Article contents
Confucian Patriotism and the Destruction of the Woosung Railway, 1877
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 November 2008
Extract
The slow growth of railways is undoubtedly one of the most astonishing features of the history of modernization in China. The Chinese government often gave as its reasons for opposition to railway development the fact that improved communications would facilitate foreign military expansion, that railways obstructed the feng-shui, that mandarin and peasant alike were opposed to the railway, and that railways destroyed the livelihood of the common people. But, until recently, these explanations have never been given serious consideration, despite the fact that Ch'ing officials discussed railway-policy in these terms in a major debate in 1866–67. This is partly because historians have found it difficult to accept Chinese objections to railway development at their face-value, and partly because Chinese officials themselves, seeing that foreigners were unimpressed by Chinese arguments against railway construction, offered others which they thought would be more acceptable to the Western mind.
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1973
References
1 Several recent studies are worthy of note: Kuo-Ch'i, Li, Chung-kuo tsao-ch'i li t'ieh-lu ching-ying (Early railway development in China) (Nankang, 1961);Google ScholarRosenbaum, Arthur L., ‘Chinese Railway Policy and the Response to Imperialism: the Peking–Mukden Railway, 1895–1911’, Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i, II, 1: 38–70 (October 1969);Google Scholar and Currie, B. C., ‘The Woosung Railroad (1872–1877)’, Papers on China (Harvard University), 20: 49–85 (1966).Google Scholar
2 Wright, Mary C., The last stand of Chinese conservatism: the T'ung-chih Restoration, 1862–1874 (Stanford, 1962), p. 274.Google Scholar
3 Hsin-chung, Wang, ‘Fu-chou ch'uan-ch'ang chih yen-ko’ (A history of the Foochow Navy Yard), Tsing Hua hsüeh-pao, VIII. 1: 1–57 (December 1932).Google Scholar
4 There exists a number of studies on the Woosung Railway among which the following are worthy of mention: Kent, P. H., Railway enterprise in China (London, 1907), pp. 9–15;Google ScholarLi Kuo-ch'i, T'ieh-lu ching-ying, pp. 37–45; and Currie, ‘Woosung Railroad’. Mr Currie should be commended for offering the most extensive coverage using British and American company archives.Google Scholar
5 Currie, ‘Woosung Railroad’, pp. 50–53. On the relationship between the Woosung Tramway Company and the Woosung Road Company, see Mayers to Wade, 5 May 1876 in F.O. 228/577, pp. 334–52.Google Scholar
6 Medhurst to Wade, 29 January 1876. F.O. 228/571.Google Scholar
7 NCH, 17 February 1876. The trials were made on 14 February Kent, Railway enterprise, p. 12.Google Scholar
8 23 Feb. or, sometimes, 22 Feb. is the date usually given for Feng's initial protest. As stated, Feng did make a personal protest on 23 Feb. but this was preceded by a written protest of the 20th. F.O. 682/356/9. An English translation of this document is available in Encl. No. 12 of Medhurst to Wade, 26 Feb. 1876. F.O. 228/571 and F.O. 228/577, pp. 76–80. On Feng' personal protest on the 23 rd, See F.O. 682/356/10, II.
9 Currie, ‘Woosung Railroad’, pp. 56–9.Google Scholar
10 Feng to Medhurst, 8 March 1876. Encl. No. 1 in Medhurst to Wade, 8 March 1876. F.O. 228/571 and 228/577, pp. 210–14; NCH, 23 March 1876.Google Scholar
11 Loc. cit. See also Medhurst to Wade, 20 March 1876. F.O. 228/571 and 228/577, pp. 199–209.
12 Loc. cit.Google Scholar
13 Meetings between the British and the Chinese took place on at least five occasions (16, 17, 18, 22, and 30 Mar. 1876) while a number of communications were exchanged in between. Memoranda of these meetings can be found in F. O. 228/577, pp. 120–9, 144–51, 152–4, 178–88, 189–90, 193–8.Google Scholar
14 9 Apr. 1876. F.O. 228/577, pp. 282–91.Google Scholar
15 Li Hung-chang to Feng, 10 April 1876. LWCK, Letters, 16: 10b.Google Scholar
16 Li to Kuo Sung-tao, 2 April 1876. Ibid., 16: 10a.
17 Li to Tsungli Yamen, April 1876 (exact date not available); to Shen, 11 April 1876. Chiao-t'ung-shih (History of communication in China), Ministries of Communication and Railways, Republic of China, comp. (Nanking, 1930ff.), Vol. 12 p. 4;Google ScholarLWCK, Letters, 16: 12b. For Wade' instruction to Medhurst, 20 March 1876, see F.O. 228/577, pp. 156–68.Google Scholar
18 Mayers to Medhurst, 25 April 1876. F.O. 228/577, pp. 364–73.Google Scholar
19 Li to Feng, 10 April 1876. LWCK, Letters, 16: 11a–11b; Chiao-t'ung-shih, Vol. 12, p. 7.Google Scholar
20 Mayers to Feng, 24 April 1876. F.O. 228/577, pp. 224–5. Mayers to Wade, 5 May 1876. Ibid., pp. 334–54.
21 Mayers, memorandum of his interviews with Li, 30 April and 1 May 1876. F.O. 228/577, pp. 228–48; Li to Feng, 4 May, 1876. LWCK, Letters, 16: 13a–13b. In this letter to Feng, Li also commented that Shen's policy was unrealistic.Google Scholar
22 As late as July 1876, G. F. Seward noted that ‘the Chinese government does not appear disposed to take any further notice of the enterprise’. Cited in Currie, ‘Woosung Railroad’, p. 64.Google Scholar
23 Chiao-t'ung-shih, Vol. 12, p. 4; NCH, 20 May, 1876.Google Scholar
24 Li Kuo-ch'i, T'ieh-lu ching-ying, p. 41. See also Medhurst to Wade, 3 July 1876. F.O. 228/572. According to Medhurst, the line was inaugurated on 30 June.Google Scholar
25 Chiao-t'ung-shih, Vol. 12, p. 4; NCH, 1 July 1876.Google Scholar
26 Ibid., 8 July and 22 July 1876 (p. 72).
27 Ibid., 22 July 1876 (p. 71).
28 Shang-hai yen-chiu tzu-liao (Historical materials on Shanghai), Shang-hai t'ung-she, comp. (Shanghai, 1936), p. 317.Google Scholar
29 Kent, Railway enterprise, pp. 13–14.Google Scholar
30 Chiao-t'ung-shih, Vol. 12, p. 5.Google Scholar
31 Li to Feng, 2 September 1876 (Tienstin). LWCK, Letters, 16: 18b–19a; NCH, 12 and 19 August 1876.Google Scholar
32 Chiao-t'ung-shih, Vol. 12, p. 5; Li to Feng, 2 September 1876. LWCK, Letters, 16: 19a; Currie, ‘Woosung Railroad’, pp. 64–5.Google Scholar
33 Feng to Medhurst, 11 September 1876. Encl. No. 2 in Medhurst to Wade, 12 September 1876. F. O. 228/572.Google Scholar
34 Medhurst to Feng, 8 September 1876. Encl. No. 1 in Medhurst to Wade, 12 September 1876. Loc. cit.Google Scholar
35 Feng to Medhurst, 12 September 1876. Encl. No. 1 in Medhurst to Wade, 15 September 1876. F.O. 228/572.Google Scholar
36 Chiao-t'ung-shih, Vol. 12, pp. 5–6; Currie, ‘Woosung Railroad’, p. 66.Google Scholar
37 On 27 October 1876, Mayers wrote this to Medhurst: ‘Having reached the limit of profitable discussion of the subject on the spot, I agreed last week with the Taotai of Shanghai, and the Commissioner specially appointed for this negotiation, the Taotai Seng Suan-hwai (his colleague, the Taotai Chu K'i-chao, being incapacitated by illness from taking any active part in the affair), to proceed to Nanking for the purpose of arriving at the most favourable arrangement possible in personal conference with the Governor General and Minister Superintendent of Trade Shen.’ F.O. 228/577, pp. 404–11.Google Scholar
38 Shen's memorial, 11 January 1877 (Nanking). Shen Wen-su kung cheng-shu (Political writings of shen Pao-chen), compiled by Wu Yüan-ping (1880), 6: 76a–77b. It is interesting to observe that the agreement was drawn up in Chinese only and was signed in duplicate by the negotiators. For the most detailed record of the proceedings at Nanking, see Medhurst to Wade, 25 October 1876. F.O. 228/577, pp. 390–402.Google Scholar
39 NCH, 5 February 1877.Google Scholar
40 Chiao-t'ung-shih, Vol. 12, pp. 10–11; The North-China Herald speaks of the Company as ‘earning a remunerative income’. NCH, 5 February 1877.Google Scholar
41 Shang-hai yen-chiu tzu-liao, p. 317.Google Scholar
42 NCH, 21 April 1877.Google Scholar
43 Ibid., 28 July and 22 September 1877. Optimism on the part of the Woosung Tramway Company was not entirely unfounded. It was a well-known fact that the coal mines opened up by Shen in Taiwan (1875) were served by a mechanized tramway, and, as we shall see below, Shen had no basic objection to railways as long as they were controlled by the Chinese themselves. The fact that Li Hung-chang was also contemplating a railway for his K'ai-p'ing mines at this time further reinforced British optimism. Ibid., 11 January 1877. The Chiao-t'ung-shih, on the other hand, maintains that no additional assets were made because of the coming transference of ownership (Vol. 12, pp. 10–11). In view of the present evidence, this seems to be erroneous.
44 Chiao-t'ung-shih, Vol. 12, p. 11; NCH, 13 December 1877.Google Scholar
45 Ch'ai, O, Fan-t'ien-lu ts'ung-shu (A collection of jottings by Ch'ai O) (Shanghai, 1925), 6: 2b.Google Scholar
46 Mayers to Wade, 25 October 1876. F. O. 228/577, pp. 394–8. See also Mayers to Harry Parkes, British Minister to Japan, 9 November 1876. Parkes Papers. V, 1849–1879. I am grateful to Dr Jack Gerson for the latter reference. The Curlew was the gunboat that transported Mayers to Nanking for the negotiations.Google Scholar
47 Li Hung-chang to Shen, 14 September 1876 (Chefoo). LWCK, Letters, 16: 20b.Google Scholar
48 NCH, 16 November 1876 and 15 February 1877. It seems that the NCH printed whatever information came to hand at the time. On some occasions, it also shared the optimism of the Woosung Tramway Company. Even as late as 25 October 1877, five days after the railway was handed over to the Chinese, the Herald could do no better than say that ‘the future of the Railway is still uncertain as ever’. NCH, 25 October 1877. See also Ibid., 18 October 1877.
49 Mayers to Parkes, 9 February 1878. Parkes Papers, V, 1849–1879; NCH, 13 December 1877.Google Scholar
50 Ibid., 31 December 1879.
51 The fate of the Woosung Railway has been the subject of various conjectures. G. C. Allen and Audrey G. Donnithorne tell us that the Chinese threw the rails and rolling stock into a river but that Ransome and Rapier salvaged them and shipped the equipment back to England. Feuerwerker says that the equipment was ‘shipped to Formosa where for the most part the rails were simply allowed to rust’. B. C. Currie seems to subscribe to this view. However, there now seems to be little doubt that Feuerwerker is correct. Both Li Hung-chang and an eye-witness cited by Lieutenant Shore of the British Royal Navy confirmed this.Google Scholar Allen and Donnithorne, Western enterprise in Far Eastern economic development: China and Japan (London, 1954), p. 135;Google ScholarFeuerwerker, Albert, China's early industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai and mandarin enterprise (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), p. 269, n. 28;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Currie, ‘Woosung Railroad’, p. 54; Hung-chang, Li to Sung-tao, Kuo, 27 February 1878. LWCK, Letters, 18: 6a;Google ScholarShore, Henry Noel, The Flight of the Lapwing, a naval officer's jottings in China, Formosa and Japan (London, 1881), p. 398. However, there had been an attempt to save the railway. Ting Jih-ch'ang was at this time planning a railway in Taiwan and requested that the Woosung Railway be re-erected on that island. Shen approved of this, but because of the lack of funds it did not materialize. Chiao-t'ung-shih, Vol. 12, p. 11.Google Scholar
52 Ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo (The complete account of our management of barbarion affairs) (Peiping, 1930), T'ung-chih 53: 5a; NCH, 21 April 1870.Google Scholar
53 Ibid., 10 February and 17 February 1876.
54 Hai-fang tang (Facsimile of the maritime defence files) (Nankang, 1957), II, p. 507a.Google Scholar
55 Yang-wu yün-tung (The westernization movement) (Shanghai, 1961), II, p. 354.Google Scholar
56 On existing literature on the Woosung Railway, see note 2 above. The terms ‘conservative Confucian patriot’ and ‘Confucian patriot’ referring to Shen's behaviour regarding the railway are first used and briefly discussed by Currie in his ‘Woosung Railroad’, p. 74.Google Scholar
57 NCH, 31 December 1879.Google Scholar
58 For example, Currie, ‘Woosung Railroad’, pp. 74–6, and Li Kuo-ch'i, T'ieh-lu ching-ying, pp. 44–5. Currie's study is the first serious attempt to analyse the motivation behind the destruction of the Woosung Railway. He also gives considerable weight to Shen's proto-patriotism as part of that motivation.Google Scholar
59 Mayers to Wade, 25 October 1876. F. O. 228/577, pp. 390–3.Google Scholar
60 Li Kuo-ch'i, T'ieh-lu ching-ying, p. 44.Google Scholar
61 See notes 15, 19, and 21 above.Google Scholar
62 On the disagreement over the purchase of ironclads, see Li's letters to Ting Jih-ch'ang, 12 Oct. 1877, and to Shen, 25 November 1877. LWCK, Letters, 17: 24b and 31b. This is discussed at some length in Pong, David, ‘Modernization and politics in China as seen in the career of Shen Pao-chen (1820–1879)’ (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, May 1969), pp. 340–3. On the China Merchants’ Co., see li to Shen 29 December 1877 LWCK, Letters, 17: 41b.Google Scholar
63 Although Tseng Kuo-fan and Shen Pao-chen had a running dispute over military funds during the last years of the Taiping Rebellion, their differences were patched up by 1872. On the Shen–Tseng dispute, see Pong, David, ‘The income and military expenditure of Kiangsi province in the last years (1860–1864) of the Taiping Rebellion’, Journal of Asian Studies, XXVI, No. 1 (November 1966), 49–65. On the improvement of their relations, see Ch'ing pai lei-ch'ao (A collection of anecdotes of the Ch'ing period), Hsü K'o, comp. (1928), 34: 77,CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Chün, Huang, Hua-sui-jen-sheng and chih-i (The recollections of Huang Chün) (Hong Kong, 1965), p. 222.Google Scholar
64 It would be too cumbersome to cite all the sources on which these generalizations are based. Both the analysis and references to sources are given fully in David Pong, ‘Modernization and politics’, pp. 240–54, 304–10, 318–21, 325–31, 364–7. Several aspects of this analysis have been discussed by, or can be inferred from, the works listed below. Liu, K. C., ‘Li Hung-chang in Chihli: the emergence of a policy, 1870–1875’, in Feuerwerker, Albert, Murphey, Rhoads, and Wright, Mary (eds), Approaches to modern Chinese history (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), pp. 68–104;Google ScholarLiu, K. C., ‘British-Chinese steamship rivalry in China, 1873–85’, in Cowan, C. D. (ed.), The economic development of China and Japan (London, 1964), p. 60;Google ScholarRawlinson, John L., China's struggle for naval development, 1839–1895 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), pp. 52–4;CrossRefGoogle ScholarHsü, Immanuel C.Y., ‘The great policy debate in China, 1874: maritime defense vs. frontier defense’, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 25 (1964–1965), 212–28;CrossRefGoogle ScholarHinton, Harold C., The grain tribute system of China (1845–1911) (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), pp. 62–3, 69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
65 NCH, 1 July 1876. The railway was often spoken of as a concomitant of progress and civilization at this time. For example, see Ibid., 25 October 1877, and Currie, ‘Woosung Railroad’, p. 51.
66 Shore, The flight of the Lapwing, p. 398.Google Scholar
67 For an excellent study of the attitude and behaviour of the progress-minded British in India, see Stokes, Eric, English Utilitarians in India (Oxford, 1959).Google Scholar
68 Quoted by Currie, ‘Woosung Railroad’, p. 57.Google Scholar
69 In a letter to Parkes, dated 9 Nov. 1876, Mayers wrote: ‘I spent some days lately at Nanking in the execution of a mission entrusted to me by Sir Thomas, the object of which was the extrication of the so-called Woosung Railway Co. from the mess they had rushed or been led into, notwithstanding the couleur de rose anticipations with which their line was constructed without troubling the Chinese Govt. for sanction to the undertaking…The local authorities protested at the right time, and set all the machinery of official opposition at work.’ Parkes Papers, V, 1849–1879.Google Scholar
70 Mayers to Wade, 25 October 1876. F.O. 228/577, pp. 390–3.Google Scholar
71 Feng to Medhurst, 29 March. 1876. see Encl. No. 1 in Medhurst to Wade, 13 April 1876. F. O. 228/571, pp. 314–26.Google Scholar
72 It is perhaps not incidental that Lin chose Shen as his son-in-law, and that Tso, the hater of the British, chose him as the Director-General of the Foochow Navy Yard.Google Scholar
73 Hsia Hsieh, Chung-Hsi chi-shih (A record of Sino-Western affairs) (title page dated 1868), 21: 5a. For an excellent study of the Nanchang anti-missionary riot, see Cohen, Paul A., China and Christianity, the missionary movement and the growth of Chinese anti-foreignism 1860–1870 (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 86–109.Google Scholar
74 Hung-chang, Li to Ching, Ho, 6 May 1878. LWCK, Letters, 18: 12b.Google Scholar
75 ‘Hsien Wen-su kung cheng-shu hsü-pien’ (The political writings of Shen Pao-chen supplementary to Shen Wen-su kung cheng-shu), an unpublished copy of Shen's memorials compiled by Shen K'o, 1889. See pp. 1–7. Pagination is mine. I am much indebted to Mr Shen Tsu-hsing for the use of the manuscript.Google Scholar
76 Ibid., pp. 8–14. For a brief summary of this memorial see Kuhn, Philip A., Rebellion and its enemies in late imperial China: militarization and social structure, 1796–1864 (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), p. 124.Google Scholar On Shen as a censor, see my article, ‘Dynastic crisis and censorial response: Shen Pao-chen in 1854’, Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies (The Chinese University of Hong Kong).Google Scholar
77 Tseng' Memorial, 28 September 1856, in Tseng Wen-cheng kung ch'üan-chi (The complete works of Tseng Kuo-fan) (Taipei, 1952), Vol. III, pp. 234–5.Google Scholar
78 Pien Pao-ti, Pien chih-chün tsou-i (The Memorials of Pien Pao-ti) (n.d.), 12: 22b–23a; Hai-fang tang, II, 135a. Hsü K'o, Ch'ing-pai lei-ch'ao, 21:163. NCH, 13 May 1876; 7 April and 27 December 1877.Google Scholar
79 Currie, ‘Woosung Railroad’, pp. 56–7.Google Scholar
80 F.O. 682/356/1.Google Scholar
81 Feng was appointed on 2 Jan 1875; Shen was appointed on 30 May 1875, but did not arrive for office until until 8 Nov. There was apparently some disagreement between Feng and the magistrate of Pao-shan which resulted in a delay in reporting to Shen. Li Kuo-ch'i, T'ieh-lu ching-ying, p. 39.Google Scholar
82 Feng's communication to Medhurst, 20 February 1876, F.O. 682/356/9. For an English translation of this document, see F.O. 228/571, Encl. No. 12 in Medhurst to Wade, 26 February 1876, and F.O. 228/577, pp. 76–80. The protest of Feng's predecessor, Shen Ping-ch'eng, has not been preserved but is summarized in Li Tsung-hsi's communication to the Tsungli Yamen of 24 September 1873. See Tsungli Yamen Archives, ‘Chiang-su Ying-jen tsu-ti’ (The lease of land by the British in Kiangsu), T'ung-chih 12/8/3. I am grateful to Mr Wang Erh-min for this reference.Google Scholar
83 Feng's argument here is nothing but an exercise in diplomatic bargaining, for he knew as well as the British that had a proper application been filed, the Chinese would still have refused permission. In this connecion, it is interesting to note a conversation between Ch'eng-lin of the Tsungli Yamen and Mayers in which the latter asked what would the answer have been had the British applied according to proper procedure. To this, Ch'eng-lin replied immediately, ‘Of course, it would have been pu chun [not permitted].’ See Mayers' memorandum to Wade, 17 March 1876. F.O. 228/577, pp. 144–51.Google Scholar
84 NCH, 23 March 1876; Medhurst to Wade, 29 January and 26 February 1876. F.O. 228/571 and 228/577, pp. 6–18.Google Scholar
85 Depositions of Chin Hsing-hsing (one of the local headmen) and his wife, Chin Su (alias Su Chin-chin), 30 Nov. 1875; Feng Shou-ching to Medhurst, January 1876; Medhurst to Feng Chün-kuang, 12 February 1876. F.O. 682/356/2, 3, 4, 5, respectively. See also the petition of Chin Su to Medhurst, 13 December 1875, and Medhurst to Wade, 26 February 1876. F.O. 228/577, pp. 20–21 and 6–18, respectively.Google Scholar
86 Feng Shou-ching to Medhurst, 20 Jan. 1876 F.O. 682/356/4.Google Scholar
87 Medhurst to Feng Chün-kuang, 12 February 1876. F.O. 682/356/5 and F.O. 228/577, pp. 48–56. See also NCH, 24 February 1876.Google Scholar
88 Medhurst to Feng Chün-kuang, 12 February 1876. F.O. 682/356/5.Google Scholar
89 Feng Chün-kuang to Medhurst, 18 February and 8 March 1876. F.O. 682/356/7 and F.O. 228/577, pp. 210–14. See also Feng's communication to Medhurst and Peter Parker, no date. F.O. 682/350/1.Google Scholar
90 Medhurst to Wade, 29 January and 26 February 1876. F.O. 228/571 and 228/577, pp. 6–18.Google Scholar
91 On Feng's refusal to pass title, see note 89. On Medhurst's position, see Medhurst to Feng, 19 February 1876. F.O. 682/356/8.Google Scholar
92 U.S. Consul Peter Parker to Shanghai Taotai shen Ping-Ch'eng 21 March 1873. F.O. 682/356/14. U.S. Vice-consul General O.B. Bradford, who had been instrumental in the early stages of the founding of the Woosung Company, also admitted to the fact that the land for the road was purchased ‘far above the real market value of the property’. See Bradford to Shen Ping-ch'eng, 19 March 1873. F.O. 228/577, pp. 104–5.Google Scholar
93 Medhurst to Wade, 7 December 1876. F.O. 228/573.Google Scholar
94 Medhurst to Wade, 20 March 1876; Feng to Medhurst, 18 February 1876; and Mayers to Wade, 25 October 1876. F.O. 228/577, pp. 205–9; 682/356/7; and 228/577, pp. 390–3. Some improvements were made subsequently. On 25 Nov. 1876 Feng and Medhurst arrived at an agreement whereby fences or ditches were to be constructed on both sides of the railway with crossings for pedestrians and animals. The agreement made no reference to the construction of higher bridges. Feng's promulgation, 25 Nov. 1876, F.O. 233/78, No. 6.Google Scholar
95 NCH, 18 September 1877.Google Scholar
96 Ibid., 19 August 1876.
97 Shang-hai yen-chiu tzu-liao, pp. 315–16. The same source speaks of many people wanting to go to Woosung for an excursion, and concludes that the railway had become a fad (pp. 316–17). Chinese sources frequently refer to the passengers as yu-k'o (‘tourists’). The NCH also reported that the original engines of the railway were ‘specially intended for holiday and excursion traffic’. (22 Sep. 1877). For railway fares, see Medhurst to Wade, 3 July 1876, F.O. 228/572.Google Scholar
98 NCH, 8 February 1877.Google Scholar
99 The petition was presented c. 2 Oct. 1877. See Jardine and Woosung Co. to the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, 2 Oct. 1877, F.O. 233/78, No. 18. According to this source, the Chinese accounted for half of the Company's shareholders.Google Scholar
100 Chiao-t'ung-shih, Vol. 12, pp. 10–11.Google Scholar
101 For example, Li Hung-chang harboured such fears when he was operating in Shanghai during the early 1860s. See Kwang-ching, Liu, ‘The Confucian as patriot and pragmatist: Li Hung-chang's formative years, 1823–1866’, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 30 (1970), 18, 30.Google Scholar
102 NCH, 22 November 1877.Google Scholar
103 Mayers cites Articles XI and XII to support his argument. See Mayer's memorandum to Wade, 17 March 1876. F.O. 228/577, pp. 138–41. See also Prince Kung's assertion of Chinese sovereignty over Shanghai in his communication to Wade, 22 March 1876. F.O. 228/577, pp. 170–7.Google Scholar
104 Medhurst to , 29 January 1876. Medhurst wrote: ‘The latter part of the project [the extension of the railway from Woosung to Soochow] seems to have been suspected by the authorities, for the Governor-General [Shen], on his last visit here, visited the spot, and placing his foot authoritatively down, gave positive orders that the line should on no account be permitted to cross the creek.’ However, at that time, Shen was not yet aware of the fact that the Woosung Road and its proposed extension was intended to be a railway, not a road. In a later communication to Wade, Medhurst revealed that ‘the company certainly contemplate extending their operation whenever means and opportunity make it desirable’. (26 Feb. 1876). F.O. 228/571.Google Scholar
105 NCH, 15 February and 2 June 1877.Google Scholar
106 Ibid., 2 June 1877.
107 Shen to Tsungli Yamen, 17 January 1877. Hai-fang tang, I, 940b–941b. It is important to note that, according to Medhurst, members of the China Merchants' Company and other influential Chinese had also taken shares in the Woosung Company. There is no evidence, however, that Shen was aware of the fact, which would no doubt be viewed as an act of betrayal, and would have contributed to his hostility towards the railway. See Medhurst to Wade, 13 April 1876. F.O. 228/571 and 228/577, pp. 300–11.Google Scholar
108 In May 1876, five of the Company's cargo carriages were converted into passenger cars but twelve freight carriages arrived from Britain soon after. Each of them had a capacity of five tons. Chiao-t'ung-shih, Vol. 12, p. 4. On smuggling and duties evasion, see Feng Chün-kuang to Medhurst, 23 February 1876. F.O. 682/356/11. For an English translation of this document, see F.O. 228/571, Encl. 14, and F.O. 228/577, pp. 88–96.Google Scholar
109 Medhurst to Wade, 26 February 1876. F.O. 228/571.Google Scholar
110 Medhurst to Feng, 23 February 1876, Encl. 13 in Medhurst to Wade, 26 February, 1876. F.O. 228/571 and 228/577, pp. 82–7. It is instructive to note that Thomas Wade remarked on the margin of the document that Medhurst should have said that the rules of shipping and landing merchandize at Woosung could not be modified without the approval of the Chinese government. He also questioned Medhurst's wisdom in refusing to make the said pledge. There is no evidence that Medhurst gave any assurance to the Chinese subsequently. In fact, Medhurst might well have acted under the pressure of the local foreign community not to make the pledge, for soon afterwards, Bradford (U.S. Vice-consul General) wrote to Feng in the following terms: ‘If, however, steamers should be deterred there [Woosung] by a lack of water on the bar, and it becomes convenient to land or discharge cargo there, I see no reason why you should object to such cargo being transported over the road.’ F.O. 228/571 (12 Apr. 1876). In addition, the provisional regulations of the Woosung Tramway Co. also stated that the carriages of the railway should be of such a type that would facilitate passenger traffic and freight service between Shanghai and Woosung. There is, however, no evidence that the Chinese were aware of this.Google Scholar
111 Currie, ‘Woosung Railroad’, p. 73.Google Scholar
112 Such an inference is not entirely unfounded. Even as late as 2 Oct. 1877, three weeks before the destruction of the railway, Jardine and the Woosung Company wrote to the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce saying, in part, that ‘the carriage of goods would greatly add to the receipts and… would be a great benefit to the people as well as to the proprietors of the line…’ F.O. 233/78, No. 18.Google Scholar
113 Shen's memorial, 18 July 1867 (Foochow). Hai-fang tang, II, 75b. In this memorial he referred to the Navy Yard School as the ‘root’ of the whole ship-building establishment. He also argued elswhere that, with regards to China's relations with foreign countries, the superior policy was the preservation of sovereignty; it was for this purpose that the Chinese engaged themselves in self-strengthening. Shen 's memorial, 16 December 1867 (Peking). Ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo, T'ung-chih 53: 26a.Google Scholar
114 Ibid., 5.
115 Yang-wu yün-tung, II, 368–71.Google Scholar
116 NCH, 1 September. 1877. The British protest was filed with the Tsungli Yamen on 8 August Li Kuo-ch'i, T'ieh-lu ching-ying, p. 44.Google Scholar
117 Currie, ‘Woosung Railroad’, p. 68.Google Scholar
118 I have no evidence that Shen made any specific response to Seward's appeal, then or after.Google Scholar
119 Feng to Mayers, 23 April 1876.Google Scholar
120 Mayers to Wade, 25 October F.O. 228/577, pp. 394–8.Google Scholar
121 Loc. cit.Google Scholar
122 NCH, 22 July 1876.Google Scholar
123 Feng to Medhurst, 23 February 1876. F.O. 682/356/11. The term used was kung-lun.Google Scholar
124 Mayers to Wade, 17 April 1876. F.O. 228/577, pp. 356–61.Google Scholar
125 Mayers to Wade, 25 October 1876. F.O. 228/577, pp. 390–3.Google Scholar
126 A reverse situation occurred in 1841, during the Opium War, when the officials lost the confidence of the people, resulting in a popular belief that ‘the officials are afraid of barbarians, but the barbarians are afraid of the people’. Kwang-ching, Liu, ‘Nineteenth-century China: the disintegration of the old order and the impact of the West’, in Ho, Ping-ti and Tsou, Tang (eds), China in Crisis (Chicago, 1968), Vol. 1. pp. 98–9.Google Scholar
127 NCH, 12 August 1876.Google Scholar
128 Chiao-t'ung-shih, Vol. 12, p. 6.Google Scholar
129 NCH, 8 October 1877.Google Scholar
130 Hung-chang, Li to Chia-mei, Chou, 23 July 1877. LWCK, Letters, 17: 15b.Google Scholar
131 Currie, ‘Woosung Railroad’, p. 62.Google Scholar
132 Li to Kuo Sung-tao, 27 February 1878. LWCK, Letters, 18: 6a. Immanuel C.Y. Hsü maintains that Shen ‘was pressured by the local gentry to buy this foreign railway and have it totally wrecked.’ I find no conclusive evidence pointing to such pressure except that coming from Wu Yüan-ping, the Governor of Kiangsu, who was vehemently opposed to the railway. One must bear in mind, however, that throughout his career, there is little evidence that Shen succumbed easily to pressure from other officials, not even Tseng Kuo-fan in the early 1860s or Li Hung-chang in the 1870s. Hsü, , The Rise of modern China (New York and London, 1970), p. 351. On the relations between Shen and Tseng Kuo-fan, see note 63 above.Google Scholar
133 Sung-tao, Kuo, Yang-chi shu-wu i-chi (Collected writings of Kuo Sung-tao) (1892), 11: 17b.Google Scholar
134 Mayers' memorandum respecting proposed railway schemes, 1 September 1865. The memorandum refers to a private interview with Li in 1863, and Mayers particularly emphasized the fact that Li's remarks ‘were made at a time when he was living, it may be said, under our protection at Shanghai; when the Mo Wang still held Soochow, and the prospect of a pacification without further European aid seemed but distant. I had long previously discovered in Li Futai a most determined enemy to the spread of European influnce.’ F.O. 233/78, No. 3.Google Scholar
135 While Li's pragmatic approach enabled him to advocate reforms which were far-reaching, his very pragmatism also led him to compromises that represented a dcrogation of Confucian principles. K. C. Liu, ‘Li Hung-chang's formative years’, p. 7.Google Scholar
136 Chiao-t'ung-shih, Vol. 12, p. 11.Google Scholar
137 In his study of Li Hung-chang, K. C. Liu defines Confucian patriotism as a concern for China in its Chung-kuo or Chung-t'u sense, which implies a solicitude for the security and independence of the land and people without at the same time a consciousness of any conflict between loyalty to the reigning dynasty and the concern for China as a country. Liu, ‘Li Hung-chang's formative years’, p. 43.Google Scholar
138 For example, in his memorandum of an interview with several members of the Tsungli Yamen on 17 September 1876, Mayers reported that while some ‘freely admitted the utility of railways’, an unidentified Chief Secretary of the Yamen ‘expressed the opinion that they are advantageous only to the rich, causing distress to the poor by destroying their means of livelihood as carters, boatmen, and the like’. F.O. 228/577, pp. 144–51. On the relationship between the policies of the T'ung-chih Restoration and opposition to railways, see Rosenbaum, ‘Chinese Railway Policy’, pp. 38–40.Google Scholar
139 Liu, K. C., ‘Li Hung-chang's formative years’, p. 43.Google Scholar
140 Levenson, Joseph R., Confucian China and its modern fate (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958), Vol. 1, p. 74.Google Scholar
- 7
- Cited by