1. On Karadzic, see Duncan Wilson, The Life and Times of Vuk Karadžic 1787–1864 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), an interesting synthesis of Yugoslav works. It does not treat the language question in great depth. For that subject, the best short discussion in English is in Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 80–81.Google Scholar

2. Šidak et al., Povijest, p. 124. Khuen-Héderváry's electoral law of 1887 assured him of a complacent majority in the Sabor. The law limited the right to vote to those who paid a very high tax rate, or about 2% of the population. The law also gave the right to vote to civil servants in the numerous Hungarian institutions in Croatia. Finally, the law gerrymandered the electoral districts so as to eliminate the possibility of the election of candidates not amenable to Khuen's government. This electoral geometry contributed to the election of Serbs, who were by and large in support of Khuen-Héderváry in the 1880s.Google Scholar

3. The term “unified government” (zajednička vlada) refers to the parliament in Budapest, to which the Croatian Sabor sent 40 of its 88 members, the 40 being elected by the Sabor itself. Thus Croatia took part in the government of the Lands of the Crown of St. Stephen, of which Croatia was one. Theoretically, the Croatian Sabor dealt only with Croatian issues, while the /[]Hungarian Parliament dealt with issues affecting the entire Hungarian half of the monarchy including Croatia. The Croatian delegation to the unified government only conferred on issues affecting Croatia.Google Scholar

4. In the eyes of Croatian nationalists at the end of the century, the Croatian political nation indicated the entire population of Croatia regardless of ethnicity; see Mirjana Gross, Prema hrvatskome gradjanskom drustvu (Zagreb: Globus, 1992), p. 150. August Harambasic, a Croatian member of the Party of Right, said in 1902 in support of the idea of Croatian political nationhood: “I say to them [Serbs]: here is your carte blanche, your blank page, just write down all of your desires, and I as a brother Croat will endorse all of them…. [You must] simply declare that you are Croatian citizens, that your homeland is Croatia, and that you are in that regard political Croats.” Most thoughtful Croats always insisted that Serbian culture could be accommodated alongside the Croatian political nation. Although there were adequate guarantees for the use of various Serbian cultural characteristics (the Cyrillic script, the Serbian variant of the Serbo-Croatian language, and the practice of their Orthodox faith), Serbs interpreted Croatian political nationhood to indicate that Serbs would have to give up their Serbian-ness in order to become anything but pariahs in Croatian society. In fact, Croatian political nationhood only implied that Serbs should work in the interests of the Croatian state, as citizens of Croatia dedicated to its survival and strength; see Stenografički zapisnici Sabora Kraljevine Hrvatske, Slavonije i Dalmacije (Zagreb: Tisak i litografije kraljevske i zemaljske tiskare, 1915), 2(2), p. 70 (1901–1906), (hereafter SKH, volume(part), page no., year).Google Scholar

5. Frano Supilo, Politika u Hrvatskoj (Zagreb: Kultura, 1953), p. 115. Supilo noted that “while therefore Count Khuen got his Croatian mandates through use of force which became legendary, he received Serbian mandates in Serbian districts not only without any sort of hassle, but indeed with the goodwill and enthusiasm of Serbian voters.” Supilo, Politika, p. 114.Google Scholar

6. See Charles Jelavich, South Slav Nationalisms: Textbooks and Yuqoslav Union Before 1914 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1990), pp. 46–47; Mato Artukovic, Ideologija hrvatsko-srpskih sporova (Srbobran 1884–1902) (Zagreb: NGoogle Scholar

7. On the Coalition, see Mirjana Gross, Vladavina hrvatsko-srpske koalicije. 1906–1907 (Belgrade: Institut drustvenih nauka, Odeljenje za istoriske nauke, 1960). 8. The Radical party was formed in 1887 in Novi Sad as a result of a split in the Serbian Liberal party following Svetozar Miletic's retirement from active politics in the early 1880s. For the Radical party, see Lazar Rakic, Radikalna stranka u Vojvodini (do pocetka XX veka) (Novi Sad: Institut za izucavanje istorije Vojvodine, 1975), (hereafter Radikalna stranka I); Lazar Rakic, Radikalna stranka u Vojvodini 1902–1919 (Novi Sad: Filozofski fakultet, 1983) (hereafter Radikalna stranka II); and Lazar Rakić, Jaša Tomić (1856–1922) (Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1986).Google Scholar

9. On the suspension of autonomy, see Kosta Milutinovic, “Hrvatskosrpska koalicija,” in Andrej Mitrovic, ed., Istorija srpskog naroda, 6(1), Od berlinskog kongresa do ujedinjenja 1878–1918 (Belgrade: Srpska knjizevna zadruga, 1983), p. 490; Inostranac [Jovan Jovanovic], “Srpska crkva u Ugarskoj,” Srpski književni qlasnik (Belgrade), 29(5), p. 394 (December 1912); Rakic, Radikalna stranka II, pp. 121–122. Newspaper accounts included detailed enumerations of the laws that were suspended; for example, see “U Mitropoliji Karlovackoj,” in Srpski svestenik (Sarajevo), Nos 10 and 11, p. 115 (1 and 15 June (sic) 1912).Google Scholar

10. The Metropolitanate of Sremski Karlovci was the central administrative organization for the Serbian Orthodox church in the Habsburg monarchy. It was based in Sremski Karlovci, a town in eastern Croatia, on the border with Hungary. Other metropolitanates existed in Dalmatia, Bosnia, Hercegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro. Each metropolitanate included several bishoprics and/or metropolitans. The Metropolitanate of Sremski Karlovci included the bishoprics of Pakrac, Upper Karlovac (both in Croatia), Vrsac, Buda, Backa, and Timisoara (all in Hungary). The Metropolitanate of Sremski Karlovci was unique in that it included territories in both Croatia and Hungary, which were two different legal entities. Thus, while the Serbian Radical party was based in Novi Sad and concentrated on its activity in Hungary and the Independent party was based in Zagreb and concentrated on Croatia, the metropolitanate and the Church Congress overlapped these territories. This was one reason why many Serbs looked to the metropolitanate as a unifying force among the Serbs of the monarchy. As shall be shown, the Radicals hoped that the metropolitanate might one day become an autonomous region for Serbs within the Habsburg monarchy.Google Scholar

11. On the composition of the councils of the Church Congress in 1906, see Jovan Banjanin and Svetozar Pribicevic, eds, Srbobran: Narodni srpski kalendar (Zagreb: Srpska stamparija u Zagrebu, 1906), p. xiii. The Congress itself consisted of 75 elected members; of that number, eight were elected internally to the Congress Committee, which qoverned the funds of the church and relations with the state; eight were elected to the Metropolitan Church Council, which governed the activities of the parishes; and six were elected to the Metropolitan School Committee, which administered the Serbian Orthodox schools of the Metropolitanate of Sremski Karlovci.Google Scholar

12. Rene Lovrenčić, Geneza politike “novog kursa” (Zagreb: Sveuciliste u Zagrebu, Institut za hrvatsku povijest, 1972), p. 91.Google Scholar

13. The Radicals’ aspirations for the administration of the church were embodied in the Monastery Decree of 1908, which they formulated while the dominant party in the Church Congress. This decree was passed and signed into law by the emperor in 1908, but was suspended along with the other laws on 11 July 1912. See Lazar Rakic, “Manastirska uredba (1908),” in Zbornik za istoriju Matice Srpske (Novi Sad), 27, pp. 7–48 (1983).Google Scholar

14. Djordje Krasojević and Jaša Tomić, Rat u srpskoj narodnoj crkvenoj avtonomiji (Novi Sad: Elektricna Stamparija dra Svetozara Miletica, 1914), p. 7.Google Scholar

15. The privileges have been published with Serbian translations in Jovan Radonic and Mita Kostic, eds, Srpske Privilegije od 1690 do 1792 (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka, 1953).Google Scholar

16. Rakić, Radikalna stranka II, 203.Google Scholar

17. On the early Independent party, see Artukovic, passim. Google Scholar

18. Sima Lukin Lazic was a would-be historian who edited the satirical newspaper Vrač pogadiač in Zagreb and later Novi Sad from 1896 to 1914. See Kosta Milutinović, “Sima Lukin Lazic i Stanoje Stanojevic,” in Studije iz srpske i hrvatske istoriografije (Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1986), pp. 178–183; Vasilije Krestic, Istorija srpske stampe (Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1980), pp. 341–392; and Supilo, Politika, p. 117.Google Scholar

19. Lovrenčić, Geneza, includes an excellent discussion of this development.Google Scholar

20. In September, 1902, Srbobran (the organ of the Independent party in Zagreb) reprinted an article that originally appeared in Srpski knjizevni qlasnik entitled “Srbi i Hrvati,” which professed to analyze the relationship between the Serbian and Croatian nations. The anonymous writer (it is now known that it was written by Nikola Stojanovic, a young Bosnian Serb who became a prominent politician) claimed that Croatian culture was doomed to be swallowed by the more vigorous, dominant Serbian culture. The publication of the article provoked riots in Zagreb. As a result, Khuen closed down Srbobran and the party leadership invited Pribicevic and Jovan Banjanin, another youthful Serb, to take over the leadership of the party.Google Scholar

21. Novi Srbobran (Zagreb) (22 December 1903); quoted in Vaso Bogdanov, Hrvatski narodni pokret 1903/4 (Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1961), p. 301. Pribicevic is speaking during the national movement of 1903 in Croatia.Google Scholar

22. In one of his earliest writings, Pribicevic wrote that “if Serbs and Croats were two different nations … then conflict would already have found justification in that fact, and to seek a method of alliance would be all that remained…. An alliance would be able, if not to solve a conflict, then at least to postpone it for awhile. But such relations do not exist between Serbs and Croats, and the Serbo-Croatian conflict cannot be considered a national question, because Serbs and Croats are not two different nations but parts of one and the same nation. That conflict, or the Serbo-Croatian question, did not emerge from below, from the nation itself, and does not rest on national differences…. It is carried in … as a product of a foreign hand … to turn us from the road of natural development to the road which leads to national death…. The cause for [the conflict] lies [also] in that we are mercilessly divided, as no other nation, into various state organizations with their own political and cultural centers,” Pribicevic, “Misao vodilja Srba i Hrvata,” in Jovan Banjanin et al., Narodna misao (Zagreb: Dionicke tiskara, 1897), pp. 55–56. Pribicevic seemed to believe that Serbs and Croats were of one nation, but that consciousness of that unity had been lost over centuries. His role, then, was to convince them that they were indeed members of the same nation. Subsequent events indicate that he thought, at best, that they were all members of the Serbian, rather than Yugoslav, nation.Google Scholar

23. On the Coalition in the first years of its existence, see Gross, Vladavina. Frano Supilo, who led the Coalition until 1910, wrote memoirs on the period: Politika, already cited.Google Scholar

24. It gained a half-victory: of the Coalition's 31 mandates, the Independents gained six. The Radicals, then in the Coalition, won two seats. Together, they won more Serbian opposition seats in the Croatian Sabor than they had won in all the previous elections combined; however, the 15 mandates of the Serbian magyarones far outweighed the eight oppositionalists. See “Konačni rezultat saborskih izbori,” Novi Srbobran (Zagreb), p. 1, (7 May 1906), and Supilo, Politika, pp. 171–172.Google Scholar

25. See Hodimir Sirotkovic, “Pravni i politicki aspekti procesa ‘Reichspost'-Friedjung,” in Starine (Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1962), 52, pp. 49–180, on the Rauch regime and the two trials. In spite of its title, the article covers the entire period in some detail.Google Scholar

26. For instance, in “Odgovor ‘Zastavi’ II,” Novi Srbobran (Zagreb), p. 1 (3 April 1906).Google Scholar

27. The two Radicals were Jovan Radivojevic-Vacic and Mladen Lisavac. They were elected on the ticket of Ban Pavao Rauch in 1908. Their association with this Ban, who proved to be an embarrassment to Croats and something of a threat to Serbs, put to an end any strength that the Radical party enjoyed in Croatia.Google Scholar

28. See Gross, Vladavina, p. 206, and the letter from Frano Supilo to Pero Čingrija of 19 August 1907, in Hamdija Hajdarhodžić et al., eds, “Korespondencija Frana Supila iz perioda 1891–1914,” in Arhivski vjesnik, 6, pp. 7–229 (1963).Google Scholar

29. Jovanovic, “Srpska crkva u Ugarskoj,” pp. 394–395; Rakić, Radikalna stranka II, pp. 121–123; see also Arhiv Srbije, Ministarstvo Inostranih Dela (hereafter AS, MID-PO), fascicle N-ll, (1912); report “b” to Jovanovic, 21 August 1912. The fascicle that includes this report is dedicated to the subject of the suspension of church autonomy. It was maintained by the minister of foreign affairs in Serbia at the time, Jovan Jovanovic. It includes several reports. One, written by Jovanovic, was based on a report by Stevan Mihailovic, a secretary in the ministry of foreign affairs in Serbia from Novi Sad who was sent by Jovanovic to investigate. Mihailović's report was filed on 7 August 1912 (hereafter designated report “a”). It was seconded by the investigation of a Serbian journalist sent to Budapest to inquire into the reasons for the suspension of autonomy. The document, dated 21 August 1912, analyzes the meeting of Serbian representatives in the Church Congress in Novi Sad of 20 August 1912, which is described above in another context. The author spoke with Dusan Peles and Svetozar Pribićević of the Independent party. Unfortunately, the name of the author of the document is illegib]e (hereafter designated report “b”). The Serbian government also sent a B[ozidar?] Marković to Zagreb to convince the Independents to work with the Radicals for the return of autonomy and Jovan Radonic to Novi Sad and Sremski Karlovci to “see all parties, hear opinions, and inform self on how it came to the suspension of the decrees and why; intentions.”Google Scholar

30. AS, MID-PO, fascicle N-11, p. 34 (1912). There is yet another possible reason. In the spring of 1912, shortly after the declaration of a commissariat in Croatia, an attempt was made on the life of the commissar, Slavko Cuvaj, by Luka Jukic. On July 10, two days before the declaration of the suspension of autonomy, the commissar, in a report to Vienna, suggested possible responses to the attempt and forwarded materials produced by various police officials in Zemun and Zagreb that implicated the Pribicevic brothers in the attack. It would seem likely that the suspension of autonomy was, at least coincidentally, a part of the package. See Ludwig Bittner et al., Osterreich-Unvarns Aussenpolitik von der bosnischell Krise 1908 bis zwn Kriegsausbruch 1914 (Vienna: Osterreichischer Bundesverlag, 1930), Vol. 4, 19. Februar bis 30. November 1912, pp. 260–262, 264–275.Google Scholar

31. Rakić, Radikalna stranka I, p. 201. Jovan Jovanovic claimed that in 1912, the metropolitanate commanded funds of two hundred million crowns; see AS, MID-PO, fascicle N-ll, p. 34 (1912).Google Scholar

32. AS, MID-PO, report “a” to Jovanovic, 7 August 1912.Google Scholar

33. On the imposition of the commissariat, see Jaroslav Šidak et al., Povijest hrvatskog naroda 1860–1914 (Zagreb: Skolska knjiga, 1968), pp. 276ff.Google Scholar

34. AS, MID-PO, Budapest-Belgrade, (telegram) 21 August 1912; see also the long reports referred to in n. 24. On the meeting, see also Arpad Lebl, Gradjanske partije u Vojvodini 1887–1918 (Novi Sad: Filozofski fakultet u Novom Sadu, Institut za istoriju, 1979), p. 106.Google Scholar

35. AS, MID-PO, report “b” to Jovanovic, 21 August 1912.Google Scholar

36. Ibid. Google Scholar

37. AS, MID-PO, fascicle N-ll (1912); Jovan Jovanovic and one of his emissaries, Stevan Mihailovic, shared Peles's opinion that the Hungarian government feared how the Independents would use the funds of the metropolitanate.Google Scholar

38. AS, MID-PO, report “b” to Jovanovic, 21 August 1912.Google Scholar

39. Ibid. Google Scholar

40. Ibid. Google Scholar

41. Ibid. Google Scholar

42. AS, MID-PO, report “a”, Mihailović-Jovanović, 7 August 1912.Google Scholar

43. Jovanović, “Srpska crkva u Ugarskoj,” pp. 394–395.Google Scholar

44. Ibid. Google Scholar

45. AS, MID-PO, report “a”, Mihailovic-Jovanovic, 7 August 1912.Google Scholar

46. Ibid. Google Scholar

47. Ibid.; this was written in a note in Jovanovic's hand on the margin of the document.Google Scholar

48. Ibid.; this, in a similar note written two days later in Jovanovic's hand.Google Scholar

49. Ibid. Google Scholar

50. There are two short studies of this party, as well as several works that include discussions of it: see Milivoj Rajkov, “ ‘Srpski glas’ i kikindski demokrati,” Zbornik za istoriju Matice Srpske (Novi Sad), 6, pp. 157–172 (1972); and Vasilije Krestic, “Iz istorije demokratskog pokreta Srba u Ugarskoj,” Balcanica (Belgrade), 8, pp. 397—411 (1977). See also Vasa Stajic, “Milutin Jaksic (1863–1937)”, Godisnjak istoriskog drustva u Novom Sadu (Novi Sad), 12(1), pp. 57–62; Rakic, Radikalna stranka II, pp. 148–151; Krestic, Istorija srpske stampe, pp. 344–360; and Arpad Lebl, Gradjanske, pp. 110–126.Google Scholar

51. Stajić, “Milutin Jaksic,” p. 57; Krestic, Istorija srpske stampe, p. 344–345.Google Scholar

52. Krestić, Ibid., p. 345.Google Scholar

53. Stajić, op.ci., p. 59; Krestić, op. cit., pp. 348–349.Google Scholar

54. AS, MID-PO, Izvestaj iz Budimpeste, Pov. br. 15, 14 March 1910. Consul Hristic's remarks read: “In this party, which has, so to speak, not yet found its legs, there are already four factions, and in Velika Kikinda alone there are three strands. If by nothing else, then by this ‘unity’ at least one can see that this is a ‘purely Serbian party'.”Google Scholar

55. Krestić, op. cit., p. 347.Google Scholar

56. “Srpska demokratska stranka u Ugarskoj,” Srbobran (Zagreb), (3 September 1909).Google Scholar

57. On the railroad pragmatic, see Gross, Vladavina, pp. 178ff.Google Scholar

58. AS, MID-PO, report “b” to Jovanović of 21 August 1912.Google Scholar

59. Stajić, “Milutin Jakšić,” p. 60.Google Scholar

60. Krestić, Istorija srpske štampe, pp. 351–352; Stajic, “Milutin Jakšić,” p. 60.Google Scholar

61. Rakic, Radikalna stranka II, p. 161; Krestić, Istorija srpske štampe, pp. 425–431.Google Scholar

62. “Odnošaji Srba u Ugarskoj,” Srbobran (Zagreb), p. 1 (21 January 1913). 63. AS, MID-PO, Izveštaj iz Budimpešte, (telegram), 21 August 1912.Google Scholar

64. Ibid. Google Scholar

65. Lebl, Gradianske partije u Voivodini, p. 106.Google Scholar

66. “Fuzija srpskih stranaka u Ugarskoj,” Srbobran (Zagreb), p. 1 (9 June 1913).Google Scholar

67. Ibid. Google Scholar

68. “Sastanak srpskih narodnih stranaka u Zagrebu,” ibid., p. 1 (14 April 1914); “Novosadska konferencija,” ibid., p. 1 (18 May 1914).Google Scholar

69. “Jedna nepametna akcija,” Ibid., p. 1 (12 May 1914).Google Scholar

70. “Mi i ostale srpske stranke,” Ibid., p. 1 (7 May 1914).Google Scholar

71. “Novosadska konferencija, Ibid., p. 1 (May 18 1914).Google Scholar

72. “Zagreb i Novi Sad,” Narodno jedinstvo (Zagreb), p. 1 (30 May 30 1914).Google Scholar

73. “Razrijesen blok srpskih narodnih stranaka,” Srbobran (Zagreb), p. 1 (22 May 1914).Google Scholar

74. AS, MID-PO, report “a”, Mihailovic-Jovanovic, 7 August 1912.Google Scholar

75. Krasojevic and Tomic, Rat, p. 16.Google Scholar

76. “Zagreb i Novi Sad,” Narodno jedinstvo (Zagreb), p. 1 (30 May, 1914).Google Scholar

77. Lebl, Gradjanske, p. 119.Google Scholar

78. Stajic, “Milutin Jaksic,” p. 61.Google Scholar

79. Milutinovic, “Hrvatsko-srpske koalicije,” p. 491.Google Scholar

80. SKH, 2, pp. 223, 434–435 (1913–1918); Milutinovic, “Hrvatskosrpska koalicije,” p. 492.Google Scholar

81. SKH, 2, pp. 434–35. (1913–1918).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

82. AS, MID-PO, Izveštaj iz Budimpeštee, Pov. br. 33, 10 April 1914.Google Scholar

83. Ibid., (telegram), 11 June 1914.Google Scholar

84. Ibid., Pov. br. 59, 12 June 1914.Google Scholar

85. Ibid., Pov. br. 71, 28 July 1913.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

86. Ibid. Google Scholar

87. Ibid. Google Scholar

88. Milutinovic, “Hrvatskosrpska koalicija,” p. 489.Google Scholar

89. AS, MID-PO, Izvestaj iz Budimpeste, Pov. br. 27, 2 April 1914; ibid., Pov. br. 29, 3 April 1914; Adam Pribićević, Moj Život (Windsor, Canada: The Author, 1981), pp. 133–134. Google Scholar

90. Pribićević, Moj Život, pp. 31–33; Krizman cites a second version of Pribicevic's autobiography, in manuscript form in the Arhiv Jugoslavie, in which the same basic story is told: Bogdan Krizman, Hrvatska u prvom svietskom ratu: Hrvatsko-srpski odnosi (Zagreb: Globus, 1989), pp. 45–46.Google Scholar

91. Krizman, Hrvatska u prvom svjetskom ratu, p. 46; this line is in the manuscript version but not in Moj Život. Google Scholar

92. Slavko Ćirić, “Stvaranje jugoslovenske države,” Letopis Matice Srpske (Novi Sad), 335, p. 53 (1933).Google Scholar

93. Ivan Meštrović, Uspomene na političke ljudi i dogodjaje (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1969), p. 29.Google Scholar