¹ De prof. in virt. 78D–E; De tranq. an. 472E; De se ipsum laud. 545A; cf. Van der Stockt 1999b.

² Such assimilation to God can be reached through knowledge (De Is. et Os. 351C and 351E; fr. 143) or virtue (De sera num. 550D; Ad princ. iner. 781A; Arist. 6.5).

³ On the E at Delphi, and notably its last section, is often considered as the key source for Plutarch's thinking about God. This view, however, has recently been challenged, and rightly so; see below, §7.

⁴ On Plutarch's view of God, see, e.g., Latzarus 1920; Valgiglio 1988; Ferrari 1995: 231–69 and passim, 1996 (on Platonic question 2), and 2005a; Dillon 2002; Hirsch-Luipold 2005b and 2014; Brenk 2012. Different aspects of his religious thinking are also discussed in García Valdés 1994; Gallo 1996; Frazier and Leão 2010; Van der Stockt et al. 2010; Roig Lanzillotta and Muñoz Gallarte 2012; Hirsch-Luipold and Roig Lanzillotta 2021.

⁵ See, e.g., De Is. et Os. 382A–C and 382F; Ad princ. iner. 781F; see also De Is. et Os. 383A and De def. or. 414E. On De def. or. 413C, see Brouillette 2010.

⁶ His justice is frequently underlined (Pérez Jiménez 2005), as are his kindness and humanity: see De sup. 167F; De Pyth. or. 402A; De sera num. 550F and 551C; Ad princ. iner. 781A.

⁷ De aud. poet. 34A–B; De ad. et am. 63F; De Is. et Os. 369A–B; De an. procr. 1015C; Non posse 1102D–E.

⁸ See Opsomer 1997 and Roskam 2015a.

⁹ Swain 1989b.

¹⁰ Plutarch's choice of words in introducing the central question is not without importance. Patrocleas points to the slowness and delay of the god (τοῦ δαιμονίου) in his punishment of the wicked. This may suggest that the actual punishment is not the work of the highest God but of daimones, and a few other passages seem to corroborate this suggestion (552F and 555D; cf. 567C in the eschatological myth). Yet things are far more complicated. Olympichus returns to Patrocleas’ problem and points out the tardiness and delay of the divine (τοῦ θείου) (549B). The impersonal τὸ θεῖον also occurs in 557A, and ‘Plutarch’ connects τὰ θεῖα καὶ τὰ δαιμόνια at the beginning of his reply (549F). Furthermore, justified and useful punishment is associated throughout the work with God (ὁ θεός), who acts as a kind of doctor, curing the disease of wickedness (551B–C; 553A; 560B; 562D; cf. 550A; 562A–B). Sometimes, even the plural form (θεοί) occurs (550C), although usually in proverbial expressions or poetic quotations (549E; 556E; 562F; we may add 557E on the anger of the gods [αἱ τῶν θεῶν ὀργαί] – a notion that is diametrically opposed to Plutarch's Platonic view of the divine).

¹¹ Trans. Waterfield and Kidd 1992.

¹² This zetetic approach may help in explaining the difficult structure of the work. Plutarch's general argument in On the slowness of divine punishments is also analysed in detail in Opsomer 2016 and Frazier 2019. See also Helmig 2005, who underlines the ad hominem character of Plutarch's argument, and Baldassarri 1994 for the philosophical background of the discussion.

¹³ There are a few traces of a distinction between two levels in the divine realm (thus Donini 1992 and 2011b: 75–82; Dillon 2002: 226) but the importance of these passages should not be overemphasized (cf. Ferrari 2005a: 18–20; Thum 2013: 358–61). The basic distinction is that between gods and demons, for which see below, §4.

¹⁴ See esp. Massaro 1996; cf. Brouillette 2014: 105–13.

¹⁵ Nevertheless, Plutarch claims that it is in line with the common conceptions. All people, he argues, conceive God as blessed and incorruptible (De Is. et Os. 358E; cf. De sup. 165B). In Arist. 6.3, he lists incorruption, power, and virtue as the three distinctive characteristics of the divine; in De comm. not. 1075E, he lists immortality, blessedness, humanity, care, and beneficence (cf. De Stoic. rep. 1051F on Antipater's view of God).

¹⁶ See Roig Lanzillotta 2012 on Plutarch's polemic against Herodotus on this point.

¹⁷ See, e.g., De Is. et Os. 358F; De sera num. 557F; De sup. 170A–B (on erroneous convictions regarding Artemis and other Olympians), De Pyth. or. 402A (on a wrong representation of Apollo); also De Is. et Os. 378D and fr. 157.2.

¹⁸ See, e.g., Ziegler 1951: 826; Moellering 1963: 20; Klaerr in Defradas et al. 1985: 243–6.

¹⁹ See, e.g., De Is. et Os. 355C–D and 378A; Non posse 1101B–C; Cam. 6.6. See further Brenk 1977 and 1987b: 256.

²⁰ Moellering 1963: 106–47.

²¹ On Plutarch's inconsistencies, see esp. Nikolaidis 1991.

²² This also appears from more general discussions of Plutarch's approach towards religion, as in Brenk 1977 and Veyne 1999.

²³ See, e.g., De sup. 167E; De def. or. 414E and 426C; Ingenkamp 1984: 80 and 1985: 40–1; Opsomer 1998: 131–2.

²⁴ Van Nuffelen 2011: 48–71.

²⁵ Fr. 157.1; on this fragment, see Van Nuffelen 2011: 50–5; Scannapieco 2012. See also De Is. et Os. 378F–379D; De E 385A; Amatorius 763C.

²⁶ Cf. Hirsch-Luipold 2002 and 2005a: 144–52.

²⁷ Cam. 21.3; Aem. 3.3; Cor. 25.7; Num. 22.11.

²⁸ Plutarch's demonology has often been discussed in scholarly literature. Seminal contributions are Soury 1942; Moellering 1963: 119–38; Brenk 1973, 1977, and 1987b: 275–94; Dillon 1977: 216–24; Froidefond 1987: 205–8; Vernière 1989; Van Nuffelen 2011: 164–7; Timotin 2012: 164–201 and 244–59.

²⁹ The locus classicus is Cleombrotus’ view in De def. or. 414F–415A and 417E–418C; see also De Is. et Os. 360D–363D. The chthonic gods can also be understood from this perspective; see Van der Stockt 2005.

³⁰ Cf. Moles 2017: 314–27; Mossman 2019.

³¹ See Brenk 1973: 3–5; 1977: 62–3; 1987b: 277 and 281–2; Van Nuffelen 2011: 166.

³² Cleombrotus’ explanation is never rejected in In the obsolescence of oracles (see Babut 1992: 216–20 and Brouillette 2014: 156–68). On the demonological interpretation of On Isis and Osiris, see Roskam 2017c: 207–11.

³³ This has entailed much scholarly discussion about the unity of the work; see, e.g., Riley 1977; Babut 1984; Barigazzi 1988; Georgiadou 1995; Brenk 1996; Effe 2008; Bonazzi 2020. Excellent studies of On Socrates’ divine sign include Corlu 1970; Nesselrath 2010; Donini 2017.

³⁴ Simmias’ theory is discussed in detail by Long 2006; see also Corlu 1970: 53–60 and Döring 1984.

³⁵ The name actually stems from Plutarch himself; De E 384E. These works have received much scholarly attention. Apart from the studies mentioned in the next notes, see esp. the seminal article of Babut 1992 on the thematic unity and structure of these works. A comprehensive philosophical interpretation can be found in Brouillette 2014. Simonetti 2017 examines the issue of oracular divination in these works.

³⁶ The best starting point for a study of the dialogue are the recent commentary of Obsieger 2013 and the outstanding study of Thum 2013; see also Moreschini 1997 and Boulogne et al. 2006.

³⁷ This claim needs a detailed interpretation of the different steps in Ammonius’ argumentation, which is beyond the scope of this book. Chapter 19 is entirely about being; in the next chapter, Ammonius turns to the god (ὁ θεός; 393A). From that moment on, the two perspectives alternate without, however, merging into one single point of view. On 393A (εἷς ὤν), see Obsieger 2013: 346 and Thum 2013: 249–55.

³⁸ Every reader of That the Pythia… will benefit from the thorough commentary of Schröder 1990; cf. also Valgiglio 1992b.

³⁹ The philosophical background of the theory is disputed: Schröder 1990: 25–59 and 1994–5 traces it back to Stoic philosophy, Holzhausen 1993 and Simonetti 2017 to Plato's Timaeus.

⁴⁰ This dialogue is the least studied of the three Pythian dialogues, although that does not mean that it is understudied. A good point of departure is the detailed commentary by Rescigno 1995.

⁴¹ Trans. Russell 1993a.

⁴² See Graf 1996 on Roman religion. For Plutarch's view of the Jews, see, e.g., Feldman 1996; Brenk 1997: 100–4; Muñoz Gallarte 2008; Geiger 2010. On the figure of the Scythian sage Anacharsis in Plutarch, see Leão 2019a.

⁴³ On Clea, see Puech 1992: 4842–3 (with previous literature).

⁴⁴ Much material that is indispensable for a correct understanding of the work is collected in the commentaries by Hopfner 1941 and Griffiths 1970, and in the important monograph by Hani 1976. Interesting new insights are reached in the interdisciplinary edited volume Erler and Stadler 2017. See also Richter 2001; Petrucci 2016a and 2016b.

⁴⁵ Analysed in Roskam 2014b.

⁴⁶ The qualification ‘barbarian’ usually implies a negative evaluation (as in this phrase too); see esp. the detailed study of Schmidt 1999; cf. Nikolaidis 1986. Yet Plutarch also recognizes instances of barbarian wisdom, the case of On Isis and Osiris being the most obvious example (next to the lost Barbarian questions); see Schmidt 1999: 258–62.

⁴⁷ Such imagery from mystery cults often occurs in Plutarch's writings; see esp. Pérez Jiménez and Casadesús Bordoy 2001. We may recall that Plutarch and his wife were initiated into the mysteries of Dionysus (Cons. ad ux. 611D).

⁴⁸ See Strobach 1997: 116–36 for Plutarch's etymological explanations of Egyptian words (122–4 on Isis).

⁴⁹ See Richter 2001 and Roskam 2004b.

⁵⁰ See also Plutarch's frequent use of the Egyptian tradition in the Table Talk; Meeusen 2017.

⁵¹ See the lengthy list in Valgiglio 1988: 131–271. See also Burkert 1996 and Sfameni Gasparro 1996.

⁵² Much material is to be found in López Férez 2007.

⁵³ De Is. et Os. 381E; see Brenk 2007 and Harrison and Francis 2008: 796–7.

⁵⁴ De sera num. 550A; Quaest. conv. 618B; De facie 927B; De comm. not. 1065E; cf. Praec. ger. reip. 807C. The Pindar quote is part of a cluster of recurrent material, as shown by Van der Stockt 2002.

⁵⁵ See esp. Boulet 2008 and Nikolaidis 2009, and the literature dealing with On the E at Delphi quoted above, n. 36.

⁵⁶ Ferrari 1995: 38–68 and 2010: 71 and 86 even argues that the dialogue is programmatic for Plutarch's philosophy as a whole.

⁵⁷ Dillon 2002: 225 n. 8: ‘The dialogue is, admittedly, concerned with Apollo, but this is still odd’; Brenk 2005: 41: ‘Apollo(n) is not the logical name a Platonic philosopher would use for the highest God.’

⁵⁸ See esp. Thum 2013. Obsieger 2013: 38–46 underscores the playful aspect of Ammonius’ speech, but at the same time underestimates its genuine zetetic aspect.

⁵⁹ Cf. Brenk 2012: 84: ‘If Plutarch really believed the One were so important, we would expect it to figure large in his other writings, and especially in his allegorical interpretation of On Isis and Osiris.’

⁶⁰ Ammonius touches upon Apollo's role as oracular god at the beginning of the dialogue (De E 385B) but it does not constitute a part of his own metaphysical interpretation. Another aspect that is ignored (by Ammonius and by Plutarch in the rest of his oeuvre) is Apollo's role as an archer; see Nikolaidis 2009: 569.

⁶¹ Thus Bonazzi 2008. Cf. Thum 2013: 77–9 (on De E 385B) and 58–9 (on De def. or. 426E–F).

⁶² Görgemanns 2005: 186.

⁶³ Cf. De E 386B; De def. or. 434F–435A; De lat. viv. 1130A.

⁶⁴ See 282B–C; 372A; 372D; 393C–D; 400D; 416D; 433D–E; 764D–E; 780F; 781F; 944E. On this topic, see Hirsch-Luipold 2002: 165–8; Roskam 2006; Brouillette 2010 and 2014: 113–25.

⁶⁵ Flacelière 1943: 109–11 and 1974; Valgiglio 1988: 74–5; Burkert 1996: 21; Sfameni Gasparro 1996: 188; Hirsch-Luipold 2002: 11, 2005b: 1–2, and 2014: 167. Contra, however, Russell 1972: 83; Brenk 1977: 91 n. 7; Moreschini 1996: 41; Frazier 2019.

⁶⁶ Rose 1924: 61.

⁶⁷ Boulogne 2004: 104.

⁶⁸ Hirsch-Luipold 2014: 168; cf. 2005: 154 (inclusive monotheism).

⁶⁹ Roskam 1999a.

⁷⁰ Cf. De def. or. 415B–C and Rom. 28.10. On Plutarch's thinking about the destination of the soul, see further Brenk 1994.