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Extrascientific Uses of Physics: The Case of Nonlinear Dynamics and Legal Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Stephen H. Kellert
Stephen H. Kellert*
Affiliation:
Hamline University
*
†Send requests for reprints to Box #173, Hamline University, 1536 Hewitt Avenue, St. Paul, MN 55104; email: skellert@gw.hamline.edu.
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Abstract

This essay explores the metaphorical use of the area of nonlinear dynamics popularly known as “chaos theory,” surveying its use in one particular field: legal theory. After sketching some of the mistakes encountered in these efforts, I outline the possibility of the fruitful use of nonlinear dynamics for thinking about our legal system. I then offer some general lessons to be drawn from these examples—both cautionary maxims and a limited defense of cross-disciplinary borrowing. I conclude with some reflections on the nature of arguments that seek to establish intellectual authority or epistemic merit by analogical reasoning.

Type
Theories, Models and Analogies
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 68 , Issue S3: No. 3 Supplement: Proceedings of the 2000 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers Sep., 2001 , 2001 , pp. S455 - S466
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 2001

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Footnotes

‡

Thanks to Terry Kent, Eric Winsberg, Maxine Eichner, Susan Williams, and Jim Bonilla for their help with this essay.

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