Islamic political rhetoric has had a wide variety of meanings in twentieth-century South Asia. This variety has often been obscured by observers who assume Islamic political symbols to have a single set of meanings as well as by contemporary political figures who attribute to earlier figures their own particular views. In Pakistan today, for example, all national heroes of the past are assumed to have used Islamic symbols exactly as does the current regime. In a recent contest—in which so far no winner has emerged—prizes were offered for portraits depicting Muhammad 'Ali Jinnah, the urbane, westernized lawyer, in Islamic dress. Such re-interpretation can force resort to explanations of expedience to reconcile apparent inconsistencies, arguing, for example, that political figures spoke differently to different audiences. What else could one make of a Jinnah if he is clothed as a fundamentalist? But desire for legitimacy—here as everywhere—outweighs accurate history.

In 1947 the British partitioned India and transferred power to two separate Dominions. Partition, however, did not mean the division of India between two ‘successor’ states. ‘India’ inherited British India's unitary centre, while ‘Pakistan’ consisted of areas with Muslim majorities which were merely seen as ‘contracting out’ of the ‘Union of India’. Congress's inheritance of the existing union centre gave it effective control over the joint assets of the two Dominions. The notion of a common Governor-General was, on the face of it, intended to safeguard Pakistan's share in the division of assets. The Indian Independence Bill was drafted on the implicit assumption that Mountbatten would remain as Governor-General for both Dominions until the division of the Indian army had been completed. As common Governor-General, Mountbatten could supervise the reallocation of assets and at the same time encourage co-operation between the two Dominions. But the reallocation of assets could not take place until a new centre had been created for the ‘seceding’ areas. The implication was that if a Pakistan centre was not formed, the assets would not be divided, and a Governor-General with a common touch could guide the Muslim areas back into the ‘Union of India’. Mohammad Ali Jinnah clearly recognized what might happen if there was a common Governor-General for two Dominions, one of which was to be regarded as the ‘successor’ and the other as the ‘seceder’.

Kinnaird College alumnae who did not work often expressed regret for having been ‘just’ wives and mothers, and a feeling of not having lived up to expectations. In some cases, these women's parents planned for them to have professional careers, but more often, such women mentioned the expectations of their college teachers that alumnae would contribute to their society in some concrete way.Educated women, in short, left Kinnaird with a sense that their education implied obligations to society. Women with careers, whether or not they had married, were satisfied that they had ‘used’ their educations fittingly. Women without careers often expressed dissatisfaction, at least to a foreign observer, butat the same time, they justified their education by pointing with pride to the way they had reared their own children, recognizing that mothers are active transmitters of social identities within the family. Alumnae who remained in primarily domestic roles as wives and mothers frequently expanded their world to include non-domestic social work and other activities beyond their immediate kin group.

Perhaps the most striking and significant divergence between the Sunni and the Shi'i legal systems as a whole lies in their respective laws of inheritance. From a comparative standpoint the outstanding characteristic of the Shi'i law of inheritance is its refusal to afford any special place or privileged position to agnate relatives as such.…

Of the eleven states in West Malaysia, it may be said that Penang presents a somewhat different situation from the other ten in terms of demography, economics, geography and politics, to mention a few basic features. Situated in the northern part of the country, the state of Penang (which comprises the island and a narrow strip, Province Wellesley, on the mainland) does not exhibit the features of a typical Malay state—a Malay-majority population, a predominantly Malay agricultural economy and a Malay Mentri Besar (Chief Minister) leading a Malay-dominated State Assembly which governs the state for the sultan, the symbol of Malay political power. Instead it has a Chinese-majority population, an economic infrastructure based primarily on commerce and trade rather than agriculture and a Chinese Chief Minister leading a Chinese-dominated State Assembly.In contrast to the other Malay states, the central political role in Penang is played by the Chinese community. Whichever political party is aspiring to come to power in the state must have significant Chinese electoral support.Against the background of a Malay-dominated Federal Governmentstriving to ensure uniformity of political, cultural, linguistic and socio-economic goals, Penang poses a challenging situation.

In the epilogue to his memoirs, Bao-Dai, the last sovereign of the Nguyên Dynasty, wrote:

In ancient Vietnamese society, the social system is embodied in the person of the emperor, through whom everything religious is done, down to the lowest village level. But, if he sanctifies this act by prescribing or controlling it, he does not assume it. On the contrary, the Vietnamese ideal is that of a sovereign wise enough to reign without stirring, ‘with his hands hanging and his clothes loose…’.