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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
Robert Barry argues that man's condition in a state of pure nature and man's condition in the state of original sin are one and the same. This article aims to show that this thesis is false and is not the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas. The Angelic Doctor teaches that man in pure nature would be more capable of doing the good proportionate to his nature and would be able to love God above all things with a natural love. Important here is the truth posited by many in the Thomist commentatorial tradition, namely, that on account of sin man is directly averted from his supernatural end and at least indirectly averted from his natural end. Furthermore, this thesis has undesirable consequences, albeit consequences unintended by Barry, for Christology and soteriology. We must understand what pertains to human nature as such if we are to understand the various states in which we find human nature, including in Christ. If a natural analogue to supernatural charity cannot even in principle obtain, charity will be something alien to human nature. Christ came not only to elevate us to supernatural life and divine friendship, but to heal human nature.
1 Barry, Robert, “Original Sin and Pure Nature: What's the Difference, and What Difference Does It Make?” Josephinum Journal of Theology 25 (2018): 1-28,Google Scholar at 1.
2 Robert Barry, “Why Pure Nature is Not Integral, and Why Integral Nature is Not Pure: The Possibility of Garrigou-Lagrange's Hypothesis of an Integral Nature,” paper delivered at 2019 American Maritain Association annual meeting, 8.
3 Long, Steven A., Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 81.Google Scholar
4 This is the very proposition Pope Pius XII wished to affirm in Humani generis no. 26, the denial of which has grave consequences for the gratuity the supernatural order. The fiercest opponent of the doctrine of pure nature in the 20th century was undoubtedly Henri de Lubac, S.J. (1896-1991). It is true that Pius XII does not mention de Lubac by name in Humani generis, nor does he endorse outright the doctrine of pure nature. Nevertheless, as Bernard Mulcahy relates, “Although it did not explicitly refer to de Lubac or explicitly endorse the notion of pure nature, this papal document was sufficiently unfavorable to the critics of modern scholasticism as to leave de Lubac thunderstruck.” Bernard Mulcahy, O.P., Aquinas's Notion of Pure Nature and the Christian Integralism of Henri de Lubac: Not Everything Is Grace (New York: Peter Lang, 2011), 166.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Some have denied the pertinence of Humani generis to the work of de Lubac and have pointed to de Lubac's own later testimony about the encyclical vindicating his position. Mulcahy says of this on the aforementioned page, “This interpretation…does not seem well founded” and goes on to explain why this is the case. For a nuanced take on how de Lubac's works do or do not fall under the condemnation of Humani generis, see Wood, Jacob, To Stir a Restless Heart: Thomas Aquinas and Henri de Lubac on Nature, Grace, and the Natural Desire for God (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2019), 415-418.Google Scholar
5 ST I, q. 75, a. 7, obj. 1 (trans. Laurence Shapcote, O.P. [Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2012]). All texts and translations of St. Thomas's Summa theologiae are taken from this edition unless otherwise indicated. “Videtur quod anima et angelus sint unius speciei. Unumquodque enim ordinatur ad proprium finem per naturam suae speciei, per quam habet inclinationem ad finem. Sed idem est finis animae et angeli, scilicet beatitudo aeterna. Ergo sunt unius speciei.”
6 “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de fine proximo et naturali. Beatitudo autem aeterna est finis ultimus et supernaturalis.”
7 Were it included, there would be a danger of making human beings naturally deific. Lawrence Feingold addresses this issue in the context of Henri de Lubac's thesis of an innate natural desire for supernatural beatitude: “No creature can have the finality of the vision of God ‘inscribed in the depths of its nature’ without also having a participation in the inner life of God imprinted ‘in the depths of its nature,’ which would be to divinize the nature of the creature, or make grace inscribed in its nature.” The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas and His Interpreters, Second Edition (Naples, FL: Sapientia Press, 2010), 442.Google Scholar
8 Quod. I, q. 4, a. 3, resp.: “Sed quia possible fuit Deo ut hominem faceret in puris naturalibus, utile est considerare ad quantum se dilectio naturalis extendere possit.” English translation from Thomas Aquinas's Quodlibetal Questions, trans. Turner Nevitt and Brian Davies (Oxford University Press, 2020).Google Scholar
9 Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald, Grace: Commentary on the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas, Ia IIae, Q. 109-114, trans. The Dominican Nuns of Corpus Christi Monastery (St. Louis: Herder, 1952), 21.Google Scholar
10 See ST I, q. 75, a. 7, ad 1 and Quaestiones de anima, a. 7, ad 10.
11 Barry, “Original Sin and Pure Nature,” 24. See also Barry, “Why Pure Nature is Not Integral,” 10: “What insight does this theological account of man provide for Thomistic philosophy? One is that speculation about the condition of Man in the State of Pure Nature need not remain purely speculative; one can empirically observe and verify what that state might be like just by looking around at the condition of Man in the State of Original Sin.”
12 Barry, “Original Sin and Pure Nature,” 2. He says on the same page, “In this respect, the topic of this article pertains more to the prior debate among scholars that has been eclipsed by the Surnaturel controversy: namely the question of how sanctifying grace relates to original justice.” For a helpful summary of the various positions, see Vollert, Cyril, “Saint Thomas on Sanctifying Grace and Original Justice: A Comparative Study of a Recent Controversy,” Theological Studies 2 (1941): 369-387.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
13 Barry, “Original Sin and Pure Nature,” 10.
14 Garrigou-Lagrange, Grace, 22.
15 See Aquinas, Disp. Q. On the Soul, q. 8, resp.
16 See ST I, q. 97, aa. 1 and 2.
17 In this state, man's reason was subjected to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul. See ST I, q. 95, a. 1.
18 St. Thomas explains that the soul is not entirely subject to matter because it has an immaterial operation of its own. Man is naturally corruptible as regards the nature of his matter left to itself, but not as regards the nature of his form. ST I-II, q. 85, a. 6, resp.: “Et quamvis omnis forma intendat perpetuum esse quantum potest, nulla tamen forma rei corruptibilis potest assequi perpetuitatem sui, praeter animam rationalem, eo quod ipsa non est subiecta omnino materiae corporali, sicut aliae formae; quinimmo habet propriam operationem immaterialem, ut in primo habitum est. Unde ex parte suae formae, naturalior est homini incorruptio quam aliis rebus corruptibilibus. Sed quia et ipsa habet materiam ex contrariis compositam, ex inclinatione materiae sequitur corruptibilitas in toto. Et secundum hoc, homo est naturaliter corruptibilis secundum naturam materiae sibi relictae, sed non secundum naturam formae.”
19 Barry, “Original Sin and Pure Nature,” 14.
20 Ibid., 15.
21 Ibid., 23.
22 White, Thomas Joseph, The Incarnate Lord: A Thomistic Study in Christology (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2017), 135-136,Google Scholar n. 30. He says further in note 32, “Reacting against the position of Suarez, the Dominican tradition tended to affirm that the essential intrinsic dignity of the human being remains after sin, but that because of the absence of an extrinsic principle (the grace of God, which is necessarily extrinsic at least insofar as it is not purely natural), an intrinsic wounding of human nature results, not from a defect in nature itself, but from the absence of grace, for which it was made.”
23 In the appendix that ends his work Grace, “Whether Aversion from the Supernatural End Cannot Exist Without Aversion from the Natural End,” Garrigou-Lagrange mentions these figures as generally answering the question in the affirmative: Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferariensis, Bañez, Alvarez, Lemos, John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Godoy, the Salmanticenses, Billuart, Gotti, and Del Prado.
24 Garrigou-Lagrange, Grace, 504. He says that the conclusions he explicates “are rejected by many only because of insufficient grasp of the foregoing principle.” This is an important principle, therefore, not only for Garrigou-Lagrange but for the Thomist tradition more generally.
25 Ibid., 66. For an application of this principle to a particular question, see Marieb, Raymond E., “The Impeccability of the Angels Regarding Their Natural End,” The Thomist 28 (1964): 409-474.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Marieb argues that angels cannot sin directly and immediately against their natural end. They can, however, sin directly and immediately against their supernatural end and consequently indirectly and mediately against their natural end. He explains his reasoning in this way (pp. 410-411): “By definition, the supernatural order cannot be connatural to any creature. It is this complete lack of proportion between the supernatural order and the creature's natural powers and exigencies that explains the radical peccability of all creatures with respect to that higher order. Obviously, then, any creature can sin directly against the supernatural good. In doing so, however, he necessarily sins against his natural end, but only ex consequenti and indirectly. This is true, as John of St. Thomas explains, because the objects of the natural and supernatural ends are so related that one cannot sin directly against one end without thereby sinning indirectly against the other. To desecrate the Blessed Sacrament is to sin directly against the supernatural order, but it is also contrary to the natural law which commands us to handle sacred things in a sacred manner.” See John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, ed. Solesmensium, vol. IV (Paris: Desclée and Co., 1953), diss. 43, a. 1.Google Scholar
26 Long, Natura Pura, 24.
27 “Respondeo dicendum quod bonum naturae humanae potest tripliciter dici. Primo, ipsa principia naturae, ex quibus natura constituitur, et proprietates ex his causatae, sicut potentiae animae et alia huiusmodi. Secundo, quia homo a natura habet inclinationem ad virtutem, ut supra habitum est, ipsa inclinatio ad virtutem est quoddam bonum naturae. Tertio modo potest dici bonum naturae donum originalis iustitiae, quod fuit in primo homine collatum toti humanae naturae. Primum igitur bonum naturae nec tollitur nec diminuitur per peccatum. Tertium vero bonum naturae totaliter est ablatum per peccatum primi parentis. Sed medium bonum naturae, scilicet ipsa naturalis inclinatio ad virtutem, diminuitur per peccatum. Per actus enim humanos fit quaedam inclinatio ad similes actus, ut supra habitum est. Oportet autem quod ex hoc quod aliquid inclinatur ad unum contrariorum, diminuatur inclinatio eius ad aliud. Unde cum peccatum sit contrarium virtuti, ex hoc ipso quod homo peccat, diminuitur bonum naturae quod est inclinatio ad virtutem.”
28 White, The Incarnate Lord, 141. Speaking of this very text (ST I-II, q. 85, a. 3), Garrigou-Lagrange explains: “[M]an in in the state of fallen nature is born as habitually and directly averse to God, his ultimate and supernatural end, and as indirectly averse to God, his final and natural end. For every sin that is posed directly against the supernatural law is posed indirectly against the natural law which teaches that one ought to be obedient to God. In pure nature, however, there would not be such an aversion, because there would be no sin, and man would be born as capable of a positive turning to God and a turning away from God. Therefore, he would be more apt to turning himself to God than if he were born turned away from God. This aversion thus pertains to the wound of the will, which, as St. Thomas says in I-II, q. 85, a. 3: ‘is deprived of an ordering to the good.’” Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald, De Deo Trino et Creatore, 449-450,Google Scholar as cited in White, The Incarnate Lord, 141, note 42.
29 St. Thomas draws an analogy with bodily sickness, which is a privation if we consider the destruction of the equilibrium of health, but something positive if we consider the humors that are inordinately disposed. “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut aegritudo corporalis habet aliquid de privatione, inquantum tollitur aequalitas sanitatis; et aliquid habet positive, scilicet ipsos humores inordinate dispositos, ita etiam peccatum originale habet privationem originalis iustitiae, et cum hoc inordinatam dispositionem partium animae. Unde non est privatio pura, sed est quidam habitus corruptus.”
30 Garrigou-Lagrange, Grace, 504.
31 Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald, Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought, trans. Patrick Cummins, O.S.B. (Ex Fontibus Co., 2015), 251.Google Scholar
32 ST I-II, q. 109, a. 3, resp.: “Sed in statu naturae corruptae homo ab hoc deficit secundum appetitum voluntatis rationalis, quae propter corruptionem naturae sequitur bonum privatum, nisi sanetur per gratiam Dei.”
33 “Dilectio enim naturalis est quaedam naturalis inclinatio indita naturae a Deo. Nihil autem naturale est perversum. Impossibile est ergo quod aliqua naturalis inclinatio vel dilectio sit perversa: perversa autem dilectio est ut aliquis dilectione amicitiae diligat plus se quam Deum. Non potest ergo talis dilectio esse naturalis.”
34 White, Thomas Joseph O.P., “The ‘Pure Nature’ of Christology: Human Nature and Gaudium et Spes 22,” Nova et Vetera 8 (2010): 283-322.Google Scholar This article is reproduced (with minor additions) in chapter two of The Incarnate Lord, which has been employed elsewhere in this paper.
35 ST I, q. 60, a. 5, resp.: “si naturaliter plus seipsum diligeret quam Deum, sequeretur quod naturalis dilectio esset perversa; et quod non perficeretur per caritatem, sed destrueretur.” St. Thomas refers back to this text in ST I-II, q. 109, a. 3, resp.
36 White, The Incarnate Lord, 139-140.
37 This is the case on account of the infinite ontological distance between them. The supernatural friendship we possess with God (charity) is founded on the communicatio between God and man, inasmuch as God communicates His happiness to us. See ST II-II, q. 23, a. 1, resp. While the term “friendship” has been used throughout the Christian tradition to speak about the relationship that obtains between God and human persons in a state of grace, according to Pierre-Torrell, Jean, “Thomas was the first to formally define charity as friendship.” Torrell, Jean-Pierre, Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas, Thomistic Ressourcement Series, V. 2., trans. Blankenhorn, Bernhard (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 45.Google Scholar He says in another place, “Of all the authors of his time, Thomas is alone in having the boldness to define charity as friendship, that, as a reciprocity of love between God and man founded on God's self-communication when, by grace, he makes man a participant in his own happiness.” Torrell, Jean-Pierre, Aquinas's Summa: Background, Structure, and Reception, trans. Benedict M. Guevin, O.S.B. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 43.Google Scholar
38 Aquinas, Thomas, Commentary on Ephesians, ch. 2, lect. 1, 83 (trans. F.R. Larcher, O.P. and Lamb, M.L., ed. Mortensen, J. and Alarcón, E. [Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2012])Google Scholar: “Et hoc est quod dicit eramus natura, id est per originem naturae, non quidem naturae ut natura est, quia sic bona est et a Deo, sed naturae ut vitiata est, filii irae, id est vindictae, poenae et Gehennae, et hoc sicut et caeteri, id est gentiles.”
39 Billuart, Charles, Summa Sancti Thomae, vol. 3 (Parisiis: apud Victorem Palmé, 1900), diss. 2, art. 3, p. 52Google Scholar: “Homo lapsus privatus fuit justitia originali et aliis donis gratuitis quibus erat vestitus et ornatus, et ideo quantum ad haec nudatus: haec non habuisset homo in natura pura, et ideo quantum ad haec nudus. At homo in statu naturae lapsae est insuper aversus voluntarie et culpabiliter a Deo ut auctore naturali, quails non fuisset in natura pura; unde ex hac parte debet homo lapsus comparari homini in natura pura, non ut nudatus nudo, sed ut vulneratus sano.”
40 White, The Incarnate Lord, 130.
