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Imperial Authority in Crisis: An Interpretation of the Coup D'état of 1861

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

Luke S. K. Kwong
Luke S. K. Kwong
Affiliation:
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
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Extract

The significance of the coup d'état of 1861 in late-Ch'ing history has been appraised by many scholars. A fairly typical viewpoint has been expressed by the eminent Chinese historian Wu Hsiang-hsiang: ‘Had there not been the coup of 1861, there would not have been the coup of 1898.’ One need not entertain the same degree of determinism to acknowledge, with Wu, that the coup of 1861 was important in its effects on the exercise of imperial power in later decades. The coup did, in fact, not only provide the immediate circumstances which favored an unprecedented experiment with the Ch'ing imperial form, namely, a regency formed by the empresses-dowager, but it did also enable the famous (or infamous) empress-dowager, Tz'u-hsi, to secure her rise to a supremacy in court affairs which ended only with her death in 1908. In view of this second development, scholars have long argued that Tz'u-hsi was both the mastermind and chief beneficiary of the coup, which was the product of her intrigues and manipulations. In fact, it has been called her (Yehonala's) coup d'état. While this view will presently be examined, my main purpose here is to define the nature of the political crisis from which the coup of 1861, as well as the idea of the female regency, originated. This, I believe, is one aspect of the subject that has not been sufficiently investigated.

Type
Articles
Information
Modern Asian Studies , Volume 17 , Issue 2 , April 1983 , pp. 221 - 238
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1983

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References

1 See, for example, WWKS, author's prefáce, p. 1; also, Hsiang-hsiang, Wu, San-sheng yu-hsin (Good fortune to last three life-times) (Taipei, San-min shu-chü, 1971), pp. 132–3.Google Scholar

2 See Ssu-ho, Ch'i et al. (eds), Ti erh tz'u Ya-p'ien chan-cheng (The second Opium War) (Shanghai, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1978), I, 1, (1).Google Scholar

3 Standard treatments of this series of events include Morse, H. B., The International Relations of the Chinese Empire (London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1910, 1918), 1, 589–617;Google Scholar Immanuel Hsü, C. Y., China's Entrance into the Family of Nations (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960);CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Banno, M., China and the West (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1964).Google Scholar An indispensable source of primary material on these events is Ch'i Ssu-ho, 6 volumes.

4 For both edicts, see CTST, dcts 2, 3, pp. 82, 83.

5 For the ‘examination hall’ scandal, see Yen-liu, Shang, Ch'ing-tai k'o-chü k'ao-shih shu-lu (An account of the Ch'ing examination system) (Peking, San-lien shu-tien, 1958), pp. 312–17.Google Scholar For the ‘money-shops’ scandal, see Ch'i-yün, Chang et al. (eds), Ch'ing-shih (History of the Ch'ing dynasty) (Taipei, Kuo-fang yen-chiu sho, 1960), VI, 4624, 4632.Google Scholar

6 For example, in the case of former grand secretary and president of the Board of Revenue, Weng Hsin-ts'un. See SL:TC, 8:9, HF 11/10/21; 10:6, 11/11. Cf. Tz'u-ming, Li, yueh-man-t' ang jih-chi pu (Supplement to the diary of Li Tz'u-ming) (1936; Taipei, Wen-kuang t'u-shu kung-ssu reprint, 1965), IV, 1990–1, HF 11/10/22.Google Scholar

7 This was according to the censor, Hsu P'eng-shou. See his memorial in CTST, dct. 45, p. 108.

8 SL:TC, 6: 49–50, HF 11/10/10.

9 SL:TC, 17:17–18, TC1/1/24. Cf. Li Tz'u-ming, HF11/11/11, IV, 2206.

10 JM, letter 12, p. 13. Cf. letter 7, pp. 8–9.

11 Some incisive criticisms are found in Li Tz'u-ming, HF11/8/16, IV, 1897–8, 1901–2.

12 JM, letters 2, 10, pp. 4, 11.

13 See CTST, dcts 54, 56, pp. 114, 116. Although these represented only the official view at the time of the coup, the accusation against Su-shun does seem to have been consistent with what is known about his arrogant behavior. See, for example, Hsueh Fu-ch'eng, Yung-an pi-chi (Historical notes and anecdotes by Hsueh Fu-ch'eng) (postscript 1898; Shanghai, Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, 1937), pp. 16–17. Also, see Chang Ch'i-yün, VI, 4632–3.

14 In this light, their subsequent clashes with the military leaders, Sheng-pao and Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, were of particular significance. See discussion in the text and notes 33–6. The incidents inadvertently served to reinforce the military strength of the Peking group in the coup d'état.

15 CTST, dct. 29, p. 98.

16 As late as mid-September, critics of the group of eight did not consider the military solution an appropriate one to the problem posed by the Tsai-yuan faction. Our evidence is the content of a conversation between a Grand Council official and Sheng-pao, then visiting Jehol, as was reported in a letter sent from there. Two versions of this letter exist, attributing the view on the military solution to either Sheng-pao or his friend. See JM, letter 11, p. 12 and JMT, pp. 235–6.

17 See, for example, SL:HF, 331:8–10, HF10/9/19.

18 See, for example, Hsien-feng's vermilion rescript (HF10/10/14) in Ch'i Ssu-ho, V, 289; also, SL:HF, 332:2, HF10/10/1; 342:22, HF11/2/10; 344:5, 2/22.

19 CTST, dct. 6, p. 85.

20 CTST, dct. 9, p. 86.

21 See joint memorial submitted by Prince Kung, Kuei-liang and Wen-hsiang in Ch'i-Ssu-ho, V, 148.

22 See Wen-hsiang's report (HF 10/10/9), ibid., 285.

23 See joint memorial by Kung, Kuei-liang and Wen-hsiang, ibid., 357.

24 SL: HF, 328:2–3, 27, HF 10/8/11, 18; 330:10, 9/4; 337:4–5, 12/3. Wen-hsiang's own account of his activities during this period is in his Wen wen-chung hung shih-lueh (A brief account of Wen-hsiang's career) (1882; Taipei, Wen-hai ch'u-pan-she reprint), 2:32–6.Google Scholar

25 Wen-hsiang's own explanation appeared to be that this edict was issued in response to his request to resign. Ibid., 2:363-b. But his request to resign at this particular time would seem to have been more politic than necessary for any other reason.

26 SL: TK, 476:15, TK 30/1/14.

27 CTST, dcts 6, 7, p. 85.

28 Cf. dcts 6, 7 and 8 in CTST, pp. 85–6, for their references to the empress(es)-dowager. Wu Hsiang-hsiang has made the same point on the basis of unpublished palace records. See WWKS, p. 56. Also, see his Wan-Ch'ing kung-t' ing yü jen-wu (The late-Ch'ing imperial court and personalities) (Taipei, Wen-hsing shu-tien, 1965), p. 3.Google Scholar It is inaccurate to assume, as Mary C. Wright does, that the ‘Empress-consort’ and the ‘Empress-mother’ were already known by their honorific titles as Tz'u-an and Tz'u-hsi on August 23. See her The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1957; 2nd printing, with additional notes, 1962), p. 16.Google Scholar The adoption of these titles came later, in October. See CTST, dct. 28, pp. 97–8.

29 Some writers have argued that the use of the seals had been ordered by the late Hsien-feng emperor himself. See, for instance, Hsu Ch'i-hsien, ‘Yü-shang. T'ung-tao t'ang chang yü Tz'u-hsi ts'uan ch'üan’ (The yü-shang and T'ung-tao t'ang seals and Tz'u-hsi's usurpation of power), in Ku-kungpo-wu-yuan yuan-k'an (The National Palace Museum quarterly), Peking, 1973·3, P. 48. But conclusive evidence for this view is lacking.Google Scholar

30 Cf. WWKS, p. 249.

31 For details of the confrontation, see CTST, dct. 54, p. 114; JM, letter 4, pp. 5–6.Cf. JMT, pp. 234–5. Additional information may be found in Li Tz'u-ming, HF11/10/1, IV, 1968–9.

32 JM, letter 2, 4, pp. 3, 6.

33 CTST, dct. 21, p. 93.

34 CTST, dct. 31, p. 99.

35 For Sheng-pao's response to the official reprimand, see CTST, dct. 24, p. 95.

36 Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's view reflected the ‘outside’ interpretation. See CTST, dct. 38, pp. 105–6.

37 JM, letter 12, p. 13.

38 CTST, dct. 19, pp. 91–2.

39 CTST, dct. 23, p. 94.

40 CTST, dct. 32, pp. 99–101.

41 CTST, dct. 36, pp. 103–4.

42 Tz'u-ming, Li, HF 11/10/1, IV, 1969–70.Google Scholar

43 See, for example, the edicts in dcts 49, 74 and 75, CTST, pp. no, 134 and 137–8.

44 M. Banno, p. 240. For a similar emphasis, see WWKS, pp. 113–14 and Hsiang-hsiang, Wu, Li-shih yü jen-wu (History and personalities) (Taipei, Tung-ta t'u-shu kung-szu, 1978), pp. 374–6.Google Scholar

45 See Prince Ch'un's comment reported in JM, letter 11, p. 12. Also, see letter 1, p. 3.

46 JM, letter 8, p. 9.

47 JM, letter 4, p. 6.

48 This is reported in Wu Hsiang-hsiang, Wan-Ch'ing kung-t'ing yü jen-wu, pp. 2–3.

49 An expression used in Silas Wu, ‘The Imperial Power: The Empress Dowager,’ a paper presented at the AAS meeting in March, 1970, p. 3.

50 See a contemporary comment on her mediating role in JM, letter 4, p. 6. Also see the famous though not entirely reliable account by Wang K'ai-yün, ‘Ch'i-hsiang ku-shih’ (The story of the [abortive] reign of Ch'i-hsiang), in Ch'i Ssu-ho, II, 325.

51 JM, letter 12, p. 13.

52 CTST, dcts 54, 56, pp. 114, 115–16.

53 For the imperial decision on this, see CTST, dct. 76, p. 140.

54 SL: HF, 356: 19–20, HF 11/7/17.

55 See the two edicts cited in note 52.

56 As regards Hsien-feng's ‘alleged valedictory edict’ appointing the eight Princes and Ministers to assist Tsai-ch'un, Mary Wright suggests that the ‘authenticity of the document has never been confirmed’ (The Last Stand, p. 317, note 21). This view has evidently been misinformed by the post-coup official rationalizations.

57 See Chao-chiang, K'uang (Luke S. K. Kwong), ‘Tz'u-hsi hsing-hsiang yü Tz'u-hsi yen-chiu ch'u-t'an’ (A preliminary inquiry into the image and the study of Tz'u-hsi), Ta-lu tsa-chih (Continental magazine), 61.3 (September 1980), pp. 4–5.Google Scholar

58 ‘Je-ho mi-cha k'ao-shih’ (An analysis of the ‘Secret letters from Jehol’), Ku-kung po-wu-yuan yuan-k'an (The national Palace Museum quarterly), Peking, in two parts: 1982.1, pp. 3–16, 61; 1982.2, pp. 70–85.Google Scholar