The 2022 Presidential Election

In the two decades prior to the 2022 presidential elections in Colombia, the counter-insurgency promulgated by President Alvaro Uribe and the hardline discourse he used to justify state and paramilitary violence, constituted a powerful force in the electoral arena (Gamboa Gutiérrez Reference Gamboa Gutiérrez2019). The 2022 elections marked a substantial departure from the status quo (Botero et al. Reference Botero, García-Montoya, Otero-Bahamón and Londoño-Mendez2023). The election was framed as a rejection of traditional political parties and Álvaro Uribe’s hardline approach to violence and insecurity (Long et al. Reference Long, Weisbrot, Rodriguez and Sammut2022). Colombians also voiced their dissatisfaction with the outgoing Duque government during the Paro Nacional (National Strike) in 2021. Dissatisfaction continued to mount in response to the unequal economic burden of the government’s policies to prevent the spread of COVID-19 (ECLAC 2022).

Uribe’s party, Centro Democrático, lost congressional seats in the legislative elections and failed to field a candidate in the first round of the presidential elections. Moreover, Federico Gutiérrez, the candidate of a coalition of right-wing political parties, Equipo por Colombia, was expected to take second place (Semana 2022). But Gutiérrez came in third (23.94 percent), and a relatively unknown candidate, Rodolfo Hernández (28.17 percent), managed to qualify for the second round. Hernández emerged as a surprising favorite in the election after securing a spot in the runoff (Botero et al. Reference Botero, García-Montoya, Otero-Bahamón and Londoño-Mendez2023). He championed anticorruption efforts, which resonated with citizens weary of political gamesmanship. Some even compared him to former US president Donald Trump for his establishment-defying attitude and resilience against controversies (Turkewitz Reference Turkewitz2022).

The strong performance of Francia Márquez in the primary elections and her historic vice presidential run mobilized decades of voter frustration and used Colombian culture and art, along with specific appeals to Black and Indigenous identity, to make visible the voices and preferences of communities that had been silenced throughout Colombia’s history (Ramírez-Botero Reference Ramírez-Botero2022). Gustavo Petro won a historic victory in the second-round runoff against Hernández, taking 50.4 percent of the vote to Hernández’s 47.3 percent. In his historic victory speech, Petro assured citizens that the demands of the National Strike, as well as the Havana Peace Agreement, would be implemented during his government (CNN 2022).

In line with this antiestablishment view of the 2022 elections, another important factor explaining the shift in the electorate was the strong turnout by members of marginalized Black, Indigenous, and peasant communities. The continued wave of violence on the Colombian periphery since the 2016 Peace Deal was expected to pose a real threat to turnout and electoral competition, especially in the PDET municipalities (Colombia+20 2022; Nygård et al. Reference Nygård and Ruiz Hiebra2020). Voter turnout increased to 58 percent in the June second-round presidential elections, up 13 percentage points from the 2006 presidential elections in which Uribe was reelected. The high levels of participation by the most marginalized sectors of the Colombian electorate provided an important counterweight to the strong conservative bastion in the Andean region (see figure 2).Footnote ⁴ As López (Reference López2022) explains, “Abstention decreased precisely in the territories where Petro and Márquez have the most influence: on the Pacific and Caribbean coasts [, the Amazon,] and in big cities.” To further understand the surprising results of the election, we turn our focus to PDET communities, where historically marginalized voters provided critical electoral support to the Pacto Histórico.

Development Plan with a Territorial Focus (PDET)

Through the 2016 Peace Agreement, the government has overseen the rollout of several different programs designed to stabilize institutions and improve living conditions in the communities that have been most directly affected by the violence. The implementation of the different chapters of the peace agreement has been characterized by heterogeneous advances (Rettberg Reference Rettberg2020; Angarita and Gelvez Reference Angarita and Gelvez2022). As of our writing, nearly 30 percent of the 578 stipulations in the Peace Accords have been completed (Kroc 2023). Out of those 578 stipulations, 130 focus on issues and rights related to gender and 80 on issues and rights related to ethnic groups, but only 11.54 percent and 12.5 percent of these stipulations, respectively, have been completed. In our analysis we focus on one of the most encompassing peacebuilding programs, the PDET. Relative to the overall agreement, the government has made substantial progress on completing the PDET program (50 percent of PDET stipulations have been implemented at the time of this writing).Footnote ⁵

PDET is a bottom-up policy designed to provide public goods and services. In the words of the peace agreement, its objective is “to achieve the structural transformation of the countryside and the rural environment and to promote an equitable relationship between rural and urban areas” (Gobierno de Colombia and FARC-EP 2016). PDET zones were created in areas that met four characteristics: high exposure to conflict, coca cultivation, low state capacity, and high levels of poverty (unsatisfied basic needs). ^{Footnote 6} There are 170 municipalities in the program, covering 36 percent of the Colombian territory and including 6.6 million people, as shown in figure 1 (Gobierno de Colombia 2022).

PDET comprises several interconnected components, spanning from comprehensive rural reform to addressing historical disparities in land distribution, as well as improving infrastructure and social services like education, healthcare, and transportation (Gobierno de Colombia and FARC-EP 2016). Collectively, PDET places a strong emphasis on promoting economic and social development initiatives, particularly targeting projects that generate employment opportunities for vulnerable populations (Valencia and Chaverra Reference Valencia and Chaverra2022). Additionally, it recognizes the crucial role of local governance and institutions by focusing on building capacity and fostering participatory decisionmaking processes (Escobar Arango Reference Escobar Arango2017). The program places significant importance on social inclusion and active participation, with a specific focus on empowering marginalized groups and addressing gender and ethnic disparities (Tovar et al. Reference Tovar, Alonso and Sánchez2023). Furthermore, PDET incorporates measures to promote environmental sustainability, advocating responsible management of natural resources (Dávila et al. Reference Dávila, Azcarate and Kørnøv2019).

The Comprehensive Rural Reform Program, of which PDET is a part, aims to “contribute to the reversal of the effects of the conflict and to change the conditions that have facilitated the persistence of violence” in these historically affected zones of the country (Gobierno de Colombia and FARC-EP 2016, 8). However, evidence from two survey waves (2019 and 2021) of 12,000 Colombians living in the 16 PDET areas finds that perceptions of overall security in PDET municipalities are quite low and have worsened over time (Weintraub et al. Reference Weintraub, Abbey Steele and Mokleiv Nygård2023). In 2021, respondents in 13 of the 16 PDET municipalities perceived that their security situation had worsened since 2019; 35 percent of respondents reported that conflict continued in their municipality, in comparison to 17 percent in 2019. While guerrilla violence in PDET municipalities has decreased steadily, the rate of targeted assassinations of social leaders has increased by 481 percent since the implementation of the Peace Accords began. The majority of these assassinations (more than one thousand) have occurred within PDET zones and have disproportionately impacted women social leaders (Llanes Reference Llanes2022; MOE 2018). By the time of the 2022 elections, many PDET municipalities continued to face significant threats to election security due to violence (Abierta Reference Abierta2022). So it is unlikely that PDET proxies for the effect of peace.Footnote ⁷

The absence of the state in Colombia’s peripheral regions is an often-used explanation for cycles of poverty, violence, corruption, and institutional weakness (Holmes and Amin Reference Holmes and Amin2014). According to Escobar Arango (Reference Escobar Arango2017), PDET proposes a solution to the “endemic problem” of centralized decisionmaking by the national government for peripheral regions to the exclusion of local community members. PDET provides a bottom-up approach to territorial reform, in which problems are identified and solutions are developed by community members themselves, first at the smallest administrative unit (veredas), then at the municipal level, and finally integrated into a regional action plan. According to official statistics collected by Ramírez Sarmiento (Reference Ramírez Sarmiento2021), between 2018 and 2020, nearly 1,300 PDET projects were completed through this community consultation process, leading to a projected $4.1 billion Colombian pesos of investments in PDET communities.

Despite PDET’s lofty goals for “transformative participation,” understood as institutional change with tangible effects on economic and physical security and full participation of citizens in policy and implementation, Ramírez Sarmiento (Reference Ramírez Sarmiento2021) argues that the reality often falls short. She credits poor program design, limited political will (under the Duque administration), and limited program implementation (beyond infrastructural development) for the program’s shortcomings with respect to transformative participation. Nevertheless, between 2018 and 2020, there were more than 33,000 programs involving more than 200,000 direct participants across the 170 PDET municipalities (Ramírez Sarmiento Reference Ramírez Sarmiento2021). As one PDET participant in the south of Tolima explained, “PDET is like a life jacket that was thrown to us to save our territories and our families … now we have a voice that we can use to demand that peace be implemented” (Ramírez Sarmiento Reference Ramírez Sarmiento2021, 81). In a series of testimonials gathered from PDET participants and members of PDET communities by the Agencia de Renovación del Territorio - ART, participation is one of the key words that people use when they are asked to describe what PDET is.Footnote ⁸

In sum, the communities that have been most affected by the civil conflict historically have been specifically targeted with a bundle of policies designed to improve their living conditions by expanding the terms of community participation and representation in collective decisionmaking. As a result, we consider the electoral implications for expanding the terms of political participation in these historically marginalized areas.

The Changing Salience of Violence to Voting

Prior to the ratification of the peace deal with the FARC, the civil conflict was the central cleavage in Colombian electoral politics (Gamboa Reference Gamboa2018). Targeted political violence, particularly from paramilitary groups, aimed to influence elections in favor of right-wing parties and to exclude leftist social leaders and former combatants from political participation and elected office (Acemoglu et al. Reference Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos2013; Fergusson et al. Reference Fergusson, Querubin, Ruiz and Vargas2021; Steele Reference Steele2011). Guerrilla groups, often lacking the strategic alliances with local elites, due to former president Álvaro Uribe’s counterinsurgency campaign (2002–10), used violence as a strategy to decrease voter turnout (Gallego Reference Gallego2018). The political polarization of peace supporters and hardliners reached its zenith during Juan Manuel Santos’s 2014 reelection campaign and the 2016 Peace Deal referendum, when a razor-thin majority voted “No” to reject the Santos administration’s proposed peace deal with the FARC (Rodríguez-Raga Reference Rodríguez-Raga2017).

The mobilization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC by its Spanish acronym) in the mid-1990s increased the intensity of the conflict throughout the country and especially in the municipalities that would later become PDET zones. The election of Álvaro Uribe in 2002 on his platform of mano dura centered the conflict as an electoral cleavage (Wills-Otero Reference Wills-Otero, Luna and Kaltwasser2014). In this environment of heightened conflict salience, exposure to violence was a strong predictor of vote choice. Acemoglu et al. (Reference Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos2013) find that Uribe won a larger share of the vote in the presidential elections in 2002 and 2006 in municipalities that had experienced a greater number of paramilitary attacks. They find a similar relationship between paramilitary violence and support for third parties running for legislative office during this same period. Weintraub et al.’s examination of the 2014 presidential contest between Juan Manuel Santos and Oscar Iván Zuluaga (2015) shows that exposure to guerrilla violence also affected vote choice in what they refer to as an election that boiled down to a referendum on the peace deal. As Colombian voters, especially voters in the most affected areas, continued to grow weary of the violence, many grew more supportive of peace talks generally and the final peace agreement (Branton et al. Reference Branton, Pulido and Meernik2019), as voters living in conflict zones were more willing to make concessions to armed actors if this meant bringing an end to the conflict (Arjona Reference Arjona2016b; Branton et al. Reference Branton, Pulido and Meernik2019; Tellez Reference Tellez2019).

Armed groups use political violence to “achieve tangible political or military objectives” (Valentino Reference Valentino2014, 91). Paramilitaries and regional elites share interests in eradicating the presence of guerrillas and establishing a “wartime social order” within their territory that is favorable to the interests of large landowners, extractive industry, and foreign investment (Potter Reference Potter2020). When it comes to elections, paramilitaries have used violence as an electoral tool to coerce voters to support right-wing parties and candidates (Arjona Reference Arjona2016a; García Sánchez Reference García Sánchez2016). This electoral relationship between paramilitaries and political elites has been possible where paramilitaries have achieved stable territorial control (Dube and Naidu Reference Dube and Naidu2015; Gallego Reference Gallego2018). Guerrillas, in contrast, have typically consolidated territorial control in peripheral areas where it is more difficult to build relationships with local elites. As a result, they have been more likely to “sabotage elections” by driving down turnout (Gallego Reference Gallego2018). Thus, political violence can affect electoral returns not only by affecting voters’ preferences but also by constraining their ability to freely exercise their suffrage.

Despite the central importance of violence to the literature on Colombian electoral politics in the last two decades, the electoral salience of the conflict has decreased significantly since the final ratification of the Peace Accords with the FARC.Footnote ⁹ While most elections before 2016 centered on the armed conflict (Wills-Otero Reference Wills-Otero, Luna and Kaltwasser2014), by the second round of the 2018 presidential elections the principal candidates were no longer competing over hawkish and dovish positions toward the guerrillas. Both candidates had pledged to respect the terms of the peace agreement and were primarily competing over their contrasting positions on Venezuela, rising levels of poverty, and the stagnant economy (Gamboa Reference Gamboa2018; Gamboa Gutiérrez Reference Gamboa Gutiérrez2019). The civil conflict continued to be a marginal issue on the national stage in the 2022 presidential elections (Botero et al. Reference Botero, García-Montoya, Otero-Bahamón and Londoño-Mendez2023). It is unlikely that we would observe the same effects of exposure to violence on voters’ electoral preferences that we observed in previous elections because the candidates were not polarized along this dimension at the national level.

We might expect that violence would be more salient in places that were disproportionately affected by the conflict at the height of its political salience and where insurgent groups and paramilitaries have continued to use violence against civilians. PDET communities exist at this intersection. Even though PDET has contributed to some reduction in violence, 40 percent or more of people surveyed reported the continued presence and governance of armed actors in PDET municipalities: “18 percent of respondents said ‘the conflict still persists here.’… for just over a million Colombians, of the 6.6 million living in PDET areas, the benefits of peace are still hardly visible” (PRIO 2020, 10).Footnote ¹⁰ This percentage increased in 2021 to 38.5 percent (MOE 2018). In anticipation of the 2022 elections, MOE reported that approximately 58 percent of the 167 municipalities with Circunscripciones Transitorias Especiales para la Paz (Special Transitory Peace Seats) (all of which are PDET municipalities) faced high electoral risks due to violence. The alarming rise in social leader assassinations has hit PDET municipalities especially hard. Albarracín et al. (Reference Albarracín, Milanese, Valencia and Wolff2023) argue that paramilitary groups have particularly used violence to sabotage the implementation of “pro-peace policies” and reduce electoral competition.

Gustavo Petro and Francia Márquez were particularly attentive to PDET zones. Unlike Hernández, they proposed to improve the implementation of PDET, bring the The National Liberation Army (Spanish: Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) and other dissident actors to the negotiating table, and improve community participation in this process (Estupiñán Reference Estupiñán2022). We argue that it is still unlikely that violence would have had much effect on voters’ preferences because the principal candidates in the first and second round were not polarized on the peace process. But to the extent that we would observe any impact of violence on voting in PDET zones, we would expect a positive boost for Pacto Histórico.

The Effects of PDET on Political Participation

We argue that PDET municipalities were critical sites for Petro and Márquez’s electoral support because of PDET’s positive impact on voter turnout. PDET is a multidimensional institution that spans a range of issues, from land reform to education, healthcare, and infrastructure. As explained above, municipal assignment to the PDET program was not random. PDET municipalities have experienced high levels of conflict violence, illicit crops are cultivated there, and historically these municipalities have had low levels of state presence and high levels of poverty.

We do not argue that political participation is the only mechanism that would predict distinctive patterns of voting in PDET areas relative to non-PDET areas, but we do argue that the participation mechanism is important for a few key reasons. First, it is counterintuitive that electoral participation has continued to increase in PDET zones, given the continuing issues with violence and insecurity since the Peace Accords. Second, while Gustavo Petro’s electoral strongholds remained stable comparing the outcomes in 2018 and 2022 and across the first and second rounds of the 2022 election, voters favoring Petro in these strongholds turned out in significantly higher rates compared to 2018. And third, while PDET’s track record on bringing peace and rural transformation has been mixed, these programs have mobilized hundreds of thousands of community members through their bottom-up approach to governance (Shenk Reference Shenk2023; Tovar et al. Reference Tovar, Alonso and Sánchez2023). We argue that community mobilization through PDET has probably served as a counterweight to the structural obstacles to turnout in PDET regions.

Like the relationship between violence and vote choice, the relationship between political violence and voter turnout is contextual. Preelectoral violence can be used to turn out voters or suppress turnout, “congruent with the goals of the perpetrators and electoral environment” (Bekoe and Burchard Reference Bekoe and Burchard2017, 89). Gallego (Reference Gallego2018) finds that FARC violence had a suppressive effect on electoral turnout from the mid-1990s until the early 2000s, while paramilitary violence affected competitiveness instead of turnout. This is consistent with the contrasting goals of paramilitaries and guerrilla groups: as paramilitaries continued to consolidate territorial power under Uribismo, the FARC turned to using violence to sabotage elections in the areas that they no longer controlled. This territorial mechanism is not unique to guerrillas; Steele (Reference Steele2011) finds that paramilitaries used violence to displace potential left-wing voters in territories traditionally controlled by the FARC. Albarracín et al. (Reference Albarracín, Milanese, Valencia and Wolff2023) find that post-accord social leader assassinations have been more frequent in places where elections have been moderately competitive and leftist parties have traditionally been more successful. Thus, targeted violence by right-wing actors has been used to discourage voter turnout and other threatening forms of civic engagement in recent years.

In anticipation of the 2022 elections, the Mission for Electoral Observation (MOE) reported that approximately 58 percent of the 167 municipalities with Circunscripciones Transitorias Especiales para la Paz (all of which are PDET municipalities) faced significant electoral vulnerabilities as a result of the prevalence of violence (MOE 2018). Moreover, MOE reported that 162 of these municipalities were at risk of forced displacement, which would have the anticipated effect of suppressing turnout (Barreto Reference Barreto2022).Footnote ¹¹ Based on the threats of violence, particularly right-wing violence in PDET areas, we would have expected to see suppressed turnout in PDET areas, but we actually observed higher turnout in many of these areas in comparison to 2018 and even between the first and second rounds of the 2022 elections (Galindo Reference Galindo2022b).Footnote ¹²

The change in electoral turnout from 2018 to 2022 contrasts with the stable concentration of votes across the two elections, especially for Gustavo Petro. In the majority of cases, Petro did not flip municipalities that opposed him in 2018. Instead, he continued to earn a strong concentration of votes in the municipalities that he had carried in the previous election, but with higher levels of turnout (Albarracín and Milanese Reference Albarracín and Milanese2022a). Likewise, the same municipalities that rejected Duque in 2018 voted strongly in opposition to Hernández in 2022. Generally, the most marginalized municipalities in Colombia have cast pro-peace and leftist votes (Arjona Reference Arjona2016b; Branton et al. Reference Branton, Pulido and Meernik2019; Gillooly Reference Gillooly2022). ^{Footnote 13} While it is possible that progress on municipal development projects, increased social spending, and improvements in education and health may have changed some voters’ preferences in favor of Petro, the consistent concentration of votes for the left casts doubt on this alternative explanation.

We argue that the PDET program probably boosted support for the left in 2022 by reducing the material barriers to turnout in highly marginalized municipalities. One important barrier to participation in PDET areas is poverty. Generally, there is a deficit in electoral participation between the rich and the poor in Latin America and other global regions. But community organizations can counter these structural disadvantages because “[they] do much of the hard work of mobilizing people into political activity by providing basic … infrastructure that reduces the costs of individual and collective action” (Boulding and Holzner Reference Boulding and Holzner2021, 11). Community organizations provide information about candidates and policies that facilitates collective action, and they provide a link between voters and the candidates who seek to mobilize them (Holland and Palmer-Rubin Reference Holland and Palmer-Rubin2015).

PDET is designed to facilitate community input and participation, from the design to the implementation of community development projects. As it was mentioned before, from 2018 to 2020, more than 33,000 programs engaged with more than 200,000 direct participants across the 170 PDET municipalities. The program rests on the foundational interests, input, and oversight of los nadies, the Indigenous and Black communities, campesinos, and women “that permit [the] speaking of everyone, for everyone” (Velásquez and Londoño Reference Velásquez and Londoño2022, 19–20). It is possible that this process of community mobilization boosted participation by increasing faith and trust in the state, although recent studies suggest that participation increases trust and satisfaction with government and not the other way around (Kostelka and Blais Reference Kostelka and Blais2018; Norris Reference Norris2011; Pacek et al. Reference Pacek, Pop-Eleches and Tucker2009). In addition, members of PDET communities have complained that they have been excluded from consultation during the implementation of development projects (Tovar et al. Reference Tovar, Alonso and Sánchez2023). On average, the level of satisfaction with security and public works in PDET communities has decreased over time (Weintraub et al. Reference Weintraub, Abbey Steele and Mokleiv Nygård2023). For these reasons, we argue that PDET’s effects on voter turnout are a function of the “mobilizational infrastructure” that community participation in PDET has produced (Boulding and Holzner Reference Boulding and Holzner2021), rather than its effects on political preferences, on trust in government, or its impact on violence.

In summary, we expect to find that voters in PDET municipalities cast a higher share of votes for the leftist Pacto Histórico coalition in the 2022 presidential election. We argue that PDET boosted the leftist vote share by increasing voter turnout in areas that were already favorable to Pacto Histórico. Still, there are valid reasons to expect that the characteristics of marginalized municipalities that make them eligible for participation in PDET, rather than the actual PDET program, are also responsible for an increase in support for the left in the 2022 presidential elections. Municipal assignment to the PDET program was not random. Specifically, all PDET municipalities have experienced high levels of conflict violence, illicit crops are cultivated there, state capacity has been historically low and poverty rates have been much higher than the national average. Marginalized communities in the Colombian periphery, such as PDET municipalities, showed strong support for Gustavo Petro in 2018, for Santos (in opposition to Óscar Zuluaga) in 2014, and for the Peace Deal referendum in 2016. These highly marginalized communities already exhibited political preferences distinct from those of less marginalized municipalities. In terms of our analysis, if the explanatory effect of PDET on left coalition support is reduced once controls for PDET characteristics are introduced to the model (selection effect), it would reduce our confidence in the participation effect argument that we have outlined above. The following hypotheses lay out the observable implications of the two possible ways that PDET would predict stronger electoral support for the left, the selection effect (hypothesis 2.1) and the participation effect (hypothesis 2.2).

Data and Methodology

To assess the impact of peace implementation and conflict violence on vote choice in the Colombian 2022 presidential elections, we utilize municipal-level data, the most micro-level unit of publicly available information. The municipal data provide a rich trove of information regarding the spatial distribution of violence, Peace Accords implementation, and support for Petro-Márquez. Our dependent variables, Petro-Márquez Vote Share Round 1 and Petro-Márquez Vote Share Round 2, are the percentage of support for Gustavo Petro and Francia Márquez at the municipal level in the two rounds of the presidential elections. These data were collected from the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, the government body that administers elections.

Our key independent variables are municipal-level measures of violence and PDET implementation. For rebel groups’ violence, we use Acciones subversivas, which is the sum of the number of military interactions between guerrillas and Public Forces in the municipality from 2003 to 2020.Footnote ¹⁵ This includes FARC actions, ELN, and three small guerrilla group attacks (ERP, ERG, and EPL). ^{Footnote 16} To proxy for paramilitary violence, we use Social leaders, the sum of social leaders killed in a municipality between 2005 and 2020, compiled by Llanes (Reference Llanes2022).Footnote ¹⁷ As a robustness check, we also used the VIPAA dataset, which counts the violent presence of armed actors (paramilitaries and guerrillas) in Colombia between 1988 and 2019, collected by Osorio et al. (Reference Osorio, Mohamed, Pavon and Brewer-Osorio2019). ^{Footnote 18} We use a dichotomous variable, PDET, that equals 1 if the municipality is part of the peace program, 0 otherwise. The 170 PDET municipalities are displayed above in figure 1. Data on PDET zones were obtained from la Agencia de Renovación del Territorio (the Agency of Territorial Renovation), the government body that implements the Peace Accords.

Figure 3 presents two graphs reflecting the relationship between the support for Petro-Márquez in the first round and the two key independent variables, Subversive actions and PDET implementation. The left panel displays the relationship between Vote Share Round 1 and Acciones subversivas, while the right panel displays the relationship between Vote Share Round 1 and PDET. Both panels reflect a positive relationship; municipalities with a greater number of subversive actions over the last two decades voted more for Petro-Márquez in the first round. Likewise, PDET municipalities went for Petro-Márquez at a higher rate compared to non-PDET municipalities. We also conducted similar exploratory correlation analyses involving other forms of violence (i.e., Social leaders), and we identified a positive relationship with the vote share of Petro and Márquez in this context.

Figure 3. Plots of Petro-Márquez Vote Share in the First Round Across Key Variables

In addition to the primary variables of interest, our models and quasi-experiment include several potentially confounding municipal-level social and economic demographic factors. We use data obtained from a databank hosted by the Economics Department at the Universidad de Los Andes.Footnote ¹⁹ Those control variables include the level of poverty as the average of the index of unsatisfied basic needs (NBI in Spanish) and municipal demographic and natural characteristics, such as a log of municipal population, altitude, and distance to the capital city of the department, all of which condition rebel recruitment and the effectiveness of state policing (Fearon and Laitin Reference Fearon and Laitin2003). We also use data culled from the Departamento Nacional de Planeación to measure subnational government quality and national government monetary transfers to the local government.

Likewise, we control for the hectares of coca crops culled from the Ministerio de Justicia and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and electoral variables, such as previous presidential electoral results, turnout, and political alignment from the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil and published by the Misión de Observación Electoral and Pachón et al. (Reference Pachón and Sánchez Torres2014).Footnote ²⁰ We control for the ratio of the slave population in the middle of the nineteenth century because the historical geography of slavery has continued to predict support for parties, especially to the left of center (Ahmed et al. Reference Ahmed, Johnson and Vásquez-Cortés2021). Also, in order to control for potential punishment of the incumbent, we control for the rate of deaths due to COVID-19 published by Datos Abiertos Colombia.Footnote ²¹ The definition and main descriptive statistics of the mentioned variables can be seen in the appendix, table A1. Finally, department-fixed effects are used to account for unobserved heterogeneity.

We test our hypothesis in three different ways. First, we use an ordinary least squares estimator and control for the factors explained above, which might influence armed violence by groups on the left and the right, policy implementation, and electoral support.Footnote ²² Second, we take advantage of the PDET’s policy design to create a propensity score matching (PSM) design. This quasi-experiment allows us to compare the effects of violence and PDET on the Petro-Márquez vote share in municipalities with similar characteristics before PDET implementation. Through PSM we use these pre-PDET covariates to estimate a maximum likelihood model of the conditional probability that a municipality would be designated to participate in PDET (Rosenbaum and Rubin Reference Rosenbaum and Rubin1983; Cunningham Reference Cunningham2021). Taking into account the four main selection criteria for PDET, we utilize four municipal characteristics: high levels of unsatisfied basic needs, NBI; average hectares of coca crops from 1998 to 2017, Coca crops; Acciones subversivas; and Local capacities, low local administrative and management capabilities.Footnote ²³ Finally, using the propensity scores, we simulated a difference-in-difference design to test our mechanism.