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The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

David Christensen
David Christensen*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Vermont
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Abstract

The main appeal of the currently popular “bootstrap” account of confirmation developed by Clark Glymour is that it seems to provide an account of evidential relevance. This account has, however, had severe problems; and Glymour has revised his original account in an attempt to solve them. I argue that this attempt fails completely, and that any similar modifications must also fail. If the problems can be solved, it will only be by radical revisions which involve jettisoning bootstrapping's basic approach to theories. Finally, I argue that there is little reason to think that even such drastic modifications will lead to a satisfactory account of relevance.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 57 , Issue 4 , December 1990 , pp. 644 - 662
Copyright
Copyright © 1990 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

This paper benefited from discussions or correspondence with James R. Christensen, Clark Glymour, Thomas R. Grimes, Richard Healey, Arthur Kuflik, William E. Mann, and Derk Pereboom.

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