Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
In this article, I discuss calls for access to empirical data within controversies about climate science, as revealed and highlighted by the publication of the e-mail correspondence involving scientists at the Climatic Research Unit at the University of East Anglia in 2009. I identify several arguments advanced for and against the sharing of scientific data. My conclusions are that, whereas transparency in science is to be valued, appeals to an unproblematic category of ‘empirical data’ in climate science do not reflect the complexities of scientific practice in this field.
I presented a previous version of this article in the symposium “The CRU E-Mails: Perspectives from Philosophy of Science,” 22nd Biennial Meeting, Philosophy of Science Association, Montreal, November 2010. I thank the chair, Kathleen Okruhlik; the other speakers, Naomi Oreskes, Wendy S. Parker (whose later helpful comments I also gratefully acknowledge), and Kristin Shrader-Frechette; and the audience for a stimulating and enjoyable session.