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The First Person and the Moral Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2015

Dean Moyar
Dean Moyar*
Affiliation:
Johns Hopkins University
*
Email: dmoyar@jhu.edu
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Abstract

In Kant’s Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account, Jeanine Grenberg argues for the centrality to Kant’s ethics of the experience of the feeling of moral constraint, especially as that feeling is described in Kant’s fact of reason argument. She criticizes interpretations of the fact of reason that interpret it as primarily a certain kind of act. I defend my version of an act-based interpretation against Grenberg’s criticisms, flesh out the Fichtean background of that interpretation and raise some further questions about Grenberg’s account.

Keywords

KantFichtemoralityconsciencefirst personfact of reason
Type
Critical Exchange
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , July 2015 , pp. 289 - 300
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2015 

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References

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