The 1971 Constitutional Amendments (Amendments XX-XLII) gave far-reaching legislative competence to the six republics and two autonomous provinces that form the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This line of development has been confirmed by the 1974 Federal Constitution and the Constitutions of the republics and of the autonomous provinces, enacted the same year. Article 281 of the new Federal Constitution enumerates the remaining federal legislative competence. In doing so, it reserves substantial powers in the area of contracts and property, but it leaves barely any room for federal intervention in the area of family law and succession. Outside the realm of legal relationships that are —in the event that they contain a foreign element— traditionally settled by the rules of Private International Law, under the new constitutions in Yugoslavia a diversity of legislations and accordingly conflicts of laws are possible in the area of taxation, social security, criminal law, some administrative matters such as identity cards, academic degrees, bar examinations, etc.

The Diplomatic Conference on the Unification of Law Governing the International Sale of Goods (The Hague, 2–25 April, 1964) has drawn up two conventions: the Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, with one annex, and the Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, with two annexes. Twenty-eight States were represented at the Conference. Intergovernmental organizations and the International Chamber of Commerce were represented as observers.

The report is divided into five sections. The first deals with the nature of fundamental rights in general. Both the classical rights of freedom and the social fundamental rights spring from a particular social situation against the background of a particular way of thinking. Positive law never develops accidentally. It develops because circumstances call for it. The same applies to the development of fundamental rights. They never develop by accident. Their materialisation is never the outcome of an arbitrary act. They develop when and where human freedom calls for special protection.

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has a ‘historic role’ as ‘the first comprehensive international human rights instrument to be legally binding on States parties’.

Mr. Smirnov (USSR) at the 1987th meeting of the Economic and Social Council.

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 1966, entered into force on 3 January 1976, three months after the deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification, as provided for in article 27 of the Covenant. The event has been described as “an historic event and a signal achievement of the United Nations”. The Covenant has to date been ratified or adhered to by the following 39 States: Australia, Barbados, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus; Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mongolia, Norway, Philippines, Romania, Rwanda, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yugoslavia.

In 1960 A.J.P. Tammes and D.J. Veegens presented reports on the Convention. Since that date some comprehensive studies have appeared, notably those of Van Emde Boas and Meuwissen. The present report builds on these publications and, therefore, does not deal with the Convention's origins and early years, but concentrates on the last decade.

The current transformation process of the American conflict of laws system from a traditional “hard-and-fast” body of jurisdiction-selecting rules to a modern method of functional analysis has raised a widespread wave of interested, diverse and, more often than not, critical reactions. Criticism to the new approach is particularly strong outside the United States and especially in the civil law countries where a certain number of established scholars tend to reject the functional methods as a rudely disguised way of always applying the forum law. Be that as it may –and a closer first hand examination of its doctrinal and jurisprudential sources may discover that the functional analysis is indeed an intelligent and sophisticated method of dealing with choice of laws problems—the fact is that American courts are increasingly applying the language and the substance of the new approach to solve both interstate and international conflicts. The following selective examination of some of these latter cases permits us to illustrate how the functional analysis actually works in practice and to evaluate to what extent this new approach might also be operative as a method of solving international conflict of laws.

When on 3 October 1957 the Russian astronaut Gagarin was launched into outer space and when twelve years later on 20 July 1969 the American astronauts Armstrong and Aldrin landed on the Moon, the enthusiasm of the world population for these two events was enormous.

Themis is blind. The law is the same for wealthy and poor alike. Access to the court is open to all equally. The standard used applies to all equally. Fine ethical postulates, but not free of magniloquence. The law is for sale at a price, and a high price. In the field of law the asking of a price also produces inequality. For some time now the Dutch legislator has attempted to eliminate this discrimination by the use of aids. The person of nil assets who wishes to assert his rights or to defend them deserves support, at least financial support. However, this activity of the legislator has not remained free from scepticism and criticism. Dutch nationals have the right to support, thus, not litigants in general. In various legal provisions aliens, in principle, are excluded from that right. In various places in civil procedural law aliens are discriminated against -albeit financial discrimination. The core of the argument expounded below lies in two of those places: where in principle persons are excluded from free legal assistance (whether in or out of court); and where in principle they are excluded from cost free access to the courts.

Bellekom: The speaker referred to the two pillars of the conception of Meuwissen: 1. fundamental freedoms contain a constitutive element; they do not say only what is, but also what ought to be: 2. fundamental freedoms are an expression of values. The latter element can also be found in German literature, where the Constitution (containing within it fundamental freedoms and human rights) is referred to as a “Wertordnung” (order of values). Fundamental freedoms are, according to that theory, values, along with others, that can be brought to bear in a concrete case. The danger of this idea is that this “Wertordnung” will amount to an order of vested interests, one that preserves existing social-economic structures and limits the possibilities for minorities. In order to show that this danger is not an imaginary one, he referred to matters such as the “Berufsverbot” (exclusion from public service) and the exclusion of lawyers from- the defence in Germany. In those very cases an appeal was made, by way of justifying those practices, to the “freiheitlich-demokratische” (liberal-democratic) value of the Constitution, a value that is assumed to be a basic element of the Constitution, a value that outweighs even fundamental rights such as equal eligibility for the public service and the right to defend oneself through legal assistance of one's own choice.

The international transportation trade ought to know of the recent unique judgment of the Supreme Court of Japan rendered, on the problem of exclusive jurisdiction, upon a claim arising from a shipment covered by a Bill of Lading (B/L) issued by a Dutch shipowner, Koninklijke Java-China Paketvaart Lijnen, N.V. (hereafter referred to as Royal Interocean). Nanyo Bussan, Inc. a Japanese import corporation, bought 21,478 bags of raw sugar from a Brazilian exporter who shipped the sugar on the motor vessel “Tjisadane” owned by Royal Interocean from Santos, Brazil to Osaka, Japan. On arrival of the “Tjisadane” at Osaka, it was found that 814 bags of raw sugar were sea-damaged. So the Tokyo Marine Fire Insurance Co., Ltd., the insurer, paid Nanyo Bussan the amount of ¥ 1,376,180 insured under the marine insurance policy. Thereafter, on 28 February 1959 the Insurance Company filed a suit against Royal interocean with the Kobe District Court where the latter's branch office is situated claiming for recovery of the insured amount by legal subrogation to the importer Nanyo Bussan to whom it had been paid. Now, there is a clause on the reverse side of the Bill of Lading that reads: “All actions under this contract of carriage shall be brought before the Court at Amsterdam, and no other court shall have jurisdiction with regard to any other action unless the carrier appeals to another jurisdiction or voluntarily submits himself thereto.” Royal Interocean invoked the application of this jurisdiction clause and pleaded that the Amsterdam Court was solely competent to try the case to the exclusion of the Kobe District Court. The Kobe District Court, after several years of deliberation, rendered judgment on 18 July 1963 in favour of Royal Interocean and dismissed the action of the Insurance Company on the sole ground that it had no jurisdiction over the case and that the Amsterdam Court was competent. The Insurance Company then appealed to the Osaka High Court, which likewise took several years of deliberation and, finally, on 15 December 1969 rendered judgment in favour of Royal Interocean dismissing the appeal on the sole ground of lack of competence in the case. The Insurance Company then re-appealed to the Supreme Court from the judgment of the Osaka High Court.

First of all, I should like to thank you all, in particular the Director of your Institute, Dr. Voskuil, and the Head of its Public International Law Department, Dr. Ko Swan Sik, for your kind invitation to attend this meeting. In the fact that you have given me this opportunity to talk about some of the fundamental questions relating to the socialist views on international law I see not only a proof of your interest in the subject, but also a task and a duty for me to make a modest contribution, by exchanging our views, towards a better mutual understanding of our attitudes to fundamental political and legal problems that are the subject of international discussion to-day.

The purpose of this lecture is to identify and investigate two things: (1) the centre of the intellectual activity described in its title as the defining and development of international law, and (2) the fundamental concept around which both defining and development revolve. The centre as indicated will be found to consist of (representatives of) what is to be called the three “legal archetypes”. The fundamental concept alluded to is the “normative concept of law”. The two notions are, of course, highly abstract as compared to the realities they are designed to help understand. They will be set forth as clearly as possible within the strict limits of this lecture, although it is realized that a truly satisfactory treatment cannot be imagined outside a full-size methodology. An apology beforehand is, therefore, in place. One particular question relating to the normative concept of law in international relations will be dealt with in some detail: it has to do with “tragedy in law” as resulting from the clash between competing normative concepts. As a final observation, the need for a maximum degree of flexibility in the international lawyer's way of thought will be stressed.