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2 Compare Samuel Williston, Contracts (3d ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1957), and Arthur Corbin, Corbin on Contracts (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1952).Google Scholar

3 See Richard Swedberg, Economics and Sociology 3–19 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1990).Google Scholar

4 See ”Symposium: Law, Private Governance and Continuing Relations,” 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 461.Google Scholar

5 Macaulay, Stewart, “Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,” 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963).Google Scholar

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8 Macaulay graciously granted me access to the notes from his original interviews.Google Scholar

9 Infra at 620–23 and appendix, Contract 3.Google Scholar

10 See especially Macneil, Ian, “Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, NeoClassical, and Relational Contract Law,” 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 854 (1978). See also Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974) (“Gilmore, Death of Contract”); id., The Ages of American Law (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977) (“Gilmore, Ages of American Law”).Google Scholar

11 See, e. g., Alfred Chandler, The Visible Hand (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) (“Chandler, Visible Hand”); Michael J. Piore & Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984) (“Piore & Sabel, Second Industrial Divide”).Google Scholar

12 In sec. V. B below, I refer to these as “open term contracts”; for an example, see appendix, Contract 2. I distinguish these contracts from the “long-term agreements”; for an example, see appendix, Contract 3.Google Scholar

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19 I am using the terminology of transaction cost economics. See Williamson, Economic Institutions 15–42; Ouchi, 25 Admin. Sci. Q. 129–41. This is in contrast to Ian Macneil's terminology, who makes a distinction between discrete “transactions” and relational “contracts.” In my terms, a given transaction may be conducted through either a “discrete contractual relation” or a “relational contractual relation.” See Ian Macneil, The New Social Contract (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980) (“Macneil, New Social Contract”).Google Scholar

20 Chandler, Strategy & Structure 13–14.Google Scholar

21 For more specific concepts used for distinguishing various contract types, see infra at 608.Google Scholar

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27 Classical sources for this discussion include Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976); Karl Bucher, Industrial Evolution (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1912); Max Weber, General Economic History (Glencoe, III.: Free Press, 1927). Modern sources for this discussion include Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956); Chandler, Visible Hand (cited in note 11); Piore & Sabel, Second Industrial Divide (cited in note 11). See also sources cited at notes 37 and 41.Google Scholar

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33 Restatement of Contracts sec. 32 (1932).Google Scholar

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38 Different types of open-term contract can be distinguished by the term which is left open and/or by who has the right to fill it in. In some cases, the quantity term is left open, to be filled in later by the seller. An “output” contract is an example. In other cases, the quantity term is left open, to be filled in later by the buyer. A “requirements” contract is an example. In some cases, the price term is left open to be filled in later by the seller based on her costs and an agreed-upon profit margin. This is called a “cost-plus” contract.Google Scholar

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42 Manufacturers also refer to this contract as a “partnership agreement.” I have opted for the term “long-term agreement” to avoid confusion with a document outlining the terms of a business partnership. I will demonstrate that these long-term agreements differ significantly from what Williamson calls “long-term incomplete contracts” (which I refer to as “open-term contracts”).Google Scholar

43 See, e. g., Hillman, Robert A., “The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory,” 67 Tex. L. Rev. 103–36 (1988); Feinman, Jay M., “The Significance of Contract Theory,” 58 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1283 (1990).Google Scholar

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48 I mean this to be a descriptive, not an explanatory, statement. On the “lag” theory of law and social change, see Friedman, Lawrence M. & Ladinsky, Jack, “Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents,” 67 Colum. L. Rev. 50 (1967).Google Scholar