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Normative Moral Neuroscience: The Third Tradition of Neuroethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 November 2018

GEOFFREY S. HOLTZMAN Open the ORCID record for GEOFFREY S. HOLTZMAN [Opens in a new window]
GEOFFREY S. HOLTZMAN*
Affiliation:
FRANKLIN & MARSHALL COLLEGEgeoffreyholtzman@gmail.com
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Abstract

Neuroethics is typically conceived of as consisting of two traditions: the ethics of neuroscience and the neuroscience of moral judgment. However, recent work has sought to draw philosophical and ethical implications from the neuroscience of moral judgment. Such work, which concerns normative moral neuroscience (NMN), is sufficiently distinct and complex to deserve recognition as a third tradition of neuroethics. Recognizing it as such can reduce confusion among researchers, eliminating conflations among both critics and proponents of NMN.

This article identifies and unpacks some of the most prominent goals, characteristic assumptions, and unique arguments in NMN and addresses some of the strongest objections NMN faces. The paper synthesizes these considerations into a set of heuristics, or loose discovery principles, that can help overcome obstacles in and attenuate resistance to NMN. These heuristics may simultaneously help identify those projects in NMN that are most likely to be fruitful and help fortify them.

Keywords

cognitive scienceexperimental philosophymetaphilosophymoral psychologyneuroethicsneurophilosophy
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 4 , Issue 3 , Fall 2018 , pp. 411 - 431
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2018 

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Footnotes

I am grateful to Michael Davis, Elisabeth Hildt, Warren Schmaus, and two blind reviewers for their insightful comments on previous drafts of this manuscript.

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