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II. Looking for the Truth: Plutarch as an Open-Minded Platonist
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 September 2021
Extract
Plutarch saw himself primarily as a philosopher, standing in the long Academic tradition that could be followed back to the ‘divine’ Plato (De cap. ex inim. 90C; Per. 8.2). But when he took his first steps as a philosopher, Plato's works had been (re)read and interpreted for several centuries. As a result, Plutarch had to acquaint himself with a rich exegetical tradition that would shape the lens through which he read Plato and would turn his attention to specific dialogues. For some Platonic dialogues had during this time received a privileged position. In particular, the Timaeus was intensively studied, which led to heated discussions about the correct interpretation of specific passages. A detailed exegesis of this dialogue, complemented with material carefully selected from a few other dialogues, yielded a few Platonic ‘core doctrines’. Many Platonists, for instance, endorsed three fundamental principles, viz. God, matter, and the Forms (the so-called Dreiprinzipienlehre). These Forms were often regarded as the thoughts of God, and the final end of life (the τέλος) was nearly always defined as an assimilation to God (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ) – as far as possible (κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν) – on the basis of a celebrated passage from the Theaetetus (176b1). Such doctrines found their way into school handbooks (like Alcinous’ Didaskalikos or Apuleius’ De Platone), which provided the reader with a systematized Plato. Inconsistencies in Plato's works were explained away, obscure passages were clarified, and later insights (including Peripatetic and Stoic doctrines) were used to reconstruct a coherent Platonic philosophy.
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References
1 Good overviews can be found in Baltes 1976–8 and Ferrari 2001b. For the Middle Platonist commentaries on Plato's Dialogues, see also Petrucci 2018a.
2 Excellent discussions of Plutarch's exegetical methods are Ferrari 2001a and 2004; Bréchet 2010–11.
3 See the seminal study of Glucker 1978; see also Nikolaidis 1999.
4 Discussions of Plutarch's Platonism include R. Jones 1916; Dörrie 1969 and 1971; Dillon 1977, 1988, and 2014; Froidefond 1987; Ferrari 1995 and 2004; Opsomer 1998, 2005, and 2007a; Bonazzi 2003: 213–40; Brouillette and Giavatto 2010; Donini 2011a; Boys-Stones 2018 (passim).
5 Opsomer 2007b. On Plutarch's dualism, see, e.g., Bianchi 1987; Alt 1993; Chlup 2000; Hirsch-Luipold 2002: 203–11; Almagor 2013.
6 The precise relation between Demiurge and Forms remains unclear. Plutarch may have discussed it in his lost work ‘Where are the Forms’ (Lamprias catalogue 67). On his view of the Forms, see further Schoppe 1994 and Ferrari 1995: 29–34.
7 On Plutarch's position regarding providence, see, e.g., Opsomer 1997; Frazier and Leão 2010.
8 The locus classicus is De def. or. 435F–437E. See further Donini 2011a: 341–58; Ferrari 2015; Meeusen 2016: 258–78.
9 Opsomer 2015.
10 See esp. the important study of Hirsch-Luipold 2002.
11 Opsomer 1994; Ferrari 2007–8; Castelnérac 2007; Roig Lanzillotta 2015.
12 This can be seen in different domains; see Demulder 2018.
13 See esp. Becchi 1996; see also below, Chapter VII.
14 Donini 2011a: 396 and 359–73; Bonazzi 2003: 237–40; Opsomer 2005: 176; Brouillette and Giavatto 2010: 3.
15 See Brouillette and Giavatto 2010: 9–25 for a typology of Plutarch's quotations from Plato. A list of quotations can be found in Helmbold and O'Neil 1959 (though not all items listed there are equally relevant) and in Giavatto 2010b. For Plutarch's reception of the Timaeus, see Chapter II, §3.1; for the Laws, see Demulder 2017; for the Phaedrus, see Billault 1999; for the Phaedo, see Roskam 2015b.
16 Dillon 1999.
17 For the importance of the so-called New Academy of Arcesilaus and Carneades in Plutarch's thinking, see esp. Opsomer 1998 and Bonazzi 2003: 213–40. See also Ferrari 2005b; Shiffman 2010; Bonazzi 2014.
18 The Lamprias catalogue is an ancient list of Plutarch's works. It is presented as a list compiled by Plutarch's son Lamprias, but, as far as we know, none of Plutarch's children was called Lamprias. The list is not entirely reliable (it does not contain all works and also includes some spuria), yet it remains a precious source of information for the titles of several lost books.
19 Plutarch's attitude towards Aristotle is a much discussed topic: see, e.g., Sandbach 1982; Babut 1996; Ferrari 1999b; Donini 2004 and 2011a: 327–39; Karamanolis 2006; Roskam 2011b; Becchi 2014.
20 See esp. Roig Lanzillotta and Muñoz Gallarte 2012; also Roig Lanzillotta 2011 on gnosticism and Boulogne 2008 on hermetism.
21 Cf. Hirsch-Luipold 2002: 288: ‘Eine Interpretation der Schriften Plutarchs, die seine Bilder nicht berücksichtigt oder den bildhaften Charakter insgesamt übersieht, wird der Intention des Autors nicht gerecht und ist deshalb methodisch problematisch’ (‘An interpretation of Plutarch's writings that does not take into account his images or entirely overlooks the expressive character, fails to do justice to the author's intention and is thus methodologically problematic’).
22 On the importance of zetetic thinking in Plutarch, see, e.g., Opsomer 1998: 189 and 191; Bonazzi 2008; Shiffman 2010: 260–1; Kechagia 2011a: 80 and 93–104; Roskam 2017c: 200–3.
23 See Giavatto 2010a for a recent discussion of this question.
24 See, e.g., Opsomer 1996: 83 and 1998: 203; Meeusen 2016: 88–9.
25 Cf. Opsomer 2010.
26 I argue this for De Is. et Os. in Roskam 2017c and for De genio Socr. in Roskam 2013.
27 Cf. Müller 2012.
28 See, e.g., Van der Stockt 2000a; see also Stadter 1999.
29 See Donini 2011a: 403–22 and 2017: 17–38 and 46–59.
30 Here as elsewhere, I use ‘Plutarch’ to refer to the character in the dialogue, as distinct from the author Plutarch.
31 See, e.g., Sept. sap. conv. 149B; De def. or. 413D; De sera num. 548A–B; Non posse 1086E; Flacelière 1959: 210; Zacher 1982: 19.
32 Cf. Ferrari 1995: 29–34; Brenk 2009 and 2016; Thum 2013: 27–36; Brouillette 2014: 33–5.
33 See, e.g., Babut 1988: 393–408 on Galaxidorus; Babut 1992: 216–20 and Moreschini 1996: 41 on Cleombrotus; and Roskam 2013 on Theocritus.
34 On Plutarch's myths, see esp. Vernière 1977 and Frazier 2019; cf. also R. Jones 1916: 40–67; Ingenkamp 2001; Deuse 2010; Hirsch-Luipold 2014. On his view of myth, see Hardie 1992; Hirsch-Luipold 2002: 138–44.
35 Trans. Waterfield and Kidd 1992. The passage, which is a salient example of Plutarch's erudite reception of several aspects of the philosophical, literary, and historical tradition, is discussed by Dumortier 1969; Brenk 1987a; and Zadorojnyi 1997. See also Frazer 1971 and Alt 1993: 126.
36 On the similarities and differences of Plutarch's myths with other (ancient and modern) testimonies of near-death experiences, see Muñoz Gallarte 2019.
37 Cf. Hirsch-Luipold 2014: 174.
38 On this work, see esp. Thévenaz 1938; Cherniss 1976; Ferrari and Baldi 2002; Opsomer 2004. Short introductions can also be found in Hershbell 1987 and Ferrari 2001a: 267–72.
39 The first to propose this interpretation was Grube 1932; see also Cornford 1937: 59–66.
40 Note the use of the term διαμαρτάνειν (‘to be utterly mistaken’; a strengthened form of the simplex ἁμαρτάνω) in 1013B and the phrase ἐκφανῶς δὲ τούτοις ἠγνόηται (‘they manifestly fail to understand’) in 1013D; see also 1013E.
41 Cherniss 1976: 139. See also Gioè 1996: 304; Ferrari 2001a: 276–8, 2002: 252–3, and 2004: 230.
42 Plutarch repeatedly says that they do not really need such a survey, since they are thoroughly familiar with the tradition; see 1012D and 1027A.
43 The second part of the treatise is even organized along the basic pattern of three zetemata (cf. 1027C).
44 See Ferrari and Baldi 2002: 240: ‘Plutarch thus seems perfectly aware of the epistemological limits of his argumentation; its subject – the physical world – does not permit the production of assertions that are provided with absolute certainty’ (‘Plut. sembra cioè perfettamente consapevole dei limiti epistemologici della sua dimostrazione, il cui oggetto, il mondo fisico, non consente di produrre asserzioni dotate di certezza assoluta’).
45 See esp. Opsomer 2004.
46 See Opsomer 2004: 159–61 for a strong case that the reading αὐτήν antedates Plutarch and was already in Xenocrates’ text; further evidence is presented in Opsomer 2020. If this is true, it has far-reaching implications, not only for our understanding and evaluation of Plutarch's view but also for the interpretation of Plato's Timaeus. For if Xenocrates’ text already had αὐτήν, this reading can no longer be easily dismissed as a later distortion influenced by Plutarch's philosophical views. Xenocrates could indeed have used the copy of the Timaeus that was available in the library of the Academy and his text is much closer to the original than the reading αὐτῶν (which may itself result from Proclus’ tampering with the text). An enquiry into the implications of all this for our understanding of Plato's Timaeus is far beyond the scope of this book, but it is a topic that would repay further study.
47 See esp. Dillon 1989; Whittaker 1989; Gioè 1996; Petrucci 2018b; cf. Ferrari 2001b: 540–1. A thorough discussion of the difference between Plato's text and that of Plutarch can be found in Ferrari 1999a.
48 In Quaest. Plat. 1006D, Plutarch wonders whether we should change the word χρόνου (‘of time’; as in Tim. 42d5) into χρόνῳ (‘in time’).
49 See Petrucci 2018b on the method and criteria of Taurus’ ideological text emendations.
50 The standard study of Plutarch's attitude towards the Stoics remains the monumental work of Babut 1969b. Shorter useful surveys can be found in Hershbell 1992b; Opsomer 2014; and Hirsch-Luipold 2016. See also Babut 1969a and Ingenkamp 1999 (on De virt. mor.); Babut 1993 (on the Delphic dialogues); Opsomer 2006 (on De E); Roskam 2005b: 224–47 (on De prof. in virt.).
51 Apart from the extant works, see also Lamprias catalogue 59, 78, 148, 149, 152, and 154.
52 See esp. Casevitz and Babut 2004; also Baldassarri 1976a; Boys-Stones 1997b and 1998; Weisser 2016.
53 See Casevitz and Babut 2002; cf. Baldassarri 1976b. Plutarch's notion of κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, however, differs from what the Stoics understood by it; see, e.g., Obbink 1992; Brittain 2005.
54 See esp. the general survey of Boulogne 2003; also Flacelière 1959; Hershbell 1992a; Kechagia 2014. See also Westman 1987 (on Quaest. conv. 673C–674C); Roskam 2011c (on De am. prol.); and Horky 2017: 121–30 (on Gryllus). Several of Plutarch's anti-Epicurean polemics have been lost: see Lamprias catalogue 80, 129, 133, 143, 148, and 159.
55 Good studies of Against Colotes in defence of the other philosophers are Westman 1955; Kechagia 2011b; and Corti 2014. See also the collection of studies in Morel 2013.
56 On this work, see esp. Adam 1974; Zacher 1982; and Albini 1993. A detailed reading of the programmatic introduction to That it is not even possible… can be found in Roskam 2017a. Warren 2011 shows the Platonic bias of Plutarch's argument.
57 See esp. Berner et al. 2000; Roskam 2007a.
58 Cf. Horky 2017: 125.
59 It is quoted in Non posse 1098C–D and 1100D, and in Adv. Col. 1125D. The fragment (fr. 41 K.) is discussed in Sedley 1976: 129–32 and Roskam 2007b: 72–3.
60 De Stoic. rep. 1038F–1039A; De comm. not. 1060E–F (= SVF 3.211–12). See Algra 1990; Casevitz and Babut 2004: 158–62.
61 Cf. Non posse 1087D (χρησώμεθα τοῖς διδομένοις ὑπ᾿ αὐτῶν; ‘let us make use of what they offer us’).
62 See Algra 2014 on Plutarch's anti-Stoic attacks and Warren 2011 on the anti-Epicurean arguments. See also Boys-Stones 1997b and Ingenkamp 1999 on the anti-Stoic polemics as promotion for Plutarch's own Platonic philosophy.
63 Cf. Babut 1998.
64 On the latter argument, see Carter 2018.