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THE BENEFITS OF BALANCE: Credibility, the Rule of Law, and Investment in Latin America

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2022

Michael Touchton*
Affiliation:
Boise State University
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Abstract

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Research surrounding political institutions and credible commitment to the rule of law is integral to recent efforts to tie democracy to economic development. I identify the determinants of rule-of-law perceptions in Latin America and argue that constraining elected officials facilitates a commitment to democracy that makes government policies credible. I also argue that aspects of politics leading to deadlock might have a hidden upside in generating policy credibility. I test my arguments against pooled cross-sectional time series data for twenty Latin American countries between 1996 and 2012. Ultimately, my research demonstrates the benefits of functioning checks and balances among elected officials for the rule of law and provides a uniform framework linking democratic inputs to legal and economic outcomes.

Resumen

RESUMEN

Investigaciones de instituciones políticas y compromisos creíbles al estado de derecho es emblemático de esfuerzos recientes para atar la democracia al desarrollo económico. Identifico los factores determinantes de las percepciones del estado de derecho en América latina. Sostengo que limitaciones efectivas sobre funcionarios oficiales actúan como mecanismos democráticos de compromiso y se ponen creíbles las políticas del gobierno. También afirmo que aspectos de la política que llevan a la parálisis podrían llevar beneficios escondidos en la generación de la política creíble. Pruebo mis hipótesis contra datos de panel para veinte países Latinoamericanos entre 1996 y 2012. Al fin y al cabo, mi investigación demuestra los beneficios de funcionamiento de controles y equilibrios entre oficiales públicos para el estado de derecho y ofrece un marco uniforme que vincula entradas democráticas con resultados legales y económicos.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 by the University of Texas Press

Footnotes

This manuscript was accepted for publication in September 2015. New data have become available on several key variables. The updated data set and Stata do-file for replication are available on the author's website: http://sps.boisestate.edu/politicalscience/faculty/mike-touchton/.

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