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THE (IN)STABILITY OF DEMOCRACY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 May 2022

Sayantan Ghosal  and
Eugenio Proto
Sayantan Ghosal*
Affiliation:
Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland
Eugenio Proto
Affiliation:
Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland
*
*Corresponding author. Email: Sayantan.Ghosal@glasgow.ac.uk
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Abstract

How stable are democracies? Building on Ghosal and Proto (2009, Journal of Public Economics, 93, 1078–1089), the conditions under which democracies are stable are analyzed. How these conditions relate to the threat of the rise of right wing populism poses to democracies is discussed.

Keywords

DemocracyconflictpopulismD74O12H11
Type
Special Issue Articles: The Political Economy of Populism
Information
National Institute Economic Review , Volume 259: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POPULISM , Winter 2022 , pp. 62 - 66
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of National Institute Economic Review

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