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Helpful Allies, Interfering Neighbours: World opinion and China in the 1950s*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 September 2014

YANG HUEI PANG
YANG HUEI PANG*
Affiliation:
Singapore University of Technology and Design, Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences, Singapore Email: yanghuei_pang@sutd.edu.sg
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Abstract

In the aftermath of the Korean War, the People's Republic of China was effectively an international pariah. Accounts of this period in Chinese textbooks emphasize how the Chinese turned this around, either during the Geneva Conference or the Bandung Conference, through deft planning and enterprise. Yet few pay any attention to how such manipulation of world opinion became increasingly difficult for Beijing after that initial success. One outcome of China's public relations campaign meant friendly Afro-Asia leaders voiced their opinions, in alarming numbers, to their Chinese counterparts regarding issues such as Asian security, mainland China's economic development, and the Taiwan problem. Indeed, recently declassified Chinese Foreign Affairs archive documents demonstrate that China tried to marshal such non-Soviet bloc opinions to its advantage during the first Taiwan Strait crisis (1955). Chinese efforts were successful in that there was no lack of volunteers to air dissent with American foreign policy. But these new allies also wished to mediate between the United States and the Republic of China, on the one side, and mainland China on the other. Moreover, such efforts were often at variance with China's domestic and strategic outlook in the region. China thus had to embark upon an active ‘management’ of disparate world opinions, which was an entirely new endeavour. Although China tried to provide a sanitized ‘script’ for its new friends, most had their own ideas. By the time of the second Taiwan Strait crisis (1958), the volume of third party interference had grown. Overwhelmed by such international attention, China responded by openly rejecting unwelcome mediation efforts and demanded outright condemnation of the United States. Thus, ironically, with its growing prominence on the international stage, China found itself unbearably weighted down by the burden of world opinion, a position previously occupied by the United States.

Type
Research Article
Information
Modern Asian Studies , Volume 49 , Issue 1 , January 2015 , pp. 204 - 240
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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References

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41 Zhou with Menon, Minutes of Conversation, 13 June 1954 (11:15am–1pm), serial no. 206-Y0010, Rineiwa Dangan, p. 352.

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47 Zhou with Cambodian Foreign Minister Tep Phan, Minutes of Conversation, 20 June 1954 (1:30pm –2:40pm), serial no. 206-Y0008, Rineiwa Dangan, p.319.

48 Zhou to PRC CC, Memo of Conversation with Laotian Foreign Minister Phoui Sananikone, 23 June 1954, serial no. 206-Y0050, Rineiwa Dangan, p. 329.

49 On 26 June, Pham Van Dong criticized K. V. Novikov for not having ‘mature ideas’ about the Laotian situation. When Pham presented his overly ambitious plan for occupying and expanding communist areas in Laos, Novikov lectured Pham on how important it was to ‘have further studies [on this topic] and then come up with concrete ideas’. See Li Kenong to PRC CC, telegram, 26 June 1954, serial no. 206–00046–34, in CWIHPB, 16 (Fall 2007/Winter 2008), p. 57.

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51 To date, China has not released the transcripts of these sensitive meetings. Wusheng, Liu, Hongqi, Du 刘武生, 杜宏奇(eds), Zhou Enlai junshi huodong jishi: 1918–1975, Vol. 2. 周恩来军事活动纪事 [Military activities of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2000), p. 337Google Scholar.

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58 ‘Obviously, the international situation is such that even reactionary figures like Churchill,’ Mao pointed out on 5 July, ‘are beginning to acknowledge Marxist-Leninist principles [peaceful co-existence] in foreign policy.’ V.V. Vaskov, Soviet chargé d’affaires, recorded Mao's enthusiasm; see V. V. Vaskov with Mao, Memorandum of Conversation, 5 July 1954, Journal of V V Vaskov, 27 August 1954, AVPRF, f. 0100, o.p. 47, papka 379, d.7, ll.69–70, in CWIHPB, 16 (Fall 2007/Winter 2008), p. 88; Declaration by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill, 29 June 1954, FRUS (1952–1954), Vol. VI (1986) Western Europe and Canada, p. 1130.

59 Mao commended the Soviet policy of relieving international tensions and coexisting with countries with different social systems. He repeated the same message the next day in a session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), highlighting that ‘[t]o protect our economic development and industrialization, we cannot do without improvements to our diplomatic camp’. 57th session of the 1st National Committee of the CPPCC, quoted in Pang and Jin, Mao Zedong Zhuan, p. 563; Mao, ‘Tong yiqie yuanyi heping’, pp. 334–335.

60 Even editorials from Sweden opined that American action was ‘impractical’, seeing this as a Republican ploy for the upcoming election. Most Indian editorials felt that the American position was ‘unreasonable’. Nevertheless, the Chinese communists reported that India's rhetorical support did not translate into action. An India foreign ministry spokesman affirmed on 8 July that, while India was prepared to support admitting China into the UN, India had no plans to submit such a proposal. ‘东南亚国家对美国反对我国加入联合国的反应’ [Dongnanya guojia dui meiguo fandui woguo jialu lianheguo de fanyin], MFA Intelligence division, no. 90, 24 July 1954, serial no. 102–00159–13, AMFA.

61 While Zhou performed well under the glare of international attention and Dulles displayed the ‘pinched distaste of a puritan in a house of ill repute’, the Korea phase of negotiations in Geneva was a galling experience for China when it handed the United States a ready excuse for rejection by insisting that the UN should not administer any future Korean elections for reunification. Since none of the other countries relished subverting the prestige of the UN, China scored no points in the first round. Henry W. Brands, Jr., ‘The Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration, Syngman Rhee, and the “Other” Geneva Conference of 1954’, Pacific Historical Review, Vol 56, no. 1 (February 1987), p. 80; Herring, From Colony to Superpower, p. 662.

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66 Zhou pointed out how scores of Chinese scholars and revolutionaries such as himself had studied in Japan and they were ‘grateful’ for this intellectual debt. Zhou also announced that Beijing was prepared to work with any Japanese: ‘If the Japanese elect Yoshida Shigeru, we will recognize Yoshida. If the Japanese elect Suzuki Mosaburo, we will also recognize Suzuki.’ Zhou also quoted Yamaguchi Kikuichirō 山口喜久一郎 (1897–1981) in ‘Zhongri guanxi de guanjian shi heping gongchu’, 中日关系的关键是和平共处 [The Key to Sino-Japanese Relations is Peaceful Co-existence], Zhou's speech to Japanese delegation, 11 October 1954, Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi中共中央文献研究室编 (ed.), in Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan 周恩来外交文选 [Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1990), pp. 87–93 (hereafter cited as ZEWW). Zhou's reassurances presented a stark contrast to the United States’ seemingly indifference to the Lucky Dragon incident in which Japanese fishermen were affected by the American hydrogen bomb test on Bikini atoll in March 1954. See Swenson-Wright, John, Unequal Allies? United States Security and Alliance Policy Toward Japan, 1945–1960 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 150Google Scholar.

67 Mao stressed the huge economic development tasks which China and India faced, and intoned: ‘China wants peace . . . application of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence should be extended to state relations among all countries.’ See Summary of Talks with Tse-tung, Mao, Beijing, 19 October 1954, in Gopal, Sarvepalli (ed.), Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Vol. 27: October 1, 1954–January 31, 1955 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002) (hereafter cited as SWJN)Google Scholar.

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69 Mao proceeded: ‘We have spent all our money on construction. If war should come we will have to gather everything to wage the war and all construction will be stopped. War plans will have to be drawn up and this would postpone the industrialization of China.’ For an alternative record, see ‘We Should Work Together to Prevent War and Win a Lasting Peace’, Mao with Nehru, record of conversation, 23 October 1954, in PRC MFA and Party Literature Research Center (eds), Mao Zedong on Diplomacy (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1998), pp. 131–133 (hereafter cited as MD).

70 Nehru merely summarized the activities of the Colombo powers but Zhou moved in to express interest. Huayuan, Xiong 熊华源, Zhou Enlai Wanlong zhi Xing 周恩来万隆之行 [Zhou Enlai in Bandung] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2002), pp. 1–7Google Scholar.

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72 Concerned that the Burmese were ‘afraid our Yunnan Province will be harmful to you’, Mao went on to reassure U Nu that he could ‘take a look at Yunan, to observe what is going on there’. Mao further stated that ‘we have issued strict orders to our people in the border areas to confine themselves to defensive measures and never take even one step across the boundary’. See ‘We should Promote Understanding in the course of Cooperation’, Mao with U Nu, record of conversation, 1 December 1954, in MD, pp. 136–142.

73 Xiong, Zhou Enlai Wanlong, p. 7; Wen Yan 闻岩 (ed.), Zhou Enlai Dashi Benmo 周恩来大事本末 [A Complete Account of Zhou Enlai's Activities] (Jiangsu Jiaoyu chubanshe, 1998), p. 609.

74 Mao pressed home the anti-imperialist rhetoric: ‘Countries in Asia and Africa have for many years been bullied by imperialist powers, mainly Britain, the US, France, Germany and Japan . . . The day will come when we shall have genuine independence . . .’. See Mao with U Nu, record of conversation, 11 December 1954, in MD, pp. 143–150.

75 Ibid.

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80 But Washington did not leave the secretary-general any bargaining chips as issues were ‘handled and settled without any consultation with the negotiator himself’. Hammarskjöld to Dulles, 27 January 1955, in FRUS (1955–1957), Vol. 2, pp. 149–151.

81 Dulles to Hammarskjöld, 28 January 1955, in FRUS (1955–1957), Vol. 2, p. 160.

82 Telephone call from M.C. Cardle, 28 January 1955, 12:31 pm, Telephone Conversation Series, box 3, telephone conv. – general January 3, 1955–February 18, 1955 (2), JFD papers, DDEL.

83 Lodge agreed, saying that ‘he [Hammarskjöld] is [in] way over his head. He has delusions of grandeur.’ Telephone call to Amb Lodge, 28 January 1955, 2:29 pm, Telephone Conversation Series, box 3, telephone conv. – general January 3, 1955–February 18, 1955 (2), JFD papers, DDEL.

84 See Zhou Enlai to Dag Hammarskjöld, letter, 3 February 1955, serial no. 113–00224–01, AMFA.

85 Swedish ambassador, Hugo Wistrand, relayed this message. Lodge to State Department, telegram, 6 February 1955 (2300hrs), FRUS (1955–1957), Vol. 2, p. 232.

86 One Indian source noted that the Taiwan Strait crisis was ‘vigorously debated’ at the Conference. Chinese Embassy in Britain to MFA, telegram, no. 205, 4 February 1955; Chinese Embassy in Britain to MFA, telegram, no. 239, 5 February 1955, serial no. 110–00276–06, AMFA.

87 Chinese Embassy in Britain to MFA, telegram, no. 407, 9 February 1955, serial no. 110–00276–06, AMFA.

88 Ibid.

89 Record of conversation, 17 July 1955, PREM 11/879, in Asia: Official British Documents 1945–65 (London: Routledge, 1999) (hereafter cited as AOBD).

90 Chinese Embassy in Britain to MFA, telegram, no. 789, 19 February 1955, serial no. 110–00276–06, AMFA.

91 31 January 1955, Catterall, Peter (ed.), The Macmillan Diaries: The Cabinet Years, 1950–1957 (London: Pan Books, 2003), p. 388Google Scholar.

92 Pearson noted conceitedly that ‘except the Asians’, the rest of the Commonwealth countries could report back on ‘the magnitude of our own defence efforts [against the Soviet bloc]’. 1 February 1955, Diary of Secretary of State for External Affairs, no. 241, L.B.P./Vol. 19, Documents on Canadian External Relations Vol. 21 (1955) (hereafter cited as DCER); 4 February 1955, ibid.

93 5 February 1955, Diary of Secretary of State for External Affairs, no. 241, L.B.P./Vol. 19, DCER Vol. 21 (1955).

94 ‘Speech by Premier Chou En-lai to the Political Committee of the Asian-African Conference, April 23, 1955’, in George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference (New York: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 62.

95 Xiong, Zhou Enlai Wanlong, pp. 1–7.

96 Lodge to Dulles, Memo, 4 May 1955, Telephone Conversation Series, box 4, Telephone Conv. – General May 2, 1955– August 31, 1955 (8), JFD papers, DDEL.

97 Lodge to Dulles, 9 June 1955, General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, box 2, strictly confidential – L (2), JFD papers, DDEL.

98 Allen Dulles told his brother: ‘The Chicoms want to talk and negotiate in secret with someone like Cooper and Bohlen . . . They want to work out a release and as if they were doing it in a generous way.’ Telephone call from Allen Dulles, 1 July 1955, Telephone Conversation Series, box 4, Telephone Conv. – General May 2, 1955–August 31, 1955 (4), JFD papers, DDEL.

99 The historian Shashi Tharoor criticized these rumours. See Chinese Embassy in Britain to MFA, telegram, no. 701, 17 February 1955, serial no. 110–00276–06, AMFA; 17 February 1955, Catterall (ed.), Macmillan Diaries, p. 395; Tharoor, Shashi, Nehru: The Invention of India (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2003), pp. 150 and 201Google Scholar; Stuart-Fox, Martin, A Short History of China and Southeast Asia: Tribute, Trade and Influence (New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, 2003), p. 13Google Scholar.

100 Hammarskjöld had also exerted ‘inner pressures’ on Washington, and the United States had reluctantly conceded to ‘have the fliers’ families write supplicant letters to Chou, asking him for release of the men, and kept controversial statements and press comments to a minimum, on the assurance that such measures would facilitate the men's release’. Hoover to Lodge, telegram, no. 709, 2 June 1955 (1514hrs), in FRUS (1955–57), Vol. 2, p. 586.

101 See Chinese Embassy in Sweden to MFA, telegram no. 1017, 24 April 1955, serial no. 113–00196–03, AMFA; see Tsang, Steve ‘Target Zhou Enlai: The ‘Kashmir Princess’ Incident of 1955’, The China Quarterly, no. 139 (September 1994), pp. 766–782CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

102 MFA to Chinese Embassy in Sweden, telegram no. 34, 20 April 1955, serial no. 113–00196–03, AMFA.

103 Johnson to State Department, telegram, no. 75, 2 August 1955, in FRUS (1955–57), Vol. 3, pp. 11–12.

104 On 30 June 1958, Beijing set the deadline of 15 July for Washington to resume talks. Washington only responded on 17 July. Mao explained his actions on 15 April 1959: ‘We didn't respond because at this point we can't be bothered with that thing [ambassadorial talks], we were going to bombard.’ See Speech at the 16th Supreme State Conference, 15 April 1959, Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansui 毛泽东思想万岁 [Long Live Mao Zedong Thought] (N. P., 1969), p. 290.

105 Yan, Wang 王焰 (ed.), Peng Dehuai Nianpu 彭德怀年谱 [Chronology of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: Remin chubanshe, 1998), p. 691Google Scholar.

106 Chinese diplomats would ‘only say that so long as the Chiang gang continues to stay in Taiwan and the offshore islands, the PRC's military action would not stop’. The United States bore the primary responsibility for the ‘tense situation’ in the Strait as it had marshalled ‘armed threats’ against China. ‘关于目前台湾局势对外宣传问题给驻外使馆的指示电’ [Guanyu muqian Taiwan jushi duiwai xuanchuan wenti gei zhu waishi de zhishi dian], no. 100, 2 September 1958, serial no. 102–0006–03; and MFA to Chinese Embassies, telegram, no.100, 2 September 1958, serial no. 110–00421–01, AMFA.

107 MFA to Chinese Embassies in Czechoslovakia, the United Arab Republic, East Germany, Hungary, telegram, no. 1338, 20 September 1958, serial no. 110–0421–01, AMFA.

108 Record of conversation between Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and the Bulgarian Ambassador Petar Pavlov Panchevski, 3 September 1958, serial no. 109–00856–13, AMFA.

109 MFA to Chinese Embassies (Czechoslovakia, United Arab Republic, East Germany, and Hungary), telegram, no. 1338, 20 September 1958, serial no. 110–0421–01, AMFA.

110 MFA to Chinese Embassies, telegram, no. 1222, N.D., serial no. 110–00421–01, AMFA.

111 Mongolia's newspaper, the Mongolian Pravda, urged perseverance on 3 September: ‘Quemoy, Matsu and Taiwan are part of China and cannot be separated . . . the Mongolian people staunchly support the Chinese people's righteous struggle.’ Embassy in Mongolia to MFA, telegram, no.199, 5 September 1958, serial no. 106–00122–02, AMFA.

112 Embassy in Mongolia to MFA, telegram, no. 411, 10 September 1958, serial no. 106–00122–02, AMFA.

113 For the Vietnamese, China's Taiwan Strait crisis was like a carnival and a media circus, with the Vietnamese News Division permitting the Chinese Xinhua news agency to interview prominent Vietnamese communists. China had earlier rejected Hanoi's calls for a ‘Southern Revolution’ [reunification with South Vietnam] during the summer of 1958. Hence, the acknowledgement by the Vietnamese comrades of the importance of recovering Quemoy was a pointed commentary on the partitioning of Vietnam at the 17th parallel in June 1954. See Chinese Embassy in Hanoi to MFA, telegram, no. 129, 2 September 1958, serial no. 106–00443–09, AMFA; Jian, Chen, ‘China and the Vietnam Wars’, in Lowe, Peter (ed.), The Vietnam War (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), p. 162Google Scholar.

114 Two days earlier, Pham Van Dong had announced total support for Zhou Enlai's official stand. Dong drew attention to the similar circumstances of South Vietnam and demanded that ‘the US cease all activities in South Vietnam’. See Chinese Embassy in Hanoi to MFA, telegram, no. 523, 11 September 1958, serial no. 106–00443–09, AMFA.

115 Some Vietnamese combat veterans even declared at the rally that they were willing to ‘fight together hand-in-hand with their Chinese comrades’. Important Vietnamese communists were present too. See Chinese Embassy in Hanoi to MFA, telegram, no. 1009, 21 September 1958, serial no. 106–00443–09, AMFA.

116 See record of conversation between Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang Wentian and the Soviet Chargé d’affaires, Bulgarian, Albanian, Czech, Hungarian, and Polish Ambassadors, no. 569, 21 September 1958, serial no. 109–00822–08, AMFA.

117 But he quickly established the insincerity of the United States by pointing out that it had ‘no intention in carrying out meaningful negotiations’ in Warsaw, and Eisenhower's rejection of Khrushchev's letter dated 19 September was ‘unprecedented’. Record of conversation between Vice-Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei and the Romanian, East Germany, North Korean, Mongolian and North Vietnamese Ambassadors, no. 566, 21 September 1958, serial no. 109–00822–07, AMFA.

118 Zubok, Vladislav and Pleshakov, Constantine, Inside Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 221Google Scholar.

119 Beijing unequivocally informed the world that the bombardments were not a prelude to an invasion of Taiwan. Record of conversation between Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang and the Indian Ambassador, no. 535, 30 August 1958, serial no. 111–00266–01, AMFA.

120 Chinese Embassy in Soviet Union to MFA, telegram, no. 589, 13 September 1958, serial no. 111–00267–01, AMFA.

121 Zhang noted that aerial exercises had taken place on 29 August off Taiwan's coast and a combined military exercise was scheduled for September. He also noted that senior American military leaders had converged in Taiwan for consultation. See record of conversation between Vice Foreign Minister Zhang and the Indian Ambassador, no. 535, 30 August 1958, serial no. 111–00266–01, AMFA.

122 Record of conversation between Vice Premier Chen Yi and the United Arab Republic Ambassador, no. 577, 21 September 1958 (1600hrs), serial no. 107–00103–21, AMFA.

123 Subsequent telegrams to the Chinese embassies in the United Arab Republic and Iraq avoided mentioning Chen Yi's embarrassing initial position of ‘we must liberate Quemoy and Matsu’. MFA (Asia-Afro Division) to Chinese Embassies in the United Arab Republic and Iraq, telegram, no. 1490, 23 September 1958, serial no. 107–00173–12, AMFA.

124 The central theme was: ‘China has always suggested that Sino-US talks should be used to resolve peacefully the differences over the Taiwan area without resorting to threats or force.’ Zhou, however, rejected the concept of ‘ceasefire’ as the ‘PRC and the US were not at war’. The bombardments of the offshore islands were simply an episode of ‘armed punishment of the Nationalists’ harassing activities’ in the ‘long civil war’ between the Communists and the Nationalists, which would not ‘threaten the Far East and world peace’. See Prime Minister Zhou Enlai to Krishna Menon, letter, 21 September 1958, serial no. 105–00375–01; Prime Minister Zhou Enlai to King Norodom Sihanouk, letter, 26 September 1958, serial no. 106–00129–01; both AMFA.

125 Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union to MFA, telegram, no. 589, 13 September 1958, serial no. 111–00267–01, AMFA.

126 Beijing saw this as a case of bad faith as all the Americans would promise was a discussion of the issue without offering an immediate ‘cessation of provocations’. Zhou explained to Antonov: ‘Since our first meeting with the US when we presented our draft accord, the American[s] probably unexpectedly came to a wrong perception . . . Thinking that we are in a hurry to reach a peace agreement, the US once again demand a ceasefire from us.’ Privately, Zhou could hardly mask his anger from the Soviets at just how ludicrous the United States’ demands were. Memorandum on the Situation in the Taiwan Strait, no. 1381, 21 September 1958, serial no. 109–00822–10, AMFA; Dulles, John Foster, ‘Problems of Peace and Progress’, Opening Session of the 13th UN General Assembly, New York, 18 September 1958), Department of State Bulletin (6 October 1958), pp. 525–530 (hereafter cited as DSB)Google Scholar.

127 Record of conversation between Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and the Soviet Chargé d’affaires S. F. Antonov, no. 563, 18 September 1958 (2200hrs), serial no. 109–00833–01, AMFA.

128 Zhang contended that the military grandstanding, the desire for negotiations, and the unstated adherence to the 12-mile limit were evidence that ‘superficially the US acts tough, but it is actually very soft’. He added that the Americans feared that the Kuomintang's actions would ‘drag the US into troubled waters’. The Americans' militant stance was also unpopular: Japan was hesitant, Britain was leery of showing too much support, and the Philippines’ suggestion that Taiwan should be included in the South East Asian Treaty Organization was dropped. Record of conversation between Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang Wentian and the Soviet Chargé d’affaires, Bulgarian, Albanian, Czech, Hungarian and Polish Ambassadors, no. 569, 21 September 1958, serial no. 109–00822–08, AMFA.

129 ‘Hence when he [Sukarno] reached the UN [in New York],’ complained Zhang to the Soviets, ‘he became wrongheaded about the ceasefire question.’ Record of conversation between Vice-Minister Zhang and the Soviet Chargé d’affaires S. F. Antonov, no. 568, 21 September 1958, serial no. 111–00267–01, AMFA; Harsono, Ganis, Recollections of an Indonesian Diplomat in the Sukarno Era (St Lucia: University of Queensland, 1977), p. 163Google Scholar.

130 Chinese Embassy in Burma to MFA, telegram, no. 1003, 22 September 1958 and no.1178, 25 September 1958, serial no. 105–00359–03, AMFA.

131 Beijing gave short shrift to India's huge economic woes and in May 1958 dismissed India as being ‘seduced by [the] small favors and little advantages’ presented by the United States. Even when Beijing realized the depth of India's economic disaster in August, suspicions about Sino-India relations remained. See Memorandum of Conversation, Under Secretary Dillion with B. K. Nehru, 16 July 1958, in FRUS, (1958–1960), Vol. XV South and Southeast Asia, p. 443; Nehru, B. K., Nice Guys Finish Second (New Delhi: Viking, 1997), p. 280Google Scholar; Junqing Tongbao [Military Intelligence Bulletin], no. 97, distribution no. 329, 8 May 1958, serial no. 105–00892–02, AMFA; Junqing Tongbao [Military Intelligence Bulletin], no. 206, distribution no. 765, 11 September 1958, serial no. 105–00892–02, AMFA.

132 Junqing Tongbao [Military Intelligence Bulletin], no. 87, distribution no. 297, 8 May 1958, serial no. 105–00892–02; Chinese Embassy in India to MFA, telegram, no. 270, 11 March 1958; no. 178, 31 March 1958, serial no. 105–00892–01; all AMFA.

133 Lloyd's idea offended both China's sense of sovereignty and its idealistic and cultural concept of international alliance. One, Beijing regarded the offshore islands as rightly belonging to China. Two, although Beijing had no great love for Chiang, to witness such skulduggery targeted at Taipei strained even Zhou's communist sensibilities. Furthermore, Lloyd's offer implied that the ungodly Red Chinese would gleefully accept this kind of deals without scruples. MFA to Chinese Embassy in India, telegram, no. 105, 3 October 1958, serial no. 110–00421–01, AMFA.

134 See MFA to Wang Bingnan in Warsaw, telegram, no. 285, 7 October 1958, serial no. 110–00421–01, AMFA.

135 The Soviets vigorously opposed any attempt to present the Taiwan problem at the 13th session of the UN. They parroted the Chinese argument that the Taiwan Strait crisis was an ‘internal affair’ and felt that the UN would be an uneven playing field as many countries were on the Americans’ side. Memorandum from Soviet Chargé d’affaires S. F. Antonov to Minister Chen Yi, 3 October 1958, serial no. 109–00833–03, AMFA.

136 Record of conversation between Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and the Soviet Chargé d’affaires S. F. Antonov, no. 612, 5 October 1958 (2400hrs), serial no. 109–00833–02, AMFA.

137 MFA Asian-Afro Division's Report on the Indonesian official statement to the UN, 4 October 1958, serial no. 105–00364–01, AMFA.

138 To ensure the Cambodians would not partake in the peace frenzy, Beijing abruptly scaled down its belligerence. Even the time-honoured Chinese demand for the ‘withdrawal of US troops’ was reduced to ‘this must be accomplished by negotiations’. See record of conversation between Premier Zhou Enlai with the Cambodian Ambassador, no. 600, 5 October 1958, serial no. 106–00129–03, AMFA; record of conversation between Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and the Soviet Chargé d’affaires S. F. Antonov, no. 612, 5 October 1958 (2400hrs), serial no. 109–00833–02, AMFA.

139 CCP Central Committee to all PRC Embassies and Representative Offices, 6 October 1958, serial no. 102–00006–06, AMFA.

140 Allen Dulles reported the problems Beijing had with an ‘Afro-Asian resolution’ on 13 October, but made no effort to exploit it. See 382nd Meeting of NSC, 13 October, 1958, NSC Series, Box 10, Ann Whitman File 1, DDEL.

141 An Indonesian spokesperson told the reporters: ‘The PRC's offer to negotiate with Taiwan reflects the spirit of the Ten Principles of the Bandung Conference and the UN Charter.’ See Chinese Embassy in Indonesia to MFA, Memorandum, no. 616, 8 October 1958, serial no. 105–00864–01, AMFA.

142 Zhou Enlai to Indonesian Ambassador Sukardjo Wirjopranote, letter, 24 October 1958, serial no. 105–00364–03, AMFA.