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Revolution or Contribution? Rational Choice Approaches in the Study of Latin American Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Evelyne Huber  and
Michelle Dion
Evelyne Huber
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Michelle Dion
Affiliation:
Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Technological Institute
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Abstract

This article assesses the contributions of studies in the rational choice (RC) tradition to scholarly understanding of Latin American politics. It groups some representative works according to their use of RC assumptions, and also reviews some of the major works in the institutionalist tradition. It argues that works in the RC tradition have neither forced a major rethinking of established theories nor filled major lacunae, although they have illuminated some phenomena that were only partly understood. The RC approach works best for narrow questions in which power relations and structural constraints are stable, whereas its essential assumptions become untenable in questions that involve shifting power relations among social groups and the state over time.

Type
Research Article
Information
Latin American Politics and Society , Volume 44 , Issue 3 , Fall 2002 , pp. 1 - 28
Copyright
Copyright © University of Miami 2002

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