1. Ambassador Kirkpatrick in the Security Council; International Herald Tribune, 29/30 October 1983.

2. Mr. Lichtenstein in the Security Council; idem.

3. President Reagan at a press conference; ibid. 5/6 November 1983.

4. For an analysis of the terms ‘sources’ and ‘recognized manifestations of international law’ see Bos, M., ‘The Recognized Manifestations of International Law: a New Theory of ‘Sources’’, 20 GYIL (1977)Google Scholar; and ‘The Identification of Custom in International Law’, 25 GYIL (1982). The passage in the text preceding note 4 is not to be construed as stating that the present author would consider all ‘sources’ enumerated in Article 38 as ‘manifestations’, or that he would consider those enumerated there as exhaustive.

5. This question has been the subject of protracted legal dispute. On the one hand, there are those who take the view that the obligation not to intervene, incumbent upon the Organization, would a fortiori apply to its member States; cf., e.g., Fonteyne, J.P.L., ‘Forcible Self-help by States to Protect Human Rights: Recent Views from the United Nations’, in Lillich, R.B., ed., Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (Charlottesville 1973) p. 206Google Scholar; Massouridis, P.A., Le principe de non-intervention en droit international moderne (1968) p. 35Google Scholar; Mitrovic, T., ‘Non-intervention in the Internal Affairs of States’, in Sahovic, M., ed., Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation (Belgrade 1972) p. 251Google Scholar. On the other hand, there are those who deny that Article 2(7) would address itself to Member States, e.g., Gerlach, A., Die Intervention. Versuch einer Definition (Hamburg 1967) p. 44Google Scholar; Kelsen, H., Principles of International Law (New York 1966) p. 295Google Scholar; Rosenstock, R., ‘The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: a Survey’, 65 AJIL (1971) p. 713CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The apparent intention of the drafters in San Francisco was, indeed, to prevent ‘that the Organization could intervene directly in the domestic economic, social and cultural arrangements of Member States’; Goodrich, L.M. and Hambro, E., Charter of the United Nations (Boston 1946) p. 72Google Scholar (italics supplied). The dispute has played a role not only in the literature, but also in UN debates; the countries of Eastern Europe and the Third World taking the first, Western countries taking the second view. Cf., for example, UN Docs. A/AC.119/SR 25, pp. 8, 26 pp. 7, 28 pp. 11, 29 pp. 4, 30 pp. 5–6, 31 pp. 4–5, 32 pp. 21–22 (first view), and 29 pp. 7–13, 32 pp. 24–27 (second view), in recording the 1964 debates of the Special Committee which prepared the Declaration on Principles of International Law, GA Res. 2625 (XXV).

6. Akehurst, M., A Modern Introduction to International Law (London 1977) p. 190Google Scholar.

7. Oppenheim, L./Lauterpacht, H., International Law (London 1955) pp. 415–416Google Scholar. Similarly, see Starke, J.G., Introduction to International Law (London 1972) p. 111 note 2Google Scholar.

8. Goodrich, and Hambro, , op.cit., n.5, p. 120Google Scholar; Jones, G.J., The United Nations and the Domestic Jurisdiction of States (Cardiff 1979) p. 31Google Scholar; Verdross, A. and Simma, B., Universelles Völkerrecht, Theorie und Praxis (Berlin 1976) p. 156Google Scholar.

9. Gerlach, , op.cit., n.5, p. 177Google Scholar; Goodrich, L.M., The United Nations (New York 1959) p. 79Google Scholar.

10. UN Doc. A/AC.119/SR 32.

11. Cf., Rosenstock, , loc.cit., n.5, p. 713Google Scholar.

12. GA Res. 2131 (XX), fifth preambular para.

13. Idem eighth preambular para.

14. This interpretation was, of course, hotly contested by the other delegations: cf., Houben, P.H., ‘Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States’, 61 AJIL (1967)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15. Indeed, during the debates on the Declaration in 1970, the principle of political independence of States served as a bridge between opposing views on the question of intervention under the Charter, when the US delegation agreed that the non-violent coercion of one State by another should also (henceforth) be considered to be prohibited by the terms of the Charter; to the extent, that is, ‘that some way had to be found to cover economic and political pressures of sufficient magnitude to affect political independence’ (Rosenstock, , loc.cit., n. 5, pp. 726–29)Google Scholar. The rationality of this view was aptly pointed out by Friedmann when he wrote that it would be utterly illogical to presume that measures which ‘affect another nations’ economic life even though they may starve it to death’ could be legal, while ‘the slightest act of physical violation of sovereignty’ would be prohibited: Friedmann, W., ‘Intervention in Civil War and the Role of International Law’, in Falk, R.A., ed., The Vietnam War and International Law (Princeton 1969) p. 153Google Scholar.

16. The argument would run as follows. Since the Declaration was adopted unanimously, the question whether the UNGA is entitled to interpret the Charter with authentic effect does not arise in this case. For, in default of conclusive statements to the contrary, each member State may, by reference to its affirmative vote, be held to have individually given its official approval to this interpretation of Charter principles embodied in the Declaration. The principle of estoppel operates with respect to the vote: cf., Verwey, W.D., ‘The United Nations and the Least Developed Countries: an Exploration in the Grey Zones of International Law’, in Makarczyk, J., ed., Essays in International Law in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs (The Hague1984) para. 12, especially notes 70 and 71, and the references to the theories of Bleicher, Cheng, and Higgins made there. For present purposes it is not necessary to go into the question of the legal merits of UNGA Declarations, for, if it were not correct to consider Res. 2625 as an authentic interpretation of Charter principles, with respect to the principle of non-intervention it could still be considered as an authentic clarification by the UN members of the concept of intervention in generalGoogle Scholar.

17. This restriction results from a contextual interpretation of the Declaration, which emphasizes in its General Part that ‘in their interpretation and application the above principles are interrelated and each principle should be construed in the context of other principles’. On the effort of countries of the Afro-Asian and Eastern European groups to confine the applicability of the principle of self-determination to peoples struggling against colonial, racist and alien regimes, see Sections 3.2 and 5 infra, and cf., Verwey, W.D., ‘Decolonization and Ius ad Bellum: a Case Study on the Impact of the United Nations General Assembly on International Law’, in Akkerman, R. et al. , eds., Declarations on Principles. A Quest for Universal Peace (Leyden 1977) p. 121 et seq.Google Scholar

18. Literal interpretation of certain phrases like ‘violent overthrow of the regime of another State’ and ‘the use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity’ would suggest that non-violent measures aimed at realizing these purposes would not constitute intervention. Some delegations drew attention to the fact, however, that the eventual text resulted from negotiations ‘at different sessions and between different groups of members with the result of overlapping, inconsistencies in wording, lacunae and redundancies … In particular, any argumentation a contrario — already in any case a dubious process of reasoning in the interpretation of international legal documents — would be inadmissible in respect of the terms of the present draft declaration’. Cf., in line with the delegate of Ceylon (Mr. Pinto), the delegate of the Netherlands (Mr. Houben); Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Report on the 25th Session of the UNGA, No. 98 (1971) 481. However correct this view may be, it does not alter the fact that such inconsistencies are there and that, consequently, unquestionable interpretative conclusions can hardly be drawn.

19. See nn. 15 and 16 supra.

20. Art. 8, 70 UNTS 237.

22. Art. 3, 233 UNTS 199.

23. Art. 3, 479 UNTS 39.

24. For detailed accounts of the history of the principle of non-intervention in the Americas see, for an American view, Thomas, A.J. and Thomas, A.v.Wynen, Non-intervention; the Law and its Impact in the Americas (Dallas 1956)Google Scholar; and, for a Latin American view, Grossman, C., Het beginsel van non-interventie in de Organisatie van Amerikaanse Staten vanuit een Latijns-Amerikaans gezichtspunt (Amsterdam 1980)Google Scholar

25. Arts. 18–20, 119 UNTS 3. The Latin American States intended to circumscribe the principle of non-interference in such a comprehensive way that problems of interpretation could not arise and weaken the prohibition of intervention; cf., Grossman, , op.cit., n.24, pp. 181–203Google Scholar.

26. E.g., the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung (1955), the Conference of Non-aligned States in Cairo (1964), and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (Helsinki 1975). Art. 6 of the Final Act of Helsinki reads: ‘The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations … They will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of military, or of political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind’ (paras 1, 3).

27. Rosenstock, , loc.cit., n.5, p. 727Google Scholar.

28. UN Doc. A/AC.125/SR 114 (1970; Mr. Sinclair). Cf., also, Friedmann, W., ‘Intervention and International Law’, 25 Internationale Spectator (1971) pp. 42, 47Google Scholar; Vincent, R.J., Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton 1974) p. 8Google Scholar.

29. Cf., for example, van Bogaert, E.R.C., Volkenrecht (Brussels 1973) p. 142Google Scholar; Goodrich, and Hambro, , op.cit., n.5, p. 120Google Scholar; de Louter, J., Het stellig volkenrecht (The Hague 1910) p. 251Google Scholar; Panhuys, H.F. van, Het recht in de wereldgemeenschap (Groningen 1974) p. 90Google Scholar; Seidl-Hohenveldern, I., Völkerrecht (Cologne 1980) p. 272Google Scholar; Westlake, J., International Law (Cambridge 1910) pp. 234–5Google Scholar. According to Verdross and Simma, op.cit., n. 8: ‘jede Einmischungsart, also auch durch Empfehlungen, ist untersagf’. According to Friedmann, also in socialist countries the official view is that ‘States shall refrain from any direct or indirect intervention under any pretext in the internal or external affairs of another State. In particular, any interference or pressure by one State or group of States for the purpose of changing the social or political order in another State shall be prohibited’; Friedmann, W., ‘Intervention, Civil War and the Role of International Law’, in Gross, L., ed., International Law in the 20th Century (Princeton 1969) p. 725 (italics added)Google Scholar.

30. Brierly, J.L., The Law of Nations (Oxford 1963) p. 402Google Scholar.

31. Moore, J.N., ‘The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict’, 9 VJIL (1969) p. 213Google Scholar.

32. Meuffels, J., De Verenigde Naties en de handhaving van de vrede (Groningen 1980) pp. 190–1Google Scholar.

33. Cf., Brierly, , op.cit., n.30, p. 402Google Scholar; Cavaré, L., Le droit international public positif (Paris 1969) p. 628Google Scholar; Fonteyne, J.P.L., ‘The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: its Current Validity Under the UN Charter’, Cal. WILJ (1974) p. 204Google Scholar; Friedmann, , loc.cit., n. 28, pp. 44–5Google Scholar; Glahn, G. von, Law Among Nations (London 1970) p. 163Google Scholar; Jacobini, H.B., International Law; A Text (Homewood 1963) pp. 261–2Google Scholar; Kelsen, , op.cit., n.5, p. 64Google Scholar; Menzel, E., Vélkerrecht (Munich 1962) p. 213Google Scholar; Nguyen, Q.D., Droit international public (Paris 1975) p. 761Google Scholar; Ross, A., A Textbook of International Law (London 1947) p. 185Google Scholar; Rousseau, C., Droit international public (Paris 1980) p. 37Google Scholar; Sibert, M., Traité de droit international public (Paris 1951) p. 341; Skubiszewski (see n.58 infra) p. 757Google Scholar; Strupp, H.J. and Schlochauer, K., Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts (Berlin 1960) p. 145Google Scholar; Thomas, A. v. Wynen and Thomas, A.J., The Concept of Aggression in International Law (Dallas 1972) p. 71Google Scholar; Vincent, , op.cit., n.28, pp. 8, 13Google Scholar; Whiteman, M., Digest of International Law (Washington 1965) p. 321Google Scholar.

34. Oppenheim, /Lauterpacht, , op.cit., n.7, p. 305Google Scholar.

35. de Vattel, E., ‘Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains’ (1758), in Classics of International Law (Washington 1916) p. 37Google Scholar; cf., also, Winfield, P.H., ‘The History of Intervention in International Law’, 3 BYIL (1922) p. 134Google Scholar.

36. Thomas, and Thomas, , op.cit., n. 33, p. 71Google Scholar.

37. Thomas, and Thomas, , op.cit., n. 24, pp. 71–72Google Scholar.

38. Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international (Sirey 1960) p. 348Google Scholar; Fairley, H.S., ‘State Actors, Humanitarian Intervention and International Law: Reopening Pandora's Box’, 10 GJICL (1980) p. 32 note 8Google Scholar; Goodrich, L.M., The United Nations (New York 1959) p. 79Google Scholar; Kelsen, , op.cit., n.5, p. 75Google Scholar. This probably also applies to a number of German authors who, in the track of von Liszt and Fleischmann (Das Völkerrecht 1925) use the word ‘Gewalf’, like E. Sauer (System des Völkerrechts1952) who writes: ‘Intervention richtet sich gegen den fremden Staat selbst und bezweckt diesen mittels Gewaltanwendung zur Abwehr eines drohenden Unrechts oder zur Durchführung eines angeblichen Anspruchs zu bestimmen’. Cf., similarly, Verdross, A., Völkerrecht (Wien 1964) p. 228CrossRefGoogle Scholar; in contrast to Bleiber, F., Handwörterbuch der Diplomatie und Aussenpolitik (Darmstadt 1959) p. 126, who refers to ‘Ausübung von Druck oder Gewalt’ (italics supplied)Google Scholar.

39. With respect to the phrase in Art. 2(4) of the Charter, Röling observes: ‘If obvious superior power is present, the weaker party is bound to reckon with this fact. This already constitutes a menace, although no explicit threat is involved. But it is not such a menace arising from the facts that is referred to in Art. 2(4)’; Röling, B.V.A., ‘Aspects of the Ban on Force’, in Meyers, H. and Vierdag, E.W., eds., Essays on International Law and Relations in Honour of A.J.P. Tammes, Special Issue XXIV, NILR (1977) p. 250Google Scholar.

40. Leurdijk, J.H., ‘Civil War and Intervention in International Law’, in op.cit., n. 39, p. 143Google Scholar.

41. Schwartz, U., Confrontation and Intervention in the Modern World (New York 1970) p. 93Google Scholar. Cf., also, Halpern, M., ‘The Morality and Politics of Intervention’, in Rosenau, J.N., ed., International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton 1964) p. 251Google Scholar; Moore, , loc.cit., n. 31, p. 213Google Scholar; Rosenau, J.N., ‘The Concept of Interventio’, 22 Journal of International Affairs (1968) p. 165Google Scholar.

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43. See text at nn. 12–26 supra.

44. Cf., for example, François, J.P.A., Grondlijnen van het Volkenrecht (Zwolle 1967) p. 682Google Scholar; Kelsen, , op.cit., n.5, p. 74Google Scholar; Oppenheim, /Lauterpacht, , op.cit., n.7, p. 305Google Scholar; Thomas, and Thomas, , op.cit., n.24, p. 70Google Scholar.

45. For a brief review of this question see Verwey, , loc.cit., n. 17, p. 123 et seq.Google Scholar

46. Advisory Opinion on the Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, PCIJ Series B No. 4 (1923).

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48. These differences are considered infra.

49. This also holds good for Latin American (and other Third World) countries adhering to the ‘national standard’ and rejecting the ‘international standard of civilization’ with respect to the treatment of nationals and foreigners within their territories, as soon as such treatment affects basic human rights: in view of their membership of the UN (and the obligations arising from Arts. 1(3), 55 and 56 of the Charter) and of the fact that most of these countries (including fifteen from Latin America) have become parties to the UN Human Rights Covenants, it is by now beyond doubt that respect for basic human rights is no longer a matter of domestic jurisdiction.

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51. François, , op.cit., n.44, p. 644; Dictionnaire, op.cit., n.38, p. 349Google Scholar.

52. Baxter, R. in Lillich, , op.cit., n.5, p. 52Google Scholar; Manin, A., ‘L'intervention française au Shaba’, 24 Ann. DI (1978) p. 160Google Scholar; Margo, R.D., ‘Legality of the Entebbe Raid in International Law’, 94 South African LJ (1977) p. 318Google Scholar; Sibert, , op.cit., n.33, p. 343Google Scholar.

53. ‘Willkürmassnahmen’: Guggenheim, P., Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts (Basel 1948) p. 262Google Scholar. ‘Arbitrary treatment’: Stowell, E.C., Intervention in International Law (Washington 1921) p. 53Google Scholar.

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56. Amerasinghe, C.F., Studies in International Law (Ceylon 1969) p. 127Google Scholar; Fonteyne, , loc.cit., n.33, p. 259Google Scholar; Fairley, , loc.cit., n.38, p. 32Google Scholar; Glahn, von, op.cit., n.33, p. 167Google Scholar; Goldie, L.F.E. in Lillich, , op.cit., n.5, p. 46Google Scholar; Meuffels, , op.cit., n.32, p. 138Google Scholar; Sornarajah, M., ‘Internal Colonialism and Humanitarian Intervention’, 11 Ga.JICL (1981) p. 75Google Scholar; Stowell, , op.cit., n.53, p. 53Google Scholar; Thiele, T.V., ‘Norms of Intervention in a Decolonized World’, 11 NYUJILP (1978) p. 144Google Scholar; Verdross, and Simma, , op.cit., n.8, p. 548Google Scholar.

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62. IdemRougier and Perez-Vera. See also Baxter, and Franck, in Lillich, op.cit., n.54, pp. 53, 63Google Scholar; Fonteyne, , loc.cit., n.33, p. 258Google Scholar; Manin, , loc.cit., n.52, p. 160Google Scholar; Meuffels, , op.cit., n.32, p. 138Google Scholar; Moore, , loc.cit., n.61, p. 251Google Scholar; Münch, I. von, Völkerrecht (Berlin 1971)Google Scholar; Rodley, loc.cit., n. 61; Weissberg, G., ‘The Congo Crisis 1964: A Case Study in Humanitarian Intervention’, 12 VJIL (1972) p. 275Google Scholar.

63. See Section 3.2 infra.

64. Cf., for example, Falk, R.A. in Lillich, , op.cit., n.54, p. 68Google Scholar; Flinterman, C., ‘Humanitarian Intervention or How Long Must the World Stand Idly By?’, 3 NJCM Bulletin (1978) p. 2 note 8Google Scholar; Franck, T.M. and Rodley, N.S., ‘After Bangladesh; the Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force’, 67 AJIL (1973) p. 277CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sornarajah, , loc.cit., n.56, p. 75Google Scholar.

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66. Goldie, in Lillich, , loc.cit., n.59, p. 46Google Scholar.

67. Lillich quoted by Fonteyne, , loc.cit., n.33, p. 260Google Scholar.

68. Formulated on the occasion of the ‘Caroline’ incident in 1837: Moore, J.B., A Digest of International Law (Washington 1906) II p. 409Google Scholar.

69. Fitzmaurice quoted by Margo, , loc.cit., n.52, p. 324Google Scholar.

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72. Fonteyne, , loc.cit., n.33, p. 261Google Scholar. Lillich also emphasizes this point, where he writes that in the case of humanitarian intervention ‘there is not a connection based upon nationality but upon the need to protect individuals under a certain international law standard’; Lillich, R.B., ‘Forcible Self-help Under International Law’, 22 NWC Rev. (1970) p. 61Google Scholar.

73. This follows from the link established in the UN Charter between the promotion of respect for human rights and the maintenance of peace; cf., Arts. 1(3), 55 and 56, and see further Section 3.2 infra.

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76. Rousseau, , op.cit., n.54, IV p. 49Google Scholar.

77. Guggenheim, , op.cit., n.53, p. 262Google Scholar.

78. Seidl-Hohenveldern, op.cit., n.29.

79. Skubiszewski, , loc.cit., n.58, pp. 758–9Google Scholar.

80. We shall come back to this infra. The authors in question include Akehurst, M., ‘The Use of Force to Protect Nationals Abroad’, 5 International Relations (1977) p. 9CrossRefGoogle Scholar; d'Angelo, J.R., ‘Resort to Force by States to Protect Nationals: the US Rescue Mission to Iran and its Legality Under International Law’, 21 VJIL (1981) p. 492Google Scholar; François, , op.cit., n.44, pp. 272–3Google Scholar; Lillich, , op.cit., n.54, p. XIGoogle Scholar; Meuffels, , op.cit., n.32, p. 138Google Scholar; Payne, , loc.cit., n.70, p. 94Google Scholar; and Reisman, M., Nullity and Revision: the Review and Enforcement of International Judgements and Awards (New Haven 1971) p. 167. It should be observed that quite a number of writers do not identify the beneficiaries and confine themselves to formulations like ‘le droit pour un Etat d'intervenir pour empêecher les crimes contre I'humanité commis par un autre Etat’ (le Fur, op.cit., n.59, p.195). It may well be that also these authors would adhere to an all-comprising concept. It should be observed in addition that a few of these writers consider the protection of nationals of the intervenor State as a species of the genus humanitarian interventionGoogle Scholar.

81. Greig, D.W., International Law (1976) p. 880Google Scholar; Margo, , loc.cit., n.52, p. 318Google Scholar.

82. Baxter, in Lillich, , op.cit., n.54, p. 53Google Scholar; Manin, , loc.cit., n.52, p. 160Google Scholar.

83. Brierly, , op.cit., n.30, p. 403Google Scholar.

84. It may well be preferable in this case not to speak of intervention and to avoid, accordingly, the expression ‘humanitarian intervention’.

85. Cf., for example, Ganji, , op.cit., n.33, pp. 15–16Google Scholar; Flinterman, , loc.cit., n.30, pp. 14–15Google Scholar; Lillich quoted in Chatterjee, , loc.cit., n.60, p. 762Google Scholar; Reisman, , op.cit., n.80, p. 187 et seq. We shall return to this in Sections 3.2 and 5 infra.Google Scholar

86. Flinterman, , loc.cit., n.30, p. 13Google Scholar.

87. Baxter, in Lillich, , op.cit., n.54, p. 53Google Scholar. Cf., Meuffels, , op.cit., n.32, p. 138Google Scholar; Verdross, and Simma, , op.cit., n.8, p. 584Google Scholar.

88. We will come back to this question, which focuses on the interpretation of Art. 2(4) of the Charter, in Section 3.2 infra.

89. Cf., for example, Akehurst, , loc.cit., n.80, p. 9Google Scholar; Brownlie, , loc.cit., in ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, n.54, p. 217Google Scholar; Fairley, , loc.cit., n.38, pp. 31–2Google Scholar; Fonteyne, , loc.cit., n.33, p. 205Google Scholar; Mirvahabi, F., ‘Entebbe: Validity of Claims in International Law’, 17 Rev. D. Pen. Mil. Guerre (1978) p. 637Google Scholar; Moore, , loc.cit., n.31, p. 261Google Scholar; Stowell, , op.cit., n.53, p. 53Google Scholar.

90. Manin, , loc.cit., n.52, p. 160Google Scholar.

91. Lillich, , op.cit., n.54, p. XI (italics supplied)Google Scholar.

92. Fairley, , loc.cit., n.38, pp. 31–2Google Scholar.

93. The primacy of the Charter over later treaties has been confirmed in Art. 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, with respect to the parties thereto and relating to treaties concluded after the entry into force of the Convention for these parties.

94. See n.35 and 74 supra.

95. Brierly, , op.cit., n.30, p. 403Google Scholar.

96. Cf., Oppenheim, /Lauterpacht, , op.cit., n.7, I p. 712 et seq.Google Scholar

97. Quoted by Lillich, R.B., ‘Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives’, in Moore, J.N., ed., Law and Civil War in the Modern World (Baltimore 1974) p. 233Google Scholar.

98. Fonteyne, , loc.cit., n.33, pp. 205–36Google Scholar, presents a review of the opinions for and against with respect to this question during the pre-UN era.

99. Humphrey, in Lillich, , op.cit., n.54, p. VIIGoogle Scholar.

100. Glahn, von, op.cit., n.33, p. 168Google Scholar.

101. ‘Da heute Gewaltanwendung in internationalen Beziehungen verboten ist, ist eine gewaltsame Intervention aus humanitären Gründen heute sicherlich verboten’ Berber, , op.cit., n.42,1 p. 193Google Scholar. Similarly, see Akehurst, , loc.cit., n.80, p. 18Google Scholar; Fairley, , loc.cit., n.38, p. 38Google Scholar; Franck, and Rodley, , loc.cit., n.64, p. 302Google Scholar; Humphrey, in Lillich, , op.cit., n.54, p. VIIIGoogle Scholar; Verdross, and Simma, , op.cit., n.8, p. 584Google Scholar.

102. Reference to advocates of a narrow and extensive interpretation will be made infra, where we consider the main arguments supporting their positions.

103. Stone, , op.cit., n.59, p. 27Google Scholar.

104. Brownlie, , loc.cit., n.54, p. 219Google Scholar. Cf., also, Akehurst, , loc.cit., n.80, p. 3Google Scholar; d'Angelo, , loc.cit., n.80, p. 489Google Scholar.

105. UNCIO VI 339 (authentic record in French); Arechaga, E. Jimenez de, Derecho constitutional de los Naciones Unidas (Madrid 1958) p. 85Google Scholar; Wehberg, H., ‘L'interdiction du recours à la force. Le principe et les problèmes qui se posent’, 78 Hague Recueil (1951) p. 62Google Scholar.

106. Stone, , op.cit., n.59, pp. 4–8Google Scholar; cf., also, Aggression and World Order (London 1958) pp. 42Google Scholar et seq., 95–101, together with idem, Legal Controls of International Conflict (London 1959) pp. 234 et seq.

107. Skubiszewski, , loc. cit., n.58, p. 746Google Scholar; de Arechaga, Jimenez, op.cit., n.105, p. 87Google Scholar.

108. Idem.

109. Röling, B.V.A., ‘On the Prohibition of the Use of Force’, in Blackshield, A.R., ed., Legal Change. Essays in Honour of Julius Stone (Sydney 1983) p. 276Google Scholar. See also text at notes 142–44, 178–81 infra.

110. Röling, idem, p. 275, and Röling, , loc.cit., n.39, pp. 246–47Google Scholar.

111. Higgins, R., The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations (London 1963) p. 220Google Scholar.

112. Akehurst, , loc.cit., n.80, p. 16Google Scholar; and idem op.cit., n.6, p. 240.

113. Röling, , loc.cit., n.39, p. 250Google Scholar. Similarly, Brownlie, I., International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford 1963) p. 364CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

114. Beyerlin, U., ‘Die Israëlische Befreiungsaktion von Entebbe in Völkerrechtlicher Sicht’, 37 ZvRW (1977) p. 217Google Scholar; Bowett, D.W., ‘The Use of Force in the Protection of Nationals’, 43 Trans. Grotius Soc. IL (1957) p. 113Google Scholar.

115. Charter of the OAS, Art. 20; 119 UNTS 3. Pacific Charter and Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, Art. 4(2); 209 UNTS 23. It is worth noting that during the debates in the Special Committee preparing GA Res. 2625 (XXV), e.g., Czechoslovakia suggested including the phrase ‘integrity or inviolability’; UN Doc. A/AC.119/L.6 (1964).

116. Stone, , Legal Controls… op.cit., n.106, p. 235Google Scholar, and ‘Force and the Charter in the Seventies’, 2 Syr JIL (1974) p. 1Google Scholar et seq; Bowett, D.W., ‘The Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad’, in Cassese, A., ed., The International Regulation of Force: Current Developments (Dordrecht 1985)Google Scholar; McDougal, M., ‘Authority to Use Force on the High Seas’, 20 NWC Rev. (1967) pp. 28–9Google Scholar; McDougal, M. and Feliciano, F., Law and Minimum World Public Order: the Legal Regulation of International Coercion (New Haven 1961) p. 126Google Scholar; Reisman, , op.cit., n.80, p. 844 et seq.Google Scholar

117. ICJ Rep. (1949) p. 35. Cf., Brownlie, , op.cit., n.113, p. 265 et seq.Google Scholar

118. Brownlie, , op.cit., n.113, pp. 267–8Google Scholar. Cf., also, Brownlie, , loc.cit., n.54, p. 222Google Scholar; Fonteyne, , loc.cit., n.33, pp. 243,255Google Scholar; Lillich, , op.cit., n.54, p. 59Google Scholar; and Meuffels, , op.cit., n.32, p.42Google Scholar.

119. UNCIO III 391, 721; VI 335.

120. Stone, , Legal Controls… op.cit., n.106, p. 235Google Scholar.

121. Akehurst, , op.cit., n.6, p. 240Google Scholar.

122. Russell, R.B., A History of the United Nations: the Role of the United States (Washington 1958) p. 465Google Scholar. Similarly, Brownlie, , opc.cit., n.113, p. 268Google Scholar; Fonteyne, , loc.cit., n.33, p. 243Google Scholar; Meuffels, , op.cit., n.32, p. 42Google Scholar; Wehberg, , loc.cit., n.105, p. 62Google Scholar.

123. UNCIO VI 340 (authentic record in French).

124. Goodrich, L.M. et al. , Charter of the United Nations (New York 1969) p. 50Google Scholar.

125. Cf., for example, USA (UN Doc. A/AC.119/SR 15, 15 et seq.; SR 17, 18); UK (id. SR 16, 14).

126. Idem, and Australia (id. SR 17, 14–15).

127. Goodrich, , op.cit., n.124, p. 50Google Scholar.

128. Not for Abi-Saab, who concludes that ‘the most important consequence of the recognition of self-determination as a legal right is to confer an international character on armed conflicts arising from the struggle to achieve this right and against its forcible denial’: Abi-Saab, G., ‘Wars of National Liberation and the Laws of War’, 3 Anals of International Studies (1972) p. 102Google Scholar. Similarly, Sagay, I., ‘The Legal Status of Freedom Fighters in Africa’, 6 EALR (1973) p. 25Google Scholar.

129. On this development, as well as on the legality of such peoples' struggles and armed support thereto, see further, Röling, B.V.A., ‘International Law and the Maintenance of Peace’, 4 NYIL (1973) p. 64 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Verwey, , loc.cit., n.14, p. 121 et seq.Google Scholar

130. GA Res. 2625 (XXV) neither embodies a specific reference to the legitimation of this struggle ‘by all available means, including armed struggle’, nor to UN member States' right ‘to offer moral, material and any other assistance’; formulations which appear in paragraphs 2 and 3 of GA Res. 3070 (XXVIII), adopted respectively by votes of 82 to 12, with 23 abstentions, and 94 to 3, with 20 abstentions. It should be observed that reading the relevant Official Records (A/C.3/SR 1976–2050) reveals that no substantial debate took place with respect to the question whether the phrase ‘material and any other assistance… in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and with relevant resolutions of the United Nations' (par. 3) includes armed support. The matter was deliberately left ambiguous. GA Res. 2625 (XXV) merely refers to such peoples’ entitlement ‘to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter’.

131. Cf., also, for example, GA Res. 1514 (XV), 2131 (XX), 2160 (XX) and 3314 (XXIX).

132. Cf., Grossman, , op.cit., n.24, p. 222Google Scholar, and the definition of ‘reprisal’ in Thomas and Thomas, , op.cit., n.24, p. 81Google Scholar.

133. Brownlie, , op.cit., n.113, p. 281Google Scholar. Cf., also, Falk, R.A., ‘The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation’, 63 AJIL (1969) p. 429CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Higgins, , op.cit., n.lll, pp. 217–18Google Scholar.

134. S/RES/188, adopted by a vote of 9 to 0, with 2 abstentions.

135. Margo, , loc.cit., n.52, p. 325Google Scholar.

136. GA Res. 3314 (XXIX) confirms in its Preamble that aggression is ‘the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force’.

137. Fonteyne, , loc.cit., n.33, p. 269Google Scholar.

138. Lillich, , loc.cit., n.72, p. 65Google Scholar.

139. Stone, J., Aggression and World Order (London 1958) p. 97Google Scholar.

140. Wright, Q., ‘The Goa Incident’, 56 AJIL (1962) p. 617CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Anand, R.P., New States and International Law (Delhi 1972) p. 54 et seq.Google Scholar

141. See text at n. 166 et seq.

142. Ceausu, D., ‘Quelques considérations relatives à l'interdiction de l'emploi de la force dans les relations internationales et le droit de légitime défense’, 15 Revue romaine d'études internationales (1981) p. 125Google Scholar.

143. Röling, , loc.cit., n.109, pp. 274, 276Google Scholar, and loc.cit., n.39, p. 249. Similarly, Akehurst, , loc.cit., n.80, p. 16Google Scholar; d'Angelo, , loc.cit., n.80, p. 487Google Scholar; Fairley, , loc.cit., n.38, p. 36Google Scholar; Franck, and Rodley, , loc.cit., n.64, p. 302Google Scholar.

144. Cf., the often-quoted address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors by McNamara, , then Secretary of Defence; text in Survival (1966) p. 210 et seq.Google Scholar The looming danger of nuclear escalation being inherent in the present system eren in minor conflicts in distant regions is a recurrent crucial theme in the writings on the ban on force by Röling. We will come back to this in Section 5 infra.

145. Stone, , op.cit., n.139, p. 98Google Scholar.

146. Waldock, C.H.M., ‘The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law’, 81 Hague Recueil (1952) p. 501Google Scholar. Similarly, Bowett, , op.cit., n.61, p. 24Google Scholar.

147. de Arechaga, Jimenez, op.cit., n.105, pp. 92–93Google Scholar.

148. ICJ Rep. (1949) p. 35.

149. Akehurst, , loc.cit., n.80, p. 18Google Scholar. Similarly, Fairley, , loc.cit., n.38, p. 38Google Scholar.

150. Brownlie, , loc.cit., in ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, n.54, p. 219Google Scholar.

151. Skubiszewski, , loc.cit., n.58, p. 764Google Scholar.

152. Cf., Röling, , loc.cit., n.39, p. 249Google Scholar.

153. Falk, , loc.cit., n.133, p. 430Google Scholar and note 39 on that page where he applies this theory to the right to resort to forceful reprisal.

154. E.g., Baxter, in Lillich, , op.cit., n.54, p. 54Google Scholar; Bowett, D.W., ‘Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force’, 66 AJIL (1972) p. 1 et seqCrossRefGoogle Scholar, and loc.cit., n.116; Krift, T.R., ‘Self-defense and Self-help: the Israeli Raid on Entebbe’, 4 Brook. JIL (1977) p. 60Google Scholar; and M. Reisman, ‘A Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos’, in Lillich, , op.cit., n.54, p. 177Google Scholar.

155. Lillich, idem, op.cit., n.54, p. 61, and cf., idem, loc.cit., n.72, pp. 61, 63.

156. Stone, , Legal Controls… op.cit., n.106, pp. 264–65Google Scholar, and idem, op.cit., n.59, p. 26–27.

157. Fonteyne, , loc.cit., n.33, pp. 249–50Google Scholar. Cf., also Akehurst, , loc.cit., n.80 p. 18Google Scholar; Lillich, , op.cit., n.54, p. 62Google Scholar.

158. ICJ Rep. (1949) p. 35 (italics added).

159. Quoted by Brownlie, , loc.cit., in ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, n.54, p. 222Google Scholar.

160. Meuffels, , op.cit., n.32, p. 139Google Scholar.

161. Brownlie, , loc.cit., n.54, p. 222Google Scholar.

162. Reisman, , loc.cit., n.154, p. 177Google Scholar.

163. Higgins, , op.cit., n.lll, p. 220Google Scholar.

164. Cf., for example, Akehurst, , loc.cit., n.80, p. 16Google Scholar; Fonteyne, , loc.cit., n.33, p. 255Google Scholar.

165. Hyde, quoted by Bowett, , op.cit., n.61, p. 104Google Scholar.

166. d'Angelo, , loc.cit., n.80, p. 491 et seq.Google Scholar; Bowett, , loc.cit., n.114, p. 114Google Scholar; Franzke, H.G., ‘Die militärische Abwehr von Angriffen. auf Staatsangehörige im Ausland – ins besondere ihre Zulässigkeit nach der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen’, 16 Öster. Z.ö.R. (1966) p. 150 et seqGoogle Scholar; Krift, , loc.cit., n.154, p. 60Google Scholar; Lillich, , loc.cit., n.97, p. 236Google Scholar; Reisman, , loc.cit., n.154, p. 171 et seq.Google Scholar

167. Reisman, idem, p. 175.

168. Lauterpacht, quoted by Reisman, idem, p. 171.

169. Idem, p. 172. Cf., Fonteyne, , loc.cit., n.33, pp. 255, 269Google Scholar; Lillich, , loc.cit., n.72, p. 65Google Scholar.

170. Reisman, , loc.cit., n.154, p. 177Google Scholar.

171. Krift, , loc.cit., n.154, p. 60Google Scholar.

172. Perez-Vera, , loc.cit., n.60, pp. 414–15Google Scholar. Cf., Bowett, , op.cit., n.61, p. 15Google Scholar.

173. See, e.g., GA Res. 2022 (XX), 2074 (XX), 2202 (XXI), 2262 (XXII), 2307 (XXII), 2396 (XXIII), 2506 (XXIV), 2671 (XXV), and numerous resolutions subsequently adopted.

174. See, e.g., GA Res. 2054 (XX), 2202 (XXI), 2307 (XXII).

175. Cf., Röling, , loc.cit., n.129, p. 48 et seq.Google Scholar; Verwey, , loc.cit., n.17, p. 121 et seq.Google Scholar

176. Grossman, , op.cit., n.24, pp. 194, 237Google Scholar; Sornarajah, , loc.cit., n.56, pp. 75–76Google Scholar.

177. Franck, and Rodley, , loc.cit., n.64, pp. 299–300Google Scholar. Also cf., Akehurst, , loc.cit., n.80, p. 16Google Scholar.

178. Franck and Rodley, idem, p. 300.

179. Significantly, Art. 8 of the Genocide Convention, for instance, provides: ‘Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and supression of acts of genocide or any other acts enumeated in article III’; and cf., Franck and Rodley, idem, p. 299.

180. Akehurst, , loc.cit., n.80, p. 18Google Scholar. Also cf., Ceausu, , loc.cit., n.142, p. 125Google Scholar; Fairley, , loc.cit., n.38, p. 38Google Scholar; Franck, and Rodley, , loc.cit., n.64, p. 302Google Scholar.

181. Baxter, in Lillich, , op.cit., n.54, p. 60Google Scholar.

182. Krift, , loc.cit., n.154, p. 60Google Scholar.

183. Reisman, , loc.cit., n. 154, p. 177Google Scholar.

184. Stone, , op.cit., n.139, p. 99Google Scholar.

185. Lillich quoted by Chaterjee, , loc.cit., n.60, p. 762Google Scholar. Cf., also, d'Angelo, , loc.cit., n.80, p. 493Google Scholar; Fonteyne, , loc.cit., n.33, p. 258Google Scholar.

186. This was the legal situation prevailing under the 1928 Briand-Kellogg Pact of Paris, which was widely held to reflect customary international law. Cf., for example, Bowett, , op.cit., n.61, p. 22 et seq.Google Scholar; Fenwick, C.G., ‘The Dominican Republic: Intervention or Collective Self-defense?’, 60 AJIL (1966) p. 64CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McDougal, and Feliciano, , op.cit., n.116, p. 233 et seq.Google Scholar; Stone, , op.cit., n.139, p. 92 et seq.Google Scholar; Waldock, , loc.cit., n.146, p. 463 et seq.Google Scholar Many other authors do not share this view, however, arguing that Art. 51 should be strictly and literally interpreted so as not to undermine the effectiveness of the ban on force. Henkin eloquently observes: ‘What draftsman or reader would say that a clause which permits self-defense if an armed attack occurs, really permits selfdefense whether an armed attack occurs or not?’; Henkin, L., ‘Force, Intervention and Neutrality in Contemporary International Law’, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (1963) p. 196Google Scholar. Also cf., Akehurst, , loc.cit., n.80, p. 17Google Scholar; Beyerlin, , loc.cit., n.114, pp. 221–2Google Scholar; Brownlie, , op.cit., n.113, p. 274Google Scholar; Jessup, P.C., A Modern Law of Nations (New York 1956) p. 169Google Scholar; de Arechaga, E. Jimenez, ‘La Legitima defensa individual en la Carta de las Naciones Unidas’, in Homenaje a Barcia Trelles (Vallencia 1958) p. 332Google Scholar; Kelsen, H., The Law of the United Nations: a Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems (New York 1950) p. 269Google Scholar; Kunz, J.L., ‘Individual and Collective Self-defense in Art. 51 of the Charter of the UN’, 41 AJIL (1947) p. 872CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Röling, , loc.cit., n.109, p. 277Google Scholar; Skubiszewski, , loc.cit., n.58, p. 767Google Scholar; Wehberg, , loc.cit., n.105, p. 71Google Scholar.

187. These are two examples mentioned in the definition of genocide embodied in Art. 2 of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; Annex to GA Res. 260-A (III).

188. This thesis is supported by, e.g., Beyerlin, , loc.cit., n.114, pp. 222–3Google Scholar; Bowett, , op.cit., n.61, p. 93Google Scholar; Fenwick, , loc.cit., n.186, p. 64Google Scholar; Krift, , loach., n.154, pp. 52–3Google Scholar; Thomas, and Thomas, , op.cit., n.24, p. 303Google Scholar.

189. See Section 4 infra.

190. Idem.

191. Cf., Akehurst, , op.cit., n.6, p. 244–5Google Scholar.

192. Idem, p. 244. Cf., also, Beyerlin, , loc.cit., n.114, p. 220Google Scholar; Brownlie, , op.cit., n.113, p. 289Google Scholar; Franck, and Rodley, , loc.cit., n.64, p. 275Google Scholar.

193. Idem, Franck and Rodley.

194. Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway case, PCIJ (1939) Series A/B No. 76.

195. Bowett, loc.cit., n.116.

196. Cf., Krishnan, V. Maya, ‘African State Practice Relating to Certain Issues of International Law’, 14 Indian Yearbook of International Affairs (1965) p. 211Google Scholar.

197 Cf., statements by, e.g., Czechoslovakia, Ghana, USSR and Yugoslavia in UN Doc. A/AC.119/SR 4, p. 6; SR14, p. 11; SR 5, p. 9, and SR 9, p. 22. Cf., also, the Report of the Special Committee preparing GA Res. 2625 (XXV), GA Off. Rec. 23rd Sess. (1968) pp. 37–38, 53, 63; and see Dugard, C.J.R., ‘The Organization of African Unity and Colonialism: an Inquiry into the Plea of Self-defence as Justification for the Use of Force in the Eradication of Colonialism’, 16 International Organization(1967) pp. 157, 165Google Scholar.

198. Cf., Grossman, , op.cit., n.24, pp. 225–26Google Scholar.

199. See Arts. 33 and 34 of the ILC Draft on State Responsibility, Y1LC (1980) I p. 153 et seq

200. See Krift, , loc.cit., n.154, p. 55Google Scholar.

201. Cf., for example, Bogaert, van, op.cit., n.57, p. 73Google Scholar; Brierly, , op.cit., n.30, p. 403Google Scholar; Colliard, C.A., Institutions Internationales (Paris 1967) pp. 284–5Google Scholar; Ganji, , op.cit., n.57, p. 24 et seq.Google Scholar; Oppenheim, /Lauterpacht, , op.cit., n.7, I p. 313Google Scholar; Rougier, , loc.cit., n.60, p. 473Google Scholar; Sauer, , op.cit., n.58, pp. 123–4Google Scholar; Scelle, , op.cit., n.57, p. 823Google Scholar.

202. Akehurst, , loc.cit., n.80, pp. 10–11Google Scholar.

203. Cf., for example, Akehurst, , loc.cit., n.80, p. 7Google Scholar; Beyerlin, , loc.cit., n.114, p. 227Google Scholar; Franzke, , loc.cit., n.166, pp. 161–2Google Scholar; Meuffels, , op.cit., n.32, pp. 149–50Google Scholar; Zacher, M.W., International Conflicts and Collective Security 1946–1977 (New York 1979) p. 238Google Scholar.

204. Reisman, , loc.cit., n.154, p. 185Google Scholar.

205. Glahn, von, op.cit., n.33, p. 168Google Scholar.

206. Weissberg, , loc.cit., n.62, p. 267Google Scholar. Cf., also, Meuffels, , op.cit., n.32, p. 140Google Scholar.

207. Frey-Wouters in Lillich, , op.cit., n.54, p. 58Google Scholar. Cf., also, Falk, , loc.cit., n.133, p. 333Google Scholar; Franzke, , loc.cit., n.166, p. 166 et seqGoogle Scholar; Lillich, , loc.cit., n.72, p. 62Google Scholar; Meuffels, , op.cit., n.32, p. 140Google Scholar; Reisman, , loc.cit., n.154, p. 185Google Scholar; Weissberg, , loc.cit., n.62, p. 261 et seq.Google Scholar

208. Chayers, A. et al. . International Legal Process (Boston 1967) p. 1166Google Scholar.

209. Idem p. 1169. Cf., also, Bogen, D.S., ‘The Law of Humanitarian Intervention: United States Policy in Cuba (1898) and in the Dominican Republic (1965)’, 7 Harvard International Law Club Journal(1965) p. 296 et seq.Google Scholar; Fenwick, , loc.cit., n.186, p. 64 et seq.Google Scholar; Franck, and Rodley, , loc.cit., n.64, p. 287Google Scholar; Meuffels, , op.cit., n.32, p. 141Google Scholar; Slater, J., Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution (New York 1970) p. 203Google Scholar; Thomas, A.v.Wynen and Thomas, A.J., The Dominican Republic Crisis 1965 (New York 1967) pp. 5 et seq.Google Scholar, 40 et seq.

210. The Events in East Pakistan, 1971 (International Commission of Jurists, Geneva 1972) p. 96Google Scholar.

211. Idem p. 79.

212. Cf., for example, Akehurst, , loc.cit., n.80, p. 13Google Scholar; d'Angelo, , loc.cit., n.80, p. 506Google Scholar; Franck and Rodley, loc.cit., n.64; Meuffels, , op.cit., n.32, p. 142Google Scholar; Salzberg, J., ‘UN Prevention of Human Rights Violations: the Bangladesh Case’, 27 International Organization (1973) p. 114 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sornarajah, , loc.cit., n.56, p. 68 et seq.Google Scholar

213. Fonteyne, , loc.cit., n.33, p. 264Google Scholar.

214. Frey-Wouters in Lillich, , op.cit., n.54, p. 107Google Scholar. Cf., also, Franck and Rodley, loc.cit., n.64. Friedmann agreed that the intervention was illegal, but held at the same time that it was ‘morally acceptable’; in Lillich, idem, p. 114.

215. Meuffels, , op.cit., n.32, p. 144Google Scholar; Zacher, , op.cit., n.203, p. 276Google Scholar.

216. Idem.

217. Cf., Manin, , loc.cit., n.52, p. 159 et seq.Google Scholar

218. Notes 1 and 3 supra; and the International Herald Tribune, 4 November 1983.

219. Text supplied by USIS on 3 November 1983.

220. For these and other quotations from, e.g., Prime Ministers Seaga (Jamaica), Eugenia Charles (Dominica), Adams (Barbados), St. Aimee (St. Lucia) and similar quotations from President Reagan, see the International Herald Tribune, 26 October – 6 November 1983.

221. Cf., Fonteyne, , loc.cit., n.33, p. 261Google Scholar.

222. Farer quoted by Franck, and Rodley, , loc.cit., n.64, p. 279Google Scholar; Chimni, B.S., ‘Towards a Third World Approach to Non-intervention: Through the Labyrinth of Western Doctrine’, 20 IJIL (1980) p. 256Google Scholar.

223. Humphrey in Lillich, , op.cit., n.54, p. VIIGoogle Scholar; Skubiszewski, , loc.cit., n.58, p. 759Google Scholar.

224. Flinterman, , loc.cit., n.64, p. 18Google Scholar; Franck, and Rodley, , loc.cit., n.64, p. 304Google Scholar. This aspect, which applies to any form of armed intervention, was considered particularly objectionable by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case: ‘it would be reserved for the most powerful States, and might easily lead to perverting the administration of international justice itself; ICJ Rep. (1949) p. 35. In a paper which will be published shortly, Bowett dismisses this argument, saying that it ‘has the same cogency as the argument that because it is not possible to protect human rights universally, it is not right to protect them anywhere’; Bowett, loc.cit., n.116.

225. Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law (Oxford 1979) p. 565Google Scholar.

226. Franck, and Rodley, , loc.cit., n.64, pp. 279 and 295 et seq.Google Scholar, where they present a number of cases to support their thesis. See also, Bowett, loc.cit., n.116; Fenwick, C.G., “Intervention: Individual and Collective”, 39 AJIL (1945) p. 650CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schwartz, , op.cit., n.41, p. 87Google Scholar.

227. Both quotations from Röling, , loc.cit., n.109, p. 283Google Scholar.

228. Tillema, H.K. and Wingen, J.R. van, ‘Law and Power in Military Intervention’, 26 ISQ (1982) p. 243 et seq.Google Scholar, counted 71 armed interventions between 1946 and 1980 by the USA, UK and France. See, also, Kende, I., ‘Oorlogen vanaf de tweede wereldoorlog’, 11 Transaktie (1982) p. 357Google Scholar, who counted 94 armed interventions between 1945 and 1982.

229. Cf., the analysis of reactions to cases of intervention in UN debates by Fonteyne in Lillich, , op.cit., n.54, pp. 203–218Google Scholar.

230. See Menzel, , opc.cit., n.33, p. 84Google Scholar; Schmelzer, K.R., ‘Soviet and American Attitudes Toward Intervention in the Dominican Republic, Hungary and Czechoslovakia’, 11 VJIL (1970) p. 103Google Scholar; Schultz, L., ‘Die Definition des Aggressionsbegriffs der Vereinten Nationen und die Sowietische Völkerrechtslehre’, 23 Osteuroparecht (1977) p. 14Google Scholar.

231. Cf., Chaumont, C., ‘A Critical Study of American Intervention in Vietnam’, in Falk, R.A., ed., The Vietnam War and International Law (Princeton 1969) p. 145Google Scholar.

232. Franck, and Rodley, , loc.cit., n.64, p. 285 et seq.Google Scholar

233. Franck, T.M., ‘Who Killed Article 2(4)?’, 64 AJIL (1970) p. 824Google Scholar.

234. Alford, N., ‘The Legality of American Military Involvement in Vietnam: a Broader Perspective1, 75 Yale LJ (1966) p. 50CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

235. International Herald Tribune, 4 November 1984.

236. This expression was used by Somalia in relation to the occupation of the Ogaden desert by Ethiopia; Thiele, , loc.cit., n.56, p. 164Google Scholar.

237. Cf., Stone, J., ‘Hopes and Loopholes in the Definition of Aggression’, 71 AJ1L (1977) p. 233 et seq.Google Scholar; Leurdijk, J.H., Interventie in de InternationaleRelaties (Amsterdam 1980) p. 72 et seq.Google Scholar; Rohlik, J., ‘Some Remarks on Self-defense and Intervention; a Reaction to Reading Law and Civil War in the Modern World’, 6 Ga. JICL (1976) p. 398 et seq.Google Scholar; Thiele, , loc.cit., n.56, p. 164Google Scholar.

238. Cf., for example, Fenwick, C.G., ‘Intervention and the Inter-American Rule of Law’, 53 AJIL (1959) p. 873 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Murdock, J.O., ‘Collective Security Distinguished from Intervention’, 56 AJIL (1962) p. 503 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Thomas, A.J., ‘The OAS and Subversive Intervention’, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (1961) p. 19 et seq.Google Scholar

239. Glahn, von, op.cit., n.33, p. 167Google Scholar.

240. Rougier, , loc.cit., n.60, p. 509 et seq.Google Scholar; Perez-Vera, , loc.cit., n.60, p. 405 et seq.Google Scholar

241. Cf., Stone, text at n.184 supra.

242. Lawrence quoted by Ganji, , op.cit., n.57, p. 43Google Scholar.

243. Friedmann in Lillich, , op.cit., n.54, p. 114Google Scholar.

244. Bogen, , loc.cit., n.209, p. 303Google Scholar.

245. Quoted by Anand, , op.cit., n.140, pp. 55, 56Google Scholar.

246. Fonteyne, , loc.cit., n.33, pp. 249–50Google Scholar.

247. Cf., for example, idem, pp. 254, 261 et seq.; d'Angelo, , loc.cit., n.80, p. 497Google Scholar; Brownlie, , loc.cit., in ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, n.54, p. 225Google Scholar; Flinterman, , loc.cit., n.64, pp. 16–17Google Scholar, Lillich, , loc.cit., n.97, p. 248Google Scholar; Meuffels, , op.cit., n.32, pp. 145–6Google Scholar; Moore, , loc.cit., n.31, p. 264Google Scholar; Reisman, , loc.cit., n.154, p. 193Google Scholar; De Schutter, B., De rol van de Verenigde Naties in humanitaire intervenlies (Brussels 1972) pp. 444–5Google Scholar. See also the conditions of legality suggested for adoption by the UN at the end of the present study.

248. Cf., Röling, , loc.cit., n.109, p. 289Google Scholar.

249. T.J. Farer, ‘Harnessing Rogue Elephants: a Short Discourse on Intervention in Civil Strife’, in Falk, , op.cit., n.231, p. 152Google Scholar.

250. Frey-Wouters in Lillich, , op.cit., n.54, p. 107Google Scholar.

251. Idem, pp. 107–8.

252. See n. 243 supra.

253. Falk, , loc.cit., n.133, p. 431 note 39Google Scholar.

254. Idem, pp. 430–1 (italics added).

255. Bos, M., A Methodology of International Law (Amsterdam 1984) pp. 3 et seq.Google Scholar, 11 et seq. In this recently published book, Bos outlines a methodology which remarkably enlightens the legal functioning of the category of general legal principles to which the principle of necessity belongs.

256. Cf., Report of the ILC on the work of its thirty-second session, GAOR 35th Session, Supp. No. 10 (A/35/10) pp. 69–111. Quotations are from pp. 72, 92–3, 102–3, 104.

257. Draft Art. 33 is entitled ‘State of necessity’ and reads:

‘1. A state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act of that State not in conformity with an international obligation of the State unless:

(a) the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the State against a grave and imminent peril; and

(b) the act did not seriously impair an essential interest of the State towards which the obligation existed.

2. In any case, a state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness:

(a) if the international obligation with which the act of the State is not in conformity arises out of a peremptory norm of general international law; or

(b) if the international obligation with which the act of the State is not in conformity is laid down by a treaty which, explicitly or implicitly, excludes the possibility of invoking the state of necessity with respect to that obligation; or

(c) if the State in question has contributed to the occurrence of the state of necessity’

258. ILC Report n. 256 supra, pp. 92–3, 102–3 (italics added).

259. Fawcett, in Lillich, , op.cit., n.54, p. 164Google Scholar.

260. Cf., Verwey, , loc.cit., n.17, p. 135Google Scholar.

261. ILC Report n. 256 supra, pp. 105–6.

262. Idem, quotations are from pp. 91–3, 94–5, 107, 108 (italics added).

263. The question, often dealt with by authors, whether and under what circumstances it might be preferable to opt for multilateral, instead of unilateral, intervention by States, is not discussed here. After all, if a general agreement was reached on the conditions of legality of a humanitarian intervention stricto sensu and the intervenor would be under an obligation to justify himself before the United Nations — as is suggested here — it would not really matter whether or not States intervene individually or collectively. As long as such agreement has not been reached, furthermore, invasions like those in the Dominican Republic, Czechoslovakia, or Grenada show that it makes absolutely no difference whether intervening Powers act alone or under the banner of a regional organization.

264. This important condition is in line with both the approach chosen in GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), on ‘Definition of Aggression’, which entitles the Security Council — and not individual States — to ‘conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances’ (Art. 2); and the demand of the ILC ‘that the State invoking the state of necessity is not and should not be the sole judge of the existence of the necessary conditions in the particular case concerned’ (ILC, n. 256 supra, p. 107).

265. Franck, and Rodley, , loc.cit., n.64, p. 300Google Scholar.