1. Civil and political (voting) rights for black Americans had emerged during Reconstruction (1867–1877). Once the South had been “redeemed”—or controlled once again by white-dominated state governments—black Americans saw the enforcement of their rights slowly vanish. Beginning in 1890, Southern states began systematically stripping black Americans of their voting rights, through constitutional (or statutory) alterations. Between 1890 and 1908, helped along by the Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) Supreme Court decision that permitted segregation of public facilities based on the “separate but equal” doctrine, all former Confederate states had established some form of racial caste (or Jim Crow) system. On disenfranchisement, see, for example, Kousser, J. Morgan, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974)Google Scholar and Perman, Michael, Struggle for Mastery: Disfranchisement in the South, 1888–1908 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001)Google Scholar; on civil-rights restrictions more generally, see Woodward, C. Vann, The Origins of the New South, 1877–1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951)Google Scholar and The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955)Google Scholar. For a comprehensive examination of black enfranchisement efforts across a century, from the 1860s through the 1960s, see Valelly, Richard M., The Two Reconstructions: The Struggle for Black Enfranchisement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2. The literature on the civil rights movement is voluminous. Representative overviews include Lewis, Anthony, Portrait of a Decade: The Second American Revolution (New York: Random House, 1964)Google Scholar; and Branch, Taylor, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954–1963 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988)Google Scholar.

3. Goluboff, Risa L., The Lost Promise of Civil Rights (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007)Google Scholar; Mack, Kenneth W., “Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown,” Yale Law Journal 115 (2005): 256–354Google Scholar; Lee, Sophia Z., “Hotspots in a Cold War: The NAACP's Postwar Workplace Constitutionalism, 1948–1964,” Law and History Review 26 (2008): 327–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hall, Jacquelyn Dowd, “The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,” Journal of American History 91 (2005): 1233–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schiller, Reuel, “The Administrative State Front and Center: Studying Law and Administration in Postwar America,” Law and History Review 26 (2008): 415–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gerstle, Gary, “The Crucial Decade: The 1940s and Beyond,” Journal of American History 92 (2006): 1292–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4. Although many historical works consider the formal end of Reconstruction to have occurred in 1877, when the last of the Southern state governments were “redeemed,” for more than a decade key members of the Republican Party continued to hold out hope that some form of Southern Reconstruction could be reestablished. After the 1888 elections, the Republicans controlled the presidency and both chambers of Congress, and a move to adopt a new voting-rights enforcement policy was pursued. Specifically, a new Federal Elections Bill, sponsored by Representative Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA), which would have placed national elections (specifically House elections) under federal control, was passed in the House in 1890 but failed in the Senate because of the concerted efforts of Democrats and a small group of western (silver) Republicans. The failed Lodge Bill is typically viewed by scholars of legislative history as the last gasp of Congress-led Reconstruction efforts. For coverage of the politics surrounding the Lodge Bill, see Welch, Richard E. Jr., “The Federal Elections Bill of 1890: Postscripts and Prelude,” The Journal of American History 52 (1965): 511–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Calhoun, Charles W., Conceiving a New Republic: The Republican Party and the Southern Question, 1869–1900 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 226–59Google Scholar; Valelly, Richard M., “Partisan Entrepreneurship and Policy Windows: George Frisbie Hoar and the 1890 Federal Elections Bill,” in Formative Acts: American Politics in the Making, eds. Skowronek, Stephen and Glassman, Matthew (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 126–52Google Scholar.

5. Jenkins, Jeffery A., Peck, Justin, and Weaver, Vesla M., “Between Reconstructions: Congressional Action on Civil Rights, 1891–1940,” Studies in American Political Development 24 (2010): 57–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6. Jenkins, Peck, and Weaver, “Between Reconstructions.”

7. On partisan sorting out on civil rights in the 1940s, see Karol, David, Party Position Change in American Politics: Coalition Management (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chen, Anthony, The Fifth Freedom: Jobs, Politics, and Civil Rights in the United States, 1941–1972 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009)Google Scholar; Feinstein, Brian D. and Schickler, Eric, “Platforms and Partners: The Civil Rights Realignment Reconsidered,” Studies in American Political Development 22 (2008): 1–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Schickler, Eric, Pearson, Kathryn, and Feinstein, Brian D., “Congressional Parties and Civil Rights Politics from 1933 to 1972,” Journal of Politics 72 (2010): 1–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8. The standard (or most widely accepted) account of partisan change is provided by Carmines, Edward G. and Stimson, James A., Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. They point to a critical moment taking place in 1963–1964, revolving around choices made by Democratic President Lyndon Johnson and the Republican standard bearer, Barry Goldwater.

9. On Franklin Delano Roosevelt and fair employment, see Reed, Merl Elywn, Seedtime for the Modern Civil Rights Movement: The President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, 1941–1946 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991)Google Scholar; and Collins, William J., “Race, Roosevelt, and Wartime Production: Fair Employment in World War II Labor Markets,” American Economic Review 91 (2001): 272–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10. On the Court and the white primary, see Weeks, O. Douglas, “The White Primary: 1944–1948,” American Political Science Review 42 (1948): 500–10CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Marshall, Thurgood, “The Rise and Collapse of the ‘Democratic White Primary,’” The Journal of Negro Education 26 (1957): 249–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hine, Darlene Clark, “Blacks and the Destruction of the Democratic White Primary 1935–1944,” The Journal of Negro History 62 (1977): 43–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Mickey, Robert W., “The Beginning of the End for Authoritarian Rule in America: Smith v. Allwright and the Abolition of the White Primary in the Deep South, 1944–1948,” Studies in American Political Development 22 (2008): 143–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11. On Truman and desegregation of the federal work force and armed services, see Berman, William C., The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1970)Google Scholar; McCoy, Donald R. and Ruetten, Richard T., Quest and Response: Minority Rights and the Truman Administration (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1973)Google Scholar; and Gardner, Michael R., Harry Truman and Civil Rights: Moral Courage and Political Risks (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2002)Google Scholar. Truman's executive orders were based on recommendations made by the President's Committee on Civil Rights, which Truman established by Executive Order 9808 in 1946. For the Committee's full set of recommendations, see President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights: The Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947)Google Scholar.

12. Jenkins, Peck, and Weaver, “Between Reconstructions.”

13. In addition, at the national level, a majority of black voters had moved into the Democratic column in 1936, during Roosevelt's first re-election campaign. See Weiss, Nancy J., Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983)Google Scholar.

14. On the conservative coalition in Congress, see Patterson, James T., “A Conservative Coalition Forms in Congress, 1933–1939,” Journal of American History 52 (1966): 757–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Moore, John Robert, “The Conservative Coalition in the United States Senate,” Journal of Southern History 33 (1967): 368–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Manley, John F., “The Conservative Coalition in Congress,” American Behavioral Scientist 17 (1973): 223–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Katznelson, Ira, Geiger, Kim, and Kryder, Daniel, “Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto in Congress, 1933–1950,” Political Science Quarterly 108 (1993): 283–306CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15. The 81st Congress did not officially adjourn (conclude) until January 2, 1951, as the lame-duck portion of the second session extended into the new year.

16. Although the enactment of an antilynching law continued to be a major concern of the NAACP and other related organizations throughout the 1940s, there were no roll-calls votes on antilynching during these five Congresses.

17. Sources on congressional attempts to eliminate the poll tax include Brewer, William M., “The Poll Tax and Poll Taxes,” The Journal of Negro History 29 (1944): 260–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kallenbach, Joseph E., “Constitutional Aspects of Federal Anti-Poll Tax Legislation,” Michigan Law Review 45 (1947): 717–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ogden, Frederic D., The Poll Tax in the South (University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1958), 241–69Google Scholar; Lawson, Steven F., Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the South, 1944–1969 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 53–85Google Scholar; and Finley, Keith M., Delaying the Dream: Southern Senators and the Fight against Civil Rights, 1938–1965 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2008), 56–78, 92–93, 96–103, 107–08Google Scholar.

18. On poll taxes in the various states, see Brewer, “The Poll Tax and Poll Taxes”; Key, V. O., Southern Politics in State and Nation (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1949), 599–618Google Scholar; Ogden, The Poll Tax in the South, 32–76; and Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics, 62–83.

19. Finley, Delaying the Dream, 56.

20. See Brewer, “The Poll Tax and Poll Taxes,” 264–65.

21. See Johnson, Kimberley, Reforming Jim Crow: Southern Politics and State in the Age before Brown (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 94CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22. Ogden, The Poll Tax in the South, 249–51; Johnson, Reforming Jim Crow, 92–94; Zangrando, Robert Z., The NAACP Crusade Against Lynching, 1909–1950 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980), 167, 181, 189Google Scholar. Eleanor Roosevelt, the president's wife, was a vocal advocate of the anti-poll tax movement. The Communist and Socialist Parties were also active supporters; their advocacy was often used as a foil by Southern senators in floor speeches against anti-poll tax legislation.

23. Note that in reporting “Southern Democrats,” we use the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) convention for categorizing Southern states: the eleven states of the former Confederacy plus Kentucky and Oklahoma.

24. Ogden, The Poll Tax in the South, 244.

25. Congressional Record, 76th Congress, 2nd Session, (August 5, 1939), 1229.

26. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 1st Session, (January 3, 1941), 18.

27. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 1st Session, (February 26, 1941), 1460.

28. Representative Geyer died on October 11, 1941. The advocacy of his bill in the House was then taken up by Representative Joseph Gavagan (D-NY).

29. See “House Will Vote on Poll-Tax Bill,” New York Times, September, 23, 1942, 16.

30. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (September 22, 1942), 7310–11.

31. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (October 12, 1942): 8066–79. The text of H.R. 110 is found on page 8079.

32. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (October 12, 1942): 8080–81.

33. Steven F. Lawson supports the Colmer conclusion, writing “Representatives from constituencies with a significant black electorate announced their intention of supporting the bill in order to give disfranchised southern Negroes the vote.” See Lawson, Black Ballots, 67.

34. Quoted in “House by 252 [sic] to 84 Votes to Outlaw Southern Poll Tax,” New York Times, October 14, 1942, 1, 21.

35. For the full debate and resolution, see Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (October 12, 1942), 8091–94, 8095–96, (13 Oct. 1942): 8120–75. The roll call appears on pages 8174–75.

36. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (October 26, 1942), 8656–57.

37. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (November 13, 1942), 8814.

38. For a discussion of the various dilatory tactics, see Finley, Delaying the Dream, 63–65.

39. The clause in question was that “[House members] shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.”

40. For a summary of these arguments, see Lawson, Black Ballots, 69–70; and Finley, Delaying the Dream, 62–67. Bilbo was the most direct in his assessment of the effect of successfully eradicating the poll tax: “if that is done, we will have no way of preventing the Negro from voting… Then, as the Negroes get their political power, they will demand social rights, economic rights, and other rights.” Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (November 19, 1942), 8958. A year later, Bilbo made his feelings even more clear in a letter to a constituent: “We are not going to bed with the African negro… We are not going to treat them as our social equals… we as a people are proud of our bloodstream and are thoroughly possessed with race consciousness.” Quoted in Garson, Robert A., The Democratic Party and the Politics of Sectionalism, 1941–1948 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), 44Google Scholar.

41. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (November 20, 1942), 9033.

42. For the debate, see Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (November 21, 1942), 9043–59; (November 23, 1942): 9060–65. For the vote, see Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (November 23, 1942), 9065.

43. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (November 23, 1942), 9065.

44. Robert De Vore, “Cloture Defeat Spells Doom of Poll-Tax Foes,” Washington Post, November 24, 1942, 1, 14.

45. White and NCAPT quotes taken from “Poll Tax Upheld as Senate Defeats Cloture, 41 to 37,” New York Times, November 24, 1942, 1, 17. On NCAPT's regrouping, see Lawson, Black Ballots, 71.

46. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 1st Session, (January 6, 1943), 18.

47. Marcantonio had taken the lead in acquiring the necessary signatures on the anti-poll tax discharge petition in the 77th Congress, after Lee Geyer had died. See Schaffer, Alan, Vito Marcantonio, Radical in Congress (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1965), 118–19Google Scholar. The NCAPT was concerned about Marcantonio being the point person on the legislation, given his socialist ties. A delegation was dispatched to try to convince him to defer his leadership position on the bill, but he refused. Lawson, Black Ballots, 72.

48. The ALP was a Socialist offshoot modeled on the British Labour Party. For a detailed overview of the ALP, see Parmet, Robert D., The Master of Seventh Avenue: David Dubinsky and the American Labor Movement (New York: New York University Press, 2005)Google Scholar.

49. Prior to the 78th Congress, Marcantonio had been designated for a seat on Judiciary by the Democratic leadership. The Southern members reacted angrily to this possibility, and a bitter fight in caucus eventually led to Marcantonio being passed over. See Schaffer, Vito Marcantonio, Radical in Congress, 131–32.

50. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 1st Session, (Febuary 23, 1943), 1244; (May 6, 1943), 4092–93.

51. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 1st Session, (May 24, 1943), 4808. Representative Carter Manasco (D-AL) echoed Cox's argument generally saying “this measure would never have reached the floor of the House if it had not been for the two major political parties playing for votes.” See Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 1st Session, (May 24, 1943), 4810.

52. Ibid., 4812–13.

53. Ibid., 4843–89. The roll call appears on page 4889.

54. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 1st Session, (November 12, 1943), 9436.

55. In anticipation of the coming debate on H.R. 7, Allen Drury, a correspondent for the United Press who was assigned to cover the Senate proceedings during World War II, wrote the following “editorial” in his diary (April 9): “During the debate we shall hear two basic fallacies reiterated over and over again. The first will be offered by the anti-poll-tax forces, who will say that the bill is Constitutional; it is not, because it would set aside control of the voting qualifications specifically vested in the states. The second will be offered by the Southerners, who will say that the poll tax is humanly and morally defensible; it is not. If everybody would just admit those two things on the first day, there might not be any filibuster at all. There would certainly be no debate. There would just be a vote.” Drury would later edit and publish his diary. For the above entry, see Drury, Allen, A Senate Journal 1943–1945 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1963), 133Google Scholar.

56. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session (May 9, 1944), 4172. Democratic leaders had been dragging their feet for some time, as they did not have the votes to invoke cloture against the certain Southern filibuster. But the NCAPT and other groups continued to push them forward. As Drury notes (in his April 28) entry, “the lobbyists have been relentless in their pressure.” Drury, A Senate Journal 1943–1945, 152. On NCAPT specifically, see Lawson, Black Ballots, 74–75.

57. Finley, Delaying the Dream, 74.

58. “Cloture Move in Poll Tax Battle is Begun,” Washington Post, May 9, 1944, 1–2.

59. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session (May 9, 1944), 4172–89; (May 10, 1944), 4244–64; (May 11, 1944), 4300–22; (May 12, 1944), 4385–405; 4405–25; 4425–29.

60. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session (May 15, 1944), 4169–70.

61. Robert C. Albright, “Senate Balks at Cloture; Sidetracks Poll-Tax Bill,” Washington Post, May 16, 1944, 1.

62. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 1st Session, (January 3, 1945), 18. Alan Schaffer refers to the situation this way: “[It was] as if [Marcantonio] and his colleagues were following a well-rehearsed morality play.” Schaffer, Vito Marcantonio, Radical in Congress, 150.

63. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 1st Session, (Febuary 19, 1945), 1285; (May 29, 1945), 5290–91.

64. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 1st Session, (June 11, 1945), 5895–96

65. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 1st Session, (June 12, 1945), 5974–6003. The roll call appears on page 6003.

66. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, (July 29, 1946), 10382–83.

67. Lawson, Black Ballots, 77–78.

68. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, (July 31, 1946): 10511–12.

69. This “switching” analysis is also noted in Lawson, Black Ballots, 79–80, and Chen, The Fifth Freedom, 81 (Table 2–2). Chen also provides the number of vote switches needed for other civil-rights related cloture votes from 1938 through 1964 (although his “yeas shy” estimate for the January 27, 1938 antilynching bill is incorrect).

70. The Republican bill incorporated the same language as the Democratic-sponsored Pepper and Marcantonio bills.

71. Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st Session, (January 3, 1947), 42. In the Republican 80th Congress, the Administration Committee and not the Judiciary Committee handled all anti-poll tax matters in both chambers.

72. Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st Session, (July 16, 1947), 9115.

73. Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st Session, (July 21, 1947), 9522–52. The roll call appears on pages 9551–52.

74. Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, (April 30, 1948), 5091.

75. Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, (April 29, 1948), 9480, 9488–97; 9499–503; 9504–09; (April 30, 1948): 9554–69; (August 2, 1948), 9597–98. Wherry's cloture motion is found on page 9598.

76. Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, (August 2, 1948), 9559–60.

77. Ibid., 9600–04. Vandenberg stated that “[t]he fact is that the existing Senate rules regarding cloture do not provide for conclusive cloture. They still leave the Senate, rightly or wrongly, at the mercy of unlimited debate ad infinitum” (9603). For newspaper coverage, see Philip Dodd, “Senate Ruling Blocks Move to End Filibuster,” Chicago Tribune, August 3, 1948, 3; William S. White, “Republicans Fail to Kill Filibuster,” New York Times, August 3, 1948, 1, 14. Floyd Riddick, the Senate Parliamentarian from 1964–1974, largely supports Vandenberg's ruling in his book on Senate procedure; Riddick's understanding was: “Until 1949 it was generally understood that cloture would apply to the pending measure, and not motions, although there had been some early cases of cloture being filed on some matter other than a bill, treaty, or resolution.” See Riddick, Floyd M. and Frumin, Alan S., Riddick's Senate Procedure: Precedents and Practices (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 303Google Scholar.

78. For short overviews of this episode, see Hartmann, Susan M., Truman and the 80th Congress (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971), 198–99Google Scholar; Lawon, Black Ballots, 81; and Finley, Delaying the Dream, 103.

79. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, (March 3, 1949), 1842.

80. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, (June 24, 1949), 8400.

81. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, (July 25. 1949): 10095–97. To bypass the Rules Committee, Representative Norton took advantage of the “21 Day Rule,” which was in operation only in the 81st Congress. An examination of the fight over this rule will be covered in the FEPC section of this article.

82. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, (July 25, 1949), 10097–124; (July 26, 1949), 10220–48. The roll call appears on page 10248. On this occasion, a statement in favor of the bill by Tom C. Clark, the attorney general of the United States, was put into the record. See Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, (July 25, 1949), 10098–100.

83. For a short discussion, see Finley, Delaying the Dream, 120–21.

84. Lawson, Black Ballots, 82. And although anti-poll tax advocates were still eager to fight for the bill, world events intruded. As Frederic Ogden notes: “The outbreak of fighting in Korea occurred about the time the Senate normally would have taken up the poll tax question. As a result of this crisis, few senators were interested in engaging in a futile debate over the poll tax.”

85. Indeed, a plank in the 1944 Republican presidential platform called for a constitutional amendment to prohibit the poll tax.

86. Southern public opinion also steadily turned against the poll tax: 43% supported abolishment in April 1941, which increased to 48% in July 1948 and to 53% in April 1949. See Ogden, The Poll Tax in the South, 251–52.

87. For a short summary of these events, see Finley, Delaying the Dream, 102. In addition, the Supreme Court in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections (1966) extended the coverage of the 24th Amendment to state elections.

88. Logan, Thomas F., “Soldier Vote in War,” American Economist 62 (1918): 122–23Google Scholar.

89. For a good overview of War Department policy and state-level voting institutions for servicemen during World War I, see Martin, Boyd A., “The Service Vote in the Elections of 1944,” American Political Science Review 39 (1945): 720–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

90. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (July 20, 1942), 6423.

91. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (July 21, 1942), 6478.

92. The roll-call vote on H.R. 528 (to consider H.R. 7416 under open rule) was 202 to 33, with Northern Democrats voting 64 to 0, Southern Democrats 42 to 32, and Republicans 94 to 0. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (July 23, 1942), 6544–45. For coverage of the entire debate (including the bill's initial consideration), see Ibid., 6541–69.

93. The secretaries of war and the navy would handle the application process, issuing postcards to servicemen for acquisition of a war ballot. The preparation (construction) of the war ballot, however, was the sole purview of the secretary of state in each state. Once a secretary of state received a completed and signed application (with the signature verified by a commissioned officer), that person would issue a war ballot to the serviceman in question. A completed ballot would then be returned directly to the secretary of state for processing. See Martin, “The Service Vote in the Elections of 1944,” 725.

94. Rankin, however, refused to buckle easily, and used his influence to stage a “single handed filibuster” that slowed the course of business and consumed most of the day. He claimed that the Ramsay bill was an “attempt to destroy the election laws of the states” and was the first step toward a complete federal seizure. Eventually Rankin relented and the legislation was dealt with. Quote taken from “House Passes Bill for Army Absentee Vote,” Chicago Tribune, July 24, 1942. See also C. P. Trussell, “House Adopts Vote Bill for Soldiers' Vote,” New York Times, July 24, 1942, 9.

95. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (July 23, 1942), 6553.

96. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (July 23, 1942), 6561. Prior to the amendment's rejection, Representative John Vorys (R-OH) requested a teller vote, but only nine members expressed their support, so tellers were refused.

97. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (July 23, 1942), 6569.

98. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (August 17, 1942), 6858.

99. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (August 17, 1942), 6858–65; (August 20, 1942), 6882, 6895; (August 24, 1942), 6923–38, 6939–41; (August 25, 1942), 6952.

100. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (August 24, 1942), 6930. Brooks' amendment caused a bit of stir, as Senator Claude Pepper (D-FL) claimed that he had submitted an amendment with nearly identical language. Pepper's contention is verified in the Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (July 27, 1942), 6633; (August 20, 1942), 6882. As a result, Pepper charged Brooks with “legislative plagiarism or hijacking.” See Edward Ryan, “Senate Passes Soldier Vote Bill, 47 to 5,” Washington Post, August 26, 1942, 1, 6. Additional remarks by Pepper on the Brooks Amendment appear in the Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (August 24, 1942), 6930–31.

101. See “Poll Tax Delays Soldier Vote Bill,” New York Times, August 25, 1942, 13.

102. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (August 25, 1942), 6954. The day before, Danaher debated the meaning of the term “elections” on the Senate floor with Barkley and Senator Theodore Francis Green (D-RI). See Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (August 24, 1942), 6926–28.

103. Finley, Delaying the Dream, 60

104. See Jenkins, Peck, and Weaver, “Between Reconstructions.”

105. Finley, Delaying the Dream, 60. See also Lawson, Black Ballots, 66.

106. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (August 25, 1942), 6962, 6971–72.

107. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (August 25, 1942), 6972; (August 31, 1942), 7008.

108. The House had initially disagreed to the Senate amendments, which necessitated the subsequent conference. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (August 31, 1942), 7008.

109. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (September 9, 1942), 7063–79. The roll call appears on page 7079.

110. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (September 12, 1942), 7086–97.

111. Congressional Record, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, (October 12, 1942), 8065. For full text of Public Law 712, see 56 Statutes at Large 753–57.

112. Kenneally, James J., “Black Republicans During the New Deal: The Role of Joseph W. Martin, Jr.,” The Review of Politics 55 (1993): 117–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

113. Ibid., 138–39.

114. Hearings on Soldier Voting, 78th Congress, House of Representatives, 1st Session (October 19, 1943), 27. The figures were part of a report entitled, “The Soldier Vote in 1942,” which was inserted in the record by Representative Adolph Sabath (D-IL).

115. Some portion of this group of servicemen voted using state absent-voting laws that were in place at the time. The number is unknown, but as Boyd Martin recounts “all incomplete reports would indicate that it was very small.” Martin, “The Service Vote in the Elections of 1944,” 726.

116. Garson, The Democratic Party and the Politics of Sectionalism, 44.

117. Although neither Soldier Voting Act has been the focus of much scholarly research, the 1944 Act has received considerably more attention. Examples include Martin, “The Service Vote in the Elections of 1944”; Jamieson, John, “Censorship and the Soldier,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 11 (1947): 367–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Young, Roland, Congressional Politics in the Second World War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), 83–89Google Scholar; Drury, , A Senate Journal, 56–84, 98–112Google Scholar; Phillip Allen Rosen, “Patriotism and Partisanship: The Soldier Vote Controversy in Virginia, 1944–1945” (MA thesis, University of Virginia, 1972); Garson, The Democratic Party and the Politics of Sectionalism, 44–52; Theodore Penton, “The United States War Ballot Commission” (MA thesis, Auburn University, 2002); and Katznelson, Ira, Fear Itself: New Deal Democracy in a Southern Cage (New York: Norton, 2013)Google Scholar. Indeed, the general belief is that the 1944 Act was more important than the 1942 Act. The 1944 Act, for example, is classified as a “landmark law”: legislation that has “so dramatically altered the perception of the role of government” that it can be deemed “of enduring importance.” See Stathis, Stephen W., Landmark Legislation, 1774–2002: Major U.S. Acts and Treaties (Washington: CQ Press, 2003), v, 224CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The best overview of the 1942 Act, and the issue of soldier voting more generally during World War II, is Katznelson, Fear Itself.

118. Young, Congressional Politics in the Second World War, 83.

119. Ibid., 84.

120. For example, a Gallup Poll on December 3, 1943 reported American servicemen favoring Democrats over Republicans by a 61% to 39% rate. See George Gallup, “Vote of Soldiers Could Decide ‘44 Election, Gallup Poll Finds,” New York Times, December 5, 1943, 48. Gallup also held, based on his figures, that “if the serviceman's vote is no larger in 1944 than it was in 1942, the [presidential] election outcome today looks like a tossup.”

121. In reference to the dangers of coming out against a federal ballot, Taft replied: “Even if the President makes an issue of Republican opposition to the federal ballot, the votes to be lost on that issue are negligible compared to the number of real votes the President will get if the federal ballot is adopted.” Quoted in Patterson, James T., Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 264Google Scholar.

122. Hearings on Soldier Voting, 78th Congress, House of Representatives. 1st Session. Hearing dates included October 19, 21, 26, and 27, 1943, and November 3, 9, 16, 1943. Hearings on Voting in Time of War by Members of the Land and Naval Forces, 78th Congress, Senate, 1st Session. Hearing dates included October 29, 1943, and November 5, 1943.

123. Drury, A Senate Journal, 11.

124. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 1st Session, (June 29, 1943), 6690.

125. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 1st Session, (November 15, 1943), 9486–87. The committee vote was 12 to 2. The Green–Lucas Bill would not have prohibited individuals from using the absent-voter laws available in their respective states. Rather, it was best thought of as a set of federal voting procedures overlaid on existing state level voting procedures. The bill's provisions can be found in Hearings on Voting in Time of War by Members of the Land and Naval Forces, 78th Congress, Senate, 1st Session (October 29, 1943), 1–7.

126. There was no stipulation in the Green–Lucas bill for extending the federal ballot to primary elections.

127. The Worley bill in the House (H.R. 3982) was almost identical to the Green–Lucas bill, except that it included only servicemen (and thus excluded merchant marines and United States citizens working abroad).

128. See Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 1st Session, (November 22, 1943), 9790–800, 9812–18; (November 29, 1943), 10057–83, 10109–18; (November 30, 1943), 10119–27, 10128–33; (December 1, 1943), 10165–75, 10177–87; (December 2, 1943), 10197–201, 10204–06, 10220–28; (December 3, 1943), 10268–90.

129. Martin, “The Service Vote in the Elections of 1944,” 727.

130. Garson, The Democratic Party and the Politics of Sectionalism, 45.

131. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 1st Session, (December 1, 1943), 10165. Eastland first introduced his amendment (on behalf of McClellan and McKellar) on November 22, which he requested “be read, printed, and lie on the table.” His request was granted. See Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 1st Session, (November 22, 1943), 9812.

132. Garson, The Democratic Party and the Politics of Sectionalism, 46.

133. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 1st Session, (December 3, 1943), 10290.

134. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, (January 17, 1943), 296; (February 1, 1944), 1014.

135. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, (February 1, 1944), 1014–34; (February 2, 1944), 1082–125; (February 3, 1944), 1168–228.

136. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, (February 3, 1944), 1228–30.

137. See Young, Congressional Politics in the Second World War, 86; Laurence Burd, “O.K. State Soldier Ballots,” Chicago Tribune, February 4, 1944, 1–2; and “House Adopts States' Plan Soldier Vote,” Los Angeles Times, February 4, 1944, 1–2.

138. For the entirety of the president's message, see “Text of Roosevelt's Soldier Vote Message,” Washington Post, January 27, 1944, 9. For an overview of the politics surrounding the president's message, see C. P. Trussell, “President Calls Vote Bill ‘Fraud’; ‘Insult’ Says Taft,” New York Times, January 27, 1944, 1, 13; and William Moore, “Senators Rebuke FDR for ‘Slur’,” Chicago Tribune, January 27, 1944, 1–2.

139. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, (February 7, 1944), 1291–99; (February 8, 1944), 1383–1404.

140. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, (February 8, 1944), 1397–98.

141. Moments later, the new Green–Lucas bill (S. 1612) came to a vote and passed 47 to 38. The vote breakdown was almost identical to the Barkley amendment vote: Northern Democrats: 27 to 1, Southern Democrats: 9 to 15, Republicans: 10 to 22, and Progressives: 1 to 0. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, (February 8, 1944), 1406. As the chambers were likely to go to conference on S. 1285, the Senate's adoption of S. 1612 (especially as it was being sent to a committee controlled by states' rights advocates) was seen mostly as an effort to appease President Roosevelt, who demanded passage of Green–Lucas. See William Moore, “Senate Passes Conglomerate Army Vote Bill,” Chicago Tribune, February 9, 1944, 7; and Robert C. Albright, “Federal Ballot Plan Tied to State Soldier Voting Bill by Senate,” Washington Post, February 9, 1944, 1–2.

142. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, (February 9, 1944), 1484–85; (February 10, 1944), 1517–22.

143. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, (February 9, 1944), 1485; (February 10, 1944), 1522.

144. Young, Congressional Politics in the Second World War, 87; William Moore, “Soldier Ballot Conference Has 5 on Each Side,” Chicago Tribune, February 11, 1944, 15; and “Army Vote Conference Threatens Stalemate,” Washington Post, February 11, 1944, 1.

145. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, (March 9, 1944), 2404–08. For the behind-the-scenes politicking in conference, prior to the release of the report, see Drury, A Senate Journal, 98–106.

146. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, (March 14, 1944), 2573. For the full debate, see Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, (March 13, 1944), 2494–516; (March 14, 1944); 2562, 2564–69, 2569–73.

147. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, (March 15, 1944), 2639. For the full debate, see ibid., 2610–39.

148. Garson, The Democratic Party and the Politics of Sectionalism, 51–52.

149. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, (April 1, 1944), 3357. For full text of Public Law 227, see 58 Statutes at Large 136–49.

150. Kallenbach, “Constitutional Aspects of the Federal Anti-Poll Tax Legislation,” 719.

151. See Martin, “The Service Vote in the Elections of 1944,” 730–31. The Southern states were Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas.

152. Penton, “The United States War Ballot Commission,” 69. Penton's numbers come from a Department of Commerce Bureau of the Census (DOC) press release and a United States War Ballot Commission memorandum.

153. Lawson, Black Ballots, 74.

154. One example is a letter by Taft, dated April 14, 1944, entitled “Statement to the Negro Press of Ohio.” See Wunderlin, Clarence E. Jr., The Papers of Robert A. Taft: Volume 2, 1939–1944 (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 2001), 545–47Google Scholar.

155. Kryder, Daniel, Divided Arsenal: Race and the American State During World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000)Google Scholar; Ruchames, Louis, Race, Jobs, and Politics: The Story of the FEPC (Westport, CT: Negro Universities Press, 1971), 19–21Google Scholar; Maslow, Will and Robison, Joseph B., “Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for Equality, 1862–1952,” University of Chicago Law Review 20 (1953): 363–413CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Garson, The Democratic Party and the Politics of Sectionalism, 20–21; and Schultz, Kenneth M., “The FEPC and the Legacy of the Labor-Based Civil Rights Movement of the 1940s,” Labor History 49 (2008): 71–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

156. Ruchames, Race, Jobs, and Politics, 17.

157. Kryder, Divided Arsenal, 66.

158. Maslow and Robison, “Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for Equality,” 394.

159. Quoted in Ruchames, Race, Jobs, and Politics, 22.

160. Maslow, Will, “FEPC: A Case History in Parliamentary Maneuver,” University of Chicago Law Review 13 (1946): 407–44, 408CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

161. Garson, The Democratic Party and the Politics of Sectionalism, 22.

162. Ibid., 22–23.

163. Chen, The Fifth Freedom, 39.

164. Ibid., 41. For an overview of Southerners' attempts during the war years to disable (or eliminate) the FEPC, see Finley, Delaying the Dream, 78–83.

165. H.R. 3986 introduced by Thomas Scanlon (D-PA); H.R. 4004 introduced by William Dawson (D-IL); H.R. 4005 introduced by Charles M. La Follette (R-IN); S. 2048 introduced by Dennis Chavez (D-NM).

166. Chen, The Fifth Freedom, 41–43.

167. Ruchames, Race, Jobs, and Politics, 45.

168. Chen, The Fifth Freedom, 81. Chen shows that had Northern Democrats and Republicans voted together on a number of crucial roll calls, a majority existed that could have pushed FEPC legislation through both chambers.

169. H.R. 481 introduced by Charles M. LaFollette (R-IN); H.R. 679 introduced by Joseph C. Baldwin (R-NY); H.R. 700 introduced by William Dawson (D-IL); H.R. 1370 introduced by Frank Hook (D-MI); H.R. 1575 introduced by Everett Dirksen (R-IL); H.R. 1743 introduced by Adam Clayton Powell (D-NY); H.R. 1762 introduced by George Bender (R-OH); H.R. 1806 introduced by Helen Gahagan Douglas (D-CA); H.R. 1815 introduced by Charles Clason (R-MA); H.R. 1894 introduced by Clyde Doyle (D-CA); and S. 101 introduced by Dennis Chavez (D-NM).

170. “The Fair Employment Practice Act,” Report No. 187 to accompany H.R. 2232, 79th Congress, 1st Session, 2.

171. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 1st Session, (February 16, 1945), 1207.

172. “The Fair Employment Practice Act,” Report No. 187, 2–4.

173. Maslow, “FEPC,” 420.

174. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 1st Session, (December 10, 1945), 11778–80.

175. Ibid., 11780. On June 12, 1945, a vote was taken within Rules on the question of issuing a special rule, but the committee deadlocked 6 to 6. Maslow, “FEPC,” 420. Martin noted in his floor remarks that four of the six votes for issuing the rule came from Republicans (the entirety of the Party's membership on the Committee). He did not mention, however, that “on more than one occasion when a Southern Democrat was absent [during committee deliberations] the Republicans engaged in dilatory tactics to delay the vote.” Maslow, “FEPC,” 419.

176. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 1st Session, (June 20, 1945), 7064; and Garson, The Democratic Party and the Politics of Sectionalism, 139–40.

177. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 1st Session, (June 20, 1945), 7065; and Chen, The Fifth Freedom, 40.

178. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 1st Session, (July 12, 1945), 7489. This was an amendment vote in the Committee of the Whole; therefore, individual vote data were not recorded.

179. Maslow, “FEPC,” 433.

180. William Moore, “Senators Vote to Act on FEPC; Rebuke Truman,” Chicago Tribune, January 18, 1946, 2.

181. Farhang, Sean and Katznelson, Ira, “The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the New Deal and Fair Deal,” Studies in American Political Development 19 (2005): 1–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

182. Maslow, “FEPC,” 434; and Finley, Delaying the Dream, 84.

183. “Senators Vote to Act on FEPC; Rebuke Truman,” Chicago Tribune, January 18, 1946.

184. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, (January 17, 1946), 81.

185. Jack Bell, “Introduction of FEPC Bill Throws Senate Into Full-Scale Filibuster,” Washington Post, January 18, 1946, 5.

186. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, (February 4, 1946), 806.

187. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, (February 1, 1946), 700.

188. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, (February 4, 1946), 814.

189. Ibid.

190. Ibid., 815.

191. The Republican Party Platform is available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25835; the Democratic Party Platform is available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29598

192. Kenneally, “Black Republicans During the New Deal,” 138–139

193. Ibid., 139; and Felix Belair, Jr., “Assert Negro Vote Will Swing To GOP,” New York Times, October 18, 1946, 13.

194. “Senate's Vote for Action on Fair Employment Bill,” New York Times, January 18, 1946, 4.

195. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, (February 1, 1946), 722.

196. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, (February 7, 1946), 1059.

197. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, (February 9, 1946), 1193–96.

198. Minority Whip Kenneth Wherry (R-NE), for example, noted that his support for cloture was contingent upon his being able to offer amendments to the underlying bill. See Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, (February 5, 1946), 898.

199. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, (February 9, 1946), 1219.

200. Chen, The Fifth Freedom, 81–82

201. “President Defies Southerners By Full Civil Rights Demand,” Washington Post, January 6, 1949, 3.

202. Chen, The Fifth Freedom, 54–55.

203. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, (January 5, 1949), 58.

204. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, (January 10, 1949), 130.

205. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, (January 10, 1949), 131.

206. Ibid., 132.

207. “Negro Leaders Call for Anti-Filibuster Support in Senate,” Chicago Tribune, February 27, 1949, 12.

208. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, (February 7, 1949), 865; and Arthur Krock, “South Stands to Lose Old Filibuster Power,” New York Times, February 13, 1949, E3.

209. Robert F. Whitney, “Southerners Open Filibuster Today,” New York Times, February 28, 1949, 1, 20.

210. William S. White, “Drive on Filibuster Opened in Senate on Truman Order,” New York Times, March 1, 1949, 1, 3. Barkley resigned from the Senate on January 19, 1949, and was inaugurated vice president the following day.

211. In a 1978 interview, Senate Parliamentarian Emeritus Floyd Riddick explained that in ruling on behalf of those who signed the Lucas petition, Barkley explicitly overruled the Senate parliamentarian. The interview is available at http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/Riddick_interview_4.pdf

212. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, (March 10, 1949): 2174. See also Davis, Polly Ann, Alben W. Barkley: Senate Majority Leader and Vice President (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. 1979), 284–85Google Scholar.

213. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, (March 11, 1949), 2273.

214. Ibid., 2275.

215. Finley, Delaying the Dream, 119–20.

216. In addition, Robert C. Byrd notes another effect of the compromise proposal. “The new rule differed from the old in that it allowed cloture to operate on any pending business or motion with the exception of debate on motions to change the Senate rules themselves. Previously, the cloture rule had been applicable to those motions. This meant that future efforts to change the cloture rule would themselves be subject to extended debate without benefit of the cloture provision.” Byrd, Robert C., The Senate 1789–1989: Addresses on the History of the United States Senate (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), 128Google Scholar.

217. Finley, Delaying the Dream, 121.

218. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, (March 17, 1949), 2724.

219. Arthur Krock, “In the Nation: Traditional Back-Talk Between Pot and Kettle,” New York Times, February 11,1949, 22.

220. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, (March 11, 1949), 2255.

221. For a series of similar explanations, see ibid., 2241–55.

222. Maslow and Robison, “Civil Rights,” 395.

223. For an overview of the politics behind the 21-day rule, see Galloway, George B., History of the House of Representatives (New York: Crowell, 1961), 61–63Google Scholar; Bolling, Richard, Power in the House (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1968), 179–80Google Scholar; and Schickler, Eric, Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 174–79Google Scholar.

224. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, (January 3, 1949), 10.

225. Ibid.

226. Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism, 175.

227. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, (January 20, 1950), 719. The Democrats would eventually succeed in eliminating the 21-day rule in the following (82nd) Congress.

228. Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism, 177.

229. For example, the New York Times reported that the outcome of the vote “appeared to sift down to House tremors over…legislation to create a Fair Employment Practices Commission.” See C. P. Trussell, “House Keeps Curb on Its Rules Group By Vote of 236–183,” New York Times, January 21, 1950, 1, 8.

230. Along these lines, the Washington Post reported: “Republicans justifiably feared that a vote for the rules change at this time would be publicly interpreted as a vote to block discharge of the FEPC bill next Monday.” Robert C. Albright, “Tally of 236 to 183 Rejects Cox Effort To Eliminate 21-Day Discharge Clause; House Defeats Rules Change,” Washington Post, January 21, 1950, 1, 7.

231. “House Keeps Curb on Its Rules Group By Vote of 236–183,” New York Times, January 21, 1950. See also “Tally of 236 to 183 Rejects Cox Effort To Eliminate 21-Day Discharge Clause; House Defeats Rules Change,” Washington Post, January 21, 1950.

232. One strategy, used by Speaker Rayburn to delay action on civil rights bills in the House, was to begin debate on measures that would provide statehood to Alaska and Hawaii. The debate on these measures would drag on for the entire day, thereby requiring civil rights advocates to wait another 21 days before attempting to call up FEPC legislation. C. P. Trussell, “FEPC Sidetracked by Rayburn Ruling and House Stalling,” New York Times, January 24, 1950, 1, 23.

233. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, (February 22, 1950), 2165.

234. Maslow and Robison, “Civil Rights,” 395.

235. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, (February 22, 1950), 2221.

236. C. P. Trussell, “‘Voluntary’ F.E.P.C. is Passed by House; Senate Fight Looms,” New York Times, February 24, 1950, 1, 18.

237. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, (February 22, 1950), 2253.

238. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, (February 23, 1950), 2300.

239. “‘Voluntary’ F.E.P.C. is Passed by House; Senate Fight Looms,” New York Times, February 24, 1950.

240. Maslow and Robison, “Civil Rights,” 396.

241. C. P. Trussell, “F.E.P.C. Bill Gets Priority in the Senate; Filibuster Looms,” New York Times, May 3, 1950, 1, 23.

242. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, (May 19, 1950), 7299.

243. Ibid., 7300.

244. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, (July 12, 1950), 9982.

245. In taking up the school-lunch bill, the House adopted H.R. 495, which made H.R. 3370 a special order of business and laid out the terms for its consideration. See Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, (February 19, 1946): 1451–54. Flannagan's quote appears on page 1454.

246. Ibid., 1455.

247. For full House debate, see Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, (February 19, 1946), 1454–79; (February 20, 1946), 1484–1508; (February 21, 1946), 1534–40.

248. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, (February 19, 1946), 1456, 1459.

249. Ibid., 1456.

250. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, (20 Feb. 1946): 1493.

251. Ibid., 1495.

252. Ibid., 1496 [emphasis ours].

253. Powell, in his own autobiography, blurs the intent of this amendment with his future civil rights efforts. He states, “…I decided to create the Powell amendment, forbidding federal funds to those who sought to preserve segregation and wherever I thought there was an opportunity that it could be passed, or wherever the opportunity arose to defeat bad legislation, there I would introduce it…The first test came with the school lunch program. Under legislation passed by congress, free school lunches were available to schoolchildren. This was of no importance to those in my district but of the utmost importance to millions of children living in those barren, benighted areas of the United States that are subcontinents of human misery. With the support of my colleagues, the first civil rights amendment, attached to the school lunch program, was passed…From then on I was to use this important weapon with success, to bring about opportunities for the good of man and to stop those efforts that would harm democracy's forward progress. Sometimes I used it only as a deterrent against the undemocratic practices that would have resulted if the amendment had not been offered.” See Powell, Adam Clayton Jr., Adam By Adam: The Autobiography of Adam Clayton Powell Jr. (New York: Citadel Press, 1971), 81Google Scholar.

254. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, (February 21, 1946), 1537.

255. Ibid., 1540–42.

256. ”House Votes Fund for School Meals,” New York Times, February 22, 1946, 22; “School Lunch Bill Approved by House Vote,” Chicago Tribune, February 22; 1946, 1; and “School Lunches,” Washington Post, February 23, 1946, 6.

257. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, (February 26, 1946), 1608–28; “Senate Boosts House Bill on School Lunches,” Chicago Tribune, February 27, 1946, 13; and “School Lunch Fund Doubled by Senate,” New York Times, February 27, 1946, 18.

258. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, (February 26, 1946), 1628; (February 27, 1946), 1724.

259. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, (May 23, 1946), 5229; (May 24, 1946), 5603. The text of the conference report appears on pages 5227–29 and 5602–03.

260. “School Lunches Voted,” New York Times, May 24, 1946, 16

261. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, (May 25, 1946), 5765; (June 11, 1946), 6674.

262. For full text of Public Law 396, see 60 Statutes at Large 230–34.

263. Stathis, Landmark Legislation 1774–2002, 227–28.

264. Powell, Adam By Adam, 81.

265. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, (April 5, 1946), 3227.

266. Ibid., 3230.

267. Examples include Enelow, James, “Saving Amendments, Killer Amendments, and an Expected Utility Theory of Sophisticated Voting,” Journal of Politics 43 (1981): 1062–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Riker, William H., Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice (San Francisco: Freeman, 1982): 152–56Google Scholar; Denzau, Arthur, Riker, William, and Shepsle, Kenneth, “Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style,” American Political Science Review 79 (1985): 1117–34;CrossRefGoogle ScholarPoole, Keith T. and Rosenthal, Howard, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (New York: Oxford University Press 1997), 157–59Google Scholar; B.Gilmour, John, “The Powell Amendment Voting Cycle: An Obituary,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 26 (May 2001): 249–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Stewart III, Charles, Analyzing Congress (New York: Norton, 2001), 33–35, 40–43Google Scholar.

268. Dalfiume, Richard M., “The ‘Forgotten Years’ of the Negro Revolution,” Journal of American History 55 (1968): 90–106CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

269. Goluboff, Lost Promise; and Mack, “Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering.”

270. Goluboff, Lost Promise, 4.

271. Lee, “Hotspots.”

272. Goluboff, Lost Promise, 36.

273. Jenkins, Peck, and Weaver, “Between Reconstructions.”

274. Ibid.

275. See Katznelson, Geiger, and Kryder, “Limiting Liberalism”; and Farhang and Katznelson, “The Southern Imposition.”

276. Jenkins, Peck, and Weaver, “Between Reconstructions.”

277. Katznelson, Fear Itself, 38.

278. Goluboff, Lost Promise, 83.

279. McAdam, Douglas, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982)Google ScholarRosenberg, Gerald N., The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991)Google Scholar; and Klarman, Michael J., From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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