In contrast with the vast specialized literature on the application of the rule of exhaustion of local remedies in contemporary experiments on the international protection of human rights, comparatively very little has been written on the place of the local remedies rules in earlier international law experiments granting procedural status to individuals. It may in fact be asked to what extent was the application of the local redress rule in those earlier experiments taken into due account by the draftsmen of present-day human rights instruments and procedures. The present study purports to examine the multiplicity of solutions given to the problem of exhaustion of local remedies in international experiments in the first half of the twentieth century.

“International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.”

“Power” is one of the most central concepts in politics. For many years political scientists and sociologists have debated the term and tried to agree on its precise content. In a recent study about economic power concentrations in the Netherlands, Mokken and Stokman and their collaborators surveyed the theoretical position of the concepts “power” and “influence”. Most of the theoretical debates are held within the confines of American political science. A number of contributions in a recent issue of The American Political Science Review show that these debates have not yet come to an end. Most of these debates concern “community power”, that is power as it manifests itself within local communities. The most important contributions to this debate have been made by American and British political scientists.

The scientific investigation of the ocean has only relatively recently become an area of concern to the international law of the sea. Until not very long ago, marine scientists had retained a freedom of movement within the natural environment they studied which their colleagues on land had already lost some time before. Ocean scientists had little difficulty in collecting their data and samples and making their observations when and where they wished. Maritime boundaries did not constitute a barrier to their mobility. The geographical extent of coastal State jurisdiction was generally very limited, and when investigations were to be conducted in the territorial sea or internal waters of a foreign State permission was readily obtained. It was even not unusual for the scientists involved only to notify the government having jurisdiction informally; the notification often being made through their scientific colleagues in the nation concerned. Beyond the narrow territorial sea oceanographic research could be carried out unimpeded under the principle of the freedom of the high seas.

1. The structure of the United Nations system was established at San Francisco in 1945 and laid down in Chapters IX and X of the UN Charter. Articles 57, 58 and 63 provide the legal basis for co-ordination in the UN system. According to Art. 57 the various specialized agencies “shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations”. Art. 58 states that the UN shall make recommendations for the co-ordination of the policies and activities of the specialized agencies. Art. 63 assigns the primary co-ordination responsibility to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

The recent Tenerife aircrash of March 1977 involves a variety of multistate issues. The Dutch lawyer, if unable to obtain a satisfactory settlement for his client, may contemplate undertaking action in the U.S.A. He will then be confronted with such questions as against whom he can bring proceedings, under the jurisdiction of which court, what the procedure will be, and which state or national law will apply. He will also be required to know who may bring an action, who may ultimately benefit from it and what items may be included to determine the amount of damages.

Law, in the present writer's conception of it, is a product of thought having for its basis certain factual and moral elements to which certain principles of rational organization have been applied. “Rational” organization being organization directed by “reason”, it should first be made clear what is the connotation of “reason” that will be followed here.

1. It was over a year ago that the Editors of this periodical asked me for a contribution giving some account of Dutch international law regarding matrimonial property. What prompted that request was the forthcoming 13th Session of The Hague Conference on Private International Law, which was to be held in October 1976. There reigned great uncertainty in Dutch international law regarding the answer which should be given to the famosissima quaestio as to what law the joint matrimonial property regime will be subject when prospective spouses do not possess the same nationality. In the reports submitted to the Royal Fraternity of Notaries in 1969, Dubbink had defended the position that the national law of the husband still prevailed, whereas the other pre-adviseur, namely myself, expressed a preference for the law of the place of domicile of the future spouses or, in the event of their not living in the same country, the law of the first matrimonial domicile. As the Hoge Raad was expected shortly to deliver judgment in a case in which the spouses differed in nationality, I had suggested waiting for that ruling. This judgment was not given until 10 December 1976. Meanwhile, however, the 13th Session of The Hague Conference had taken place, so that the occasion for the writing of the article was no more. The Editors nevertheless considered that their request could be maintained. I am happy now to furnish my contribution, because both the judgment of the Hoge Raad and the Convention adopted in 1976 by the Hague Conference on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property Régimes have evinced important new points of view, including more especially the premise of the future spouses' free choice of law. The Dutch international law of matrimonial property needs to be re-written, but that is far beyond the ambitions of the present article. After describing and analysing the caselaw of the Hoge Raad I will simply endeavour to give a succinct description of the present state of this law. In so doing I will also refer as appropriate to the recently adopted Hague Convention.

1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly

“as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction”.

At the present time, the world commodity trade is primarily carried by ships. Merchant fleet and fishing vessels of 10,000 gross tonnage of more than thirty nations sail in and out of the port areas throughout the world carrying passengers and cargoes including inflammable gas and pollutant chemicals. The rapidly increasing intensity of traffic, the size of vessels, the speed of container and other ships, the growing danger of collision, loss of life and pollution underscores an important need for improved maritime communication.

The theme chosen by the T.M.C. Asser Institute for today's symposium reads “Legal aspects of a projected new international economic order”, In my opinion this is a courageous choice. As far as I know, the Institute has in the past always chosen topics that permitted unequivocal definition. It is not immediately obvious that such is the case with our present subject. In my view a more democratic and equitable international economic order than the present one would be highly desirable. But it is one thing to express such a preference. A different thing althogether is to assume that “a new international economic order” as a concept is already part of social reality and is, therefore, suitable for legal discussion. To me personally, this assumption would appear to be as yet premature. However, the particularization in our theme of the new international economic order as a “projected” one puts things in a different light, for this must mean that we have to envisage our new international economic order in terms of three important resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly taken in 1974.1 am referring to the Declaration and the Programme of Action concerning the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and to the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. All three resolutions having been adopted by “consensus” of the General Assembly, the question arises as to what legal significance can be attributed to them.

The humble contribution of this writer to the Festschrift in honour of Professor A.J.P. Tammes relates to a study of the status and norms of the principle of self-determination in contemporary international law. There has been a prolonged controversy on the issue: some consider that the principle now enjoys the status of a legal right with corresponding obligations while others attribute only a moral status to the principle without any binding legal effect. By way of illustration of the nature of the controversy one can refer to the views of Rosalyn Higgins on the one hand and of Leo Gross, L.C. Green and Rupert Emerson on the other. According to Rosalyn Higgins, the main question is not whether the General Assembly resolutions have any binding effect but whether the practice of States (which she finds unanimous and consistent) revealed by the cumulative effect of such resolutions indicates the emergence of new norms or rules of customary international law. Dr. Higgins considers that the conclusion is inescapable that self-determination has developed into an international legal right. To Professor Leo Gross, the practice of decolonization (which he finds neither constant nor uniform) is a matter of political expediency, not based on a sense of legal obligation. Hence, subsequent practice as an element of interpretation does not support the theory that the principle of self-determination has acquired the status of a legal right or that human rights provisions could be interpreted as rights with corresponding obligations either generally or specifically with respect to the right to self-determination. Rupert Emerson considers it a relevant factor that the colonial Powers and a number of States supporting them have not accepted the basic principle that colonization is illegitimate nor the corollary proposition that the colonial peoples are entitled to as speedy as possible an exercise of their right to self-determination. After pointing out that there is still no right of self-determination in positive international law, Professor Green has conceded that since 1966 (when by Resolution 2200 (xxi) of 16 December 1966 both the Covenants on Human Rights were adopted by the General Assembly), such a right may be one in nascendi and may mature into a legal right in future as and when such non-binding instruments come into force; such a right can never operate retroactively, particularly because no attempt has been made to clarify what is meant by the “peoples” who are supposed to enjoy the right.

The codification of international law concerning the non-self-governing territories has proceeded through three distinct phases in this century. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations contained the notion that the well-being and the development of dependent peoples was the sacred trust of civilization. This concept legally applied only to the mandated territories, but in fact embodied the then current philosophy of the colonial powers. It implied that the territories should not be exploited for the benefit of the administering authorities; it was, however, a fairly static view, which did not even indicate to what end the “development” was to lead.

Outline:***

1. Some indications on the research project of the Universities of Utrecht and Leyden on international economic organisations and legal issues of a new international economic order

2. Some legal characteristics of the existing international economic order

3. What should be new in a new international economic order?

4. The impact of the principle of State sovereignty on a new international economic order

5. Three final remarks

Twenty years ago, when I presented my thesis on “The position of members of resistance movements under international law” at a public graduation ceremony in the Amsterdam University auditorium, Professor Tammes was my Promotor. For many years he had watched with interest over the progress of the thesis and had helped me, in our frequent exchanges of views, to deal with the difficulties and uncertainties of this part of international law. Bearing in mind the resistance movements of World War II, the subject seemed to be of more than merely theoretical importance, though it did offer important theoretical aspects, as will appear from the following pages.

The current discussions on establishing a so-called New International Economic Order (NIEO) have their origin no doubt in both the poor performance of the first UN Development Decade and the profound changes — apparent since the early seventies — in world political and economic relations.

In many countries, including our own, the question whether there should be a right to strike, and, if so, to what extent, and with what restrictions, has been and still is hotly debated. There remain few countries where strikes are absolutely prohibited. On the other hand there are also few countries where the right to strike is an inalienable right vested in the constitution. The legislator can adopt various attitudes towards the strike by making a strike a criminal offence, by granting the liberty to strike or the right to strike. In most countries the second attitude prevails; strikes are considered a fairly normal phenomenon though not guaranteed as a right. The method of assesment of the possible illegality of strikes, and the sanctions imposed on workers or trade unions, vary greatly.

I was indeed intrigued by the previous speaker's comments and also by the excellent and very thorough and very provocative presentation this morning. As Prof. VerLoren van Themaat knows from previous discussions with me, there are many things in what he says that I do not agree with, and I suspect that one of the reasons for my being here relates to that. To a certain extent I'd like to follow up on the analogy that was made at the outset of this morning. It seems to me that we are dealing with the sextet that is playing a piece of music, which I would characterize perhaps as a concerto, because there is an interplay between two parts of this sextet, namely, the legal scholarship if you will and the economic principles or scholarship. I have not concluded in my own mind which plays the solo-part and which the background-part?

The submission to the United Nations International Law Commission of the second Report on Succession of States in respect of matters other than treaties by the Special Rapporteur, M. Bedjaoui, has aroused marked turbulence in the otherwise serene deliberations of the Commission. This commotion may be partly due to the methods used by the Special Rapporteur in fulfilling the task assigned to him by the Commission, but it is also due, at least in part, to the subject dealt with, viz. the status of ‘acquired rights’ in cases of state-succession. In reading the proceedings, one is struck by the courteousness of Professor Tammes's remarks, which nonetheless leave no doubt as to the position he held in the discussion.

The present time might not seem to be a very propitious one to discuss international monetary relations with the object of obtaining new insights as to how to achieve a New International Economic Order. A stream of articles and pamphlets has been published or is forthcoming with titles such as: An International Monetary Nonsystem, Alternatives to Monetary Disorder. The Failure of Monetary Reform. This by itself is an indication that all is not well in the esoteric world of international finance.