Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rcrh6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T05:35:15.692Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A Note on Business Survival and Social Network

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 May 2018

Chenlin Zhao  and
Ronald S. Burt
Chenlin Zhao
Affiliation:
University of Chicago, USA
Ronald S. Burt*
Affiliation:
University of Chicago, USA
*
Corresponding author: Ronald S. Burt (ron.burt@chicagobooth.edu)
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

We extend Burt, Burzynska, and Opper's cross-sectional network prediction of relative success among Chinese entrepreneurs by predicting which ventures are still active five years later. The cross-sectional analysis is corroborated in three ways (despite the vicissitudes of a national anti-corruption campaign): (1) Businesses run in 2012 by CEOs with a network rich in structural holes are more likely to be active five years later, in 2017. (2) Survival odds are improved if the large, open network around a CEO in 2012 was initially a supportive ‘cocoon’ closed network when the business was founded. (3) Both results are contingent on capturing the guanxi ties valuable early in the history of the business. The two network effects disappear when the network around a CEO is limited to his or her currently valued contacts. Beyond corroboration, we find that advantage is concentrated in ventures that began well and had become successful. Network advantage here does not compensate for weakness – it is a mechanism for cumulative advantage, amplifying the success of businesses already doing well.

摘要:

摘要:

在Burt, Burzynska和Opper所做的中国创业者的横向网络预测的基础上, 我们预测哪些企业五年后还会活下来。采用三种方式来证实这个横向分析 (尽管存在反腐败运动的变迁) :(1) 在2012年, 由那些拥有丰富结构洞网络的CEO所运营的企业, 在五年之后的2017年更可能保持活跃;(2) 如果在2012年企业刚开始创立时, 某个CEO的大而开放的网络是一种支持性的封闭性网络的话, 企业存活的可能性更大;(3) 以上两个结果都依赖于在企业建立的早期抓住有价值的关系。当CEO的网络局限于其当前接触的关系时, 以上两个网络效应就消失了。在印证以往发现之外, 我们发现优势都集中在那些开端良好并且获得成功的企业上。这里的网络优势并没有弥补劣势—这是累积优势的机制, 放大了那些已经做得很好的企业的成功

हम बर्ट, बुर्ज़िंस्का व ऑपर के चीनी उद्यमियों की तुलनात्मक सफलता के अनुप्रस्थ-काटीय संजालीय पूर्वानुमानों को पांच साल के बाद भी क्रियाशील उद्यमों का अनुमान कर आगे बढ़ाते हैं. यह अनुप्रस्थ काटीय विश्लेषण (राष्ट्रीय भ्रष्टाचार विरोधी मुहिम के बावजूद) तीन पहलुओं से पुष्ट होता है: (1) 2012 में संरचनात्मक दूरियों से लैस मुख्य अधीक्षक के व्यवसाय पाँच साल बाद 2017 में भी क्रियाशील दिखे. (2) अगर 2012 में मुख्य अधिशासी के इर्द गिर्द का वृहद् मुक्त संजाल आरम्भिक अवस्था में सहायक संवृत्त संजाल था तो उसकी उत्तरजीविता के योग बढ़ जाते हैं. (3) दोनों ही परिणाम व्यापार के आरम्भ में महत्वपूर्ण गुआंची संबंधों के अभिग्रहण पर निर्भर हैं. दोनों संजाल प्रभाव तब ओझल हैं जब मुख्य अधिशासी के इर्द-गिर्द का संजाल महत्वपूर्ण संबंधों पर केंद्रित होता है. इस पुष्टि के अतिरिक्त यहाँ पाया गया कि अनुकूलता उद्यमों में थी जो कुशलता से आरम्भ हुए और सफल हुए. संजालीय अनुकूलता यहाँ कमज़ोरियों की क्षतिपूर्ति नहीं करती. यह समग्र अनुकूलता की प्रक्रिया है जो अस्तित्वमान सफल व्यापार की सफलता को परिवर्धित करती है.

Sumário:

SUMÁRIO:

Estendemos a previsão de rede transversal de Burt, Burzynska e Opper de sucesso relativo entre empreendedores chineses, prevendo quais empreendimentos ainda estarão ativos após cinco anos. A análise transversal é corroborada de três formas (apesar das vicissitudes de uma campanha nacional anticorrupção: (1) As empresas geridas em 2012 por CEOs com uma rede rica em vazios estruturais são mais propensas a estar ativas cinco anos depois, em 2017; (2) As probabilidades de sobrevivência são melhoradas se a grande e aberta rede em torno de um CEO em 2012 foi inicialmente uma rede fechada de apoio quando a empresa foi fundada; (3) Ambos os resultados estão condicionados à captura dos laços guanxi valiosos no início da história do negócio. Os dois efeitos de rede desaparecem quando a rede em torno de um CEO está limitada a seus contatos valorosos atuais. Além da corroboração, descobrimos que a vantagem está concentrada em empreendimentos que começaram bem e se tornaram bem-sucedidos. A vantagem de rede aqui não compensa a debilidade - é um mecanismo de vantagem cumulativa, amplificando o sucesso de empresas com bons resultados.

Аннотация:

АННОТАЦИЯ:

АННОТАЦИЯ: Мы развиваем кросс-секционную сетевую гипотезу, предложенную Burt, Burzynska & Opper, относительно успеха китайских предпринимателей на основании того, какие предприятия все еще действуют через пять лет. Несмотря на перипетии национальной антикоррупционной кампании, кросс-секционный анализ получает подтверждение в трех случаях: (1) Предприятия, которые в 2012 году возглавляли руководители с сетью, богатой структурными дырами, с большей вероятностью будут активны через пять лет, в 2017 году. (2) Шансы на выживание бизнеса увеличиваются, если крупная открытая сеть вокруг генерального директора в 2012 году была первоначально вспомогательной закрытой сетью «кокон», когда был создан бизнес. (3) В обоих случаях, результаты зависят от использования связей guanxi, которые являются ценными на ранней стадии истории бизнеса. Два сетевых эффекта исчезают, когда сеть вокруг генерального директора ограничивается его или ее ценными контактами в настоящее время. Помимо подтверждения гипотезы, мы обнаруживаем, что преимущество есть у тех предприятий, которые начинали хорошо и стали успешными. Так, сетевое преимущество не компенсирует слабость, т. е. это механизм кумулятивного преимущества, усиливающий успех бизнеса, который уже преуспевает.

Resumen:

RESUMEN:

Extendemos la predicción de la red transversal de Burt, Burzynska y Opper sobre el éxito relativo entre los emprendedores chinos al predecir cuáles emprendimientos están aún activos cinco años después. El análisis transversal es corroborado de tres maneras (a pesar de las vicisitudes de una campaña nacional anticorrupción): (1) Los negocios que se llevaron a cabo en el 2012 por los CEOs con una red rica en agujeros estructurales son más propensos a tener un rol activo cinco años después, en el 2017. (2) Las probabilidades de supervivencia se mejorar si la red grande y abierta alrededor del CEO en el 2012 fue apoyada inicialmente con un “capullo” de una red apoyo cerrada cuando el negocio fue fundado. (3) Ambos resultados están supeditados a la captura de los valiosos vínculos guanxi tempranamente en la historia del negocio. Los dos efectos de red desaparecen cuando la red alrededor del CEO se limita a sus contactos actualmente valorados. Más allá de corroborar, encontramos que la ventaja se concentra en emprendimientos que comenzaron bien y tuvieron éxito. La ventaja de red aquí no compensa la debilidad: es un mecanismo de ventaja acumulativa que amplifica el éxito de las empresas que ya lo están haciendo bien.

Keywords

Chinese managemententrepreneurshipnetwork advantagesocial network中国管理创业网络优势社会网络चीनी प्रबंधनउद्यमितासंजालीय अनुकूलतासामाजिक संजालGestão chinesaempreendedorismovantagem de rederede socialкитайское управлениепредпринимательствосетевое преимуществосоциальная сетьGerencia chinaemprendimientoventaja de redred social
Type
Article
Information
Management and Organization Review , Volume 14 , Issue 2 , June 2018 , pp. 377 - 394
Copyright
Copyright © The International Association for Chinese Management Research 2018 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Burt, R. S. 1992. Structural holes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Burt, R. S., & Burzynska, K. 2017. Chinese entrepreneurs, social networks, and guanxi. Management and Organization Review, 13 (2): 221–260.Google Scholar
Burt, R. S., Kilduff, M., & Tasselli, S. 2013. Social network analysis: Foundations and frontiers on network advantage. Annual Review of Psychology, 64: 527–547.Google Scholar
Burt, R. S., & Opper, S. 2017. Early network events in the later success of Chinese entrepreneurs. Management and Organization Review, 13 (3): 497–537.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cai, H., Fang, H., & Xu, L. C. 2011. Eat, drink, firms, government: An investigation of corruption from the entertainment and travel costs of Chinese firms. Journal of Law and Economics, 54 (1): 55–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
DiPrete, T. A., & Eirich, G. M. 2006. Cumulative advantage as a mechanism for inequality: A review of theoretical and empirical developments. Annual Review of Sociology, 32: 271–297.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Everton, S. F., Kang, S. M., & Thornton, P. H. 2013. Timing matters: Aligning new venture stage and investor relational structure for best performance. Academy of Management annual meetings, Orlando, Florida.Google Scholar
Goodman, L. A. 1970. The multivariate analysis of qualitative data: interactions among multiple classifications. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 65 (329): 226–256.Google Scholar
Guo, C., & Miller, J. K. 2010. Guanxi dynamics and entrepreneurial firm creation and development in China. Management and Organization Review, 6 (2): 267–291.Google Scholar
Lee, Y., & Gargiulo, M. 2018. Agency and structure: career trajectories of songwriters in Korean pop music. Presented at the Intra-Organizational Networks Conference, University of Kentucky LINKS Center.Google Scholar
Luo, Y. 2008. The changing Chinese culture and business behavior: The perspective of intertwinement between guanxi and corruption. International Business Review, 17: 188–193.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Merton, R. K. 1968. The Matthew effect in science. Science, 159 (3810): 56–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., Lester, R., & Canella, A. A. Jr. 2007. Are family firms really superior performers. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13 (5): 829–858.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nee, V., & Opper, S. 2012. Capitalism from below. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Obstfeld, M. 2016. Comment. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Fall: 166–172.Google Scholar
Salganik, M. J., Dodds, P. S., & Watts, D. J. 2006. Experimental study of inequality and unpredictability in an artificial culture market. Science, 311 (5762): 854–856.Google Scholar
Stuart, T., & Wang, Y. 2016. Who cooks the books in China, and does it pay? Evidence from private, high-technology firms. Strategic Management Journal, 37 (13): 2658–2676.Google Scholar
Xiu, L., & Gunderson, M. 2013. Gender earnings differences in China: Base pay, performance pay, and total pay. Contemporary Economic Policy, 31 (1): 235–254.Google Scholar
Yoo, M. 2003. The ties that (un)bind: Social networks and entrepreneurship in high technology industries. Doctoral Dissertation, Sociology and Business Administration, University of Michigan.Google Scholar
Zuckerman, E. W., Kim, T.-Y., Ukanwa, K., & von Rittmann, J. 2003. Robust identities or nonentities? Typecasting in the feature-film labor market. American Journal of Sociology, 108 (5): 1018–1074.Google Scholar