1. Hall, , A Treatise on International Law (8th ed., Higgins, Oxford, 1924) 116 n.l.Google Scholar

2. De Jure Belli ac Pacts Libri Tres (transl., Oxford, 1925)Google Scholar, lib. II, c. IX, esp. sec. XII.Google Scholar

3. The Law of State Succession (Cambridge, 1956).Google Scholar

4. For practical examples, cf. Oppenheim, Lauterpacht's, International Law, I (Peace), (8th ed., London/New York/Toronto, 1955) § 84a, 168–169Google Scholar. On State succession as a particular aspect of the succession of international persons, see Guggenheim, , Beiträge zur völkerrechtlichen Lehre vom Staatenwechsel (Berlin, 1925) 42–45Google Scholar (hereinafter referred to as Beiträge). The present study shall exclusively deal with the theory of State succession.

5. See in particular: Kunz, , “Identity of States under International Law”, 49 American Journal of International Law (hereinafter AJ) 68–76 (1955)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Marek, , Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law (Geneva, 1954).Google Scholar

6. The importance of the question of recognition for that of State succession has been stressed by Guggenheim, , Beiträge, 11–16Google Scholar. In his Traité de droit international public, I (Geneva, 1953), 188–193Google Scholar (hereinafter referred to as Traité), this author abandons the declaratory theory of recognition.

7. An important exception is Lauterpacht, , Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (London, 1927), § 53. 125Google Scholar (hereinafter referred to as Private Law Sources).

8. Principles of International Law (New York, 1952) 114Google Scholar (hereinafter referred to as Principles). We are quite aware of the fact that Kelsen's theory, with its emphasis on the fundamental norm and on the identification of the State and the legal order, is the target of violent attacks, principally because of its alleged lack of resemblance to reality.

9. Marek, , op. cit., 51.Google Scholar

10. Cf. e.g. Decenciere-Ferrandiere, , “Considérations sur le droit international dans ses rapports avec le droit de l'Etat”, XL Revue générale de droit international public (1933) 45–70, esp. 64–65.Google Scholar

11. Herz, , “Beiträge zum Problem der Identität des Staates”, XV Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (1935) 241–268, 261.Google Scholar

12. Cf. Von Tuhr, , Der Allgemeine Teil des deutschen bürgerlichen Rechts, I (Munich and Leipzig, 1910–1918), 219CrossRefGoogle Scholar, according to whom the notion of identity rests, “…besonders bei Gedankengebilden, wie es die Rechte sind, auf einer mehr oder minder willkürlichen Begrenzung der Identitätsmerkmale” (quoted by Guggenheim, , Beiträge, 43).Google Scholar

13. Cf. below, 341 ff.

14. Hence, the following statement appears to be inaccurate: “The legal identity of a State is the identity of the sum total of its rights and obligations under both customary and conventional international law.” (Marek, , op. cit., 5).Google Scholar

15. If we admit that revolutions do not affect a State's identity.

16. See below, esp. 354 ff.

17. Cf. Oppenheim, Lauterpacht's, I, op. cit., § 81, 158.Google Scholar

18. See, for instance, Dahm, , Völkerrecht, I (Stuttgart, 1958), § 16, 85–86Google Scholar; Fenwick, , International Law (3rd ed., New York, 1948) 148Google Scholar; Moore, , A Digest of International Law, I (Washington, 1906), § 76, 248Google Scholar; Romano, , Corso di diritto internazionale (2nd rev. ed., Milan, 1929) 115Google Scholar; Sibert, , Traité de droit international public, I (Paris, 1951), nr. 136, 207.Google Scholar

19. Guggenheim, , Traité, I, 444Google Scholar; similarly Paenson, , Les conséquences financières de la succession des Etats (1932–1953) (Paris, 1954) 9.Google Scholar

20. See, for instance, Kunz, , loc. cit., 71–72.Google Scholar

21. Cf. e.g.: Briggs, , The Law of Nations (2nd ed., London, 1953) 209–213, 926–929Google Scholar and the documents reprinted ibid., 920–926; Castren, , “Aspects récents de la succession d'Etats”, 78 Recueil des Cours (1951, I) 385–505, 395Google Scholar; Huber, , Die Staalensuccession (Leipzig, 1898) 7Google Scholar; Monaco, , Manuale di diritto internazionale pubblico (Turin, 1960), nr. 89, 204Google Scholar; Moore, , op. cit., I, § 78, 249Google Scholar; Oppenheim, Lauterpacht's, op. cit., I, § 77, 153–154Google Scholar; Ross, , A Textbook of International Law (General Part, London/New York/Toronto, 1947), § 20, 134Google Scholar; Sereni, , Diritto internazionale, II (Milan, 1958), 373Google Scholar; Sibert, , op. cit., I, nr. 135, 206Google Scholar; etc. For judicial decisions, see the classical examples: The Tinoco Arbitration (Great Britain v. Costa Rica), 18 AJ (1924) 147–174Google Scholar; George W. Hopkins Claim (United States v. United Mexican States; United States-Mexico, General Claims Commissions, 21 AJ (1927) 160–167Google Scholar; Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. v. State of Russia (United States, Circuit Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit), 21 F 2nd. 396, 401.Google Scholar

22. More recently, this writer abandoned his view son that subject: cf. below, n. 30.

23. Kelsen, , “Théorie générale du droit international public, problèmes choisis”, 42 Recueil des Cours (1932, IV), 121–353, 334Google Scholar, (hereinafter referred to as Théorie générale). Chapter IV (312–349) on State succession.

24. Guggenheim, , Beiträge, 16Google Scholar: “Vom Standpunkt der Rechtsordnung des Einzelstaates aus betrachtet, ist seine Rechtskontinuität ausgeschlossen, insofern das Staatsgrundgesetz (Verfassung) nicht unter Wahrung der von ihm selbst vorgeschriebenen Formen verändert wird: denn das Staatsgrundgesetz kann nicht seine eigene, auf revolutionärem Wege vollzogene Aenderung regeln.”

25. Cf. Merkl, , “Das Problem der Rechtskontinuität und die Forderung des einheitlichen rechtlichen Weltbildes”, V Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (1926) 497–527, 521.Google Scholar

26. Théorie générale, 336.Google Scholar

27. Ibid., 337.

28. Kelsen, , Principles, 93–94.Google Scholar

29. In this sense: Guggenheim, , Traité, I, 461 n. 1Google Scholar; cf. also Udina, , “La succession des Etats quant aux obligations internationales autres que les dettes publiques”, 44 Recueil des Cours (1933, II) 669–773, 684–689Google Scholar, and Marek, , op. cit., 12–13.Google Scholar

30. Kelsen's theory on universal succession in the event of revolutionary changes is contradicted especially by the constitutive theory of recognition, for, according to the latter, the States members of the international community decide with constitutive effect whether a given change has produced a new State or merely a new Government. Kelsen, having more recently abandoned the declaratory view of recognition (“Recognition in International Law”, 35 AJ, 1941, 605–617)Google Scholar, also dropped his thesis on universal succession (Cf. General Theory of Law and State, Cambridge, 1945, 219–220)Google Scholar. Nevertheless, it may be doubted if the concept of universal succession is compatible even with the declaratory view on recognition: although recognition, according to the latter, would not “make” the State or Government, a fundamental distinction between State and Government subsists in international practice.

31. Similarly Cansacchi, , “Realtà e finzione nell'identità degli Stati”, IV Comunicazioni e Studi (University of Milan, 1952) 23–97, esp. 95–97.Google Scholar

32. Diritto internazionale pubblico (3rd ed., Palermo, 1960) 434–436Google Scholar. Quadri subscribes to the theory of universal succession. There is nevertheless one fundamental difference between Kelsen's and Quadri's concept: whereas the former was of the opinion that even revolutionary changes of Government in reality constitute State successions, the latter endeavours to attenuate the difference between State and Government.

33. For another example, taken from the ancient Egyptian tradition, cf. Berber, , Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts, I (Munich and Berlin, 1960), § 32, 247.Google Scholar

34. This phenomenon was called “universal succession”. It must be noted, however, that even the Roman “universal succession” was not truly universal.

35. See the positions taken by Guggenheim, , Traité, I, 192–193Google Scholar and ibid., n. 4; Kelsen, , 35 AJ (1941)Google Scholar, loc. cit., 614Google Scholar; Schücking/Wehberg, , Die Satzung des Völkerbundes, I (3rd ed., Berlin, 1931), 268–269Google Scholar; cf. also Charpentier, , La reconnaissance internationale et l'évolution du droit des gens (Paris, 1956) 330–333Google Scholar. Contra: Lauterpacht, , Recognition in International Law (Cambridge, 1947) 400–403Google Scholar (hereinafter referred to as Recognition), and apparently Chen, , The International Law of Recognition (London, 1951) 211–216.Google Scholar

36. Charpentier, , op. cit., 140–153, esp. 140–144Google Scholar. This assertion only applies to general international law.

37. Cf. Zorn, , Grundzüge des Völkerrechts (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1903), § 9, 74.Google Scholar

38. See, for instance, the Swiss recognition of Italy's sovereignty over Ethiopia after the annexation. Cf. Swiss Federal Council, Rapport de gestion, 1936, 76.Google Scholar

39. Raestad, , “La cessation des Etats d'après le droit des gens”, XX Revue de droit international et de législation comparée (1939) 441–449Google Scholar. As to the withdrawal of recognition from Governments, see Lauterpacht, , Recognition, 352–355.Google Scholar

40. Lauterpacht, , Recognition, 351.Google Scholar

41. Ibid. and n. 1, ibid. Lauterpacht's Statement is somewhat incomplete. Such an act must clearly show the State's intention to withdraw legal recognition, for the establishment and the severance of diplomatic relations alone are purely political acts. See Kelsen, , Principles, 267–270Google Scholar. It is precisely the declaratory theory of recognition, rejected by Lauterpacht, which fails to distinguish between legal and political recognition. The severance of diplomatic relations may—but does not have to—imply withdrawal of legal recognition.

42. Cf. Lauterpacht, , Recognition, 349–350Google Scholar, who points out that similar procedures have sometimes been followed for the withdrawal of recognition of Governments (ibid., 353).

43. The practical application of these rules can lead us into considerable difficulties.

44. Kelsen, , 35 AJ (1941)Google Scholar, loc. cit., 609–610; see also Charpentier, , op. cit., 281ffGoogle Scholar. In favour of an obligation to recognise: Lauterpacht, , Recognition, esp. 73–75.Google Scholar

45. The situation would be quite different if we adhered to the theory that there is a duty to recognise if certain conditions are met. It would then follow that, as soon as a State ceases to be effective, there is an obligation to withdraw recognition, even if no new State is effectively established on the territory concerned.

46. It is to be noted that such interregna would occur very frequently if the declaratory theory on recognition were subscribed to: in many instances, the effective “death” of the old, and the effective establishment of the new State usually do not coincide. Of course, interregna are also possible if the constitutive view is adopted; however, they are likely to be less frequent: the withdrawal of recognition—which mostly coincides with the recognition of the new entity and which marks the end of the old State—may artificially extend the latter's existence until the recognition of the new State.

47. See below, esp. 365–366.

48. Marek, , op. cit., 50–51 and 186–189Google Scholar, chooses the independence of States as a criterion for continuity or discontinuity; this choice was mainly dictated by the author's acceptance of the declaratory theory on recognition.

49. As far as municipal law is concerned, revolutionary Governments generally break with the past (internal discontinuity). Sometimes, however, the new Government takes over the entire internal debt of the State; in such a case, even the internal continuity would be safeguarded by virtue of a fiction.

50. The best example for such a case is the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire accompanied by the transformation of Austria into a Republic.

51. See the doctrinal controversy between Verdross, , Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft (Vienna, 1926) 149Google Scholar, and Strupp, , “Les règles générales du droit de la paix”, 47 Recueil des Cours (1934, I) 263–593, 469–470.Google Scholar

52. “…la doctrine dualiste n'assure pas l'indépendance complète et réciproque du droit des gens et du droit interne, car elle admet que l'ordre juridique international apprécie les normes du droit interne selon leur conformité à ses propres normes. C'est dans le cadre de la responsabilité internationale de l'Etat pour me conduite contraire au droit international que ce dernier fait vàloir sa supériorité sur le droit étatique: il annule ou déclare illicite les actes contraires à ses normes et affirme donc ainsi sa primauté sur le droit interne. La doctrine ne saurait contester qu'en dernière analyse l'ordre juridique international affirme sa supériorité en annulant ou frappant de sanctions des manifestations du droit étatique qui lui sont contraires.” (Guggenheim, , Traité, I, 23–24).Google Scholar

53. Reine Rechtslehre (2nd ed., Vienna, 1960) 345.Google Scholar

54. Kelsen, , Principles, 267.Google Scholar

55. 35 AJ (1941), loc. cit., 609Google Scholar. Contra: Chen, , op. cit., 43.Google Scholar

56. Recognition of already existing States by new States never occurs in international practice—unless the request for recognition usually made by the new States is considered as an offer to recognise the already existing ones. See Lauterpacht, , Recognition, 57Google Scholar. But, if we consider the request for recognition as such an offer, we accept the classical contractual theory of constitutive recognition which is rejected by Kelsen himself (35 AJ, 1941, loc. cit., 609).Google Scholar

57. See above, 345 and n. 44, 45.

58. Except in the cases of partial annexations where different rules apply. Cf. supra, 344.

59. Op. cit., 3.Google Scholar

60. “State Succession in the Matter of Treaties”, 24 British Year Book of International Law (1947) 360–375, 360–362.Google Scholar

61. Cavaglieri, , La dottrina della secessione di Stato a Stato e il suo valore giuridico (Pisa, 1910) 141Google Scholar; O'Connell, , op. cit., 103–105, 273–274Google Scholar. Slightly different the American “benefit”-theory; cf. Wilkinson, , The American Doctrine of State Succession (Baltimore, 1934), esp. 95–96.Google Scholar

62. See Kaufmann, , “Die Stellung der deutschen Ansiedler”, Studien zur Lehre von der Staatensukzession. Drei Gutachten von Sir Thomas DrBarclay, A. Struycken und DrKaufmann, E. (Berlin, 1923. Also exists in French) 67–156, 114–119.Google Scholar

63. Cf. above, 338 and n. 7; Sereni, , op. cit., II, 387Google Scholar. See also Scelle, , Manuel élémentaire de droit international public (Paris, 1943) 97Google Scholar, who speaks ofan “anthropomorphisme rudimentaire” and Berber, , op. cit., I, § 32, 248Google Scholar. For a more differentiated view, cf. Dahm, , op. cit., I, § 19, 101.Google Scholar

64. Huber, , op. cit., 23Google Scholar; Kelsen, , “Théorie du droit international public”, 84 Recueil des Cours (1953, III), 197Google Scholar; Schwarzenberger, , International Law, I (3rd ed., London, 1957), 163Google Scholar. It would seem, however, that even the provisions of municipal law on the succession of legal personalities historically are based upon an analogy with the succession of physical persons.

65. Cf. Grotius, , op. cit., lib. II, c. IX, sec. XII.Google Scholar

66. It is rather surprising that both Byrne, , Law Dictionary (London, 1923)Google Scholar and Capitant, , Vocabulaire juridique (Paris, 1930)Google Scholar contain no definition of the word “analogy”. Jowitt, , 1 The Dictionary of English Law (London, 1959)Google Scholar, says: “Analogy, identity or similarity of proportion: where there is no precedent in point, in cases on the same subject, lawyers have recourse to cases in a different subject-matter but governed by the same general principle. This is reasoning by analogy”; Littre, , Dictionnaire de la langue française, I (Paris, 1878)Google Scholar, defines analogy as a “…Rapport, similitude entre plusieurs choses différentes… Raisonner par analogie, former un raisonnement fondé sur les rapports ou sur les ressemblances en tant qu'elles indiquent des rapports” (emphasis ours).

67. For an exhaustive survey up to 1930, see Feilchenfeld, , Public Debts and State Succession (New York, 1931) 17–18, 25–34, 63–68, 171–174, 300–310, 397–422, 572–575Google Scholar. Cf. also Briggs, , op. cit., 231–238Google Scholar; Guggenheim, , Beiträge, 29–42Google Scholar; Huber, , op. cit., 8–25Google Scholar; Castren, , loc. cit., 398–402Google Scholar. The older theories on State succession can be divided into the following four groups:

(1) Conceptions relying upon private law analogies, particularly upon the succession post mortem in Roman law: theory of natural law and Appleton's concept which is based on the Roman notions of adrogatio and in rem versio (Des effets des annexions de territoires sur les dettes de l'Etat démembré ou annexé et sur celles des provinces, départements, etc., annexés, Paris, 1895)Google Scholar;

(2) First positivist theory: Heffter, , Dos europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart (8th ed., Berlin, 1888) 62–63;Google Scholar

(3) Huber's conception of State succession (op. cit.). Huber's monograph on this topic still belongs to the classics of international law;

(4) Negativist theories: Keith, (The Theory of State Succession with Special Reference to English and Colonial Law, London, 1907)Google Scholar, Schoenborn, (Staatensuccession, in Handbuch des Völkerrechts, ed. by Stier-Somlo, II, 2, Berlin/Stuttgart/Leipzig, 1913)Google Scholar, Gareis, (Institutionen des Völkerrechts, 2nd ed., Giessen, 1901)Google Scholar, Zorn, (op. cit.)Google Scholar, Focherini, (Le successioni degli stati…, Modena, 1910)Google Scholar, Cavaglieri, (op. cit.)Google Scholar, Strupp, (loc. cit.)Google Scholar, Hold-Ferneck, (Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts, II, Leipzig, 1932, 109–117)Google Scholar, Schnitzer, (Staat und Gebietshoheit, Zürich/Leipzig, 1935).Google Scholar

68. Loc. cit.; see also “On State Succession in Practice and Theory”, in 24 Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret og Jus Gentium (1954Google Scholar; = Acta Scandinavia juris gentium) 55–75.Google Scholar

69. Op. cit., §§15–20, 74–121.Google Scholar

70. Op. cit., 148–156.Google Scholar

Beiträge and Traité, I, 459–478.Google Scholar

73. Especially Théorie générale and Principles.

74. Private Law Sources, §§53–57, 125–133.Google Scholar

75. Op. cit., I, §§ 76–84a, 152–169.Google Scholar

76. Op. cit.

77. Op. cit., §§ 19–20, 125–135.Google Scholar

78. See, for instance: Droit international public approfondi (Paris, 1958), nrs. 188–208, 161–179.Google Scholar

79. Op. cit., I, nrs. 133–155, 205–225.Google Scholar

80. Traité théorique et pratique de droit international public (Paris, 1933) 58–76.Google Scholar

81. Loc. cit.

82. Völkerrecht (4th ed., Vienna, 1959) 189–201.Google Scholar

83. Kelsen's position; see below, 354.

84. O'Connell, , op. cit., 85–90Google Scholar, contradicting Mosler, , Wirtschaftskonzessionen be Aenderungen der Staatshoheit (Stuttgart, 1948) 41ff., 80, 92.Google Scholar

85. See Verdross, , Völkerrecht, op. cit., 190.Google Scholar

86. 35 AJ (1941), loc. cit.Google Scholar

87. Principles, 296Google Scholar (emphasis ours). As early as in 1932, the same author wrote: “L'identité d'un droit, pris au sens subjectif, n'est cependant pas moins problématique que l'identité du sujet de droit, et plus particulièrement de l'Etat. On peut contester—on l'a d'ailleurs fait—qu'un droit ou qu'une obligation demeure le même, lorsque son sujet vient à changer. Aussi bien le changement du sujet d'une obligation semble-t-il mettre en question l'identité du droit.” (Théorie générale, 312–313).

88. Ibid., 318. Cf. also Hatschek, , Völkerrecht als System rechtlich bedeutsamer Staatsakte (Leipzig/Erlangen, 1923) 171–172.Google Scholar

89. Kelsen, , Théorie générale, 319.Google Scholar

90. Ibid., 320–321.

91. Ibid., 322–323.

92. Ibid., 325.

93. Ibid., 327.

94. Ibid., 331.

95. Ibid.: “Quand une succession de ce genre intervient en vertu du droit international général, cela signifie que les traités en question ont le caractère de traités conclus en faveur ou à la charge d'un tiers, à savoir du successeur éventuel, qui succédera aux droits et obligations découlant du traité conclu par le prédécesseur.” In our opinion, the same reasoning can be applied in municipal law: contracts in general only are binding upon the parties to them, except in the cases of succession post mortem (if the successors do not repudiate the succession or place themselves under a beneficium inventarii), and in those of transmission inter vivos, at least if they do not imply novation.

96. Ibid., 338: “… quand le droit international institue une succession à des droits et obligations n'ayant pas un caractère international, ceux-ci acquièrent par là même le caractère en question”.

97. Ibid., 340.

98. Private Law Sources, §53, 125.Google Scholar

99. Ibid., § 54, 128: “Moreover, the taking over of financial and other liabilities independently of a treaty is always liable to be interpreted as an act of grace or of political convenience, and not as a matter of legal obligation.”

100. Private Law Sources, §55, 129.Google Scholar

101. Ibid., 130.

102. Cf. above, 340ff.

103. See Huber, , op. cit., 18.Google Scholar

104. Who introduced the beneficium inventarii into Roman successoral law.

105. Private Law Sources, § 56, 131Google Scholar. It is to be noted that in the earliest period of Roman law, the doctrine of continuation quoad personam was equally unknown: the paterfamilias merely was the administrator of the estate which belonged to the family. Hence, only a change in the person of the administrator took place upon the death of the paterfamilias. Cf. May, , Eléments de droit romain (18th ed., Paris, 1935), nr. 229, 517–518Google Scholar; Cuq, , Manuel des institutions juridiques des Romains (2nd ed., Paris, 1928) 677.Google Scholar

106. Op. cit.

107. Op. cit., II, 343–412, esp. 385–412.Google Scholar

108. Cf. Mosler, , op. cit., 16Google Scholar: “Die Tatsache des Gebietswechsels bringt das Rechtsverhältnis zum Entstehen. Der Grund der Haftung des Erwerbers ist nicht die Nachfolge in die Person des Verliererstaates, sondern die Ausübung der Hoheitsgewalt auf dem neuen Gebiet, die dem Erwerber gegenüber den Heimatstaaten der Ausländer, die sich in diesem Gebiet aufhalten oder Vermögen besitzen, nach fremdenrechtlichen Grundsätzen gewisse Verpflichtungen auferlegt.” Ibid., 172: “… Die Gebietsveränderung ist keine Rechtsnachfolge, sondern ein Vorgang, der völkerrechtliche Rechtsbeziehungen neu entstehen lässt. Die erworbenen Rechte sind nicht geschützt, weil sie ipso jure bestehen bleiben, sondern weil es dem Heimatstaate der Berechtigten gegenüber völkerrechtswidrig wäre, sie unberücksichtigt zu lassen.” Sereni goes even farther (op. cit., II, 411)Google Scholar: “Il diritto internazionale fa soltanto divieto allo Stato successore di non tenere alcun conto di talune situazioni di fatto relativo a stranieri e ai loro interessi che si trovino sul suo territorio; un tale obbligo va considerato nel quadro degli obblighi che il diritto generale impone ad uno Stato in tema di trattamento degli stranieri, e non in relazione al solo problema della c.d. successione tra Stati.” Mosler's views would seem to be theoretically défendable. Indeed, it can be argued that the rights and duties assumed by the territorial successor formally are new, although they have the same material content as those belonging to the predecessor. Hence, there would be no “succession”, if this term were defined in a very restrictive manner (i.e. as requiring the formal identity of the burdens and benefits assumed by the successor with those formerly belonging to the predecessor). Such a narrow interpretation, however, is hardly admissible, especially if the problem is considered in the light of the principles of Roman law. See below, 365. In any event, it follows that the question as to whether succession takes place or not, becomes one of pure terminology. The attempt to qualify the Law of State succession as a part of the international legislation relating to the protection of vested rights of foreign nationals has no bearing upon the fundamental question; we would face a similar situation if, in private law, the provisions relating to succession post mortem were qualified as constituting a part of family law, for instance.

109. Corso di diritto intemazionale, op. cit., 128.Google Scholar

110. Cf. below, 364ff.

111. Sack, , “La succession aux dettes publiques d'Etat”, 23 Recueil des Cours (1928, III) 149–325Google Scholar; Scelle, , op. cit., 96–111Google Scholar; Romano, , Corso di diritto intemazionale, op. cit., 113–130Google Scholar; “Di una particolare figura di successione di Stato a Stato. A proposito dell'annessione di Fiume”, IV Rivista di diritto internazionale (1925) 297–312.Google Scholar

112. See, for instance, Guggenheim, , Traité, I, 56.Google Scholar

113. Planiol/RIPERT/PICARD, Traité pratique de droit civil français, III (Les Biens, and ed., Paris, 1952), nrs. 991–999, pp. 973–984.Google Scholar

114. Cf. e.g. Deschenaux, , “Obligations propter rem”, lus et Lex. Festgabe zum 70. Geburtstag von Max Gutzwiller (Basle, 1959), 711–747Google Scholar, who defines the obligations ob rem as “…obligations dont le sujet passif ou actif est designé par le droit réel qu'une personne a sur une chose”. (712). Here, the existence of a true succession may perhaps be doubted, for “En cas de transfert du droit réel dont elle dépend, l'obligation propter rem s'éteint pour l'aliénateur et elle renaît dans la personne de l'acquéreur…” (ibid., 718). See, however, our remark, supra, 358, and below, 364, 366.

115. Cf., for instance, the rules set forth by the German Civil Code, §§ 398–419. See also the interesting comment by Ripert, , “Les règles du droit civil applicables aux rapports internationaux (Contribution à l'étude des principes généraux du Droit visés au Statut de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale)”, 44 Recueil des Cours (1933, II), 569–663, 638–640Google Scholar. This author observes that originally, private rights and duties were highly personal and intransmissible. The institute of novation was the only device for the “transmission” of rights and obligations. Actually, it has become possible to cede a right without the debtor's consent, but doubts remain in respect of the cession of debts. “Dans le droit des gens, le rapport juridique est en général intransmissible, car il est créé intuita personae.” (ibid., 638–639). The first part of this sentence may be more or less correct. As to the second part, it ought to be noted that even in private law, all legal relationships can be said to be created intuitu personae. On all these points, cf. also Schnitzer, , Vergleichende Rechtslehre, II (and ed., Basle, 1961), 625–627Google Scholar, who emphasises the recent tendencies in the theory of private law to admit the transmission stricto sensu of entire contractual complexes. See Telles, Galvao, “La cession de contrat”, 3 Revue internationale de droit comparé (1951) 217–237CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Italian Civil Code, Articles 1406–1410.

116. Novation has been defined as “prions debiti in aliam obligationem transfusio atque translatio” (D. 46.2. 1. pr.). de la Morandiere, Julliot, Précis de droit civil, II (Paris, 1957), nr. 815, 410Google Scholar, requires “Une obligation valable remplacée par une obligation valable et diferente de l'ancienne” (emphasis added). Cf. Joers/Kunkel/Wenger, , Römisches Privatrecht (3rd ed., Berlin/Göttingen/Heidelberg, 1949) § 124, 199Google Scholar: “Wesentlich für die römische Auffassung war dabei, dass die alte Verbindlichkeit mit ipso iure-Wirkung erlosch und eine völlig neue entstand…” The Romans also knew an institution called novatio necessaria, namely, for the case of litis contestatio. See Ibid., 200: “Die heute sog. novatio necessaria knüpfte sich an die beiden Haupteinschnitte des klassischen Prozessverfahrens, die litis contestatio und das Urteil: Die litis contestatio, d.h. der von den Parteien unter Gutheissung des Magistrats abgeschlossene Prozessvertrag …, hob nach romischer Ansicht den materiellen, auf dare bzw. daré faceré oportere gerichteten Anspruch auf und ersetzte ihn durch die sog. Prozessobligation, die auf condemnari oportere lautete, kraft deren also die Parteien verpflichtet waren, sich dem Urteilsspruch des von ihnen erwählten Richters zu unterwerfen.” This obligation, in turn, was replaced, at the moment of the judgement, by the obligation of iudicatum facere oportere. “Beide Vorgänge werden in den römischen Quellen mit der rechtsgeschäftlichen Novation verglichen und auch als Novationstatbestände bezeichnet.” (ibid.).

117. We think that a similar reasoning can be applied to rights oh rem: If the subject of a right is determined by the fact that it owns a certain estate, and if the said estate is transferred, the former owner's rights propter rem fall to the ground, but are immediately replaced by materially identical new rights belonging to the acqueror.

118. On the fate of the acqueror's rights in the event of the dominant tenement's or territory's temporary dereliction, cf. below, n. 121.

119. Cf. supra, 358.

120. It must be reminded, however, that the partial acquisition of a State's territory never depends directly upon the diminished State's consent, but on the successor's effective possession.

121. The reader's attention is drawn to the following difficulty: It is relatively easy to justify the survival of servitudes if the servient territory is acquired by prescription after an interregnum, for the obligation of every member of the legal community concerned to respect the right of the dominant territory's actual holder to the undisturbed enjoyment of the servitude subsists. If, on the contrary, the dominant territory temporarily becomes vacant, all the rights and obligations connected with the servitude would normally expire, for there is nobody to enjoy the undisturbed exercise of the said servitude. At least in private law theory, the latter nevertheless continues to exist throughout the interregnum, thanks to a legal fiction. We reserve our position in regard to the fate of rights propter rem in case of an interregnum on the estate or territory designating the subject of these rights.

122. Kaser, , Das römische Privatrecht, I (Munich, 1955) § 158, 564 (emphasis added).Google Scholar

123. Principles, 296Google Scholar, quoted above, 354 and also n. 87. Similarly Mosler, , op. cit., 172Google Scholar: “… Die Gebietsveränderung ist keine Rechtsnachfolge, sondern ein Vorgang, der volkerrechtliche Rechtsbeziehungen neu entstehen lässt”. It may be seriously doubted if a formal renewal of rights and duties which are materially transmitted a priori excludes the term or the idea of succession.

124. For Roman law, see e.g. Girard, , Manuel élémentaire de droit romain (7th ed., Paris, 1924) 924–925Google Scholar; for Anglo-Saxon law, cf., for instance, Williams, On the Law of Executors and Administrators, I (13th ed., Parry and Potter, London, 1953), 281–282Google Scholar. In other systems, the gap is filled by the principle “Le mort saisit le vif”; in this sense, Swiss Civil Code, Article 537, § 1.

125. Cf. above, 345–346 and n. 46.