One of the controversial questions in the area of human rights has been that concerning the status of economic, social and cultural rights; and while the entry into force of the two Covenants in 1976 may be considered as conclusively establishing the status of these rights under international law some dissent on the matter continues to be expressed. Much of the debate on this issue has centered on the question whether economic, social and cultural rights are “true” rights or “legal” rights of individuals; and the fact that liberal Western philosophy and socialist philosophy give different answers to this question has inevitably invested the issue with ideological and political rivalry and prestige. In part, the heavy emphasis upon producing legal documents, such as resolutions, declarations and conventions has obviously contributed to the above preoccupation. That emphasis is understandable up to a point because the rule of law is clearly the most reliable way of protecting, or redressing the violation of, human rights, and the international instruments seek to strengthen the rule of law within states. Nonetheless, this preoccupation has perhaps contributed to the restriction of attention to legal factors, to the consequent neglect of the social context within which the rule of law inevitably has to be established. The unhappy result has been that, excepting the European Convention, human rights treaties have remained largely unimplemented, even by states for whom they have entered into force, and that they are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.

One of the major weaknesses of international law has been the absence of centrally organized machinery to enforce breaches of the law, as well as institutionalized sanctions against suchbreaches. This situation inspired misgivings “in the breasts of legal theorists”, and gave rise to the question whether international law was really law. Hobbes, and Pufendorf, gave a negative answer to the question; and during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Austin, s and his followers, who regard sanction as an indispensable element of a legal norm, adopted the same attitude.

Must pension claims or rights be included in the division of assets constituting part of a “total community of property” (i.e., the matrimonial property, all of which is held jointly by the spouses under the statutory provisions obtaining where no arrangements to the contrary are made at the time of marriage) upon the dissolution of a marriage? This important question was recently answered by the Hoge Raad [Dutch Supreme Court] on 27 November 1981, NJ [Nederlandse Jurisprudentie – Dutch Law Reports] (1982) p. 503. In the case which the Hoge Raad had to consider, the total community of property had been dissolved as a result of a judicial separation. Among the assets contributed to the community by the husband were all the shares in an N.V. (public company), of which he was also the managing director. The N.V. had agreed to grant certain pension rights to the husband in his capacity as managing director. These rights consisted of: (a) an old age pension of Dfl. 8,000 per annum (with a widow's pension of Dfl. 5,600 per annum), commencing when the husband attained the age of 60 (1 May 1974) and ending on the date he reached the age of 65 (1 May 1979); to provide for the pension, which the N.V. retained under its own management, a sum of Dfl. 104,000 was allocated to reserves on 31 December 1970; (b) an old age pension of Dfl. 16,430 per annum (with a widow's pension of Dfl. 8,230 per annum) commencing on the date the husband attained the age of 65 (1 May 1979); this pension was built up from 1950 onwards and was substantially increased on 1 April 1979, when it was also transferred to a life assurance company.

On a good number of occasions in recent years, strong feelings have been aroused in the Netherlands, particularly in political circles in the seat of government in The Hague, by two agreements which have been described as gentlemen's agreements. Both agreements involve the Dutch Government, the first being between the State on the one hand and two oil companies, Shell and Esso, on the other regarding investments to be made for the benefit of the Netherlands in the period 1980 to 1984, and the second being between the State (in this case the Ministry of Finance) on the one hand and the joint banks on the other allowing the tax authorities to have only limited rights to inspect the particulars of third parties at the banks.