1. Two drafts in 1974 and 1975; an official Proposal for a Directive by the Commission to the Council in 1976 (OJEC 14/10 76 C 241/9); Advice of the Economic and Social Committee, July 1978, OJEC 7 May 1979, C 114/15; Advice of the European Parliament, May 1979, OJEC 21 May 1979, C 127/61; Advice of the Social Economic Council, Publication No. 4, 18 January 1980; Discussion on Art. 6.3.13 of the New Civil Code.

2. OJEC 07/08/85, No. L 210/29.

3. Preamble Directive.

4. Art. 1 Directive, para. 6 Preamble. The Social Economic Council gave a positive advice on the concept of strict liability on three conditions, being the exclusion of the development risk, no financial ceiling and an indemnification and less severe liability for the supplier than for the producer of an end-product. A comparable result can be reached by reducing the importance of the concept of culpability, shifting the burden of proof on behalf of the injured party. These methods are also used in the Netherlands.

5. Para. 6 Preamble; Tebbens, H. Duintjer, ‘De Europese Richtlijn Produktaansprakelijkheid’, NJB (22 03 1986) No. 12, p. 369Google Scholar.

6. Para. 7 of the Preamble.

7. Art. 3 ss. 1 and 2 Directive and para. 8 Preamble.

8. Art. 3 s. 3 Directive.

9. In Belgium and France, the regime of the Napoleonic Code regarding the indemnification for hidden defects, which was adopted in the Netherlands, constitutes one of the main tenets of the doctrine of product liability. Product liability in these countries is to a large extent based on contractual liability for hidden defects. The product is considered defective in such countries when the defect renders the product unsuitable for the use intended by the purchaser or when the purchaser – had he known of the defect – would not have purchased the product or would have purchased it only for a lower price. Both Belgian and French law utilize a presumption that the professional seller is aware of the hidden defects of products sold by him. In Belgium, the said presumption can be refuted by proving his ‘insurpassable lack of knowledge’. In France, even this evidence is disallowed. This presumption of knowledge of hidden defects in many cases also results in the nullity of exoneration clauses. Moreover, the application of the hidden defects regime is extended to cover persons other than the purchaser – so-called sub-purchasers. In this way an enduser, who may be the last person in a long line of sellers and purchasers, can institute a claim against every seller in the line. In some cases even third parties, such as the relatives of the purchaser, are allowed to institute such a claim. For a survey of the jurisprudence, see Punt, H.G., Produktenaansprakelijkheid (1987)Google Scholar, to which the following cases can be added – HR (Supreme Court) 1 December 1972, NJ 1973, 103 (Calculator) and Court of Amsterdam 25 May 1988 TvCR 1988 274–278 (DES), see Slagter in TvP No. 3, 1988.

10. Dommering-van Rongen, L. ‘Produkten-aansprakelijkheid’, in Spier, J., ed., Contracten in dePraktijk (1985)Google Scholar. In HR 3 April 1970, NJ 1970, 252 and 29 January 1971, NJ 1971, 221 the Court held that the ambit of these Articles, that mainly protect the Seller, should not be intended to cover cases for which the drafters had not intended, being cases where the agreement pertains to a product that is individualized at the making of the contract, meaning that the parties intended that the seller could only discharge his obligation by delivering a certain individualized product, and the purchaser could not claim another product in its place. See Verkade, D.W.F., ‘Produktenaansprakelijkheid, TvCR (01 1985)Google Scholar; van Delft-Baas, M., Produkt-informatieplichten (1987)Google Scholar.

11. Art. 19 Directive.

12. The Italian Act implementing the Directive deviates in two areas. Firstly, the Italian decree provides a defence for the producer if his product conforms generally with mandatory legal norms. The Directive fixes the defence more precisely by speaking of mandatory regulations issued by the public authorities. A second difference is that the Italian decree allows the producer to exonerate himself if he proves that, according to the state of scientific and technical knowledge at any given time, his product could not be ‘considered’ defective. The Directive, however, provides for a different, objective defence, namely that the producer will avoid liability if he can establish that when the product was first marketed, scientific and technical knowledge was not sufficiently advanced for the defect inherent in the product to be discovered.

The UK implemented the Directive through Part I of the Consumer Protection Act of 15 May 1987. The Commission is of the opinion that the so-called ‘development risks’ defence (Art. 7e of the Directive) has been wrongly implemented. Section 4(l)(e) of the UK Act takes an ‘ideal’ producer as the standard of measuring whether or not a defect could have been discovered according to the state of scientific and technical knowledge. This introduces a subjective element thereby tending to lead national judges to apply the rules of negligence and liability based on fault. This conflicts completely with Art. 1 of the Directive which introduces liability for defective products, irrespective of fault (strict liability).

13. International Business Lawyer (March 1989) p. 101. van Empel, M. and Ritsema, H.A., Aansprakelijkheid voor Produkten (1987)Google Scholar.

14. Press Release, EEC Commission, 27 December 1988.

15. Cousy, H., ‘Vraagbaak omtrent de Directive Produktaansprakelijkheid’, Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht (07 09 1988) no. 3Google Scholar.

16. Faure, M. and Vanbuggenhout, W., ‘Produktenaansprakelijkheid’, Rechtskundig Weekblad (1987) no. 1, 5 09 1987Google Scholar, and no. 2, 12 September 1987.

17. Cousy, loc.cit. n. 15.

18. Art. I of Draft Bill No. 19636.

19. Para. 1.2.

20. Final Report Draft Bill No. 19636, para. A2; Memorandum on Final Report para. A1.

21. Kapteyn, P.J.G. and van Themaat, P. Verloren, Inleiding tot het recht der Europese Gemeenschappen (1987)Google Scholar. Maresceau, M., ‘Het verbindend karakter van Directiven volgens de rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie’, SEW (1980)Google Scholar.

22. Kolpinghuis case (8 October 87, no. 80/86) TvCR 87, 272; Struyck, J.V., ‘Produktenaansprakelijkheid: communautair en nationaal recht’, NJB (13 05 1989) No. 19, p. 638Google Scholar.

23. Taschner, H.C., ‘Die künftige Produzentenhaftung in Deutschland’, 10 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1986)Google Scholar.

24. Halcion, Court of Arnhem 7 July 1987, TvCR 1987 No. 4; HR 30 June 1989 No. 13 564.

25. Arts. 15 and 16, Section 1 Directive.

26. Explanatory Notes para. 1.4.

27. Explanatory Notes para. 2.

28. Barendrecht, J.M., ‘Produktaansprakelijkheid: Europees Burgerlijk Recht?’, in Preadviezen Vereniging Burgerlijk Recht (1987)Google Scholar. Punt, op.cit. n. 9.

29. Art. 1407 c.

30. See Duintjer Tebbens, loc.cit. n. 5.

31. Answers to Parliament p. 31.

32. Slagter, W.G., ‘Produktenaansprakelijkheid in Nederland’, TvP (07–09 1988) no. 3Google Scholar; van Catwijck, A.J.O. Baron van Wassenaer, Produktenaansprakelijkheid (1986)Google Scholar.

33. The EEC Treaty on recognition and enforcement in many cases offers the consumer a forum against the EEC importer in his home country and the possibility to enforce in the whole Community under Art. 5 s. 1 (forum contractus) and s. 3 (forum delicti).

34. Thus the supplier will have to insert a hold harmless clause and keep a good stock inventory indicating producers and/or importers.

35. Ford v. Den Ouden, Court of Amsterdam June 27 1958, NJ 1958, 104. The Court held the assembler, Ford Amsterdam, liable for damage caused by defective parts it imported, but which were produced by Ford America.

36. The Strasbourg Treaty only covers death and bodily injuries. Slagter, loc.cit. n. 32; Art. 1407e.

37. See Duintjer Tebbens, loc.cit. n. 5.

38. Memorandum on the Final Report, p. 12.

39. See Duintjer Tebbens, loc.cit. n. 5; ‘Bei einer Selbstbeteiligung’; ‘sous déduction d'un franchise’; Art. 11 para. 2 of the Belgian Draft ‘onder aftrek van een franchise van 22.500 frank’.

40. Art. 1407 b.

41. The 1979 Draft referred to the intended use. See Duintjer Tebbens, loc.cit. n. 5; Rooy, R. Van, ‘EEG Directive Produktenaansprakelijkheid en NBW’, NJB (22 03 1986) No. 12, p. 379Google Scholar.

42. See Duintjer Tebbens, loc.cit. n. 5; Huygen, R.P.J., ‘Produktenaansprakelijkheid’, WPNR (1985) no. 5766 p. 826Google Scholar.

43. See Barendrecht, loc.cit. n. 28; Punt, op.cit. n. 9.

44. Schellen, J. Van, Toerekening naar Redelijkheid (1985)Google Scholar; van Dunné, J.M.V., Verbintenissenrecht in Ontwikkeling (1986)Google Scholar; Schut, G.H.A.,Onrechtmatige Daad (1985)Google Scholar.

Regarding the rules on causation, it should be noted that in the Dutch law of tort - and especially in tort cases related to transportation, safety and the environment – the proximate or legal cause doctrine does not limit liability to foreseeable risks. In view of the current state of jurisprudence, and in particular the following cases: Doorenbos v. Intercommunale Waterleiding Gebied Leeuwarden N.V., HR March 20, 1970, NJ 1970, 251; De Nederlandse Lloyd N.V. v. The State, HR December 19, 1975, NJ 1976, 280; and Stad Rotterdam v. Provinciate Noordbrabantsche Electriciteitsmaatschappij, HR June 13, 1975, NJ 1975, 509, one may assume that once it has been determined that damage has been wrongfully caused, the person who has caused such damage is, in principle, liable for the total damage. It is not required that the extent of the damage was foreseen. In these cases the Supreme Court has anticipated Art. 6.1.9.4 (cited below) of the Dutch New Civil Code, which is not yet in force. In Doorenbos, the court held that the causation doctrine in tort cases does not limit liability to foreseeable risks, but excludes liability for damage that takes such an exceptional form for the type of tort concerned or has such a remote relation thereto, that the burden of the said damage may not be reasonably imposed on the person who according to the law is liable for the consequences of that type of tort. Or, as provided in the above-mentioned Art. 6.1.9.4, ‘Only the damage that bears such a relation to the occurrence on which the liability of the debtor is founded so that it - in view of, inter alia, the nature of the liability and of the damage – can be attributed to the debtor as a consequence of the said occurrence, shall be fit for reparation’. With respect to proof of causation, the burden has sometimes been shifted to the producer in cases where statutory safety requirements were violated (NJ 1974, 453; NJ 1980, 77).

45. See Barendrecht, loc.cit. n. 28; Punt, op.cit. n. 9.

46. Nieuwenhuis, J.H.N., ‘Alternatieve Causalitcit en Aansprakelijkheid naar Marktaandeel’, Preadviezen Vereniging voor Burgerlijk Recht (1987)Google Scholar.

47. The said article is part of a recent revision of the Dutch rules of evidence. It provides that ‘[t]he party that invokes the legal consequences of facts or rights stated by it, bears the burden of proof of such facts or rights, unless a different distribution of the burden of proof results from a special rule or from the principles of equity’.

48. See Slagter, loc.cit. n. 32.

49. Storm, P.M., ‘Een Gebrekkig Produkt’, TVVS (1985) No. 85/10, p. 241Google Scholar.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.; see also Slagter, loc.cit. n. 32.

52. Ceversely, the following of a correct governmental regulation does not preclude defectiveness of the product. Snijders, G.M.F., Produktveiligheid en Aansprakelijkheid (1987)Google Scholar. See Explanatory Notes.

53. van Catwijck, A.J.O. Baron van Wassenaer, Eigen Schuld en Medeschuld (1985)Google Scholar.

54. See Van Wassenaer van Catwijck, ibid.; Slagter, loc.cit. n. 32; Van Empel and Ritsema, op.cit. n. 13. The Strasbourg Treaty gave a definition of ‘to put into circulation’; the Belgian Draft also has a definition.

55. See Duintjer Tebbens, loc.cit. n. 5.

56. It remains to be seen what degree of proof will be regarded as sufficient, taking into account the requirements of the Chemproha case, NJ 1973, 439.

57. See Slagter, loc.cit. n. 32, the ‘prosumer’ is protected.

58. See Snijders, op.cit. n. 52.

59. See Duintjer Tebbens, loc.cit. n. 5.

60. Ibid.

61. See Slagter, loc.cit. n. 32.

62. See Van Empel and Ritsema, op.cit. n. 13.

63. See Storm, loc.cit. n. 49, the Directive does not mention a fourth element: the causal relation between the defect and the damage.

64. Aside from the available remedies, the distinction is also of importance with regard to the obligation to deliver and force majeure; the time at which the risk of loss passes from seller to purchaser; and the place of delivery.

65. HR, NJ 1970, 252.

66. Art. 1303 CC.

67. HR, NJ 1980, 250.

68. HR, NJ 1971, 221.

69. HR, NJ 1973, 459.

70. HR, NJ 1986, 213.

71. Court of Amsterdam, NJ 1958, 104.

72. HR February 2, 1973, NJ 1973, 315.

73. NJ 1973, 439.

74. HR, NJ 1982, 614.

75. HR, NJ 1979, 535.

76. (a) manufacturing or construction errors (defective tow-bar, VR 56, 85; defective camping gas cylinder — Court of Maastricht December 11, 1980, unreported);

(b) use of defective (base)materials (defective gas pipeline, NJ 1974, 357);

(c) insufficient inspection (defective acetylene cylinder, NJ 1933, 881; defective hot-water bottle, NJ 1973, 315, see supra; defective gas regulators, NJ 1977, 249);

(d) defective design (self-igniting carpet, Court of Zwolle February 18, 1976, 23 NILR (1976) p. 364);

(e) Incorrect advertising, NJ 1966, 179.

77. Court of Arnhem July 7, 1987, TvCR 1987, No. 4.

78. Court of Den Bosch November 13, 1979, NJ 1980, 370.

79. Court of The Hague December 7, 1979, NJ 1981, 670.

80. NJ 1975, 509.

81. See Hondius, E.H., Standaardvoorwaarden (1978)Google Scholar; Rijken, G.J., Exoneratie clausules (1983)Google Scholar; van Dunné, J.M., Verbintenissenrecht in Ontwikkeling (1987) the supplement ‘Exoneratieclausules’Google Scholar.

82. HR April 14, 1950, NJ 1951, 17.

83. HR March 12, 1954, NJ 1955, 386.

84. HR May 19, 1967, NJ 1967, 261.

85. HR February 20, 1976, NJ 1976, 486.

86. HR April 1986, NJ 1986, 714.

87. HR January 6, 1987, NJ 1987, 553.