1. First ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 1955; second ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 1963; second printing of second ed., Denver: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1980. Subsequent page references are to the second edition.Google Scholar

2. Journal of Modern History, XL (1968), 396–410.Google Scholar

3. Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 289.Google Scholar

4. Hilberg, Raul, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1961), pp. 362-63, 393ff.Google Scholar

5. Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 118.Google Scholar

6. “Collaborationism,” JMH, XL (1968), p. 399.Google Scholar

7. Kahin, George M., Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 110ff, 120.Google Scholar

8. For a very recent confirmation of this persistent consciousness, see Wimbush, S. Enders and Alexiev, Alex, The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces: Preliminary Findings (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1981, mimeo.), pp. 19–24.Google Scholar

page 14 note 1. See, e.g., the following: Armstrong, John A., Ukrainian Nationalism 1939-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955); John A Armstrong, ed., Soviet Partisans in World War II (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964); Yuriy Tys-Krokhamliuk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine (New York: Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army, 1972); Ihor Kamenetsky, Hitler's Occupation of Ukraine, 1941-1944 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1956), and, of course, many others.Google Scholar

page 15 note 2. Kleist, Peter, Zwischen Hitler und Stalin (Bonn, 1950). Quoted by Kamenetsky, p. 62.Google Scholar

page 15 note 3. Armstrong, John A., “Collaborationism in WW II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe,” Journal of Modern History Vol. 40, No. 3 (Sept. 1968), 396–410.Google Scholar

page 17 note 4. Farmer, Kenneth C., Ukrainian Nationalism in the post-Stalin Era (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), pp. 156–160. Also of interest, although it lacks documentation, is a discussion of OUN activity in the Ukraine in the 1960s and 1970s: Y. Vilshenko, “The Current Liberation Struggle in the Ukraine,” ABN Correspondence Vol. XXXI, No. 5 (Sept. - Oct. 1980), pp. 30–41.Google Scholar

page 17 note 1. Slowo Narodowe of December 20, 1938 cited in Stercho, Peter G., Diplomacy of Double Morality (New York, 1971), p. 325.Google Scholar

page 17 note 2. Pravoberezhnyi, F., 8,000,000; 1933-yi rik na Ukraini (Winnipeg, 1957) p. 15. See also S. O. Pidhainy et al., ed. The Black Deeds of the Kremlin (Detroit, 1955).Google Scholar

page 18 note 3. Massacre in Vinnitsa (New York, 1953), p. 3.Google Scholar

page 18 note 4. , Stercho, pp. 375–376.Google Scholar

page 18 note 5. Mirchuk, Petro, Roman Shukhevych: Komandyr Armii Bezsmertnykh (New York, 1970) p. 99.Google Scholar

page 18 note 6. Stetsko, Iaroslav, 30 Chervnia 1941: Proholoshennia Vidnovlennia Derzhavnosty Ukrainy (London, England, 1967), p. 162.Google Scholar

page 19 note 7. One final question that is germaine to the issue: how much did the world know about Jewish executions in 1941-1942?Google Scholar

page 19 note 8. Had this occurred it is doubtful that the Ukrainians could have achieved anything. As in the Balkans, the British and Russians would have probably worked out a percentage formula which would leave Ukraine totally under Russian control.Google Scholar

page 20 note 9. Armstrong, John A., Ukrainian Nationalism (New York, 1963), p. 129. The author admits that “integral nationalism” was not deeply rooted in Ukraine.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 20 note 10. Lebid, Mykola, UPA: Ukrainska Povstanska Armiia, (1946), p. 14. It should be pointed out that the OUN until 1940 was headed by A. Melnyk but with the approach of the war broke up into the Bandera and Melnyk factions. The Bandera group consisted of more voluntarist elements and was more prone to radical activism. However, both factions continued to play an important role in the liberation struggle.Google Scholar

page 21 note 11. Stetsko, , p. 36.Google Scholar

page 21 note 12. A Committee was organized in Cracow which had as its objective to prepare a government made up of people from different political parties. Polikarpenko, H., Orhanizatsia Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv pidchas Druhoi Svitovoi Viiny (Canada, 1951) p. 177. See also Z. Knysh, Rozbrat: Spohady i materialy do rozkolu OUN u 1940-1941 rokakh (Toronto, n.d.), p. 175.Google Scholar

page 21 note 13. Point six was predicated on German agreement and cooperation.Google Scholar

page 22 note 14. Stetsko, , p. 209.Google Scholar

page 22 note 15. Pysma-Poslannia Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptytskoho z chasiv nimetskoi okupatssi, Part II, (Yorkton, Sask. 1969), pp. 222–231, 267–270, 27–28.Google Scholar

page 22 note 16. Lewin, Kurt I., “Andreas Sheptytsky and the Jewish Community in Galicia” The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U. S., Nos. 1-2, 1959, p. 1, 661.Google Scholar

page 22 note 17. , Stetsko, p. 119. For the OUN-B stand on the creation of such a government see OUN v Svitli Postanov Velykykh Zboriv, Konferencii ta inshykh dokumentiv z borotby 1929-1955 rr. (Zbirka Dokumentiv) (1955), p. 56.Google Scholar

page 23 note 18. , Armstrong, p. 282; Knysh, , p. 178.Google Scholar

page 23 note 19. The letter of Metropolitan Sheptytsky to Hlibovych dated July 13, 1941 indicates that he was very much aware of the political situation and the split between Bandera and Melnyk. In it he recognized Stetsko as head of government, does not in any way revoke or withdraw his support, and referring to the OUN split writes: “Is it possible to reconcile them? (Bandera and Melnyk) It is imperative.” A copy of the letter is owned by Mr. R. Danylewych of Cleveland, Ohio who kindly allowed me to copy portions of it.Google Scholar

page 23 note 20. One may try to make an argument for German-Ukrainian collaboration when the Ukrainians created a military unit which was to make up part of the German Army. It is a fact that almost all Ukrainians welcomed the creation of this unit under Gen. P. Shandruk. But once again we have to put emphasis on the time element and objectives of the Ukrainians. By 1945 the German High Command was aware that the war was lost and welcomed any help they could get. For the Ukrainians it was the last chance to organize a military unit which would serve as the nucleus of an independent army of a hoped for independent state. Armstrong, p. 169.Google Scholar

page 24 note 1. Stalin, I. V., Sochineniia (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1947), V. p. 49.Google Scholar

page 25 note 2. Lebed, Mykola, “Do zv'iazkiv OUN-Bandery z nimets'kym viis'kom,” Svoboda (Ukrainian daily, Jersey City, N.J.) June 10, 1960. Conformation of the ties between the OUN and the German military is provided by the former Abwehr station chief in Istanbul, Paul Leverkuehn in his work, German Military Intelligence (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954), pp. 158-16.Google Scholar

page 26 note 3. This information regarding the battalions is based on the detailed accounts by Iurii Lopatynsky and Dr. Liubomyr Ortynsky (who were, respectively, officers in “Nachtigall” and “Roland”) that were published in Svoboda between June 15 and June 25, 1960.Google Scholar

page 26 note 4. Horak, Stephan M., “Ukraintsi v Druhii svitovii viini,” Ukrains'kyi istoryk, Nos. 65–68 (1980), pp. 66–67.Google Scholar

page 26 note 5. Ibid., pp. 68–69 and Armstrong, John A., Ukrainian Nationalism, 2nd edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 116–117.Google Scholar

page 26 note 6. Hitler's Secret Conversations, 1941–1944. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1953), pp. 13–14, 20–21, 29.Google Scholar

page 27 note 7. Ibid., p. 76.Google Scholar

page 27 note 8. Ibid., p. 29.Google Scholar

page 27 note 9. Ibid. Google Scholar

page 27 note 10. Ibid., p. 57.Google Scholar

page 27 note 11. Nuremberg Documents, 1,130-PS as quoted in Alan Bullock, Hitler, A Study in Tyranny (Long Acre — London: Oldhams Press Ltd., 1952), p. 633.Google Scholar

page 27 note 12. Reitlinger, Gerald, The House Built on Sand (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1960) chapter 6. The brutality that characterized Erich Koch's rule may be attributed to a pathological mentality as well as to Nazi racist ideology. Hans Gisevius, who know Erich Koch, characterzied him as a “devil of a fellow…a first-rate demagogue, a bold adventurer…[with] a vigorous imagination.” He is said to have been able to influence Hitler, in his own view, by providing the Fuehrer with “something novel at every interview, something extravagant, exorbitant, and impressive.” Gisevius states that Koch had “become a megalomaniac” by the time of his appointment as Reichskommissar of Ukraine. See Hans B. Gisevius, To the Bitter End (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), pp. 200-201. However, the possibility remains that Erich Koch's extreme Ukrainophobia has not been fully explained and could also have been related to his allegedly pro-socialist (Communist) past which might have been associated with a grudging respect for Russia. Originally a railway clerk, Koch had been associated with the anti-capitalist and pro-socialist (Gregor and Otto) Strasser wing of the Nazi Party. He advocated a “pro-Russian policy,” according to Hermann Rauschning in his The Revolution of Nihilism, Warning to the West (New York: Alliance Book Corporation, Longmans Green & Co., 1940), p. 258. The pro-Soviet view is also evident in Koch's book, Aufbau im Osten (1934). Conceivably Koch's brutality in Ukraine could have been prompted by a desire to demonstrate that he had overcome these earlier pro-Soviet views. See Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941-45 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957), pp. 124-127. Yet there remains the fact that Erich Koch (who was apprehended only in 1949) was not tried in the Ukrainian S.S.R., the scene of his worst crimes, but was, instead, turned over to the Poles and was not placed on trial for nearly a decade and in the end succeeded in escaping the death penalty. By contrast, Dr. Hans Frank, who ruled the General Gouvernement of Poland, was found guilty by the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal and was executed. A possible reason for the Soviet decision not to have Koch put on trial in the Ukrainian S.S.R. is suggested by Reitlinger: “In Moscow there was nothing against Koch's treatment of the Ukrainian nationalists, but there was very much against publicity for Koch's victims.” (Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 226). For whatever reasons, wittingly or not, Koch more than any other responsible Nazi official in the field, served Stalin's purposes in Ukraine and turned Ukrainians against Germany. There remains the unanswered question of whether or not the Kremlin influenced Polish justice in the case of Erich Koch.Google Scholar

Various German officials criticized Erich Koch's policies and vainly advocated measures designed to win support among Ukrainians. These included Alfred Rosenberg, head of the Ostministerium (who was isolated in the Nazi leadership and had no real authority); although he favored the development of a Ukrainian state for the containment of Russia, Rosenberg remained a racist and a rabid anti-Semite. Other officials who at various times criticized Erich Koch included Professor Theodore Oberlaender, Professor Hans Koch, Dr. Otto Braeutigam and Georg Leibbrandt. See Dallin, op. cit., pp. 88, 109-110, 121, 157-67, 513-515. Even Dr. Joseph Goebbels as propaganda minister ultimately recognized the senseless nature of Nazi policies in Ukraine in an entry in his diary on April 25, 1942 (The Goebbels Diaries, 1942-1943, edited and translated by Louis P. Lochner [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948] p. 185). However, the continued dominance of Hitler, Bormann, Himmler, Goering and Erich Koch nullified all efforts to reorient German occupation policies. Nazi occupation policies in Ukraine are described in Ihor Kamenetsky, Hitler's Occupation of Ukraine, 1941-1944 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1956) and in his Secret Nazi Plans for Eastern Europe (New York: Bookman Associates, 1961).Google Scholar

page 29 note 13. , Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 188.Google Scholar

page 29 note 14. Horak, Stephan M., “Ukraintsi i Druha svitova viina,” Ukrains'kyi istoryk Nos. 61–64 (1979), pp. 35–37.Google Scholar

page 29 note 15. Indicative of the Reichskommissariat's hostility to the Autocephalous Church was the fact that the Church found it necessary to consecrate six bishops in semi-secrecy in Kiev in May 1942. Among the many repressive measures suffered by the Autocephalous Church was a ban by the Reichskommissariat on a conference of bishops in October 1942, although the hierarchs circumvented it by meeting in Lutsk for “private” discussions. See Wlasowsky, Ivan, Narys istorii Ukrains'koi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy (New York and Bound Brook: Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the U.S.A., 1966) Vol. IV, Part Two, pp. 222, 240-241, 390.Google Scholar

page 29 note 16. , Lebed, op. cit., confirms that Jary was the contact between the OUN and the German military. For an example of citicism of Jary's role in the OUN as well as the pro-German orientation see Nashe Slovo (Munich-London), No. 7, 1980, pp. 90–93. Cf. John A. Armstrong, op. cit., p. 35. Jary withdrew from political activity and remained silent until his death in 1969.Google Scholar

page 29 note 17. For three somewhat different texts of the Act of June 30 see Kost' Pankivsky, Vid derzhavy do Komitetu (New York-Toronto: v-vo Kliuchi, 1957), pp. 111–115.Google Scholar

page 30 note 18. Dr.Ortynsky, Liubomyr, an officer in “Roland,” stated that the OUN leadership issued a circular in the second half of April 1941, on a “strictly confidential” basis, in which it warned of the possibility of a negative attitude on the part of the Nazi government toward the cause of Ukrainian national liberation. Svoboda, June 21, 1960.Google Scholar

page 30 note 19. , Pankivsky, op. cit., p. 32.Google Scholar

page 30 note 20. Ibid., p. 40.Google Scholar

page 31 note 21. On the origins of the OUN see Motyl, Alexander, The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919-1929 (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1980).Google Scholar

page 31 note 22. Pankivsky, Kost', Roky nimets'koi okupatsii (New York-Toronto: v-vo Kliuchi, 1965), pp. 278–280, 282-285, 289.Google Scholar

page 32 note 23. Khrushchev, Nikita S., Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970), p. 218.Google Scholar

page 32 note 24. Krushchev Remembers, The Last Testament (Boston: Little Brown and Co., pp. 94–95.Google Scholar

page 32 note 25. , Armstrong, op. cit., p. 289.Google Scholar

page 33 note 26. Based on the memoirs of Mykola Velychkovs'ky and quoted in Horak, op. cit., Ukrains'kyi istoryk, Nos. 65–68 (1980), p. 69.Google Scholar

page 27 note 27. See Krammer, Arnold, The Forgotten Friendship; Israel and the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1953 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), pp. 61–65.Google Scholar