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The Judge in the Mirror: Kant on Conscience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 September 2014

Marijana Vujošević
Marijana Vujošević*
Affiliation:
University of Groningen Email: m.milosavljevic-vujosevic@rug.nl
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Abstract

Kant’s conception of conscience has been relatively neglected by Kant scholars and the secondary literature offers no explanation of whether (and if so, how) his treatments of conscience fit together. To achieve a fuller understanding of Kant’s general position on conscience, I question the widespread assumption that conscience is a feeling and account for the nature of conscience and its multiple functions. On my reading, conscience is ‘the internal judge’ whose verdict triggers certain emotional reactions. Through the moral self-evaluative activities of this inner judge, we come to know our character better. In the judgements of conscience, we take account of various psychological conditions while judging both whether these conditions stand in the way of our establishing moral maxims and whether we hold ourselves accountable for our actions. By arousing certain feelings, these judgements also move us to moral action.

Keywords

conscienceKantmoral self-appraisalguiltimputationmaximsubjective conditions of moral receptivity
Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 19 , Issue 3 , November 2014 , pp. 449 - 474
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2014 

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