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“Primary” and “secondary” rules in the law of State responsibility categorizing international obligations*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2009

J. Combacau  and
D. Alland
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Extract

The obstacles facing the Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission in drawing up a draft on the “content, forms and degrees of international responsibility” arise mainly out of the absence in the first part of the draft of any real theory of international delict introducing into this general concept criteria for differentiation which would enable more restricted categories to be distinguished. Once it is admitted that responsibility (defined in the abstract as the emergence of new legal relations between the wrongdoer on the one hand, and his victim or third parties on the other) can take a variety of forms, covers a broad spectrum and involves different subjects according to the legal causes which gave rise to it, then we can no longer avoid analyzing those causes. The internationally wrongful act, defined as the violation by a State of an international obligation, ceases to be the homogeneous legal concept of the first part of the draft adopted on first reading by the International Law Commission, but instead breaks down into a multiplicity of acts.

Type
Symposium on State Responsibility and Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law
Information
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law , Volume 16 , December 1985 , pp. 81 - 109
Copyright
Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 1985

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References

1. See Willem Riphagen, Reports Nos. 1 (Preliminary Report) to 5: A/CN.4/330 (1980), 344 (1981), 354 & Add. 1–2 (1982), 366 & Add. 1 (1983), 380 & Corr. 1 (1984); all are reproduced in vols. 2 part 1 of the Yearbook of the International Law Commission.

2. 2nd Report Ago, A/CN.4/233, paras. 12–30 (ILC Yearbook 1970 vol. 2); 3rd Report Ago, A/CN.4/246 & Add. 1–3, para. 43; (id. 1971 vol. 2 part 1; see also Prel. Rep. Riphagen, supra n. 1, para. 11.

3. See 1st Report Ago, A/CN.4/277 & Add. 1, paras. 41–76 (ILC Yearbook 1969 vol. 2) and his Note A/CN.4/196 (id. 1967 vol. 2), with references to Garcia-Amador's reports.

4. 5th Report Ago, A/CN.4/291 & Add. 1–2, paras. 72–155 (ILC Yearbook 1976 vol. 2 part 1); debates in the ILC at the 28th session, meetings 1371–1376, 1402, 1412–1413 (id. 1976 vol. 1); ILC's Report on 28th session, A/31/10, Commentary on Art. 19 (id.1976 vol. 2 part 2). See also debates in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, 29th session, agenda item 87, meetings 1484–1486, report A/9897, paras. 109–111, and 30th session, agenda item 108, meetings 1534–1535, 1538–1550, report A/10393, paras. 26–28. And, on this very important question, comments of governments, especially Canada (para. 5), Chile (para. 24), Mali (para. 2), Yugoslavia, Byelorussia, USSR: A/CN.4/328 & Add. 1–4 (id. 1980 vol. 2 part 1). Other authors and references quoted infra, n.20.

5. 5th Report Ago, paras. 12–36 loc.cit., n.4; ILC's Report on 28th session, ibid., commentary on Art. 17.

6. 6th Report Ago, A/CN.4/302 & Add. 1–3, paras. 1–13 and 14–46 (ILC Yearbook 1977 vol. 2 part 1), ILC's Report on 29th session, A/32/10, Commentary on Art. 20 and 21 (id. 1977 vol. 2 part 2). See Combacau, J., “Obligations de résultat et obligations de comportement: quelques questions et pas de réponse”, Mélanges offerts à Paul Reuter — Le droit international: unité et diversité (Paris 1981) pp. 181–204.Google Scholar

7. On this traditional conception, see, inter alia: Personaz, J., La réparation du préjudice en droit international public (Paris 1938)Google Scholar; Reitzer, L., La réparation comme conséquence de l'acte illicite en droit international (Paris 1938)Google Scholar; Bollecker-Stern, B., Le préjudice dans la théorie de la responsabilité internationale (Paris 1973)Google Scholar; Gomez-Robledo, A., “Aspectos de la reparación en derecho internacional”, 9 Boletin mexicano de derecho comparado (1976) pp. 349–375Google Scholar; Mann, F.A., “The consequences of an international wrong in international and national law”, 48 BYIL (1976-1977) pp. 1–65Google Scholar; Reuter, P., “Le dommage comme condition de la responsabilité internationale”, Estudios de derecho internacional — Homenaje al profesor Miaja de la Muela, vol. 2 (Madrid 1979) pp. 837–846Google Scholar. Also 6th Report Garcia-Amador, A/CN.4/134 & Add. 1 (ILC Year-book 1961 vol. 2).

8. See 4th Report Riphagen, loc.cit., n.1 paras. 3–11.

9. Ibid., para. 12; and, on the particular characterization of a breach as a “crime”, 5th Report Ago, loc.cit., n.4 para. 79.

10. This way of grouping and differentiating obligations according to their content may be found in municipal law. See, e.g., Mazeaud, H., “Essai de classification des obligations: obligations contractuelles et extra-contractuelles, obligations déterminées et obligation générate de prudence et diligence”, Rev. trim. dr. civil (1936) pp. 1–58Google Scholar; Esmein, P., “Remarques sur de nouvelles classifications des obligations”, Etudes de droit civil à la mémoire de Henri Capitant (Paris 1939) pp. 235–240Google Scholar; and the other references quoted in J. Combacau, op.cit., n.6 p. 193.

11. Prel. Report Riphagen, loc.cit., n.1 para. 32.

12. 3rd Report Riphagen, loc.cit., n.1 para. 107 et seq., and para. 36 et seq., - the distinction between “sub-systems” refers to the function of the rules.

13. 5th Report Ago, loc.cit., n.4 para. 72.

14. See Report of the Sub-Comittee appointed by the ILC in 1962, A/CN.4/152 (ILC Yearbook 1963 vol. 2 p. 227), reproduced in Note Ago, A/CN.4/196 (id. 1967 vol. 2 p. 325).

15. See Prel. Report Riphagen, loc.cit., n.1 paras. 81–82.

16. 3rd Report Riphagen, loc.cit., n.1 paras. 54–57 and 72; see also the proposed Art. 3 in this report, and its commentary in para. 147.

17. 2nd Report Riphagen, loc.cit., n.1 para. 164: proposed Art. 2, and the references therein.

18. Ibid. The origin of this expression is to be found in the judgment of the International Court of Justice, in the case concerning United States diplomatic and consular staff in Tehran, ICJ Rep. (1980) p. 3 para. 86.

19. 4th Report Riphagen, loc.cit., n.1 (Add. 1) para. 53 et seq.

20. See references quoted supra n.4, and, in addition: Dupuy, P.M., “Action publique et crime international de l'Etat: à propos de l'article 19 du projet de la Commission du droit international sur la responsabilité des Etats”, 25 AFDI (1979) pp. 539-54CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “Observations sur le crime international de l'Etat”, 84 RGDIP (1980) pp. 449-86Google Scholar; Gounelle, M., “Quelques remarques sur la notion de ‘crime international’ et sur l'évolution de la responsabilité international de l'Etat”, Mélanges offerts à Paul Reuter, op.cit., n. 6 pp. 315–26.Google Scholar

21. Not later than 1967: see Note Ago loc.cit., n.14, and the Report reproduced therein.

22. See supra, n.6.

23. See, inter alia, “Responsibility of states for injuries to aliens”, Restatement of the Law second, Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Washington 1965) pp. 497–633Google Scholar; Przetacznik, F., “International responsibility of the state for failure to afford the special protection for foreign officials”, 52 Rev. dr. int. et sc. diplom. (1974) pp. 310-26Google Scholar and 53 id. (1975) pp. 29–49; Dupuy, P.M., “Due diligence in the international law of liability”, in Legal aspects of transfrontier pollution (OECD 1977) pp. 369–379Google Scholar; Dominicé, C., “Représailles et droit diplomatique”, Recht als Prozess und Gefüge - Festschrift für Hans Huber (Bern 1981) pp. 541-52.Google Scholar

24. United States diplomatic and consular staff in Tehran, Judgment, ICJ Rep. (1980) p. 3, especially para. 69 (‘second phase of the events’): the Iranian Government's “plain duty was at once to make every effort, and to take every appropriate step, to bring these flagrant infringements (…) to a speedy end, to restore (…), and in general to re-establish the status quo [and to offer reparation for the damage]”.

25. Simma, B., “Reflections on Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and its background in general international law”, 20 Öesterreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (1970) pp. 5–83Google Scholar; see also the commentary on Art. 30 of the first part of the ILC draft, in ILC's Report on 31st session, A/34/10 (ILC Yearbook 1979 vol. 2 part 2).

26. See supra, n.5.

27. Such as those slated in the Nuclear Test cases, ICJ Rep. (1974) p. 253 and 457.

28. E.g., Vienna Convention (1969) Art. 60 para. 5.

29. United States diplomatic and consular staff in Tehran, ICJ Rep. (1980) at para. 91; see Dominicé, loc.cit., n.23 p. 552.

30. Even if, in practice, such a consequence might turn out to be incompatible with the sensitivity of the sovereign State. A State which has carried out an unlawful nationalization (discriminatory, or without indemnity) will in most cases not de-nationalize (see, 3.3.1.2); but contra, the arbitral award in Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Government of the Arab Republic of Libya, 19 January 1977, para. 92 et seq. (English text in 17 ILM (1978) p. 3; French text in 104 Clunet (1977) p. 350).

31. See for instance in: Dominicé, “Observations sur les droits de l'Etat victime d'un fait internationalement illicite”, in: Institut des hautes études internationales de Paris, Cours et travaux, Droil international — 2 (Paris 1982) pp. 1–70, at 40 and 44.Google Scholar

32. Case concerning the Air Services Agreement, United States v. France, arbitral award, 9 December 1978, 18 RIAA p. 454; see de La Rochère, J. Dutheil, “L'interprétation de l'accord franco-américain relatif au transport aérien international — changement d'appareil à Londres”, 25 AFDI (1979) pp. 314-37CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Damrosch, L.F., “Retaliation or arbitration — or both? The 1978 United States-France aviation dispute”, 74 AJIL (1980) pp. 785–807.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

33. Arbitral award, 31 July 1928, concerning the responsibility of Germany arising from damage caused in the Portuguese colonies in South Africa (“the Naulilaa case”), 2 RIAA p. 1013 at 1026.

34. Ruiz, J. Iuste, “Las obligaciones ‘erga omnes’ en derecho internacional publico”, Estudios de derecho internacional — Homenaje al profesor Miaja de la Muela, vol. 1 (Madrid 1979) pp. 219-50Google Scholar; Starace, V., “La responsabilité résultant de la violation des obligations à l'égard de la communauté internationalé”, 153 Hague Recueil (1976) pp. 263–317Google Scholar; and supra, n.20.

35. 5th Report Riphagen, loc.cit., n.1, proposed Art. 14 para. 1.

36. Bissonnette, P.A., La satisfaction comme mode de réparation en droit international (Genève 1952)Google Scholar; Dominicé, C., “La satisfaction en droit des gens”, Mélanges Georges Perrin (Lausanne 1984) pp. 91–121.Google Scholar

37. Here lies the difference between these rules and those contained in 3.1.1 supra, where the substitute obligation was still a primary one.

38. See Salmon, J.J.A., “Le fait étatique complexe: une notion contestable”, 28 AFDI (1982) pp. 709-38CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 732, with the examples quoted.

39. Supra, n. 18. See also B. Simma in this volume.

40. On these notions, see Alland, D., “La légitime défense et les contre-mesures dans la codification du droit international de la responsabilité”, 110 Clunet (1983) pp. 728–762 at 741 et seq.Google Scholar

41. Texaco Calasiatic v. Libya (supra, n.30) paras. 97–112.

42. PCIJ ser. A, No. 17 at pp. 47–48. On restitutio in integrum, see Prel. Report Riphagen, loc.cit., n.1 para. 32 et seq.

43. See Cepelka, C., Les conséquences juridiques du délit en droit international contemporain (Prague 1965) at pp. 24-5 and 42–77.Google Scholar

44. See under 3.2.2.

45. The quantitative differentiation which varies the requirements as to the character of the offence (only ‘serious’ or also ‘on a widespread scale’) depends on the subject-matter (in the sense specified in 2.3.1.1) which the rule deals with: for example, according to Art. 19, the environment or human rights.

46. This calling into question might be provisional. Because of the division of work in the ILC (which lead it to assume the existence of two distinct regimes of responsibility before examining the contents of these regimes) States have at times manifested hostility or reticence towards Art. 19. See: A/C.6/31, SR.18 (para. 36), 19 (para. 5), 20 (para. 2), 21 (para. 7), etc.

47. 8th Report Ago, A/CN.4/318 & Add. 1–4 (ILC Yearbook 1979 vol. 2 part 1), especially para. 91; 3rd Report Riphagen, loc.cit., n.1 para. 138 et seq. (and, much earlier, Prel. Report, loc.cit., n. 1, para. 68).

48. See Marek, K., “Criminalizing State responsibility”, 14 RBDI (1978-1979) pp. 460-85Google Scholar; P.M. Dupuy, loc.cit., n. 20.