In recent years there has been an accumulation of analyses showing a negative association between crime rates and various measures of criminal sanctions, which have been widely interpreted as evidence of the deterrent effect of sanctions (see Tullock, 1974; Tittle, 1973; van den Haag, 1975). In this paper, results are presented that are in conflict with such an interpretation. For the sanction of imprisonment (time served in prison and the risk of imprisonment given commission of a crime), the analysis indicates that the negative association is more readily interpreted as a negative effect of crime rates on sanction levels rather than its reverse—a deterrent effect.

The effect of police practices on the rate of robbery in 35 large American cities is estimated by a set of simultaneous equations. The measures of police resources (patrol units on the street) and police activity on the street (moving citations issued) are more precise than anything thus far available in studies of this kind and permit the use of identification restrictions that allow stronger inferences about the causal effect of arrests on crime rates than has heretofore been possible. Police resources and police activity independently affect the robbery rate after controlling for various socioeconomic factors. The political arrangements that lead to the use of aggressive patrol strategies are discussed and their effect estimated. The implications for, and limitations upon, policy are also discussed.

This study investigates the effects of being apprehended for shoplifting. The deviance amplification hypothesis derived from labeling theory and the converse deviance termination hypothesis derived from deterrence theory were formulated to structure the analysis. Self-report data on shoplifting were collected from high school students in four communities. Youth who had been apprehended for shoplifting reported more subsequent shoplifting than unapprehended youth. Youth who were exposed to police contact during apprehension reported more subsequent shoplifting than those who were handled by store personnel alone. In addition, apprehended youth reported a stronger deviant self-concept and less fear of store antishoplifting devices. These patterns were not strong but they were consistently in the direction predicted by labeling theory. Although other explanations may also be useful, it appears that labeling theory explains these findings, at least in part.

Laws that decriminalize public drunkenness continue to use the police as the major intake agent for public inebriates under the “new” public health model of detoxification and treatment. Assuming that decriminalization introduces many disincentives to police intervention using legally sanctioned procedures, we hypothesize that it will be followed by a statistically significant decline in the number of public inebriates formally handled by the police in the manner designated by the “law in the books.” Using an “interrupted time-series quasi-experiment” based on a “stratified multiple-group single-I design,” we confirm this hypothesis for Washington, D.C., and Minneapolis, Minnesota. However, through intensive “microanalysis” of these two jurisdictions, we show that Minneapolis, in responding to strong business pressure, developed several alternative means of keeping the streets clear of transient public inebriates while Washington, D.C., treated decriminalization as an opportunity to shift police priorities and relied on informal “safe zones” to handle the inebriate population.

Explorations of differential justice suggest that apparent relationships between class, race, and legal treatment may be explained by the more extensive conviction histories found among lower class and minority populations. But these findings have emerged without adequate exploration of the antecedents of a defendant's criminal record. This article examines the determinants of accumulated criminal histories, viewing the conviction awarded a defendant as the first stage in the construction of a prior offense record. Path analytic techniques were applied to data drawn from a sample of persons arrested for murder in order to examine the nature of relationships among the demographic characteristics of defendants, their prior offense records, access to legal resources, and ultimate dispositions. Patterns evident from the analysis suggest that the operation of the criminal record in the legal system constitutes a continual cycle in the confirmation of criminality. Prior record, itself partly a product of discretionary treatment, becomes a salient factor in the accumulation of additional convictions not only through its direct effect but also through its influence on access to private counsel and bail, which in turn significantly affect outcome.

In this article I argue that several conceptual and methodological deficiencies have plagued research on racial discrimination. Discrimination is usually conceptualized as a function of societal or institutional forces rather than as an attribute of individual decisionmakers, resulting in research designs that analyze decisions of courts, rather than those of individual judges. However, a finding of no discrimination in aggregate court data does not preclude the possibility that individual judges discriminate against or in favor of minorities. Thus the selection of the unit of analysis, and other methodological choices, can significantly affect substantive conclusions. Finally, research has largely been concerned with description, rather than explanation, and has therefore failed to illuminate the decisional processes that produce discrimination.

Each of these critiques is substantiated with data from the Fulton County (Georgia) Superior Court. My findings suggest three patterns of sentencing among judges: pro-black, anti-black, and nondiscriminatory. Anti-black judges are strongly tied to traditional southern culture, concerned about crime, prejudiced against blacks, and relatively punitive in their sentencing philosophies. In addition, they tend to rely more heavily on the defendant's attitude and prior record in making their sentencing decisions. Thus, discrimination seems to flow from both the attitudinal predispositions of the judges and the process they employ to make decisions.