No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Workers’ Self-Management and the Politics of Ethnic Nationalism in Yugoslavia
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 November 2018
Extract
Yugoslav nationalism like other European nationalist movements is largely the product of the nineteenth century. The peoples of Yugoslavia were separated by cultural differences which seemed minor when compared with those of their occupiers, the Germanic Hapsburgs and the Ottoman Turks. The dream uniting the South Slavic peoples was the achievement of liberation from both foreign overlords. The conditions of the Balkans in the nineteenth century constituted the fertile ground in which the Yugoslav ideal flourished. The Yugoslav ideal became a uniting ideology which enabled all the Slavic peoples to play their role in the quest for liberation.
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © 1976 by the Association for the Study of the Nationalities (USSR and East Europe) Inc.
References
Notes
1. The centralistic Vidovdan Constitution was passed with the abstention of most Croats. The only concession to multinational character of the state rested in the title, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and in the preamble.Google Scholar
2. Josip Broz Tito, Workers Manage the Factories in Yugoslavia, Belgrade: Jugostampa, 1950.Google Scholar
3. The removal of Vice-President Aleksander Rankovic in July of 1966 occasioned a thorough-going downgrading of the secret police, which he had long headed. The powers of the secret police have never fully recovered from the revelations and reforms connected with Rankovic's removal.Google Scholar
4. The 1969 Party Statutes permitted freedom of conscience and the right to retain an opposing opinion, as long as a member does not work actively against party decisions. Budislav Soskich, “Democratic Centralism in the Draft of the New Statute of the LCY,” Socijalizam (December 1968): 12.Google Scholar
5. Tito already in 1971 condemned the reduction of the League's status at the Sixth Party Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia held in 1952 in a speech in which he proclaimed that there was no substitute for the League's role. Borba, 1971 June 17, p. 6.Google Scholar
6. See Mary B. Gregory, “Regional Economic Development in Yugoslavia,” Soviet Studies, XXV/2 (October 1973): 213–28, and Nicholas R. Land, “The Dialectics of Decentralization,” World Politics, XXVII:3 (April 1975): 309–35.Google Scholar
7. The income ratio within the commune of Split, as cited in a study by D. Vuckovic, is as high as 1:30 if one takes into account the various invisible items accruing to persons in managerial positions. Borba, 1975 August 2, p. 5.Google Scholar
8. In 1972, 135,171 citizens participated in 6,130 workers’ councils and managing boards, while 54,156 served on collective executive boards. In the area of communal self-government, communal assemblies included 40,791 persons and 93,000 were involved in local communal commissions and boards. “Local Communities-Development and Results,” Yugoslav Survey, XIII/3 (August 1973):5–18.Google Scholar
9. Although by law two-thirds of the workers’ councils must be production workers, several studies on the distribution of power in the councils have concluded that those with technical and managerial positions and party membership wield the most decisive influence. See Jospi Obradovic, “Distribution of Participation in the Process of Decision-Making,” First International Conference on Participation and Self-Management, Vol. 2. Zagreb: 1972; Jospi Zupanov and A. S. Tannenbaum, “Control, Participation, and Effectiveness in Four Yugoslav Industrial Organization,” Administrative Science Quarterly, XVI/1 (March 1971), and Veljko Rus, “The Limits of Organized Participation,” in First International Conference on Participation and Self-Management, Vol. 2. Zagreb: 1972.Google Scholar
10. The Slovene sociologist, Joze Goricar, perceives of the process as one of the results of the embourgeoisement and the aging of the League membership. Another equally plausible is that many individuals transferred their activities to bodies where their political efficacy was greater, i.e., self-managerial organs. Joze Goricar, “Zarista Globalnih Konflikata u Jogoslovenskom Drustav,” Drustveni Konflikata i Socijalisticki Razvoj Jugoslaviege, III Deo, Ljubljana: Jugoslovensko udruzenje za sociologiju, 1972.Google Scholar
11. Although in 1919 the bulk of the population and resources of the new state lay in the southern portions, three-fourths of the existing industrial plants were located in the former Hapsburg lands. Svetozar Tejovich, Market-Planned Economy of Yugoslavia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966, p. x.Google Scholar
12. The Constitutional amendments involved six major issues: 1) compensation; 2) participation of republics and provinces in financing the federation; 3) the status of foreign trade enterprises and retention of foreign earnings; 4) republic-federal relationships; 5) the appointment of the Chairman of the Federal Executive Council; and 6) national parity in the Constitutional Court. With the exception of the turnover tax, fiscal policy was placed in the hands of the republics. Delo. 1971 August 23.Google Scholar
13. The most prominent organization sparking Croat nationalism was Matica Hrvatska, which has its roots in the nineteenth century. It was organized to revitalize Slavic cultures in the Hapsburg Monarchy.Google Scholar
14. Some of the leading elements within the Matica Hrvatska were League members in good standing and the Croat League itself was not adverse to using nationalistic pressures whenever it served its political purposes. The debate revolves around the question which organization served whose purposes.Google Scholar