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Clark Glymour, The Mind's Arrows: Bayes Nets and Graphical Causal Models in Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2001), 240 pp., $30.00 (cloth).

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Charles Twardy
Charles Twardy*
Affiliation:
Monash University
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Type
Book Review
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 3 , July 2005 , pp. 494 - 498
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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