On October 6, 1789, the French Assemblée Nationale adopted legislation for a “voluntary” or “patriotic” tax as an attempt to replenish the nearly bankrupt treasury. Fiscal corruption, a mounting public debt, and unpaid taxes in the last years of the monarchy had culminated in a financial crisis of major proportions. The first order of business, therefore, for the newly formed Assemblée, was to reform the existing tax system and to bring in new revenue, which they hoped to accomplish in part with the impôt volontaire.

According to the terms of the law, every citizen was expected to give a one-time “contribution” amounting to ¼ of his income, payable over 3 years, with deductions being allowed for rent, interest on debts, and other obligations. In addition, any silver plate or jewelry of gold or silver in a person's possession were taxed at 2 ½ percent of their worth. Exceptions were made for those whose income was less than 400 francs a year, and residents of hospitals and charitable institutions. All citizens were free, of course, to donate more than the amount required, especially in the form of valuables. Another feature of this legislation was that no attempt at investigation was to be made; the government hoped that by showing its faith in the patriotism of its citizens, no coercion would be necessary. The only official record required from each citizen was a signed form, stating the amount of tax paid, and a sworn statement that it was true. Upon receipt of these forms, municipal officials were to publish lists of names and amounts collected.

The body of enquiry known as economics grew out of the practical needs of economic life and statesmanship, and also out of philosophical speculation on the nature of man and society. Adam Smith reflects both aspects, but I would locate him predominantly in the philosophical wing. When he switched from considering the theory of moral sentiments to dealing with the causes of the wealth of nations, I don't believe that he saw himself as engaging in a fundamentally different mode of enquiry. He was, of course, concerned with practical questions--of ethical behaviour in the one case and of economic policy in the other--but discussion of both was from a broad philosophic viewpoint. Ricardo, on the other hand, seems to me to exemplify, and at a high level, someone who falls predominatly in the other wing. Although his thought was abstract, it was much more an attempt to deal pragmatically with important issues of practice than it was an attempt, in the philosophical tradition, to understand the general nature of men's interaction in society. Indeed, utilitarianism by then offered a strictly philosophic rationale for concern with practice (albeit a piggish one in some eyes) which did much to confound and confuse the dual origins of economics. Mill and Sidgwick, among others, maintained the tradition of a close connection between philosophical and economic enquiry, within the framework of a broadened utilitarianism, and the continuing affinity of the two disciplines has been exemplified more recently in the work of writers such as Rawls and Sen, not to mention the recent upsurge in discussion of economic methodology.