive set such that 〈M, Є 〉 is a model of ZF (Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory) and α is the least ordinal not in M, then 〈Lα, Є 〉 is also a model of ZF.

In this note we shall use the Jensen uniformisation theorem to show that results analogous to the above hold for certain subsystems of ZF. The subsystems we have in mind are those that are formed by restricting the formulas in the separation and replacement axioms to various levels of the Levy hierarchy.

This is all done in §1. In §2 we proceed to establish the exact order relationships which hold among the ordinals of the minimal models of some of the systems discussed in §1. Although the proofs of these latter results will not require any use of the uniformisation theorem, we will find it convenient to use some of the more elementary results and techniques from Jensen's fine-structural theory of L. We thus provide a brief review of the pertinent parts of Jensen's works in §0, where a list of general preliminaries is also furnished.

We remark that some of the techniques which we use in the present paper have been used by us previously in [6] to prove various results about β-models of analysis. Since β-models for analysis are analogous to transitive models for set theory, this is not surprising.

The aim of this paper is to prove strengthenings of three theorems appearing in Jensen [1].

Theorem 1. (◊ℵ1,) If B is an infinite Boolean algebra (BA), then there is B1, such that ∣ Aut (B1) ≤∣B1∣ = ℵ1 and 〈B1, Aut (B1)〉 ≡ 〈B, Aut(B)〉.

Theorem 2. (◊ℵ1) There is a countably compact logic stronger than first-order logic even on finite models.

This partially answers a question of H. Friedman. These theorems appear in §§1 and 2.

Theorem 3. (a) (◊ℵ1) If B is an atomic ℵ-saturated infinite BA, Ψ Є Lω1ω and 〈B, Aut (B)〉 ⊨Ψ then there is B1, Such that ∣Aut(B1)∣ ≤ ∣B1∣ =ℵ1, and 〈B1, Aut(B1)〉⊨Ψ. In particular if B is 1-homogeneous so is B1. (b) (a) holds for B = P(ω) even if we assume only CH.

In this paper we prove that Beth's property does not hold in L<ω. This answers a question posed by Magidor and Malitz in [8]. Beth's property is a natural closure condition on a language which says that everything implicitly definable in the language is also explicitly definable in the language. That the first-order predicate calculus (L0) has the property was first shown by Beth [4]. Lopez-Escobar proved that also has Beth's property [7]. Malitz [9] showed the Beth's property fails in Lκλ where κ ≥ λ ≥ ω1. Friedman and Silver showed that the property fails in Lκλ for κ > ω1. Also Friedman [5] showed that extensions of elementary logic using cardinality quantifiers (L)1κ do not have Beth's property.

The undefined notation used here is standard. If further clarification is needed, we refer the reader to [3]. κ and λ denote infinite cardinals. cX and ȣX∣ denote the cardinality of X. cfμ will denote the cofinality of the order μ. All languages discussed are assumed to have no function or constant symbols. All structures are relational. The type of a formula is the set of relation symbols appearing in the formula (excluding equality). The type of a set of formulas is the set of all relation symbols appearing in some formula of the set of formulas. For purpose of this paper we will assume that to each n-ary relation in a structure there is associated an n-ary relation symbol and that in any given structure this association is one-to-one. Using this convention we can define the type of a structure to be the set of those relation symbols to which there is associated a relation in the structure. Sometimes we use the term predicate instead of relation.

Theorem. The Jacobson radical of an ℵ0-categorical associative ring is nilpotent.

We prove first that if T is a countable complete theory with n(T), the number of countable models of T, equal to three, then T is similar to the Ehrenfeucht example of such a theory. Woodrow [4] showed that if T is in the same language as the Ehrenfeucht example, T has elimination of quantifiers, and n(T) = 3 then T is very much like this example. All known examples of theories T with n(T) finite and greater than one are based on the Ehrenfeucht example. We feel that such theories are a pathological case. Our second theorem strengthens the main result of [2]. The theorem in the present paper says that if T is a countable theory which has a model in which all the elements of some infinite definable set are algebraic of uniformly bounded degree, then n(T) ≥ 4. It is known [3] that if n(T) > 1, then n(T) > 3, so our result is the first nontrivial step towards proving that n(T) ≥ ℵ0. We would also like, of course, to prove the result without the uniform bound on the finite degrees of the elements in the subset.

Theorem 2.1 is included in the author's Ph. D. thesis, as is a weaker version of Theorem 3.7. Thanks are due to Harry Simmons for his suggestions concerning the presentation of the material, and to Wilfrid Hodges for his advice while I was a Ph. D. student.

There is no algorithm for determining whether or not an equation is true in every 3-dimensional cylindric algebra. This theorem completes the solution to the problem of finding those values of α and β for which the equational theories of CAα and RCAβ are undecidable. (CAα and RCAβ are the classes of α-dimensional cylindric algebras and representable β-dimensional cylindric algebras. See [4] for definitions.) This problem was considered in [3]. It was known that RCA0 = CA0 and RCA1 = CA1 and that the equational theories of these classes are decidable. Tarski had shown that the equational theory of relation algebras is undecidable and, by utilizing connections between relation algebras and cylindric algebras, had also shown that the equational theories of CAα and RCAβ are undecidable whenever 4 ≤ α and 3 ≤ β. (Tarski's argument also applies to some varieties K ⊆ RCAβ with 3 ≤ β and to any variety K such that RCAα ⊆ K ⊆ CAα and 4 ≤ α.)

Thus the only cases left open in 1961 were CA2, RCA2 and CA3. Shortly there-after Henkin proved, in one of Tarski's seminars at Berkeley, that the equational theory of CA2 is decidable, and Scott proved that the set of valid sentences in a first-order language with only two variables is recursive [11]. (For a more model-theoretic proof of Scott's theorem see [9].) Scott's result is equivalent to the decidability of the equational theory of RCA2, so the only case left open was CA3.

In [6], G. Metakides and the author introduced a general model theoretic setting in which to study the lattice of r.e. substructures of a large class of recursively presented models . Examples included , the natural numbers with equality, 〈 Q, ≤ 〉, the rationals under the usual ordering, and a large class of n-dimensional partial orderings. In this setting, we were able to generalize many of the constructions of classical recursion theory so that the constructions yield the classical results when we specialize to the case of and new results when we specialize to other models. Constructions to generalize Myhill's Theorem on creative sets [8], Friedberg's Theorem on the existence of maximal sets [3], Dekker's Theorem on the degrees of hypersimple sets [2], and Martin's Theorem on the degrees of maximal sets [5] were produced in [6]. In this paper, we give constructions to generalize the Morley-Soare Splitting Theorem [7] and Lachlan's characterization of hyperhypersimple sets [4] in §2, constructions to generalize Lachlan's theorems on the existence of major subsets and r-maximal sets contained in maximal sets [4] in §3, and constructions to generalize Robinson's construction of r-maximal sets that are not contained in any maximal sets [11] and second-order maximal sets [12] in §4.

In §1 of this paper, we give the precise definitions of our model theoretic setting and deal with other preliminaries. Also in §1, we define the notions of “uniformly nonrecursive”, “uniformly maximal”, etc. which are the key notions involved in the generalizations of the various theorems that occur in §§2, 3 and 4.

Monadic (second-order) theories of well-orderings were first studied by Büchi [1], [2], [3] using concepts of automata theory. There it was shown that the monadic theory of ω, the monadic theory of any countable ordinal, and the monadic theory of ω1 are decidable. Expansions of the well-ordering (ω, <) by further relations were considered in [4], [5], [8] and [9], for example. Concerning such expansions, Buchi and Landweber [4] asked whether there is a set P ⊂ ω such that the weak monadic theory of (ω, <, P) is decidable and the (strong) monadic theory of (ω, <, P) is undecidable. In this note we give a negative answer by proving the following general theorem: If α is an ordinal and an n-tuple of subsets of α, then the monadic theory of (α, <, ) is decidable provided the monadic theory of (cf (α), <), i.e. of the cofinality of α, and the bounded monadic theory of (or, <, ) are decidable. (In the bounded monadic theory the second-order variables range only over bounded subsets of α.) Also we show that in the bounded and the (strong) monadic theory of a structure (α, <, ) the same classes of subsets of α are definable. For the proofs we use a result of Shelah [7] and a suitable version of a combinatorial argument which was introduced by Büchi [1] and McNaughton [6] into the study of monadic theories.

Since Birkhoff and von Neumann [2] a new area of logical investigation has grown up under the name of quantum logic. However it seems to me that many authors have been inclined to discuss algebraic semantics as such (mainly lattices of a certain kind) almost directly without presenting any axiomatic system, far from developing any proof theory of quantum logic. See, e.g., Gunson [9], Jauch [10], Varadarajan [15], Zeirler [16], etc. In this sense many works presented under the name of quantum logic are algebraic in essence rather than genuinely logical, though it is absurd to doubt the close relationship between algebraic and logical study on quantum mechanics.

The main purpose of this paper is to alter this situation by presenting an axiomatization of quantum logic as natural and as elegant as possible, which further proof-theoretical study is to be based on.

It is true that several axiomatizations of quantum logic are present now. Several authors have investigated the so-called material implication α → β ( = ¬α∨(α ∧ β)) very closely with due regard to its importance. See, e.g., Finch [5], Piziak [11], etc. Indeed material implication plays a predominant role in any axiomatization of a logic in Hilbert-style. Clark [4] has presented an axiomatization of quantum logic with negation ¬ and material implication → as primitive connectives. In this paper we do not follow this approach. First of all, this approach is greatly complicated because orthomodular lattices are only locally distributive.

The theory of abstract computational complexity in ordinary recursion theory (ORT) was initiated by Rabin [7] and Blum [1]. Jacobs [5] generalized the notions to recursion theory on an admissible ordinal α(α-recursion theory) and proved in this setting certain main theorems such as Blum's Theorem and the Compression Theorem.

In ORT the notions of “finite” and “bounded” coincide. Thus when lifting a theorem from ORT to α-recursion theory, “finite” may be translated to either “bounded below α” or to the stronger and more natural “α-finite”. Jacobs conjectured that “bounded below α” was the best possible in the theorems mentioned above. In this paper we shall prove that the stronger version of these theorems are, in fact, true. Furthermore our constructions are uniform for all admissible α.

Rather than restricting ourselves to α-recursion theory we shall consider transitive rudimentarily closed structures M = 〈M, ∈, R〉 which admit what we call an acceptable prewellordering. The special case M = 〈Lα, ∈〉 and M = 〈Sβ, ∈〉 where α is admissible and β a limit ordinal constitute, respectively, α-recursion theory and β-recursion theory (see Friedman [4]).

We consider the effect on decidability of adding, to the decidable theory of algebraically closed fields of characteristic zero, relation symbols for algebraic independence or function symbols for differentiation. Our results show that the corresponding theories are usually undeeidable.

Let k and K be algebraically closed fields of characteristic zero. Let K be an extension of k of transcendence degree n over k. Since k has characteristic 0, we may assume that the rational field, Q, is a subfield of k.

Let Indn be the n-ary relation on K which holds for exactly those n-tuples from K which are algebraically independent over k.

Let x1, …, xn be a transcendence base for K over k. For i = 1, 2, …, n, let Di: K → K be the partial differentiation function with respect to xi and this base.

Let KnInd = (K, +, ·, Indn), n ≤ 1 and let KnDiff = (K, +, ·, D1, …, Dn), n ≤ 1 where K has transcendence degree n over k.

We show that the theories of these structures are independent of k when k has infinite transcendence degree over Q, that KnDiff has undeeidable theory for n ≤ 1 and that KnInd has undeeidable theory for n ≤ 2. The theory of K1Ind is decidable.

In classical first-order predicate logic CL1 (without equality) only tautologies and antitautologies satisfy nontautological schemas. I.e., if F[p, Q] is a nontautological formula (fl) in the predicate letters shown, with p prepositional, then ⊬ F[K, Q] for any sentence K not containing some Q ∈ Q, unless ⊢ K or ⊢ ¬K. This is an easy consequence of the Completeness Theorem. Clearly, the analogous statement fails for intuitionistic predicate logic IL1; already when Q is empty: (i) ¬¬ K for, e.g., K ≡ p ∨ ¬p; (ii) ¬¬K → K for, e.g., K ≡ ¬p.